"A Frisky, Tiresome Colt?":Sir William Joynson-Hicks, the Home Office, and the "Roaring Twenties" 1924-1929 by Clayton, Huw Francis
"A Frisky, Tiresome Colt? " 
Sir William Joynson-Hicks, the Home Office and 
the "Roaring Twenties" 
1924-1929 
Huw F. Clayton 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for 
examination in the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, at the 
University of Wales, Aberystwyth (Aberystwyth 
University). 
October 2008 
Department of History and Welsh History 
University of Wales, Aberystwyth 
2008 
Summary. 
The late 1920s saw a major cultural clash between the standards of the avant- 
garde of the postwar generation, and the earlier morality of a largely elderly 
political, administrative and judicial elite. This has traditionally been portrayed 
as a fight between an out-of-touch minority trying to defend the discredited 
values of an older world against the new, improved culture of a different age. 
Particular criticism has been reserved for William Joynson-Hicks, Home 
Secretary for the period 1924-1929, a Puritanical Diehard Unionist who was 
accused of trying to impose his own morality on everyone else by police action. 
This thesis explores various aspects of the policing of morals - 
censorship of theatre, literature and film, and the efforts to enforce regulations 
on out-of-hours drinking and the taking of drugs, to discern whether there was a 
consistent pattern of censorship, and crucially, how far Joynson-Hicks himself 
was involved. It also examines two major police scandals that occurred in 1928 
in cases linked with these enforcement campaigns, and assesses how far 
pressure from the top was to blame for their occurrence. 
The evidence assembled calls into question some long-held assumptions 
- namely that Joynson-Hicks was a puritanical zealot who personally fought 
almost alone to enforce his standards through the law, and more importantly, 
how far the belief he was without popular support in his stance, or made Britain 
uniquely an island of reaction in a world giving way to the new culture, is 
accurate. It underlines the role the Civil Service played in all of these matters, 
and suggests Joynson-Hicks could be more pragmatic in his enforcement of the 
law than is popularly supposed. It ends with an attempt to explain why he 
earned his previous fearsome reputation, and asks whether the time is ripe for a 
reassessment of his career. 
ii 
"Quite exactly where post-war gaiety ended and pre-war 
political awareness began it is impossible to say, but it 
could have been on that June morning in 1932 when Jix 
(William Joynson-Hicks) died. He had seen the post- 
Armistice world as a frisky, tiresome colt which had only to 
be bridled and blinkered before it could be led back to a 
respectable stable. He had no humility and too much to 
say. " 
Ronald Blythe, The Age of Illusion. 
1 
Contents. 
Chapter Page 
List of abbreviations iii 
List of illustrations iii 
Acknowledgements v 
Introduction 1 
Part One: The Background 9 
1 "The Years that the Locust hath Eaten? " 
Britain in the 1920s 10 
2 Dropping bricks: the political career of Sir William 
Joynson-Hicks, 1st Viscount Brentford of Newick 39 
Part Two: Creative and Artistic Culture 84 
3 The Lord Chamberlain's Position 85 
4 Literature, Pornography and Obscenity 112 
5 A New Problem of Censorship: The film industry 
and the British Board of Film Censorship 153 
Part Three: Low Culture and High Living 185 
6 "A Good Word for DORA: " Night Club Culture 186 
7 "The Loathsome Trade: " Drugs and the Drug Trade 
in the 1920s 217 
8 The Problem of the Police 245 
Conclusion 282 
Bibliography 310 
11 
List of abbreviations used to denote archives in the footnotes. 
NA The National Archives, Kew, London 
BL The British Library, Euston Road, London 
List of illustrations. 
In-text illustrations: 
Figure Subject Page 
1 Sir William Joynson-Hicks 61 
2 Punch cartoon of Joynson-Hicks 61 
3 2nd Earl of Cromer 100 
4 Miles Malleson 100 
5 Radclyffe Hall 140 
6 D. H. Lawrence and Aldous Huxley 140 
7 Sir William Horwood 200 
8 Kathleen Meyrick 200 
9 Sir Malcolm Delevingne 234 
10 Brilliant Chang 234 
11 Lilian Wyles 259 
12 Leo Chiozza Money 259 
111 
Title and divisional page illustrations: 
Frontispiece: William Joynson-Hicks as a policeman throws various writers 
including D. H. Lawrence, James Joyce, George Bernard Shaw, Aldous Huxley 
and a "frank" woman novelist out of Hyde Park while Austen and Dickens look 
on in horror. It is noted that each is accompanied by "his literary inspiration, " to 
which Lawrence has added, by hand "except me, so I suppose I've got none! " 
Cartoon by David Low, Evening Standard, 26th February 1929, this version in 
Boulton, James T., et. al. (eds. ) The Letters of D. H. Lawrence Volume 7: 1928- 
1930 (Cambridge 1993) 
The Background: Joynson-Hicks informs the House of Commons, in reply to a 
question from William Wedgwood Benn (father of Tony Benn, later Viscount 
Stansgate) that "he certainly was not going to take the opinion of the House 
before exercising the powers conferred on him by the Emergency Act. " Punch 
cartoon, 23rd June 1926. 
Creative and Artistic Culture: Joynson-Hicks "fights" with a writer who tells 
him "hands off' literature, and points a fountain-pen at the Home Secretary in 
threatening fashion while a scantily-clad woman sitting on a much older man's 
shoulders looks on. Cartoon by Beresford Egan, in P. R. Stephenson and 
Beresford Egan, Policeman of the Lord: A Political Satire (London 1929). 
Low Culture and High Living: a female dancer in a nightclub raises a glass of 
champagne in a cheeky act of defiance to the advancing Joynson-Hicks, who 
raises his hands in horror. Cartoon by Beresford Egan, in P. R. Stephenson and 
Beresford Egan, Policeman of the Lord: A Political Satire (London 1929). 
iv 
Acknowledzements. 
After three years of work on this topic, there are a great many people to whom I 
owe special thanks. Professor W. D. Rubinstein agreed to let me continue my 
studies under him after my MA, gave me the original idea for this thesis and 
helped me to work on the detailed plan of it, and was always extremely efficient 
in returning work to me rapidly whenever he received it, always adorned with 
shrewd points and suggestions, without which completion of this work on time 
and within the word limit would have been extremely difficult, if not 
impossible. Dr. Richard Coopey was also very helpful and approachable as a 
second supervisor, and his own research on the rave culture of the 1960s also 
threw some interesting sidelights on this topic, especially chapter 7. Various 
members of staff in the Department of History and Welsh History also 
volunteered information of great value at crucial times - particular mention 
should be made of Richard Rathbone and Angela John, the Emeritus Professors, 
who were always supportive and were tireless in their efforts to help all the 
postgraduates, giving invaluable feedback on papers, suggestions on further 
reading and offering sage advice from their experience which I and many others 
benefited from. 
Professor John Charmley and Dr. Sian Nicholas, the examiners, were 
most helpful and made many useful suggestions for further reading and possible 
areas of extra research that have greatly improved this thesis in its final form, as 
well as holding a most interesting discussion in the viva that threw new light on 
some aspects of it (especially the importance of religion). I would also like to 
thank Dr. Paul O'Leary, the chair of the viva examination, who did a fine job in 
that capacity and also contributed some useful ideas towards the discussion 
himself from his own work on Irish history and Catholicism. 
Other lecturers who suggested possible fruitful lines of inquiry or who 
helped with the loan of books at crucial moments include Peter Lambert, Roger 
Price, Bjorn Weiler and Gerry Hughes (now of the Department of International 
Politics). The support staff of the Department of History and Welsh History, 
especially Awen Dafydd and, in her absence, Maureen Jones, were always on 
hand to deal with the paperwork or to sort out various crises which emerged 
V 
from time to time, and always did so with good grace. Among my fellow 
students, thanks are due especially to Stephanie Ward, an inspiration to the rest 
of us and the founder of the popular Postgraduate Research Seminar 
Programme, who generously allowed me many slots in which to test this thesis, 
invaluable for the airing of ideas to get feedback or suggestions. Owen Collins 
was the source of much useful information and a man whose unfailing wit could 
lift the lowest spirits. Simon Dunbar, my housemate for two years, who 
analysed the casualty figures of the Jallianwala Bagh (Amritsar) massacre for 
me to come up with an estimate of the dead and wounded used in chapter 2 and 
offered much useful technical support over computing issues I did not 
understand. Another student who deserves special mention is Daniel Gray of 
Roehampton University, who led me to several sources on Brilliant Chang 
without which much of chapter 7 simply could not have been written, or would 
have been at best groping in the dark on the basis of the few pieces of 
information I had. 
Much of this work - indeed, a great majority of it - was written in light 
of sources held in the National Archives at Kew. I am grateful to those staff, 
archival and security, who assisted me during my frequent visits, and who were 
never less than courteous and helpful. Dr. Matthew Stevens of the IHR proved a 
good friend at need, whose hospitality enabled me to avoid the seemingly 
endless merry-go-round of bed and breakfast accommodation I had endured 
before. The staff of the British Library in Euston Road were similarly courteous 
despite the difficulties they encountered (chapter 3). The staff of the National 
Portrait Gallery, in St. Martin's Place, London, were remarkably efficient, 
providing many of the illustrations that adorn this thesis in rapid time and also 
clarifying the copyright rules that applied to them with a speed that went far 
beyond the call of duty. David Fagg, of the Department of History and Welsh 
History, was kind enough to unearth several Punch cartoons of Joynson-Hicks 
that provided much amusement, as well as a further rich source of illustrations. 
The National Library of Wales and the Hugh Owen Library were the source of 
nearly all the books and articles that could be desired. An example of true 
generosity and devotion to duty was given by to Dr. Marianne Dacy, of the 
Australian Journal of Jewish Studies, who very kindly sent me copies of the 
articles that constitute the major debate on the anti-Semitism or otherwise of 
V1 
Joynson-Hicks in chapter 2 all the way from Sydney by air mail completely free 
of charge. 
Thanks are also due to those who had no direct input on this thesis. The 
congregation and choir of Holy Trinity Church, Aberystwyth tolerated the 
absences and preoccupation of their choirmaster (and the resultant wrong notes 
on the organ due to a lack of practice) with great good humour, and were a 
source of constant moral support in good times and bad, as well as insisting on 
paying me a wage that formed a welcome chunk of my income from their own 
by no means plentiful resources. Individuals who deserve particular mention 
include the Aveson family, Ian, Judith and John, always good friends, Tessa 
Briggs and Brian Stamps, my deputies as choirmaster at one time or another, 
and Jacqueline Harvey and Vera Morris, who assisted nobly in filling gaps on 
the organ rota towards the end of my three years as a PhD student. Borth Golf 
Club were good enough to let me work extremely flexible hours as barman to fit 
in with my studies, another valuable source of funds, and the Department of 
History and Welsh History, University of Wales Aberystwyth also found 
employment for me, as an examination supervisor and later, as a seminar tutor, 
work valuable not only for its financial assistance but also for the experience of 
teaching it gave me. 
My family, of course, have had a huge impact upon this thesis. Always 
there, and always willing to help in any way they could, and always 
encouraging of my work even when they did not quite understand it, thanks are 
due to my mother Jill, father Nick, sister Heather and brother-in-law Tom. 
However, the greatest thanks I could possibly owe are due to two other people. 
This project never secured funding, and therefore would have been impossible 
even to contemplate without money given to me by my paternal grandparents - 
many thousands of pounds, given with no thought of reward or return other than 
that I should be able to complete my studies. They were also unfailing in their 
assurance that I should do what I felt was right for me, and go as far as I 
possibly could along my chosen path. Their kindness, generosity and love was 
an inspiration, and it is a source of sadness to me that both of them died before 
this work was completed - my grandfather in 2002, and my grandmother in 
November 2007. 
It is to their memory, with love and respect, that this thesis is dedicated. 
vi' 
Introduction. 
"He [Joynson-Hicks] saw the 1920s as a frisky, tiresome colt 
that needed only to be saddled and bridled before it could be 
led back to a respectable stable. He had no humility and too 
much to say. " 
Ronald Blythe, The Age of Illusion. 1 
This is a study of manners and morals in Britain in the 1920s, especially in 
London. It tells the story of a generation recovering from the deadliest war ever 
fought up to that time pushing moral boundaries, and a generation who grew up 
long before the war struggling to cope with them. Most importantly, it explores 
the reasons behind various flashpoints that arose in the course of the decade, 
from what has typically been regarded as the "wrong" side - the side of the 
government and of the "reactionary" elements that were trying to impose their 
own standards upon this new generation. 
It is also, despite the apparent paradox, very largely the story of one 
man, the man in the title. William Joynson-Hicks, long-serving and 
controversial Home Secretary between 1924 and 1929, became something of a 
hate figure for the standard bearers of new culture. He was a personal Puritan, a 
lifelong teetotaller, an Evangelical Christian (within the Anglican church) noted 
for his wild flights of rhetoric and Victorian attire -a Victorianism that has 
been extended to include his attitude towards the hedonistic zeitgeist of the 
1920s. A very large part of this thesis is devoted to examining his role in the 
course of events, and to considering whether the storm of criticism that burst 
over him was justified, either wholly or in part. 
The structure of this thesis is simple, dividing neatly into chapters on a 
series of mini-topics. Individual topics are discussed in the chapters below 
(there are eight of them). For ease of reading, the thesis is further divided into 
1 Ronald Blythe, The Age of Illusion: England in the Twenties and Thirties 
1918-1940 (London 1963,2001) p. 42 2 Joynson-Hicks was usually referred to as "Jix" for short, by press, public and 
colleagues. However, I have preferred to call him by his full name except where 
I am quoting directly from an original source that uses it (for example, his 
official biography by H. A. Taylor, Jix: Viscount Brentford (London 1933)). 
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three parts. The first part consists of two chapters, containing background 
information. The first chapter offers a short overview of the 1920s through the 
literature on the decade, as it has changed and evolved over the decades, but 
concentrating particularly on recent cultural studies in the fields of politics, 
religion and society in the 1920s. The second chapter offers a detailed overview 
of Joynson-Hicks' own career. This was necessary because there are only three 
detailed studies of him available. One, his official biography by H. A. Taylor, 
was written very shortly after he died seventy-six years ago, and therefore lacks 
the broader historical perspective on his own times that would have made it into 
a truly definitive account. A second, by Ronald Blythe in his book The Age of 
Illusion, would not have rated even a mention had there been a more substantial 
scholarly literature on the subject, apart from one extremely important insight 
which is discussed in the conclusion. It amounts to a scurrilous and sometimes 
wildly inaccurate character assassination, as part of its overall aim of portraying 
interwar Britain as a society living in denial of its problems and the outside 
threats it faced. A third - by the far the best of the three - was written by 
Jonathan Hopkins. However, his excellent MPhil thesis (for which he had, 
uniquely, access to Joynson-Hicks' personal papers) is only available at the 
University of Westminster Regent's Park Campus library. This is something of 
a loss to scholarship, because Hopkins' shrewd work, while comparatively 
short, offered a balanced perspective and several crucial insights - particularly 
on the question of women's suffrage and Joynson-Hicks' role in getting women 
the vote (something so at odds with his reputation as a Diehard Tory that a myth 
has grown up, fostered by Churchill, that he became the champion of women's 
suffrage due to an absent-minded commitment given to the House of Commons) 
which is were Hopkins' real interest in the subject lay. Drawing on these, and a 
variety of other biographies and sources, I have endeavoured to summarise 
Joynson-Hicks' career and present a skeleton of the facts that are not in dispute. 
The second part concerns censorship in literature; plays, novels, poetry 
and film. It also briefly discusses censorship of art due to the crossover of one 
of the personalities involved (D. H. Lawrence was both a writer and an 
3 Jonathon M. Hopkins, "Paradoxes personified: Sir William Joynson-Hicks, 
Viscount Brentford and the conflict between change and stability in British 
society in the 1920s, " University of Westminster MPhil thesis (1996) 
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exhibited painter). The first chapter of this part (chapter three) deals with theatre 
censorship. This topic has already been written on extensively by, among 
others, John Johnston (a former censor) Steve Nicholson (a former actor, now 
an academic) and Nicholas de Jongh (a theatre critic). However, the theatre 
censorship system was the only formal, government-sponsored system of 
censorship operating in Britain at this time. It was also frequently used as a 
reference-point for what was and was not acceptable in the cultural sphere, and 
was also used as a model for an unofficial system of film censorship set up in 
1912 and granted quasi-formal status after the First World War. Understanding 
the mechanics and nuances of the system is thus essential for understanding of 
the mindset of those who acted as censors in any capacity in Britain. I have also 
utilised several other sources - including Home Office papers at the National 
Archives - to elaborate on the relationship between the Home Office and the 
Lord Chamberlain (the official censor) and particularly that between Joynson- 
Hicks and the Lord Chamberlain during his tenure, the Earl of Cromer. 
Chapter four deals with the censorship of books in the 1920s. This was 
perhaps the thorniest and most controversial area covered in this thesis, and as 
such has also had a substantial literature produced on it, of varying scale and 
quality. This chapter concentrates heavily on the case of The Well of Loneliness, 
a book about lesbian relationships, which was ordered to be destroyed by a Bow 
Street Magistrate in a storm of publicity after a long campaign that left the 
reputation of the book's publisher in tatters and saw the Home Office take the 
law on obscene literature right to its limits. There is a substantial file on the 
subject at the National Archives, released to Diana Souhami for her biography 
of the author (Radclyffe Hall). However, this chapter also deals with the 
troubles D. H. Lawrence had over a book of crude poems called Pansies and 
over a series of paintings that a friend of his exhibited (against Lawrence's own 
better judgement). Regrettably, due to the destruction of the relevant files, it has 
not been possible to look in detail at two other potentially interesting cases of 
suppression; Sleeveless Errand, a novel by Norah James about decadent youths 
which was banned for containing a lot of swearing, and Lawrence's last novel, 
Lady Chatterley's Lover, thirty years later the subject of a famous ruling under a 
new Obscene Publications Act. This chapter also examines continuity of policy 
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on this subject under Joynson-Hicks' successor, former Labour leader J. R. 
Clynes. 
Chapter five deals with the subject of film censorship in Britain, which 
faced difficult times over these five years, especially over the introduction of 
sound. It traces the introduction of the system of censorship - which, unlike the 
Lord Chamberlain's office which it consciously, even conscientiously copied, 
was entirely voluntary and could not be enforced by legal sanction - its gradual 
acceptance and the formation of a system that survives with remarkably few 
modifications right down to the time of writing. It traces the role of the Home 
Office in this process, and its own reaction to a system of censorship nominally 
outside its control but in practice very anxious to please those in authority. It 
also considers why the Home Office was at no point proactive in the 1920s in 
trying to force the British Board of Film Censors (BBFC) under its control 4 It 
discusses the censorship of Russian propaganda films more than films over 
which moral questions were raised, largely due to the fact that in the latter area 
the Home Office was content to leave most of the enforcement to the BBFC, 
while in the former area it took an active interest. 
The third part moves from high culture to what might be considered 
lifestyle or "low" culture - in this case, nightclubs and drug-taking. Chapter six 
discusses nightclubs, against which Joynson-Hicks waged a relentless campaign 
in his period in office without the slightest regard for the fact that the nightclubs 
of London's West End were frequented by the wealthy and powerful (which, 
given the very high prices nightclubs charged, was not surprising). They had 
emerged as an unanticipated by-product of the Defence of the Realm Acts 
(D. O. R. A. ) of the First World War, which restricted opening hours for premises 
licensed to sell alcohol, and were thus a new problem in the 1920s. Finding 
secondary sources of any merit at all on this subject was difficult, and from that 
point of view the chapter breaks new ground by looking in detail at the attitude 
4 There had been a previous attempt to do so in 1916, which foundered upon the 
logistical difficulties of either getting legislation in wartime or proceeding 
without it when each individual local authority would have to be persuaded to 
waive their statutory powers on the subject. The argument was rendered 
academic when the Home Secretary sponsoring the bill (Herbert Samuel) left 
office on the fall of Asquith and it was shelved by his successor. See below pp. 
154-155. 
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of the Home Office (and, particularly, the Home Secretary) towards them and 
the lengths to which they were obliged to go in order to gain the necessary 
evidence for a prosecution of the nightclubs under the relevant legislation 
(which actually remained a modified form of D. O. R. A. ). 
Chapter seven covers much the same ground as chapter six, 
concentrating on drug law rather than drink law. This was also an unintended 
side-effect of D. O. RA., and one which was only pursued briefly in the 1920s 
before a less punitive approach to enforcement, concentrating on treatment of 
the addict rather than punishment, was adopted. There is an extensive literature 
on this, led by Virginia Berridge's substantial oeuvre, and accompanied by the 
work of (among others) Marek Kohn. However, the role of the Home Secretary 
is of interest, and has not been covered in any depth, most previous studies 
choosing instead to focus on role of the civil servant charged with monitoring 
drug use, Malcolm Delevingne. This is partly because, as I shall explain, 
Joynson-Hicks took virtually no interest in this area, calling into question at 
least part of his image as a censor of all morals. 
Chapter eight breaks from this mould of moral policing to look instead 
at the impact of policing morals on the police themselves. It concentrates 
heavily on two major scandals. The first, in 1928, involved the inappropriate 
interrogation of a young girl, Irene Savidge, by two male officers after she had 
been arrested along with an older man and former Liberal minister (Sir Leo 
Chiozza Money) in Hyde Park on a charge of offending against public decency 
(specifically, committing a sex act). The resultant outcry against the police led 
to a major public inquiry which entered a majority and minority reports - the 
majority report dismissing the allegations against the police but recommending 
minor changes, the minority report upholding the complaint and recommending 
major procedural changes. The second scandal, also in 1928, concerned the 
activities of Sergeant George Goddard, who was found to have taken substantial 
bribes from nightclub owners in order either to block police raids against them 
or to tip them off when raids were about to occur. The scandals were linked in 
the press and in Parliament with Joynson-Hicks, specifically his Puritanical zeal 
to clean up London, and nearly forced his resignation. They are therefore an 
interesting and useful addition to this thesis, while not strictly speaking part of 
the main argument. 
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The conclusion draws all of this together and analyses it. It also sets the 
social campaigns of the 1920s in their broader context - both against other, 
similar campaigns by other Home Secretaries and across national boundaries, 
drawing comparisons with America, France and Weimar Germany. It also 
attempts to explain why particular opprobrium has been reserved for Joynson- 
Hicks, disallowing the conventional explanation that he was a tyrannical lunatic 
who launched a unique reign of terror in London as inconsistent with the 
evidence, and offering instead a more plausible explanation which covers all the 
points raised in this thesis. 
It will be noted from the above that there are gaps in this point of 
comparison. Ideally, this thesis would also have discussed three further aspects 
of moral policing; visual arts, the enforcement of the Sexual Offences Act, and 
prostitution. There are however good reasons why they are not covered. The 
first is that of sheer space. In order to do any sort of justice to the topics 
covered, it was necessary to write upwards of 10,000 words on each. Allowing 
for a further 30,000 words to be written on Joynson-Hicks, and to cover an 
introduction and conclusion, that left at most seven (rather six, to be on the safe 
side) topics that could be covered. I selected the six in this thesis as the ones 
which were either new phenomena in the 1920s (nightclubs/drug 
regulations/film censorship) or showed the strongest links to Joynson-Hicks 
personally (literature, nightclubs again, the police) or were indispensable to a 
study of this sort because they offered the only formal point of comparison to 
something else (theatre). 
Individually, there were also strong arguments against including these 
three topics. The first is the extent of other literature readily available on two of 
them. Matt Houlbrook's immense recent work Queer London: Perils and 
Pleasures in the Sexual Metropolis 1918-1957 (Chicago 2005) offers an 
accessible, cogent and extremely thorough dissection of both the homosexual 
underworld in London in this period (and long after) as well as offering a 
similarly lucid account of the police efforts to suppress its To duplicate this 
work, when space was already at a premium, seemed to be rather pointless. As 
far as prostitution goes, some aspects of it are any case covered by the chapter 
51 am grateful to Dr. Bjorn Weiler for drawing my attention to this book. 
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on the Savidge inquiry. For the rest, Stefan Slater is currently working on a 
thesis about the policing of prostitution in interwar Soho at Royal Holloway's 
Bedford Centre for Women's History, and again it seemed unnecessary to 
duplicate his work. While both these arguments could have been made with 
justice for theatre or film censorship, or even literary censorship, nobody has 
considered in depth the role of the Home Secretary in the last two, while the 
first is necessary in order to discuss them with any sort of perspective. The last 
three therefore hung together as a unit, while the first two, despite the obvious 
attractions of including them, were not central to this particular thesis. 
As far as visual art (by which I mean painting, sculpture or photography) 
is concerned, I would have liked to put it in. There were many important 
developments in art in this period, led by the great sculptor Jacob Epstein (who 
was also a painter) which challenged pre-war moral standards in art in much the 
same way as The Well of Loneliness did in literature. However, while my 
grandmother came from a family of famous painters, I am not particularly 
artistic and instead have a background much more heavily graded towards 
literature, which includes novels, theatre and film 6I therefore decided to stick 
with what I knew best, which also had the merit of saving time that I would 
have had to spend familiarising myself with the artwork of the 1920s and the 
contextual works from before and after. 
This thesis fills a gap in the current literature. The nearest equivalent 
would be the comparatively modest work by Stefan Petrow, Policing Morals: 
The Metropolitan Police and the Home Office 1870-1914 (Oxford 1994). It 
covers essentially the same ground as this thesis, although concentrating more 
on "low" culture (drunkenness, prostitution and gambling in particular) than on 
the "higher" culture. However, it stops in 1914 under the apparent impression 
that after the First World War the dominant class morality of the pre-war years 
(the entire book offers a heavily class-based analysis of moral policing, based 
on John Stuart Mill's theories in On Liberty) was defeated and everything 
changed. However, this thesis calls that idea into question, which on its own 
suggests that such a study is long overdue. 
6 Reuben Chappell, the famous maritime artist, was a distant cousin of mine. I have inherited artworks by him, his son Edward and his niece Miriam, but not his talent for creating them. 
7 
A much more recent book by Donald Thomas, Freedom's Frontier: 
Censorship in Modern Britain (London 2007) is worthy of mention. Thomas 
provides a narrative history of censorship in Britain from the 1880s until 2005 
(unusually for an academic book, starting at the end and telling much of the 
story in flashback). While an admirable and extremely well-written book, it 
suffers from two flaws - it only discusses written and spoken censorship, not 
the censoring of immoral behaviour, and it lacks a strong argument, if only 
because its structure more or less precludes a proper conclusion. While it is a 
valuable contribution to the debate on censorship of the printed word and free 
expression, this lack of a broader context causes it to atrophy slightly, because it 
never quite offers the reality of censorship as part of a wider culture of 
suppression. 
There are a number of more specialised texts on the individual topics. To 
maintain the continuity of the topics, I have elected to study those at the start of 
the individual chapters. Each chapter therefore takes on the character of almost 
a small essay in its own right. However, there are cross-references included, and 
the conclusion draws together all these differing strands in order to set them in a 
wider context. However, one literature review has become a short chapter by 
itself. It sets out the boundaries of historical scholarship on the period this thesis 
focuses on, and it seems therefore to be an excellent place to start. 
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PART ONE 
THE BACKGROUND 
P. C. Jrcxs (to Master lViDonooD DzzrN). 84 PASS ALONG 
TEERE I AND DON'T YOÜ DARB TO V TERTER WIT8 
M6 IN THE EX RCISE OB MY DUTT. " 
9 
- 
1) "The Years that the Locust hath Eaten? " Britain in 
the 1920s. 
"Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for Co-Ordination of Defence, 
who was well versed in the Bible, used the expressive phrase 
about this dismal period, of which he was the heir: "The years 
that the locust hath eaten" - Joel, ii, 25" 
Winston Churchill. ' 
This is a study of manners and morals in Britain in the 1920s, especially in 
London. It tells the story of a generation recovering from the deadliest war ever 
fought up to that time pushing moral boundaries, and a generation who grew up 
long before the war struggling to cope with them. Most importantly, it explores 
the reasons behind various flashpoints that arose in the course of the decade, 
from what has typically been regarded as the "wrong" side - the side of the 
government and of the "reactionary" elements that were trying to impose their 
own standards upon this new generation. It casts very strong doubt on the idea, 
put forward by among others A. P. Herbert, Beresford Egan, Ronald Blythe and 
Marek Kohn, that the tenure of Joynson-Hicks as Home Secretary in the 1920s 
marked the apogee of this repressive culture as a result of his personal 
influence. Although Joynson-Hicks clearly approved all the steps made, and 
was completely unafraid of taking further steps than usual if he thought he 
should, there is every reason to think that he was fully supported by the Police, 
Home Office, the Lord Chamberlain's office, churches, elements of the press 
and also a constituency in the public (although again the size of it is open to 
doubt). The fact that this earlier argument has gone unchallenged for so long 
underlines the urgent need for a better understanding of how and why 
censorship of all forms operated in Britain in the 1920s. This chapter aims to 
sketch out the context of the 1920s in which Joynson-Hicks, the Home Office 
1 In The Second World War Volume I. " The Gathering Storm (London 1948) p. 52. While the phrase was used by both Inskip and Churchill to refer to the 
period 1931-1935, it has also been applied to the wider interwar years, by, for instance, William McElwee, Britain's Locust Years (London 1962) dust jacket 
summary. 
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and their opponents operated, and also to study some of historical literature 
available on the period to examine where the thesis fits in current debates. 
Although there is a vast literature on this period, it has not always been 
as conscientious in its chronicling as might be desired. For many years after the 
Second World War, the historiography was dominated by memories of high 
unemployment in the 1930s and the disastrous "Appeasement" policy (widely 
blamed as a factor in the outbreak of the war) lambasted so effectively above by 
the man who took charge of the war effort in 1940 after its discrediting, 
Winston Churchill. These twin features led to a widespread belief that the entire 
period between 1918 and 1940 was an era of failure, of setbacks and of mistakes 
- "locust years" or "the age of illusion. " The blame for these two major issues, 
especially the second, has been laid at the door of Neville Chamberlain, who 
was first Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1931 to 1937 and subsequently 
Prime Minister until replaced by Churchill in May of 1940. Kenneth 0. Morgan 
commented that, while there was a period when a more sympathetic approach to 
Chamberlain in particular had been encouraged in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
recent trend was to confirm the initial verdict of such books as Guilty Men 
(1940) (partly written by Michael Foot, subsequently Labour party leader) that 
Appeasement was a series of "calamitous miscalculations. "2 The policies 
adopted on unemployment have also come in for criticism - especially for the 
ignorance displayed by the government of the true effect of unemployment 
upon the unemployed. 
However, the 1920s were not the 1930s. In the 1920s, while 
unemployment was still a serious problem, it was not the same problem. The 
problems of the 1920s need to be examined in their own right - the Great 
Depression following the Wall Street Crash marking a near-epochal shift. That 
is not to deny the seriousness of the economic problems confronting the 
country in 1918. Britain had fought a major war, one that entailed a drastic 
restructuring of industry to produce munitions and other essential war materiel, 
a restructuring which would now need to be reversed, at a severe cost to those 
2 Kenneth 0. Morgan, Michael Foot: a Life (London 2007) p. 79 3 For a recent (albeit restrained) example, see Roy Hattersley, Borrowed Time: The Story of Britain between the Wars (London 2007) chapter seven, esp. pp. 196-97 
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labourers in industries linked with war commodities - especially coal, iron and 
steel, the primary industries, but also chemicals, munitions and cotton 
production. More seriously, this war had also damaged key markets. France had 
suffered severe physical damage and an equally drastic economic restructuring. 
Germany, perhaps, had suffered still more economically. Throughout the 1920s 
unemployment figures, so low in the war and the pre-war years, hovered 
between one and two million. 
This led to a consensus among historians for many years that there had 
been substantial failures in economic policy in the interwar period, and that had 
a more "Keynesian" policy of supply-side stimulation of demand been followed 
(as proposed by David Lloyd George in his 1928 book We Can Conquer 
Unemployment) much of the unemployment might have been assuaged. 4 This 
was a product of the tendency to read Britain's economic performance 
backwards into the 1920s. In 1967 D. H. Aldcroft attacked the idea of Britain's 
poor economic performance, commenting that many of the problems stemmed 
from Britain's late development of newer industries to fill the gap left by the 
decline of its older ones, leading to the interwar years being a time of 
dislocation rather than declines This was a theme he developed and expanded in 
his later book The British Economy Between the Wars (1983) which began with 
the rather wry observation that "not so many years ago it would probably have 
been regarded as heresy to suggest that there was anything good to say about the 
period, "6 before going on to commit precisely that heresy by discussing the 
importance of new industries in the economy and the overall growth of it 
despite a series of depressions. More recently there has been a tendency to 
revert to the notion of a long series of difficulties and failures in the economic 
situation. However, it is important to note that these refer to economic problems 
rather than political failures, as before. So, for instance, James Foreman-Peck 
identified the large amount of debt in British businesses in the 1920s that had 
4A full discussion of this consensus is available in D. H. Aldcroft, "Economic 
Progress in Britain in the 1920's" [sic] Scottish Journal of Political Economy 13 
1966) pp. 297-316 
5D. H. Aldcroft, "Economic Growth in Britain in the Inter-War Years: A 
Reassessment, ' The Economic History Review (New Series) 20 (1967) pp. 311- 
326 
6 D. H. Aldcroft, The British Economy Between the Wars (Oxford 1983) p. 1 
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been used to fund their expansion in the First World War and the short boom 
that followed, debt which was held at a high rate of interest due to the difficulty 
of attracting investors from abroad making it difficult to service, as the key 
reason for heavy industry's struggles in this period. 7 
Socially, the war had cost almost three-quarters of a million men killed 
in Britain alone. 8 That stark figure was compounded by the many hundreds of 
thousands more who served in the armed forces and had been disabled or 
suffered shell-shock. On top of these woes, in 1919 the last major pandemic to 
date - influenza - had swept across the world. It proved far more deadly than 
the war, leaving fifteen million dead. It proved especially lethal to young men; 
among the 150,000 who died in England and Wales alone, many thousands 
were survivors of the trenches .9 The war had also battered many traditional male 
bastions. Women, pressed into service in the industrial and agricultural sectors, 
proved remarkably difficult to dislodge, through a mixture of the low wages 
employers could force on them making them economically attractive workers 
and the efforts of the feminist sects that had inspired the suffrage movement. A 
large proportion of them, as a result of the Representation of the Peoples Act 
(1918) now had the vote, and in 1918 the Fenian Countess Markeiwicz, also 
7 James Foreman-Peck, "The Debt constraint on British Economic Policy and 
Performance in the 1920s" in Michael J. Oliver (ed. ) Studies in Economic and 
Social History: Essays in Honour of Derek H. Aldcroft (Aldershot 2002) pp. 
101-118. 
8A higher figure of one million dead is sometimes quoted, but that includes 
casualties from the Dominions and the Empire. While there is not a precise 
figure of dead available, partly due to this reason, partly due to the inadequacy 
of official records and partly due to occasionally conflicting reports issued for 
propaganda purposes, Jay Winter's figure of approximately 723,000 military 
deaths from the United Kingdom is likely to be fairly accurate. Jay Winter, The 
Great War and the British People (London 1985) pp. 68-72. This figure did not 
account for civilian casualties, including in the merchant navy, but was arrived 
at after substantial research and is generally accepted by authors on the topic. 
See Gerard J. DeGroot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War 
(Harlow 1996) pp. 272-273 
9 John Stevenson, The Penguin Social History of Britain: British Society 1914- 
1945 (London 1990) p. 210. This is confirmed by Nevil Shute in his 
autobiography: "At that time there was a terrible epidemic of influenza ravaging 
the country ... Deaths in the army became so numerous that my battalion was 
ordered to provide a permanent funeral party to tour round Kent with a gun 
carriage and a dozen specially drilled men to conduct military funerals. " Nevil 
Shute, Slide Rule: The Autobiography of an Engineer (London 1954: 1968) p. 34 
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known by her maiden name of Constance Gore-Booth, won a parliamentary seat 
in Ireland. 1° By 1928, they had gained a full franchise equal to that enjoyed by 
men: something that had not seemed likely in 1914. 
Traditionally, it was assumed that the deaths among young men had hit 
the aristocracy hard. A patriarchal system depended upon plenty of sons among 
the aristocracy to continue the bloodlines and the estates, who were carefully 
groomed for their role through public schools and the elite universities. But an 
unusually high proportion of public schoolboys had enlisted: and an unusual 
proportion of them had been junior officers. These, in turn, had suffered 
unusually high casualties on account of leading charges across No Man's Land. 
The memorials of Cambridge, Oxford and Eton showed that approximately one 
in five of their alumni of military age had been killed, nearly double the average 
for all ranks and classes, which was 11%. 11 Such damage, the argument ran 
could not be without effect on the aristocracy. It was assumed that this 
accelerated an already noticeable decline in aristocratic power and wealth 
following the Lloyd George budgets and the McKenna tax increases to pay for 
the war, forcing the aristocracy to sell their holdings. 12 However, more recent 
work by Ross McKibbin suggests that in fact those aristocrats who did sell their 
land usually did so in order to get more profitable investments in place, and that 
the people who really suffered as a result of higher taxes and loss of sons were 
the rank below them - the country gentry and the middle-ranking 
manufacturers. 13 
At the same time, and in despite of this, the inter-war period was a time 
of unprecedented middle-class power. The decline in the upper-middle classes 
was offset by the increased relative wealth and importance of the level below 
them - the professional middle classes. The fact that, unlike the working classes 
lo She refused to take her seat, leading to the oft-repeated legend that Lady 
Astor was the first female MP. Robert Graves and Alan Hodge, The Long Week- 
end:: A Social History of Great Britain 1918-1939 (London 1940: New York 
1963) p. 20 
lt DeGroot pp. 273-275. 
12 For the traditional view, see Noreen Branson, Britain in the Nineteen 
Twenties (London 1975) pp. 91-92 
13 For the modem view, supporting the resilience of the aristocracy and the 
continuing importance of land to them, see Ross McKibbin, Classes and 
Cultures: England 1918-1951 (Oxford 1998) pp. 21-22 
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they had stable employment in a time of economic uncertainty, and unlike the 
upper middle and upper classes they had stable incomes (albeit somewhat 
smaller even when this is allowed for) in a time of deflation, allowed them to 
gain a greater level of economic strength, which was translated into an increase 
in their political and social importance. McKibbin went so far as to refer to the 
period 1923 to 1938 (after which professional salaries remained static and 
manual wages soared) as a" kind of golden age" for this class. This was all the 
more ironic as this group, insofar as it was homogenous, did not always 
appreciate the strength of their position, tended to worry rather about how weak 
it might be after a difficult and turbulent five years after 1918 left mental scars 
that ran deep into the following years. 14 The tension between an uneasy and 
troubled working class, a decaying upper class and a powerful middle class was 
a constant backdrop to the 1920s. This is important to this thesis for two 
reasons. First of all, it was the class that Joynson-Hicks and many of the civil 
servants at the Home Office were drawn from. It was also this particular class 
that was most closely aligned with the Christian Evangelist tradition, and was 
most likely to be censorious in matters of morality and behaviour. Their 
increased influence was, it will be argued, an important factor in the culture of 
censorship that existed in this period. 
One of the acute difficulties of this thesis is not necessarily a lack of 
secondary literature, for the literature in this field is vast and complex, but a 
lack of secondary literature germane to the precise topic. Texts are either highly 
specific to the individual topics (and will therefore be discussed in most detail in 
the individual chapters) or tangential to the matter under discussion. Where it is 
not, further difficulties can arise. Laura Beers and Geraint Owen summed it up 
rather well in a recent publicity sheet for a conference, when they commented 
that while there is substantial and increasing historical interest in the interwar 
years, there is also a lack of coherence and co-ordination between those who 
work in the field, leading to a largely fragmentary historiography where 
"diverse specialities have not yet met in a broader exchange of views. "5 
14 ibid. pp. 52-4 59-60,62 
15 Laura Beers and Geraint Owen, website publicity for "Unconventional Wisdoms: new perspectives on interwar Britain, " conference at Newnham 
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At the same time, there are a large number of "popular" studies of the 
interwar years that attempt to "survey" the period in a bid to provide this very 
context. However, they all, even the ones written by academic historians, suffer 
from a range of shortcomings. Most fail to make a clear distinction between the 
1920s and the 1930s. Many either repeat myths that have little foundation in 
fact, or indeed create them - most of which tend to be myths about the 
corruption, incompetence and autocratic behaviour of the government. At the 
same time, some of them are valuable books with at least pretensions towards 
serious scholarship. Most difficult of all from this point of view is Ronald 
Blythe's The Age of Illusion (1963) which suffers from virtually all the worst 
faults of the genre and yet is one of only two publications to deal at length with 
William Joynson-Hicks, rendering it indispensable to this study. 
Certain other books in this field deserve mention. Robert Graves and 
Alan Hodge, professional writers both, produced a social history of the interwar 
period in 1940, entitled The Long Week-End. It is in some respects of more use 
as a primary source than a secondary one, as it gives the opinions of the writers 
on many issues, including literature, art, theatre, as well as politics and social 
trends. Douglas Goldring's The Nineteen Twenties (1945) is also deserving of 
mention as a primary source, despite suffering from all the worst tendencies 
listed above. 16 Charles Mowat and A. J. P. Taylor both produced magisterial 
studies of the period - Mowat's Britain Between the Wars 1918-1940 (1955) 
and Taylor's England 1914-1945 (1965) both still recognised as classics in their 
own field. Neither, however, are immune from the deficiencies of the genre. 
Mowat was scathing in his denunciation of Stanley Baldwin, claiming that he 
had only one defence for his deficiencies and failure to properly rearm: "that he 
was tolerated so long [by the British people]". Taylor's book, as his contribution 
to the famous Oxford History of England series, has entered popular 
consciousness to a great degree, and is responsible for much of the language 
College, Cambridge, 14th -15th April 2009, 
http: //www. hist. cam. ac. uk/seminars events/conferences/wisdoms. html, 
accessed 21st March 2009. 
16 For instance, his firm belief that the banks were to blame for everything that he perceived as wrong in society, and that the Second World War had been 
caused by their desire to sell more war loan. Douglas Goldring, The Nineteen 
Twenties: A General Survey and Some Personal Memories (London 1945): see 
especially pages 28,35,252 
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directed at Joynson-Hicks - for instance, it was Taylor who first claimed that 
Joynson-Hicks "saw a Communist under every bed. "17 This attitude of 
untempered criticism reached its pinnacle with Ronald Blythe's The Age of 
Illusion in 1963. 
After that time even the popular market gradually rowed back from the 
wildest excesses of these books. Led by William McElwee in his book Britain's 
Locust Years 1918-1940 (1962) criticism gradually began to be replaced by 
curiosity. A major biography of Baldwin, which attempted to recast him as the 
most important Conservative leader since Disraeli, was published by Keith 
Middlemas and John Barnes in 1969, confirming and strengthening this trend. 
The popular social history by John Stevenson, British Society 1914-1945 (1984) 
also emphasized continuity of social development and improvement in this 
period, showing how much of what occurred in this field between the wars had 
its roots in pre-war developments and led on to the Labour government's 
reforms in the 1940s. However, there was still considerable support for more 
traditional viewpoints, exemplified by Noreen Branson's book Britain in the 
Nineteen Twenties (1975). 
More recently, since the 1990s, popular studies have turned towards a 
more negative assessment of the period. So, two books by Martin Pugh, one of 
them a huge survey of Britain from 1870 to 1997, and the other (very recent) 
one a more straightforward social history concentrating exclusively on the 
interwar period, both painted gloomy pictures of the economic failures 
(especially the lack of a Keynesian policy). In this he was supported by two 
confirmed amateurs - A. N. Wilson, in his book After the Victorians (2005) and 
Roy Hattersley, who recently produced a new book called Borrowed Time 
(2007) surveying the interwar years. Ross McKibbin has also produced a major 
social history of the period 1918 to 1951. After Blythe, this is possibly the most 
valuable text of this description to this study. For one thing, it is useful in its 
careful deconstruction of class and society in the period, which not all the others 
seem to be quite at ease in doing - despite the immense importance of class 
barriers in this period. One of the key things central to understanding the role of 
the state in censorship and suppression in this period is that it was dominated by 
17 A. J. P. Taylor, The Oxford History of England XV. " English History 1914- 194S (Oxford 1965) p. 242 
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the middle classes - including Baldwin and Joynson-Hicks, who was once 
described by the Socialist journalist Harnen Swaffer as "belong[ing] to the great 
body of middle-class Evangelicals who, largely, are the backbone of this 
country. They have been behind most of the big moral causes which have swept 
the nation for centuries. They fought slavery and other horrors; and, usually, 
they have won. " 18 It is also of importance given that Joynson-Hicks was unusual 
in trying to enforce the law (or, alternatively, his system of ethics) rigorously on 
all levels of society, including wealthy night-clubbers. Unlike the impoverished 
prostitutes and street-betters in Petrow's study Policing Morals (see below) 
these were people with power, wealth and influence, who were capable of 
hitting back, and had therefore usually been left well alone by Joynson-Hicks' 
predecessors. 
For all their faults, these broader surveys offer the context that more 
specialised monographs tend to lack, which renders them of some use to this 
thesis. However, it is also necessary to consider some of the more specialized 
works in various fields that come close to this topic. 
Much of this thesis has to deal with the politics of the 1920s (and to a 
lesser extent, those of the years immediately after the First World War and the 
1930s) including the internal politics of the Conservative party. Politically, the 
interwar era is either a time of great ferment or of great stability and inwardness, 
depending on the discussant. This could be because all the major political 
changes happened to the Opposition. For twelve out of twenty-one years there 
was a coalition government (1918-1922,1931-1939) dominated by the 
Conservatives but led for much of the time by a senior figure of the Left (Lloyd 
George 1918-1922, Ramsay Macdonald 1931-1935). For six and a half more 
years (1922-January 1924 and December 1924-1929) the Conservatives were in 
power on their own, under first Bonar Law and then Stanley Baldwin. The other 
two and a half years consisted of minority Labour governments led by 
Macdonald and propped up by the Liberals. Most significant in all this is the 
absence of any mention of the Liberals as a party of power. In 1914 the Liberals 
were in government. By 1925, they held a mere 40 seats in the Commons, and 
even their leader of seventeen years, Herbert Asquith, was unable to find a seat. 
18 Hannen Swaffer, "The Night Club Panic, " The People, 8th February 1925 
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Labour had replaced the Liberals as the party of opposition, although, as Trevor 
Wilson noted in the 1960s, it found it far more difficult to replace the Liberals 
as a credible alternative government to the Conservatives. 19 This was the major 
political narrative of the interwar years ; but the net result of this credibility gap 
of Labour's was that for all but three of the twenty-one years between 1918 and 
1939, the Conservatives were in power, whether on their own or in a coalition. 
There has been considerable controversy and confusion over the success 
(or, for a very long time, perceived lack of success) of the Conservatives' 
programmes in government and in opposition. The most unfortunate effort in 
this direction was probably the official biography of the dominant Conservative 
figure of the period, Stanley Baldwin. Written by G. M. Young ands published 
in 1952, it painted his subject as an indolent and ineffectual figure who took 
very little interest in the machinery of government - this last partly caused by a 
paucity of archival material bearing Baldwin's name, something acknowledged 
and explained by more recent biographers as part of Baldwin's preference for 
working by word of mouth rather than by memo. 20 An important departure in 
this direction was made by Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, who in 1969 
produced an immense 1,150 page biography of Baldwin which, on their own 
admission, turned into something of an epic study of the interwar period on the 
grounds that "it is undesirable for political biography to be also the history of 
the subject's time... but in Baldwin's case it is almost inevitable" 21 
More recently, a cultural school of history has emerged that goes some 
way to support the notion of Baldwin as a figure of his time who reflected the 
political aspirations of the electorate in the 1920s. Philip Williamson's work on 
Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values asserted that "study of 
Baldwin raises central historical questions which if intelligently addressed can 
19 Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party (second edition London 
1966) pp. 419-421. In fact it is now possible to go further than he did (in dating 
the end of the Conservative hegemony to Wilson's narrow win in 1964) and say 
that the Conservative hegemony established in the First World War lasted 82 
years, until Tony Blair's victories in 1997,2001 and 2005 broke it. During that 
time, they never spent more than six and a half years out of power (1945-51 
being their longest period in opposition). 20 Philip Williamson, Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and National Values (Cambridge 1999) pp. 33-4 
21 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London 1969) pp. 
xiii-xiv. 
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reveal much about Conservatism and the broader political culture of the 
interwar years. v)22 In an earlier article he had already dissected the unsuccessful 
Conservative election campaign of 1929, and concluded there was a deliberate 
choice to portray Baldwin as the "Safety First" candidate on the grounds that it 
would touch a chord with the electorate. He argued that while the campaign was 
incoherent and shambolic, as well as unsuccessful, it was not a reactive one that 
used a slogan selected accidentally as had previously been alleged, calling into 
question many of the assumptions about Conservative incompetence in this 
period. 3 More recently than either, he has published an essay dissecting the 
changes in Baldwin's post-retirement reputation until the late 1960s (the era of 
Middlemas and Barnes) which, as noted above, was a period when many of the 
myths around this era, and around Baldwin himself, were formed 24 Joynson- 
Hicks was a senior figure in the Conservative party under Baldwin, and he had 
tried to encourage a more pro-active stance from his Cabinet colleagues than 
one of "safety first, " urging them instead to adopt Lloyd George's proposals and 
present them to the electorate as their own. 5 At the same time, his policies 
against night club owners (which are discussed in chapter 6) have been credited 
with playing a role in creating popular disenchantment with the government, 
although to say the least, for reasons that will be discussed below, it seems 
unlikely 26 
This concentration on Baldwin has led to a number of difficulties. One 
of them is defining the Conservative strategy in the 1920s, particularly after 
1924. Baldwin himself gave the very strong impression of desiring to lead a 
moderate, non-confrontational party in a bid to unite the country behind a 
shared belief in a political philosophy based Baldwin's. Yet as Williamson's 
biography makes clear, Baldwin was also a man inclined to give his Cabinet 
colleagues their heads in matters of detailed policy implementation - not 
perhaps surprising given that most of them, notably Churchill, the Chamberlain 
22 Williamson 1999 p. 12 
23 Philip Williamson, `"`Safety First: Baldwin, the Conservative Party and the 
1929 General Election" Historical Journal 25: 2 (1982) pp. 385-409 24 Philip Williamson, "Baldwin's Reputation: Politics and History 1937 to 1967" Historical Journal 47: 1 (2004) pp. 127-168 25 Richard Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill: Rivals for Greatness (London 
2007)p. 262 
26 Middlemas and Barnes p. 515 
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brothers, Balfour and (while he lived) Curzon all had immense experience, far 
greater than Baldwin's own. 27 This meant that mixed messages about the nature 
of Conservatism were sent out. For instance, David Cesarani has accused 
Baldwin of attempting to portray himself as moderate in matters of race 
relations, while at the same time allowing others who were anything but 
moderate (among whom he numbered Joynson-Hicks) to say what they liked 
without check from the centre, and indeed encouraging them to do so by 
attacking "aliens" in his election broadcast of 192428 
In the field of culture, the attitude of Baldwin himself, and of most of his 
colleagues, was confrontational. He frequently attacked the habits and 
atmosphere of the post-war world as "bad and dangerous for the community. i29 
Robert Home, a leading socialite and night clubber, was carefully excluded 
from Baldwin's cabinets despite his great ability and expertise in financial 
matters 30 Joynson-Hicks himself exemplified this attitude with his work in this 
field, as is discussed below. Given that Baldwin lost only one of five general 
elections that he fought, 31 it would seem that this approach was at least not 
anathema to a large portion of the electorate. However, one of the frequently 
recurring themes in this thesis is that it is impossible to reliably gauge public 
opinion on this question in the days before sophisticated opinion polling, a 
problem made more acute by the fact that all sides claimed to represent a "silent 
majority. , 32 
Other important work in this field, leaving cultural considerations aside, 
has been done by David Jarvis, who has made major contributions to our 
understanding of the changing class and gender identities in British politics 
(especially the Conservative party) in the 1920s as the electorate was changed 
27 Williamson 1999 pp. 34,67-68 
28 David Cesarani, "The Anti-Jewish Career of Sir William Joynson-Hicks, Cabinet Minister" Journal of Contemporary History 24 (1989) pp. 461-482, pp. 
471,476 
29 Williamson 1999, p. 155, quoting a speech at Cambridge in 1927. 30 ibid. p. 68 
31 In 1923 the Unionists remained the largest party, although they were unable 
to form a government; in 1924,1931 and 1935 they won large absolute 
majorities (in the latter two cases the victory being further distorted by their 
alliance with factions of Labour and the Liberals). In the entire period 1914- 1945 only in 1929 did they come second in a general election. 32 See below pp. 152,215-6,308 for examples of this difficulty. 
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by the 1918 and 1928 reform acts (one of which was sponsored through the 
House of Commons by Joynson-Hicks). His 1996 article "British Conservatism 
and Class Politics in the 1920s- analyzed the changing pattern of Conservative 
electoral campaigns as they considered how to respond to the expanded 
electorate after 1918, and their relationship with an electorate at once defined by 
class and yet clearly not fully homogenous within that class structure. His 
argument was that the Conservatives managed eventually to win their great 
victory of 1931 by persuading everyone that they had a vested interest in the 
status quo that the party stood for, despite the Great Depression? 3 More 
recently, he has also discussed the changing role of women in Conservative 
politics as part of Amanda Vickery's book on the influence of women in British 
politics since 1750, something he also considered more specifically in relation 
to Conservative constituency associations in the 1920s in an earlier work for 
Martin Francis and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska's work The Conservatives and 
British society, 1880-1990 (Cardiff 1996). In this latter paper he concluded that 
while the heavy reliance of these associations on women to keep going was 
unpopular with men, it makes the Conservative engagement with female 
suffrage to appease this important support base easier to understand. 34 It is 
rather surprising, given all this literature, that Joynson-Hicks is still credited 
with having created the Equal Franchise Act more or less by accident. 5 
However, there is no particular evidence that any considerations about gender 
politics influenced the moral policies pursued by the Home Office during his 
time there. Certainly there has been no suggestion that women were to be 
33 David Jarvis, "British Conservatism and Class Politics in th e 1920s, " The 
English Historical Review 111 (1996) pp. 59-84 34 David Jarvis, "The Conservative Party and the Politics of Gender" in Martin 
Francis and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds. ) The Conservatives and British 
society, 1880-1990 (Cardiff 1996) pp. 172-193: Jarvis, ""Behind every great 
party" : women and Conservatism in twentieth-century Britain, " in Amanda 
Vickery, (ed. ), Women, privilege and power : British politics, 1750 to the 
present (Stanford (CA) 2001) pp. 289-314 
S Mari Taganayaki, currently working on the parliamentary debates that led up 
to the passing of the Act in 1928, continued to put forward this view at a 
conference in Chatham in February 2008 ("Women and the Law") and despite a long subsequent discussion, I was unable to persuade her that she was mistaken. Mari Taganayaki, "Women and Parliamentary Legislation, 1918-1928" 
Women's History Network South Study Day, Women and the Law, held at the University of Kent at Medway (Chatham) 9th February 2008. 
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targeted in a campaign about "traditional values, " and if it was ever a 
consideration in the mind of Joynson-Hicks, he does not appear to have 
committed it to paper. 36 
It should be noted that a major reason why the Conservatives were 
elected had little enough to do with their own merits. Mostly they rode a wave 
of anti-Communist hysteria to power, a practice never better exemplified than 
by the "Zinoviev letter" election . of 1924, when a forged letter purporting to 
show that Labour was working for Moscow was published shortly before the 
election, apparently causing the Liberal voters to stampede over to the 
Conservatives. 7 It was not only Edgar Wallace, the defeated Independent 
Liberal at Blackpool in 1931, who came up against a Conservative candidate 
who "had it all over him when it came to chilling the electors' blood with far- 
fetched stories"38 They were also greatly assisted by the phenomenon of the 
"split vote. " Prior to the First World War, Labour and the Liberals had co- 
operated in attacking the Unionists, and not putting up candidates against each 
other, lessening the chances of the Unionists winning an overall majority. After 
the war, however, this agreement lapsed, and although only once - in 1931 - did 
the Conservatives secure over half the popular vote, only on one occasion - in 
1929 - did they come second in terms of the number of seats they won. 
However, the emergence of "anti-Bolshevism" has tended to gain at least equal 
prominence as an explanation for this dominance. Paul Ward's book Red Flag 
and Union Jack (1998) partly discusses this when he discusses how it was 
essential for the Labour party to distance themselves from the notion of "the 
Red Flag" (Bolshevism) in order to secure a broad enough electoral base to 
challenge for power, inventing themselves as a "National" party of Britain. 9 It 
is worth noting in partial support of this theory Clare Griffiths' argument that 
36 Of course, it should be noted that the government documents that make up the 
bulk of the source material for this thesis would not, at this time, have been a 
good place to look given the official neutrality of the Civil Service. There may 
be evidence of such a pitch in party or personal documents, and it would be an 
interesting question to investigate. 
37 "Apparently" because it has been argued that the "Zinoviev letter" only 
confirmed and strengthened an already existing trend in this regard: see Robert 
Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Major (London 1997) p. 225 38 Quoted in Wilson p. 402 
39 Paul Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism and the British 
Left 1881-1924 (Rochester NY 1998) 
23 
the ability of the Conservatives to present themselves to the newly enlarged 
electorate as a non-sectional, fully national party in this period was a major 
factor in their success. 40 Part of this trend may be discerned in chapter 5 below, 
which closely examines the attitude of the Home Office under Joynson-Hicks to 
films produced in Russia, an attitude that was abruptly reversed under his 
Labour predecessor. 
Joynson-Hicks certainly represented a strongly anti-Bolshevik strand in 
British politics of the 1920s, which was obviously not universally unpopular. At 
times he also seems to have been less than scrupulous in drawing distinguishing 
lines between Socialists in the Labour party and Communists; on arrival at the 
Home Office he invited Sir John Anderson, his new Permanent Under- 
Secretary, to celebrate the defeat of Labour. 41 That said, it did on occasion 
severely embarrass the government domestically and diplomatically, most 
notoriously over the 1927 "ARCOS Raid" which caused the suspension of 
diplomatic relations with Russia and caused a media storm at home. 2 How far 
his attitude against Bolshevism extended into the suppressive culture of the 
Home Office outside his work against Russian films is a more difficult one to 
judge. It is worth noting that Douglas Goldring claimed Joynson-Hicks wished 
to forcibly suppress the sale of alcoholic as an extension of wartime controls on 
the grounds that "if the restrictions imposed as a "war emergency" were relaxed, 
even in regard to beer drinking, "Bolshevism" might result"43 Although a 
tenuous argument exists here that the general clamping down on the areas in this 
40 Clare Griffiths, "Dubious Democrats: Party Politics and the mass electorate in 
twentieth-century Britain" in Bob Moore and Henk von Nierop (eds. ) Twentieth 
Century Mass Society in Britain and the Netherlands (Oxford 2006) pp. 30-46, 
pp. 35-6: cf. David Jarvis, "The Shaping of the Conservative Electoral 
Hegemony, 1918-1939" in Jon Lawrence and Miles Taylor (eds. ) Party, State 
and Society: Electoral Behaviour in Britain since 1820 (Aldershot 1997) pp. 
131-152, where he argues that the Conservatives were forced to reform their 
methodology, message and membership to cope with this electorate, and tried to 
make voters identify with them as the supporters of a social order in which they 
held a stake. 
41 Anderson declined the invitation, simply saying that he was a professional 
civil servant who would work with any political master the electorate voted for, 
without expression of either "pleasure or sorrow" on their victories or defeats. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, John Anderson: Viscount Waverley (London 1962) 
88-89 pp. 88-89 
below pp. 73-74 
43 Goldring p. 248 
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thesis might be the result of a general desire to browbeat and intimidate the 
electorate and make it almost impossible for them to plot against the state, it is 
not one generally supported by the evidence, although to argue that both themes 
- moral policing and anti-Bolshevik campaigns - sprang from the same belief 
that, given the choice, people would chose something that was bad for them, is 
certainly not untenable. 44 
The suggestion that this Conservative hegemony and its results was 
sparked by the wholly hypothetical fear of a revolution based on events in 
Russia that were unlikely to be repeated closer to home is to overlook two very 
obvious points. First, there were a series of revolutions across Europe in the 
period 1918-1920, and while none of them were overthrew the governments 
they were attacking some of them, notably Bela Kun's rising in Hungary, came 
extremely close to it. In France, in Italy, Berlin, Bavaria, there was sufficient 
unrest to cause alarm. In Britain there were riots, strikes and general discontent, 
and although with hindsight the danger of revolution was minimal that is to 
ignore the fact that what was likely to happen was far less important than what 
could happen: and what could happen was thought by both the Establishment 
and the far left to be a full-on revolution as in Russia. 45 The struggle of far left 
and, to counterbalance it, the far right; represented in Europe in 1922 by Horthy 
and Mussolini but later to be added to, with Franco, Schuschnigg and most 
notoriously, Hitler; was to dominate interwar politics and philosophy just as the 
same fundamental ideological differences were to inform the thinking of the 
1960s and 1980s. 
The second point that is often overlooked is the fact that there was a 
revolution in Britain in 1918: a prolonged, bitter and bloody revolution whose 
last rites are, even at the time of writing, only tentatively being read. This was a 
revolution that had almost nothing to do with the war, or with Communism 
(although many of its followers were Socialists) and which had been threatened 
well before 1914. But, more significantly perhaps, it lay in that part of Britain 
which has always held a slightly ambiguous status. 
The Irish revolution led by Michael Collins and the counter-revolution 
led by forces under the nominal command of Hamar Greenwood of and by itself 
44 See below pp. 242-243 
45 Branson chapter 2 pp. 13-45 offers an excellent analysis of this. 
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is almost wholly irrelevant to this thesis. Yet the fact that there was a major 
insurrection on soil which was undoubtedly part of the United Kingdom as it 
was then constituted (whatever the arguments as to whether or not Ireland was 
in practice a "colony") cannot be ignored. Easy though it would be to say that 
Britain suffered no revolution after the First World War, it would be manifestly 
untrue. And it was only a step from a revolution in Ireland, something that had 
been possible but comparatively unlikely in 1914,46 to suggesting that a 
revolution might occur in Liverpool, or Cardiff, or above all in Glasgow. The 
latter place was held to be the very heartland of radical Communism and not 
without good reason, given the establishment of the ultra-left wing Clyde 
Workers Committee, which called a general strike in 1919. While Marwick (and 
before him, Keynes) may have dismissed talk of the fear of revolution as a 
distraction and an irrelevance, it is clear that, however unrealistic it may have 
been, it had entered deeply into the British national psyche, or at least the 
psyche of the ruling classes, and therefore must be considered an important 
factor in British politics 47 
This is something that has been clarified and explained by the recent 
work of Jon Lawrence. Lawrence has written a series of articles on violence and 
the fear of violence in post-First World War British political culture. In one 
recent contribution, he particularly linked the Black and Tan atrocities, along 
with the Amritsar Massacre of 191948 and the industrial unrest of the period 
1919-1921 with a fear of violence among the propertied classes on the British 
mainland. 49 His argument was that these actually further fed the fears of this 
group that the war had left an entire generation of men "brutalized, " and that the 
government, with its determination to fight hard in Ireland in particular, was 
making matters worse. 
46 Although there was a serious danger, indeed a near certainty, of civil war in 
Ireland in 1914, this would have been caused by the Protestants of Northern 
Ireland rebelling against Catholic majority rule: not what ultimately happened, 
the rebellion of the Irish Catholics against London rule. 41 Arthur Marwick, The Deluge: British Society and the First World War 
(revised second edition Basingstoke 2006) p. 313 ' See below pp. 60-63 
49 John Lawrence, "Forging a peaceable society: War, Violence and the Fear of 
Brutalization in Post-First World War Britain" Journal of Modern History 75 
(2003) pp. 557-589 
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The period 1918-1926 also seemed to be one where the old order might 
conceivably stumble on the mainland of its own accord anyway. As John Lucas 
pointed out in one of the all-too-rare books that concentrates solely on the 
1920s: 
"The Hitchhiker's Guide to the 20th Century tells us that the 
superficial glitter of the 1920s was succeeded by the earnest 
radicalism of the 1930s. Yet the 1920s has a claim to be thought of 
as more radical than the decade that succeeded it. During the 1920s 
two Labour governments took office. Admittedly, they were 
minority governments and neither lasted for long; but there was no 
Labour administration during the following decade, and if the 
evidence of the admittedly crude opinion polls of 1939 are anything 
to go by, Labour would have done even worse in the then pending 
general election than it had in 1935... the radical 1930s didn't 
produce a general strike; and by the end of the decade union 
membership was lower than it had been at its outset... [this] is 
ignored by commentators who wish to see the 1930s as a political 
decade, and who as frequently regard the 1920s as all of a glitter: a 
time of profoundly superficial attractions which came to an end in 
1929, with the Wall Street Crash. "so 
This was an entirely valid thrust against the notion of a 1920s where the only 
issue was an older caste of politicians trying to revert to their idealised image of 
a stable pre-war world, and a hedonistic generation (as portrayed by Nevil 
Shute) looking solely for some fun after the hardships of war. 51 
A further area where some revision of ancient historical truisms might 
be called for with some profit is in the area of religious history. Traditionally, 
one of the difficulties many historians have in understanding this period is that 
they lack the necessary understanding of the ongoing centrality of Christianity, 
in the organized form of the Anglican church in public life. At one time it was 
50 John Lucas, The Radical Twenties: Aspects of Writing, Politics and Culture (Nottingham 1997) p. 8 
sl Shute pp. 34-41 
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widely assumed that organized religion suffered a terrible blow in the First 
World War from which it never recovered, as part of a more general, long held 
view among sociologists that ever since the Industrial Revolution religious 
belief has been in inevitable, steady decline in the West, a process to which the 
First World War made a significant contribution. It was claimed that this view 
was supported by Robert Graves' famous autobiography, Goodbye to All That, 
which detailed his transition from a strong, buoyant Christian to an implacable 
atheist as part of his total rejection of the world he had grown up in following 
the First World War, and among other examples C. E. Montague's 
Disenchantment and Siegfried Sassoon's Memoirs of a Fox-Hunting Man, 
which followed a broadly similar pattern. This was a view put forward with 
some vehemence by Arthur Marwick in the 1960s, who claimed that "simple 
old world religious faith... [was] extinguished at the Battle of the Somme °'52 
The idea that there was a close and immediate link between the war and a 
decline in religious belief is still put forward. One of the most influential 
proponents of such a theory is Steve Bruce, whose book God is Dead: 
Secularization in the Modern West (Oxford 2002) mounted a spirited defence of 
secularization theory against its critics (although it was noted by one reviewer 
that he was not always scrupulous in his use of data to support his arguments) 
and argued strongly against any "revisionist" ideas of it 53 
The reason for Bruce's defensiveness is the work of Callum Brown, who 
in 2001 stood secularization theory on its head with The Death of Christian 
Britain. It should be noted that he was working within parameters already 
defined by S. C. Williams. Her book Religious Belief and Popular Culture in 
Southwark c. 1880-1939 (1999) stressed the fact that church and chapel going 
formed only part of religious observance, and not necessarily the most 
52 Arthur Marwick, The Deluge: British Society and the First World War 
(reissued second edition Basingstoke 2006) pp. 258-9: cf. pp. 337-339, where 
Marwick directly links the war and the subsequent social dislocation to the 
decline of Nonconformist congregations in York noted by Seebohm Rowntree. 53 Robin Gill complained that sometimes Bruce did not always use similar data: 
for instance, Bruce claimed that 7% of scientists believed in God against 90% of 
the general population, whereas the like-for-like figure was 30% of the 
population (the 90% was made up of those who believed in "any sort of god"). Review by Robin Gill, in The American Journal of Sociology 108 (2003) pp. 
1160-1162 
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important part. She argued that religious faith was generally an outlook and a 
pattern of living in the area of London (Southwark) she studied rather than a 
habit of going to services on Sundays. Callum Brown went further and widened 
his scope to a national view. Working from oral testimony to delve into the 
consciousness of religion, like Williams particularly among the hitherto 
neglected working classes, he dated the beginning of fundamental secularization 
in Britain very precisely to 1963, stating that it was an abrupt process that could 
not be portrayed as proceeding gradually since the Enlightenment (as he 
accused proponents of secularization theory like Bruce of doing). He explained 
his reasoning thus: 
"The mere presence of Christian churches or Christian people in 
Britain does not make, and never has made, Britain Christian, 
and their mere gradual disappearance does not in itself make it 
unChristian. What made Britain Christian was the way in which 
Christianity infused public culture and was adopted by 
individuals, whether churchgoers or not, in forming their own 
identities. Before getting to religious decline, the conception of 
religiosity must be made wider and deeper. v%54 
This cultural redefining of Christian influence in British society led him 
to conclude that Christianity's position in Britain was largely stable between 
1800 and 1963, even if numbers of churchgoers fluctuated (both up and down) 
because it exerted a stranglehold over public imagination. What was "right" and 
"wrong" was defined by Christian morality and thinking. The 1960s changed 
that entirely, and, he argued, possibly irreversibly. As a result, he branded these 
163 years as "[Britain's] last Puritan age... this puritanism was imposed not by 
the state but by the people themselves"" 
The influence of Brown, or at least the influences that informed his 
thinking, are perhaps discernable in the work of Matthew Grimley. Building on 
earlier studies that showed modest increases in attendances for all churches 
54 Callum G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Christianity and Society in 
the Modern World (London 2000) p. 8 55 ibid. p. 9 
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throughout the 1920s (although most notably among Catholics and least 
significantly among Nonconformists) he has cast doubt upon how far the power 
of the churches declined in this period. Most of all, he underlines the immense 
cultural and social importance of the churches, which he argued allowed them to 
influence political thought as well to a major greater degree than previously 
realised. Apart from anything else, most senior politicians - including Baldwin 
himself, and certainly including Joynson-Hicks - remained personally 
profoundly religious, meaning that the churches still had tremendous "soft 
power, " which Grimley defined as their influence upon society, politics and 
cultural thinking. 6 This conforms well with the paradigm of cultural 
Christianity set by Brown, and suggests a major shift in attitudes towards 
religious history. While Grimley may still complain that "historians of Britain in 
the twentieth century have tended to cast religion in a minor or residual role, 9957 
it is worth noting that this change is spilling over into other political writers as 
well, including Philip Williamson, who devoted an entire chapter of his book on 
Baldwin to Baldwin's Christian mindset and links with religious 
organisations S8 
Such a change is to be welcomed and is especially important in this 
thesis for two reasons. One of them is the centrality of religion to Joynson- 
Hicks' own character, and indeed his career. He was brought up in a fervently 
Evangelical household, within the Church of England but having much in 
common with some of the Nonconformist churches (for instance, the Wesleyan 
Methodists). At the age of fourteen he signed the pledge and kept it. In 1928 he 
played a crucial role in thwarting the High Church wing of the Church of 
England in their attempts to guide a revised version of the Book of Common 
Prayer through Parliament. I will argue in the conclusion that most of his 
actions in regard to the areas examined in this thesis can be traced to his 
religious beliefs. This attitude certainly extended to the civil servants of the 
Home Office and a large section of the police force, all of whom would have 
56 Matthew Grimley, "The Religion of Englishness: Puritanism, 
Providentialism, and "National Character, " 1918-1945" Journal of British 
Studies 46: 4 (2007) pp884-906 
57 Matthew Grimley, Citizenship, Community and the Church of England: 
Liberal Anglican Theories of the State Between the Wars (Oxford 2004) p. 5 58 Williamson 1999, chapter 9: see also pp. 103-8, p. 155, pp. 277-82 
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been at the very least inculcated with Christian moral precepts, even if they did 
not fully subscribe to them. The defence of Christian morality, possibly linked 
in their minds with the defence of Western , 
civilization against atheistic 
Communism, was certainly a key theme in the 1920s, albeit, due in part to this 
earlier neglect of the role of religion, an underexplored one. 
The second reason is that many of the actions in this thesis - moves 
against drinking after hours, complaints about films, plays and books, and 
efforts to combat the sexual adventurers taking advantage of London's open 
spaces for instance - were led by the churches, or by organisations affiliated to 
them. Most important and most powerful among them was the London Public 
Morality Council. This was an organisation affiliated to several churches, led by 
the Bishop of London, Arthur Winnington-Ingram, at its foundation in 1899 
devoted to campaigning against indecency (defined as sexual misconduct, 
including promscuity and homosexuality but especially prostitution). However, 
it increasingly broadened its remit to include other kinds of immoral behaviour, 
notably drinking culture and obscenity in literature, theatre and cinema. It not 
only had powerful voices in Parliament on its side (including Winnington- 
Ingram himself) but had the resources to employ agents to patrol open spaces, 
bookshops, cinemas and theatres looking for offenders - whom they would then 
report to the police, the local authority (over whom the thought of thousands of 
church voters being influenced by the LPMC's actions could exercise a 
powerful motivation) or the Lord Chamberlain and the Home Office S9 
The evidence gathered for this thesis would suggest that there is a case 
to be made that during the 1920s the LPMC reached the height of its power and 
influence, riding on not only the numerical strength of the churches in this 
period but what was clearly a sympathetic attitude towards their aims within the 
Home Office, elements of the magistracy and judiciary and at least some of the 
senior officers within the police. The history of this organisation is still yet to be 
written, a notable gap in the current literature. While some idea of its activities 
may be gleaned in this study, and in others including that of Stefan Petrow, it 
would deserve a full study of its own. This thesis, while attending to some of its 
59 Stefan Petrow, Policing Morals. The Metropolitan Police and the Home 
Office 1870-1914 (Oxford 1994): for details of its founding, p. 124; its influence 
over local authorities, p. 137; its closeness to the Metropolitan Police p. 153. 
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more public activities, does not fully fill that gap, but it does underline the 
immense power and influence it wielded. 
One of the other reasons why the LPMC achieved much greater power 
in this period was as a result of major changes in the legal system wrought by 
the First World War, which greatly extended what Stefan Petrow called the 
"policing [of] morals, " which greatly increased the legal instruments available 
to litigants in such fields. In 1915 the Defence of the Realm Act (usually called 
DORA for short) was passed in order to strengthen the hands of the government 
in their bid to galvanize the British economic and social systems to fight a total 
war. This gave ministers the right to assume additional powers at short notice, 
by means of Orders in Council (an administrative function signed by the 
monarch, not a legislative process that required Parliamentary ratification) and 
led to a number of arcane powers being introduced, some of them in very 
surprising areas. For instance, laws against drink, drugs and prostitution were all 
tightened under DORA, and many of these changes were later codified under 
new legislation to ensure they continued into the years of peace (in the case of 
this thesis, the important ones were the Licensing Act of 1921 and the 
Dangerous Drugs Act of the same year). An amended form of DORA was also 
left on the statute book for use against major civil events (a General Strike, for 
instance) in the form of the Emergency Powers Act of 1920. 
This topic has been discussed in detail by K. D. Ewing and C. A. Gearty, 
in The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in 
Britain, 1914-1945 (Oxford 2000). In it they closely analyze the effect of 
DORA upon the legal and political structures of Britain, and especially the way 
in which it was used (amongst a variety of other legislation including the 
Mutiny Act of 1797) against Communists and other people considered enemies 
of the State, and in the Irish troubles, comparing it to the treatment of the British 
Union of Fascists in the 1930s. Joynson-Hicks the scourge of the Communist 
party moves in and out of its pages, although he seems to be curiously marginal 
to the main study. However, it concentrates on political freedoms. DORA also 
had a major and lasting impact upon moral freedoms as well, and in this thesis 
(especially part 3) it will be noted that it occurs frequently as the act that set the 
legislative powers under which moral policing operated throughout the 1920s. 
One of the most important, as well as the most surprising things revealed in this 
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thesis is how widely DORA was used in activities outside the political sphere, 
and how important it became as a legislative tool, in ways that have never been 
satisfactorily examined. 
For the individual areas of investigation, there is more. While they are 
discussed with more thoroughness in the chapters that deal directly with the 
subjects, I will also briefly list the most important works here. The recent works 
of Steve Nicholson, his three volume epic The Censorship of British Drama 
1900-1968 (2003) and also his less epic but equally detailed study of the 
portrayal of Communism on the stage between the wars, British Theatre and the 
Red Peril (1999) set the standard for work on the Lord Chamberlain's unique 
system of censorship that survived a major inquiry in 1909 to finally be 
abolished by Roy Jenkins in 1968. He was building on earlier work by Nicholas 
de Jongh (a theatre critic) and John Johnston (the last Comptroller of the Lord 
Chamberlain's Office to discharge the duties of theatre censor). There have 
been more modest recent gestures made, for instance in The Cambridge History 
of British Theatre Volume Three: Since 1895 (2004) but these tend to take the 
form of critical assessments of the theatre, its structures and quality, rather than 
an investigation into the mechanics of censorship (as Nicholson's is). So, for 
instance, Maggie Gale's contribution on "The London Stage 1918-1945" is 
more concerned with what was performed, rather than why it could or could not 
be performed, building on her earlier editorial compilation with Clive Barker of 
British Theatre Between the Wars 1918-1939 (2001). The most notable recent 
contribution to literature on theatre censorship apart from Nicholson comes 
from the collaborative effort of Anthony Aldgate and James Robertson, 
Censorship in Theatre and Cinema (2005). This work, despite its comparative 
shortness, is as the title implies a comparative study of censorship in theatre and 
film, arranged by themes over the period 1912 (when cinema censorship may be 
said to have begun with the formation of the British Board of Film Censorship) 
and 1968 (when theatre censorship was abolished) although it also contains a 
brief discussion of the continuing presence of the BBFC after that date. 
Valuable in its ambition and in its scope, it draws important parallels between 
the Lord Chamberlain's office (established by law) and the BBFC (established 
by the film industry and yet consciously modelled on the Lord Chamberlain's 
system). This thesis aims to go rather further, however, by identifying 
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similarities in other areas as well, and takes a somewhat different approach by 
concentrating on one short, albeit formative, time-period for the major part of its 
investigations. 
The field of literature and literary censorship has long been an attractive 
one for writers, critics, and historians alike. In 2007 Donald Thomas published 
Freedom's Frontier: Censorship in Modern Britain. It is a substantial study of 
literary censorship in the period between the late nineteenth century and the 
early twenty-first, with reference to how structures of control have evolved over 
time. On the subject of Radclyffe Hall's novel on lesbianism, The Well of 
Loneliness, the prosecution of which dominates chapter 4, there is more 
available, including more recent work. The first significant books in this 
direction were spurred by the freedom of expression debates of the 1960s, and 
were written by (among others) C. H. Rolph (the pen name of author and 
journalist Cecil Rolph Hewitt). This was further embellished by a book entitled 
Radclyffe Hall: A Case of Obscenity? (1968) by Vera Brittain, the famous 
feminist and writer, who was one of the expert witnesses for the defence at the 
1928 trial who was disallowed by the magistrate. More recently, both Diana 
Souhami (a professional writer) and Laura Doan have written substantial 
accounts of the case; Souhami as part of her biography of Radclyffe Hall, for 
which she managed to get the Home Office File that has proven so important to 
this thesis released, and Doan in an attempt to, in her own words, "constitute a 
new direction in lesbian historiography by its insistence on a particularized 
national context and temporality in interrogating a range of myths long accepted 
without question"60 
Other works on this topic include Emily Hamer's Brittania's Glory: A 
History of Twentieth Century Lesbians (1996) which consists of a series of short 
biographies of women who were either avowedly or very probably lesbians 
(including Radclyffe Hall). Both Doan and Hamer are of considerable 
importance to authors on lesbianism. Matt Houlbrook's substantial and very 
interesting book Queer London: Perils and Pleasures in the Sexual Metropolis 
1918-1957 (2005) is also of some use in this regard, particularly in detailing the 
cultural attitude towards homosexuality. It is used not only in this chapter but in 
60 Laura Doan, Fashioning Sapphism: The Origins of a Modern English Lesbian 
Culture (New York 2001) p. xxiii 
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chapter 8 on the subject of the policing of London's open spaces for courting 
couples. Recent books on D. H. Lawrence include a substantial biography by 
Brenda Maddox, entitled The Married Man: A Life of D. H. Lawrence (1994). 
On the subject of film, there is again a substantial popular literature 
available from journalists and critics, including Tom Dewe Matthews and 
Alexander Walker. While both make some effort to provide scholarly sound 
works, both have weaknesses in relation to a study of this nature (for instance, 
Matthews' 1994 book Censored, invaluable in many respects, has no references, 
while Alexander Walker in The Shattered Silents: How the Talkies Came to 
Stay focuses more on the films than the culture of the time that made them). 
Neville March Hunnings' book Film Censors and the Law (1967) offers an 
immense comparative study of legal processes used to control film distribution 
in several countries, which is of some service in sorting through the 
international context of the times. Annette Kuhn has offered much valuable 
work in this field, starting with her PhD thesis, Cinema, Censorship and 
Sexuality 1909-1925 (1989). More recently, she has examined this theme further 
in her article "The Trouble with Elinor Glyn: Hollywood, Three Weeks and the 
British Board of Film Censors" (2008) which examined a particular case 
study. 61 In another article, she also discussed the way in which horror films 
were classified in order to stop children from seeing them (not always 
successfully) 62 Jeffrey Richards' The Age of the Dream Palace: Cinema and 
Society in Britain 1930-1939 (1984) is an interesting and worthwhile book 
about the heyday of cinema in Britain between the wars, although as it 
concentrates on the 1930s rather than the 1920s its usefulness to the particular 
time this thesis concentrates on is limited. The same might be said of Sarah 
Smith's Children, Cinema and Censorship, (2005) although by defining the 
beginning of the 1930s in 1927, when sound films were introduced, there are 
elements of overlap. It is worth noting that Smith's book tended to contradict 
61 Specifically, obviously, the film adaptation of Elinor Glyn's controversial 
novel Three Weeks, about an affair between a young aristocrat and a Balkan 
queen: Annette Kuhn, "The Trouble with Elinor Glyn: Hollywood, Three 
Weeks and the British Board of Film Censors" Historical Journal of Film, 
Radio and Television 28 (2008) pp. 23-35 62 Annette Kuhn, "Children, "Horrific" films and Censorship in 1930s Britain" 
Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 22 (2002) pp197-202 
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Richards' belief in censorship as an instrument of social control in a class 
warfare, arguing instead that most censorship sprang from a desire to prevent 
children seeing anything considered unsuitable for them, drawing on and further 
developing Kuhn's work in this field. 3 While the concept of children seeing 
"unsuitable" films was a recurring one in complaints lodged against the 
BBFC, M the evidence of this thesis would not wholly endorse her conclusions, 
tending rather to agree with the position of Richards that class was an important 
factor. 
On drug laws, which form the basis for chapter seven, there is also a 
substantial literature. Virginia Berridge's oeuvre alone would dignify any 
literature review - the many editions of her substantial work Opium and the 
People: Opiate Use and Drug Control policy in nineteenth and early twentieth 
century England (revised (third? ) edition 1999) have made major contributions 
to our understanding of drug use and control in Britain during that period. Bob 
and Pippa Little and John Seed have also contributed works that attempt to 
reconstruct the past of London's Limehouse area, sometimes referred to as 
"Chinatown, " where many of Britain's drug addicts either lived or obtained 
their supplies. These drew on some less orthodox sources - including the 
memories and oral testimony of one of Limehouse's inhabitants in the case of 
the Littles, and fiction novels (notably those of Sax Rohmer and Sexton Blake) 
to investigate cultural attitudes in the case of John Seed 65 Marek Kohn's brief 
book, Dope Girls: The Birth of the British Drug Underground, despite its 
tabloid sensationalist style, also has some uses and will be cited where 
appropriate. 
Unfortunately there is only a very limited literature on the other two 
topics examined (of nightclubs and police scandals). While James Morton's 
book on police corruption goes some way towards plugging the gap in the latter, 
as does Jonathan Lopian's PhD thesis from the 1980s and the work of Joan 
63 Sarah J. Smith, Children, Cinema and Censorship: From Dracula to the 
Dead End Kids (London 2005) pp. 3 and 7 ' See below pp. 169-171 
65 Annie Lai and Bob and Pippa Little, "Chinatown Annie: The East End Opium 
Trade 1920-1935: The story of a woman opium dealer, " Oral History Journal 
14 (1986) pp. 18-30: John Seed, "Limehouse Blues: Looking for Chinatown in 
the London Docks 1900-1940" History Workshop Journal 62 (2006) pp. 58-85. 
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Lock on the establishment of a female branch of the Metropolitan Police 
published in the 1970s, they expend only a limited space on the salient cases 
before dealing with other examples (Morton) or the troubled systems of the 
Metropolitan police (Lopian) or the continuing development of the "British 
Policewoman" after the Savidge enquiry more or less guaranteed their survival 
and acceptance (Lock) On nightclubs there is, perhaps surprisingly, virtually 
nothing. About the only people to even discuss them are Douglas Goldring and 
Ronald Blythe - two of the worst offenders in creating myths in the popular 
history market. This chapter (chapter 6) is therefore written almost exclusively 
from primary source material of one description or another. 
Even with all this vast literature, there remains a huge gap, one that 
urgently needs filling, and this thesis aims to do that. That it is the lack of any 
sort of proper context to these different strands. Laura Doan claimed that she 
wrote her book, Fashioning Sapphism, partly to try and set the banning of The 
Well of Loneliness in context 67 Yet the context she had in mind was a purely 
lesbian and gender context. In claiming that the trial helped crystallize a British 
lesbian culture, she may have been correct. But the trial also reflected a much 
broader culture of suppression and control in the 1920s, one supported and 
encouraged by the Home Office but not always or even especially often created 
by it. The evidence gathered for this thesis, working in and out of the literature, 
reveals that it was not even confined to obscenity, sexual mores or swearing - 
drink, drugs and Bolsheviks were all attacked and regulated through various 
laws aimed at cultures that promoted them. There was a clearly a solid and 
widespread belief, at least in the Home Office, the law enforcement agencies 
and possibly among politicians and the public (although there the evidence is 
more doubtful) that the State could and should intervene in order to keep society 
"clean" - of sex, drugs, drink and Communism. The work of Matt Houlbrook 
and the banning of The Well of Loneliness suggests that it also extended to 
homosexuality, while in chapter 4 we will see that it also encompassed art. This 
66 James Morton, Bent Coppers: The Story of Police Corruption (London 1993): 
Jonathan Bernard Lopian, "Crime, Police and Punishment 1918-1929: 
Metropolitan experiences, perceptions and policies, " University of Cambridge 
PhD thesis (1986): Joan Lock, The British Policewoman: Her Story (London 
1979) 
67 Doan p. xxiii 
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"cultural" belief in moral control forms the bedrock of the topics explored in 
this thesis. 
In the interests of providing a fuller understanding of the culture of 
repression in this period, this thesis attempts to draw all these strands, including 
the existing literature, together in a bid to show by comparisons that it was a 
well-established and deeply embedded attitude in the psyche of the Home Office 
and indeed of at least one Home Secretary. In the interests of making an attempt 
to provide as much context to the topic as possible, let us now turn to the 
somewhat eccentric life and political career of that eponymous Home Secretary. 
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2) Drooping Bricks: The Career of Sir William Joynson- 
Hicks, lst Viscount Breitford of Newick. 
"[Joynson-Hicks was] A prosperous solicitor.. . he was very keen on 
motoring and on police raids to seize the works of such notorious 
pornographic authors as Radcliffe [sic] Hall and D. H. Lawrence. " 
Roy Jenkins. ' 
On the 26th of March 2006, an article appeared in the Sunday Telegraph. It 
contained, as an incidental part of the main argument, a list of the longest 
serving Home Secretaries of the twentieth century. It put Jack Straw equal in 
length of tenure with William Whitelaw at four years and 37 days. This, 
confidently declared Matthew d'Ancona, was "trumped only by Douglas Hurd 
(four years and 54 days), Herbert Gladstone (four years and two months), 
Herbert Morrison (four years and five months), Rab Butler (a day shy of five 
and a half years), and Chuter Ede (six years and two months). "2 A most 
interesting list, in its own way, despite a few trifling errors of date. Given that 
these statistics emanated from the Home Office itself, at that time in a state of 
meltdown, small errors are not maybe terribly surprising. Precise dates of 
ministerial tenure are always, in any case, at best guesswork. 
4 But there was one 
far more serious omission. In fact, one Home Secretary had somehow got left 
off the list. 
Sir William Joynson-Hicks, Home Secretary throughout the second 
Baldwin Government of 1924-29, was Home Secretary for four years and seven 
months, putting him fourth in the pantheon for length of tenure behind Ede, 
1 Baldwin (London 1987) p. 179 (biographical note). 
2 Matthew d'Ancona, "Mr Blair is now, at best, a politician in remission, " 
Sunday Telegraph (Opinion) 26/3/2003 
3 This list was published in 2006 at the time the "foreign prisoner scandal" that 
forced Charles Clarke's resignation was about to break. 
4 For an extremely clear exposition of the difficulties in this area, see David and 
Gareth Butler, Twentieth Century British Political Facts 1900-2000 (revised 
eighth edition Basingstoke 2005) p. 
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Butler and Morrison (four years and eight months, not five months) 
5 Yet, 
unlike most on the list above, he is not a household name. Even 1, a political 
historian since my mid-teens, had never heard of him until W. D. Rubinstein 
suggested him as an unexplored potential thesis topic. This is even more 
remarkable when the fact that he was a far more controversial Home Secretary 
than any in modem times is taken into account. His tenure in office featured 
what the normally sympathetic Keith Middlemas and John Barnes described as 
a governmental attitude of "rabid anti-Bolshevism, "6 the General Strike of 1926, 
a major purity campaign, in the arts, literature, and the liquor trade, which was 
regarded as a result of Joynson-Hicks's personal Puritanism, the extension of 
votes for women, substantial prison reform, and a series of major police 
scandals. 
The Sunday Telegraph did, with rather an ill grace, correct this mistake 
when their attention was drawn to it' But it is perhaps symptomatic of a wider 
issue. Joynson-Hicks, as he was always called, was such a highly controversial 
figure that many people doubtless felt he was probably better forgotten. A. P. 
Herbert referred to "the gentle sound of dropping bricks, "8 and it is true that no 
politician so gaffe-prone as Joynson-Hicks could aspire to Cabinet rank today 
unless he (or she) had abilities quite out of the ordinary. Yet Joynson-Hicks was 
not unusually gifted. Clever, industrious, a superb mob orator with a turn for 
extreme rhetoric and long practical experience as a solicitor and politician, yes: 
talented beyond the likes of Austen Chamberlain, Birkenhead, Sir Robert Home 
and Winston Churchill, whom he leapfrogged in the Cabinet pecking order after 
1922, definitely not. 
Of course, the division of the Unionists now called the "slice off the 
top, " when a large majority of the most talented and experienced Unionists 
withdrew temporarily from front-line politics after Chamberlain's ousting as 
s See Butler and Butler p56 for the full list of Home Secretaries 1900-2001 
(with dates) 
Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London 1969) p. 
283 
7 They published a letter I wrote to them on this subject in the next issue, under 
the title "How fascinating. " The ill-grace may be partly because in my email I 
added in brackets "(even if you do not publish this letter, I strongly recommend 
you print a correction). " See "Letters, " The Sunday Telegraph, 2nd April 2006 
Quoted in Middlemas and Barnes p. 283 
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leader in 1922, was of great assistance in his rise to prominence. Without it, he 
certainly would have had no hope of cabinet office, let alone such high cabinet 
office. But he had more than loyalty to Bonar Law and Baldwin to recommend 
him. He may have been, as Home Secretary, "a leap in the dark, "9 but he was 
experienced, able, industrious and with practical experience of law enforcement 
as a solicitor. In an office that, then as now, is a gruelling and thankless one, 
these were necessary qualities. Perhaps a brief look at Joynson-Hicks's career 
may serve to elaborate some of these highly confusing points about him. 
There are two very different streams of thought about Joynson-Hicks. 
Ronald Blythe saw him as a pompous, crass, reactionary fool. H. A. Taylor, the 
official biographer who had access not only to the Joynson-Hicks family but 
also to writings of Joynson-Hicks himself, for a planned memoir, was much 
more sympathetic, seeing Joynson-Hicks as an industrious, irascible, but 
essentially kindly and well-meaning man, with a streak of humility that was not 
often shown. 10 Here the question of agendas and motive comes in. Ronald 
Blythe's book, while officially a work of history, is in effect a satire, bordering 
in many places upon a work of fiction. Taylor, of course, as he was writing the 
official biography and was therefore presumably commissioned to do so by 
Lord Brentford's family, would naturally be more sympathetic than a satirical 
take. It is not always easy, presented with two such opposites, to come to a 
reasonable conclusion based on the evidence. However, it is necessary to 
attempt to do so. Fortunately, there is at least a skeleton of facts that is not in 
dispute. 
In later life, Joynson-Hicks commented that he had often been accused of being 
a Victorian and a Puritan. He freely admitted that he was both: "the first, due to 
the date of my birth, and the second, from the nature of my upbringing"11 
William Hicks -- the Joynson came later - was born in 1865, the year of 
Palmerston's death, in London, the eldest of four sons of Henry Hicks, 
merchant. The family was increasingly prosperous, but maintained a sternly 
9 ibid. 
lo H. A. Taylor Jix, Viscount Brentford. being the authoritative and official 
biography of the Rt. Hon. William Joynson-Hicks, first Viscount Brentford of 
Newick (London 1933) p. 7 
11 ibid. p. 13 
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evangelical outlook on life that bordered on the Calvinistic. Sundays were days 
of prayer and meditation, in addition to the two church services they attended. 
Hicks clearly had a good relationship with his parents, especially with 
his mother, who lived to be over ninety and died not long before he did. 12 It was 
therefore only natural that he should accept their worldview as his own and 
develop it, until it became practically second nature to him. This was reinforced 
by the fact that he was not, as was usual for the elder sons of affluent families, 
sent away to boarding school. Instead, he became a day boy at Merchant 
Taylors' School in Charterhouse, and lived at home with his parents. This did 
not necessarily, however, make his upbringing any the less strict. When the 
aged Henry Hicks was asked if he was proud of the success of his four sons (all 
of whom achieved distinction in their professions) he commented that he was 
not, because he always demanded the best from them. 13 
Some saw in this upbringing the signs of an emotional and cultural 
sterility - symbolized by the decision of William Hicks to sign the pledge at the 
age of just fourteen. It was a promise, so far as can be judged, that he kept 
through all the remaining 52 years of his life. Or, in the words of Ronald Blythe, 
"his [Hicks'] first refusal in a long career of professional negation. "14 Taylor, 
on the contrary, concluded that it was the influence of his local parish priest, the 
vicar of Christ Church, Highbury. 's Whatever it was, it was clearly a first step in 
formulating a personality based upon denial and rigid self-discipline, that was to 
serve him well both as a solicitor with a heavy workload and in his later 
political career. 
Hicks did not go to a university, instead being articled to a solicitor in 
London upon leaving school in 1881. His pursuits for most of the next seven 
years, until he was in his early twenties, seem to have been normal for his class 
and occupation at the time, including Freemasonry (becoming Master of his 
Lodge at the age of twenty-five) and riding, as well as the usual sports of tennis, 
golf and croquet. Rather more unusual was his habit of practicing making 
speeches to his colleagues in the firm. This was not appreciated, and eventually 
12 H. A. Taylor, p. 15 
13 ibid. p. 15 
la Ronald Blythe, The Age of Illusion: England in the Twenties and Thirties 
1919-1940 (London 1963,2001) p. 22 
15 Taylor, p. 16 
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culminated in a violent assault upon his person, where he was lifted bodily and 
hurled from the building by a burly colleague. 16 
He seems, in between times, to have distinguished himself as a solicitor, 
with a good grasp of the necessary paperwork and also a keen sense of how to 
handle the necessary procedures and officials for a practicing solicitor. He was 
also a skilled debater -a skill honed both by a school debating society and his 
unpopular forays into office oratory - which made him a formidable opponent 
in an action. 17 
At the age of twenty-three, having fulfilled his articles over a five year 
period, Hicks decided to strike out on his own. This was a bold decision, one 
fraught with considerable risk, and it seems that initially he found the going 
difficult. However, after a few years his practice began to grow - not least 
because he served his clients so well that their opponents started to come to him 
too. One letter, instructing him to take the steps necessary to collect a bad debt, 
closed with the immortal words, "I hope you will pursue this man as relentlessly 
as you pursued me. 
Even at this time, Hicks was showing signs of the peculiarly candid 
mode of expression that was to so bedevil his political career. Instead of 
vaguely threatening consequences of moment in sinister innuendoes, he warned 
opponents to "look out for squalls. " One farmer in Lincolnshire, which was 
suffering from severe storms at the time, was informed blithely that "his past 
experiences would be as nothing compared with the tornado that would break 
over his head if he did not pay what he owed. "19 
However, his first major breakthrough in terms of work came when his 
father was voted onto the board of the London General Omnibus Company in 
1904. With this new connection, Henry Hicks was able to slip some work his 
son's way, and the Board were sufficiently impressed by his industry and 
capability that his workload from them grew until he finally became their 
official solicitor. This had the unintended side-effect of making Hicks into an 
expert on transport law, which he broadened into the study of modem transport 
16 Taylor pp. 24-5: Blythe p. 22 
17 Taylor, p. 24 
18 ibid. p. 27 
19 ibid. 
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more generally. In 1907 he became chairman of the Motor Union, a pressure 
group on behalf of motorists, and in 1911, when it merged with the Automobile 
Association, he became chairman of that instead and remained so until entering 
the government in 1922. While his original work was with cars and omnibuses, 
he was also a pioneer in the field of aviation and mechanized farm machinery, 
work that was to bring him minor acclaim in World War 1.20 
In 1894, while on holiday in France, he met Grace Joynson, the daughter 
of a wealthy Manchester silk manufacturer. She was eight years younger than he 
was, but Hicks seems to have been quickly interested in her, and they became 
engaged. This did not, in fact, stop Hicks from completing his tour of the south 
of France and Italy, although it does seem to have telescoped the Italian leg 
slightly? I They were married the following year, with Hicks adding his wife's 
maiden name to his own. 
There seem to have been persistent rumours, later in Joynson-Hicks' 
life, that he kept a mistress. These rumours were codified in the 1926 modern 
dress production of Rutland Boughton's opera Bethlehem, where King Herod 
was played as a modem Home Secretary complete with wife and mistress. 2 
However, Rutland Boughton was staging a deliberate and calculated attack on 
the Establishment in the aftermath of the General Strike, and his production may 
have been the cause of the rumours rather than merely be giving effect to them. 
20 F. M. L. Thompson, `Hicks, William Joynson- , first Viscount Brentford (1865-1932)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
Press, Sept 2004; online edn, May 2006 
pttp: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/33858, accessed 4 Dec 20071 
Taylor pp. 34-5, Blythe p. 23 
22 See Steve Nicholson, "A Critical Year in Perspective: 1926" in Baz Kershaw 
(ed) The Cambridge History of British Theatre Volume III: Since 1895 
(Cambridge 2004) pp. 127-142, p. 141: "Herod gives vent to his feelings in 
regular Joynson-Hick's (sic) style. " Michael Hurd also referred to this Herod as 
the "embodiment of capitalism" (Jesus was born in a miner's cottage for 
contrast). There can be no doubt of Boughton's commitment to Communism 
and his estrangement from orthodox religion - he may perhaps have been 
tempted to go further into a personal and scurrilous attack on a Home Secretary 
who really did embody both anti-Bolshevism and religious orthodoxy. See 
Michael Hurd, Rutland Boughton and the Glastonbury Festivals (Oxford 1993): 
for the 1926 production of Bethlehem, p. 180; for Boughton's rejection of 
religion, p. 18; and for his Communism, which endured from the General Strike 
until his resignation from the CPGB in protest at the treatment of the Hungarian 
revolutionaries, p. 23, pp. 230-31 
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On the face of it, Joynson-Hicks, the committed, Puritanical Home Secretary 
whose ruthless crackdown on promiscuity in Hyde Park nearly forced his 
resignation, cuts a rather unlikely figure as a womaniser. 23 Neither Taylor nor 
Blythe make this claim, although Blythe derides the marriage as "useful rather 
than brilliant, " and there is some evidence to suggest that in later years Sir 
William and Lady Joynson-Hicks were not especially close. 4 Taylor would 
refute that notion, describing an ideal marriage which brought Joynson-Hicks 
"the real blessing of true happiness at home. "25 It is certainly not impossible that 
he kept a mistress. It would not have been by any means unusual for a politician 
of his stature and background to have women other than his wife in his life - 
Lloyd George, Birkenhead and Curzon being three obvious examples. But in the 
absence of any hard evidence, it must be considered improbable. 
Whatever the truth of his marital state, it is certainly true that in 
conventional, outward terms of the time the Joynson-Hicks marriage was a 
success. It brought Joynson-Hicks a very important step in his political career 
by introducing him to Manchester society, trading on his father-in-law's 
connections and established presence in Manchester Unionist politics. 
Joynson-Hicks (as he must now be called) had long been interested in 
politics, symbolized by his insistence on practicing speeches in front of his 
unfortunate colleagues. In 1898 Joynson's influence secured his son-in-law's 
adoption as candidate for North Manchester, a safe Liberal seat, and one that 
Joynson-Hicks failed to turn into a Tory one. He came extremely close, cutting 
the majority of Charles Swann from 455 to 26 in the election of 1900, but that 
may be due to Swann's "Little Englander" status and Joynson-Hicks' jingoism 
at this key period of the Boer War. The failure to win the seat did not disillusion 
Joynson-Hicks, who continued to fight for seats in Manchester for ten years, but 
he later admitted that his career might have been more successful had he been 
23 See below chapter 8, especially pp. 264-265 
24 Blythe p. 23. During the Savidge crisis (see below chapter 8), Savidge's 
father wrote c/o Lady Grace Joynson-Hicks to the Home Secretary. Her reply 
mentioned that her husband "was away on holiday, " presumably without her. 
See Lady Grace Joynson-Hicks to J. Savidge, 19th August 1928, in NA HO 
144/17754/512746/132 
ZS Taylor p. 35 
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given the eight years in Parliament he was denied by his failure in north 
Manchester. 26 
The subsequent decline of the Salisbury and Balfour government did not 
do his prospects much good either. In 1906, at the height of the Tariff Reform 
furor, he was pitched into battle against the arch-Tory renegade, Winston 
Churchill. Churchill, first elected in 1900, had left the Unionist benches in 1903 
over Tariff Reform for the Liberals. There is some evidence to suggest that the 
Liberals' social policy, as well as their fiscal policy, had some bearing on this, 
as he had argued for a measure of social reform to cure the ills of industrial 
Britain. 27 Since his defection, Churchill had become one of the Liberals' most 
vicious attack dogs in their pursuit of the Tory government, and as a result had 
become very unpopular among his former colleagues. Joynson-Hicks was, so 
far as his uncharacteristically tortuous pronouncements on the subject can be 
judged, a Balfourite (i. e. in favour of retaliatory tariffs against countries that had 
already put up barriers to entry in a bid to protect their own economies). It may 
be unfair to Joynson-Hicks to refer to his position as "tortuous" - Balfour was 
never very clear on exactly where he stood in the fiscal debate, and his position 
changed fairly often, presumably because he knew how badly divided his party 
was on the issue and feared that a firm lead from him might cause it to fracture 
altogether28 According to Richard Rempel, around 55% of all Unionist 
candidates made the same compromise as Joynson-Hicks, with the large 
majority of the rest declaring for Chamberlain. 29 
However, this all proved rather irrelevant for two reasons. First of all 
Joynson-Hicks lost, and lost badly. That was inevitable, given the tide of the 
electoral process. What was perhaps not foreseen was how bad the particular 
catastrophe in Manchester would be. Joynson-Hicks himself warned, "if the 
26 ibid. pp. 36-42 describes the campaign. 
27 See Huw F. Clayton, "A Fight for Free Food? The right-wing free traders and 
Joseph Chamberlain, 1903-1906" MA dissertation, University of Wales 
Aberystwyth (2005) pp. 20 and 31 for a brief discussion of Churchill's 
defection, and why it remained relatively unusual among the Unionist Free 
Traders. 
28 See Taylor, pp. 57-8: cf. Richard Rempel, Unionists Divided: Arthur Balfour, 
Joseph Chamberlain and the Unionist Free Traders (Newton Abbot 1972) pp. 
59-60,129-130 
29 Rempel p. 158 
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Conservatives lost... Churchill would go flying over like a comet crying 
"Gentlemen of England, the Conservative stronghold of Lancashire has 
fallen! , "30 Indeed it did fall, spectacularly, as the Unionists forfeited all their 
seats in Manchester and its satellite towns, where the casualties included 
Balfour himself, beaten by 2,000 votes in East Manchester, a seat he had held 
for twenty years 31 
The second is that the campaign was fought on issues other than Free 
Trade at a local level. Joynson-Hicks actually talked predominantly about Poor 
Law Reform (which he supported) and repeal of the Aliens Act (which he 
opposed) as well as the Established Church and women's suffrage. Here, then, 
for the first time, we get the curious dichotomy of the reactionary against the 
enlightened reformer. 
In a recent study, Richard Toye notes that it was Joynson-Hicks and not 
Churchill who pushed the issue of Old Age pensions in the 1906 election, 
despite Churchill's later reputation for radicalism. Toye's conclusion that it was 
as part of a drive to keep Tariff Reform as far from the agenda seems a little 
unfair. 32 Joynson-Hicks' concern for Poor Law reform would have been of a 
piece with his later obsession with penal reform in the 1920s, where he set a 
high standard that subsequent Home Secretaries have struggled to live up to 
ever since. At the same time there can be no doubt that he would wish to keep 
off fiscal policy for fear of saying something that would embarrass him, or 
worse, his leader. The Aliens Act proved rather more problematic for Joynson- 
Hicks, because of a large Jewish community in the constituency and his flat 
refusal to even consider repeal of the Aliens Act (which was regarded as anti- 
Semitic). The difficulties with the Jewish community that this caused were 
exacerbated by his refusal on religious grounds to attend a Sunday rally for 
them, and his counterattacks led to the allegations of anti-Semitism that dogged 
him throughout his life and on into posterity. 33 
30 Quoted in A. K. Russell, Liberal Landslide: The General Election of 1906 
(Newton Abbot 1973) p. 147 
31 See Russell, pp148-150, also David Butler and Gareth Butler, British 
Political Facts 1900-2000 (revised edition Basingstoke 2005) p. 77 
32 Richard Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill: Rivals for Greatness (London 
2007) p. 40 
33 Taylor pp. 61-2 
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It is only fair to add - and this is another complicating factor on the 
radicallreactionary front - that Churchill also had serious problems with 
disruptive influences at his meetings. Churchill had not previously been an 
opponent of votes for women, but as a result of continual heckling by the 
suffragettes, he changed his views and declared that he did not wish to see 
His views women get the vote (although he later withdrew the remark) 
34 
remained ambiguous throughout his life, but there is good reason to think that 
he opposed the enfranchisement of women in 1928 35 Joynson-Hicks was let off 
much more lightly by the suffragettes, but his pleas for them to show restraint 
towards his rival met with a frosty refusal 36 
Churchill swept home by 1,241 votes, and Joynson-Hicks was forced to 
watch as this man, ten years his junior, was able to go off to the career that he 
coveted. The Unionists nationwide were reduced to a pitiful rump of 157 MPs, 
under the temporary leadership of Joseph Chamberlain, and his political 
prospects must have seemed gloomier than ever. It is therefore interesting to 
note that a mere two years later he had not only avenged his defeat but 
humiliated the Liberals in the very area where their triumph had been sweetest. 
When the Liberal government had first been formed in 1905, the 
premiership had been taken by the incumbent leader, Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman, who was in poor health at the time and was not expected to 
continue for long. Herbert Asquith, long tipped as a future leader and a much 
younger and more forceful man, had been nominated as the de facto heir 
apparent by being given the Chancellorship of the Exchequer. In 1908 the death 
of Campbell-Bannerman finally saw Asquith take total control of the Liberal 
government. 37 It was very clear that one of the winners in the inevitable 
reshuffle would be Winston Churchill, the man who had comfortably defeated 
Joynson-Hicks in 1906, and that as a new Cabinet minister he would have to 
submit himself for re-election to the House of Commons. 
34 Toye p. 40 
31 See below pp. 74-76 
36 Taylor p. 63 
37 Campbell-Bannerman theoretically resigned, but this was because he had only 
days to live. He never, in fact, moved out of Downing Street, dying there about 
three weeks after his resignation. 
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It was suggested that Churchill should be returned unopposed. The 
arguments in favour of this were that the requirement for re-election was an 
archaic one, that a change of government following the death of a Prime 
Minister was no time to be scoring political points, and that Churchill was such 
an impressive young MP and minister that he deserved to get on with his work 
without all the mudslinging and political point-scoring that characterized a by- 
election. These were all true sound reasons - but the real, overriding reason why 
the Liberals wished to avoid an election seems to have been because they were 
nervous about losing it -a fear that was well justified. 
Joynson-Hicks absolutely refused to bow to this pressure. He announced 
that he wished to fight Churchill on the question of Education. Just as Balfour's 
1902 Act had enraged the "Nonconformist conscience" by giving only Anglican 
vicars the right to enter schools to preach, so the Liberals had enraged 
Anglicanism by taking it away again. However, given the somewhat troubled 
career of Churchill, who was elected as a Unionist for Oldham in 1900, crossed 
the floor to the Liberals in 1903, and had subsequently become a savage critic of 
his old party, it seems unlikely that Churchill would have been granted a simple 
walkover in any case. 
As a result of some inflammatory statements by Joynson-Hicks, the 
campaign was rather an ill-tempered one. In particular, his continued support for 
the controversial Aliens Act earned him the hostility of the Jewish community, 
at whom the Act was widely perceived as being aimed. But he pulled no 
punches in his attacks on Churchill, referring to him as "a guerilla chieftain who 
was once a lieutenant of our party. " He was also savage in his attacks on the 
record of the Campbell-Bannerman government, referring with wild 
exaggeration to policies which had "in two short years... alienated our colonies, 
thrown away the fruits of the Transvaal war, attempted to gerrymander our 
constitution, increased our taxation, flouted our religious convictions, let loose 
chaos and bloodshed in Ireland and are now setting out to attack every trade and 
institution not prepared to obey the rattle of the radical drum. 08 
Churchill made every effort to force the by-election onto the question of 
Free Trade against Protectionism (where Joynson-Hicks was again at his most 
38 From Randolph Churchill, Winston S. Churchill 1874-1965: Volume II Young 
Statesman (London 1967) p. 253 
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tortuous). But he failed, and the question of policies that had enraged those ex- 
Tories who had elected Churchill in 1906 loomed large. Randolph Churchill 
insinuated that the entry of a third candidate into the race, the Marxist Dan 
Irving, siphoned support away from Churchill. In actual fact it would seem 
more likely that this would be cancelled out by those voters who were uneasy 
about Churchill's Radical leanings but could now see there was clear water 
between him and the Marxists. In any case, even had Irving not stood it would 
have made no difference whatsoever to the result, as Joynson-Hicks won 
outright with 50.7% of the vote. 
39 It represented a dramatic turnaround from 
1906, not only in terms of the swing (although at 6.4% that was high enough) 
but in terms of the cultural reversal from the position of total Liberal 
dominance. Of course, the defeat had no real effect on Churchill's career, who 
simply moved to Dundee and sat for that seat until defeated in 1922 by a Labour 
candidate. But it was a sweet triumph for the Manchester Tories nonetheless, 
and one they savoured to the full. 
It was however, to prove something of a poisoned chalice for Joynson- 
Hicks himself. Following the campaign, which had attracted national attention, 
he seemed to become arrogant in the blaze of publicity, and made two serious 
blunders. One was to dog him through his life (and indeed on into death) and 
the other was to seriously hamper his career for more than a decade. He himself 
later commented, "It is a mistake to win a spectacular by-election.. .1 am afraid 
that I thought I was a more important person than I really was"40 
The first mistake was on a personal level. In the aftermath of his victory 
he was invited to a dinner in his honour given by the Maccabean Society. At 
this function, he responded to a toast in very unusual, indeed bizarre, not to say 
rude, fashion: 
"I could say that you were a delightful people, that Jews were 
delightful opponents, that I am very pleased to receive the 
opposition of the Jewish community and that I am, in spite of 
all, your humble and obedient servant. I could say that, but it 
39 Churchill pp. 254-55. The precise figures were Joynson-Hicks 5417 (50.7%) 
Churchill 4988 (46.7%) Irving 276 (2.6%) (Churchill p257) 
40 Taylor p. 99 
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wouldn't be true in the slightest degree. I have beaten you all 
thoroughly and soundly and I am no longer your servant! "4' 
Such feelings towards any defeated block of opponents are understandable - but 
usually the demands of politics meant that they are not bluntly expressed, 
certainly not while in receipt of the hospitality of the target of such abuse. As a 
result, this speech has become a defining position for those who believed that 
Joynson-Hicks was an anti-Semite. Ronald Blythe is the most obvious example, 
but in our own time David Cesarani has also repeated these allegations, backed 
up by a wealth of other evidence. Most of this evidence is rather circumstantial. 
Cesarani makes great play of Joynson-Hicks' remarks to the Maccabean 
Society, his support for the Aliens Act, and his consistent failure to apologize 
for his remarks when offered the chance to do so. Probing Joynson-Hicks' later 
career, Cesarani also concludes that his pursuit of Rufus Isaacs over the 
Marconi scandal, his attacks on Montagu over the Amritsar Massacre, and his 
opposition to a Jewish homeland in Palestine were motivated by anti-Semitism. 
He also accuses Joynson-Hicks of tightening restrictions on Jewish immigration 
acting from the same motives. 
2 Curiously, rabidly anti-Semitic remarks by one 
of Joynson-Hicks' opponents, Chaim Weizmann (albeit directed at the Arabs 
and not the Jews) pass without comment 
43 
On the other hand, both H. A. Taylor and W. D. Rubinstein reject the 
portrait of Joynson-Hicks as an anti-Semite. Rubinstein in particular sought to 
refute the evidence marshalled by Cesarani in support of his arguments, with 
al Quoted in Blythe, p. 27: quoted from the Jewish Chronicle? 
42 Two articles by Cesarani in the late 1980s took this line, although William D. 
Rubinstein commented that they are "virtually identical. " See David Cesarani, 
-The Anti-Jewish Career of Sir William Joynson-Hicks, Cabinet Minister, " 
Journal of Contemporary History 24: 3 (July 1989) pp. 461-482, and "Joynson- 
Hicks and the Radical Right in England (sic) after the First World War, " in 
Tony Kushner and Kenneth Lunn (eds. ) Traditions of Intolerance: Historical 
Perspectives on Fascism and Race Discourse in Britain (Manchester 1989) pp. 
118-139 
43 Cesarani "Joynson-Hicks and the Radical Right, " p. 126, quotes Weizmann as 
saying about the Arab delegation from the Palestinian mandate, "Happily they 
are a fifth-rate people, but they make a stink and they are supported by an anti- 
Semitic clique" (this implicitly included Joynson-Hicks, who was certainly one 
of their supporters). Weizmann subsequently became the first President of Israel 
in 1949. 
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some success. His articles are considerably more detailed than Cesarani's and 
call many of his fundamental assumptions into question. 
44 For one thing, he 
demonstrated that Joynson-Hicks had in fact supported the creation of a Jewish 
state in Palestine at the time of the Balfour Declaration in 1917,45 only changing 
his mind as the dangers and difficulties of establishing such a state in the face of 
native Arab opposition became clear to him - something Cesarani briefly 
acknowledged but hurriedly glossed over. 
46 For another, and far more 
importantly, Rubinstein noted that when Cesarani claimed Joynson-Hicks had 
tried to tighten up immigration laws (with, it was alleged, the aim of stopping 
Jewish refugees from arriving in Britain) he was conveniently ignoring the fact 
that as Home Secretary he allowed more Poles and Russians, who would mostly 
have been Jewish in this period, to take out naturalization than any other Home 
Secretary, firmly asserting that if they had been resident for a long time, obeyed 
the law and paid their taxes, integrating into the British state, they should be 
allowed to become full members of British society. Rubinstein argued that the 
real reason Joynson-Hicks wanted to keep out immigrants was the one he gave 
in Parliament - that there were one million unemployed, and that more workers 
to compete for jobs would cause further hardship and possibly resentment 
47 
44 See W. D. Rubinstein, "Recent Anglo-Jewish Historiography and the Myth of 
Joynson-Hicks's Anti-Semitism, " Parts I and II, The Australian Journal of 
Jewish Studies Volume 7 part I pp. 41-70 and part II pp. 21-43 respectively 
(1993). 
as A letter of 2nd November 1917 by the then Foreign Secretary, Arthur 
Balfour, to Lord Rothschild, stating the Cabinet's sympathy with the aim of the 
establishment a Jewish national home in Palestine and their wish to use their 
"best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, " as long as such a 
state did not compromise the interests of the indigenous peoples. This objective 
was later incorporated into both the Treaty of Sevres and the Mandate of 
Palestine. The original letter is now at the British Library. 
46 Ibid. part I p. 54; "although he [Joynson-Hicks] was certainly an anti-Zionist 
in 1922, he was an equally strong Zionist... in 1917: " cf. Cesarani "Joynson- 
Hicks and the Radical Right, " p. 126; "Churchill... [made] full use of pro- 
Zionist declarations submitted to the Zionist Review, in 1917, by Joynson-Hicks 
and other current anti-Zionists, " which is the only mention he makes of 
Joynson-Hicks' change of heart. 
47 Rubinstein part II, pp. 24-27: cf. Cesarani "Joynson Hicks and the Radical 
Right" pp. 128-131, in which he claims that there were acute difficulties and 
delays "of years" in naturalizations of Jews in this period, plus deportations of 
Jews for various "petty offences. " He offers no details to back these vague 
remarks, and his supporting evidence is a select committee report of early 1925 
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Yet this work did not escape criticism either, as a stinging response from 
Geoffrey Alderman the following year made clear. In this, he accused 
Rubinstein of reading the evidence superficially in order to take anti-Semitic 
remarks that were officially directed at "Bolsheviks" or "Aliens" at their face 
value. He also put forward the argument that Joynson-Hicks' change of heart 
over Zionism between 1917 and 1922 was due not to the evidence that Zionist 
aspirations might be troublesome or costly, but due to an ingrained anti- 
Semitism, which he was openly flaunting as a member of "a group of Gentile 
anti-Zionists who were also notorious anti-Semites. "48 Rubinstein, in a further 
article as part of an increasingly heated correspondence, dismissed this as 
"simply wrong, even allowing the fallacious use of guilt by association" and 
challenged Alderman to name one of these "notorious anti-Semites" (a 
challenge which, due to the closure of the correspondence on the subject, 
Alderman was never able to take up) 49 
The reason for this sensitivity on the question of anti-Semitism is, as 
Jonathon Hopkins shrewdly pointed out, largely the result of a dramatic shift in 
context that occurred after 1945.50 After the Holocaust a large number of 
opinions to do with racial identity that had previously been considered 
respectable, even normal, became unthinkable, and those who had held them 
quietly dropped them. 
5' Joynson-Hicks, who died before Hitler even came to 
power, or John Buchan, who died in 1940, had no opportunity to defend 
themselves from being tarred with the brush of a subsequent set of values. 
on the subject, at which point Joynson-Hicks had been in office only nine 
months, not "years, " and which could have no bearing on the matter at hand. 
48 Geoffrey Alderman, "Recent Anglo-Jewish Historiography and the myth of 
Joynson-Hicks's Antisemitism: a Response, " in The Australian Journal of 
Jewish Studies Volume 8 part I (1994) pp. 112-121: for anti-Semitic remarks 
hidden in another guise, p. 114: on Zionism, p. 117 
49 W. D. Rubinstein, "Professor Alderman and Jix: A Response, " The 
Australian Journal ofJewish Studies Volume 8 part II pp. 192-201, p. 193 
50 Jonathon M. Hopkins, "Paradoxes personified: Sir William Joynson-Hicks, 
Viscount Brentford and the conflict between change and stability in British 
society in the 1920s, " University of Westminster MPhil thesis (1996) p. 124 
sl Another popular or at least widespread form of thinking made unacceptable 
by the Holocaust was eugenics, or "Darwinism, " (after Charles Darwin from 
whose theories of evolution it was loosely derived) necessitating some 
retractions by, for instance, Aldous Huxley: see David Bradshaw, 
"Introduction" to Brave New World (London 1994) pp. vi-viii 
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Probably, as Hopkins concluded, the strong Evangelical influence upon 
Joynson-Hicks made him intolerant of beliefs that differed strongly from his 
own. For instance, a very good case can be made out for a rabid anti- 
Catholicism, there is no doubt through the evidence amassed for the body of this 
thesis that Joynson-Hicks regarded avant-garde social and cultural practices 
with a mixture of disgust and contempt, and that is even before the violent anti- 
Bolshevism that defined his tenure as Home Secretary is discussed. 2 But it is a 
major leap to take from saying that he held something in contempt to saying that 
he was actively working against Jews from pure prejudice, as Cesarani does 53 
The overall evidence is not wholly conclusive, partly because Joynson-Hicks 
sometimes changed his position on various matters, the Balfour Declaration for 
example, but it certainly does not strongly support the theory that Joynson- 
Hicks was an anti-Semite. 
The best answer to charges of anti-Semitism is not to comment that 
many perfectly respectable Tories regarded the Jews with a mixture of 
patronising amusement and contempt, although it is not difficult to find 
evidence of such an attitude in the writings of Buchan or Dorothy L. Sayers. 4 It 
is simply to say that while there can be very little doubt that Joynson-Hicks did 
regard the Jews as less blessed than himself as a white, Protestant Englishman, 
he was not an active or dangerous anti-Semite along the lines of a Hitler or even 
SZ Hopkins pp. 123-124 
53 Cesarani "The Anti Jewish career, " pp. 471-2 
sa See, for instance, Dorothy L. Sayers, Whose Body? (London 1923: 1977): "it 
must be very inconvenient, what with not working on Saturdays and 
circumcising the poor little babies and everything depending on the new moon 
and that funny kind of meat they have with such a slang-sounding name, and 
never being able to have bacon for breakfast, " (p. 46): and cf. John Buchan most 
notoriously in The Thirty-Nine Steps (London 1914) "The Jew is everywhere, 
but you have to go far down the backstairs to find him... a little white-faced Jew 
in a bath chair with an eye like a rattlesnake, " The Penguin Complete Richard 
Hannay (London 1992) p. 8. Sayers had a Jewish lover (John Cournos) and her 
work was first published by Victor Gollancz - Buchan was active on behalf of 
Jewish refugees in the 1930s and was in Hitler's "Black Book" of people to be 
arrested after the invasion of Britain for that reason. Both of these sentences 
were spoken by characters in their works of fiction as part of the 
characterisation process (respectively the scatty Dowager Duchess of Denver 
and the paranoid Scudder) but are often wrongly taken to represent the views of 
the authors; cf. Richard J. Evans, Telling Lies About Hitler: The Holocaust, 
History and the David Irving Trial (London 2002) p. 202, where David Irving 
claimed Scudder's remark showed anti-Semitic prejudice by Buchan. 
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a Belloc. It may indeed be that his reservations about an Israeli homeland in 
Palestine and his statement that he would award citizenship to an immigrant 
who had adopted English as a first language and an English way of living from 
choice, rather than one who kept up as far as possible the cultural and linguistic 
traditions of his birth sprang from anti-Jewish prejudice. 55 But such statements 
did not make him some kind of crypto-fascist, and to suggest otherwise is to 
overstate the case. 
Joynson-Hicks' second mistake was less disastrous in terms of his long- 
term reputation, but more serious in the immediate effect it had upon his 
political career. Following his great victory, bloated with the importance of his 
triumph from the immense press coverage it had received, he made a disastrous 
maiden speech. 
On the 18th May 1908, the House of Commons debated a new 
Elementary Education Act. For sectarian reasons, it had previously proven 
impossible to find a satisfactory lasting solution to the issues raised by the 1902 
Education Act, which had so angered Nonconformists. 56 Both Catholics and 
Anglicans were uneasy about proposals that might weaken the right of parents 
to determine the sort of religious instruction given in schools. John Redmond, 
leader of the Irish Nationalists, had been on his feet to denounce the proposed 
compromise as offending against a point of principle - "rightly or wrongly, we 
consider it inimical to our religion. "57 He was not the only Irish nationalist to 
denounce it, claiming that it was an offence against a point of principle. 
Education had played a crucial part in the Manchester by-election, and Joynson- 
Hicks took the opportunity to jump to his feet on the subject. Forgetting the 
modesty that usually attends such occasions, and failing to accustom himself to 
the difference between a hustings platform and the House of Commons, he 
proceeded to berate the House as though he were the official Unionist 
spokesman on the issue: 
ss Cesarani "Joynson-Hicks and the radical right" pp. 123-4,131-2 
56 See Hugh McLeod, Religion and Society in England, 1850-1914 (Basingstoke 
1996) pp. 92-3 for a brief discussion of the difficulties in this field. 
57 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates 1066-1918: Parliamentary Debates 1892- 
1908 (fourth series) Volume CLXXXVIII (1908) column 1702 
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"Mr JOYNSON-HICKS (Manchester North-West) said he wished 
to congratulate the hon. Member for Louth on the speech he had 
just delivered ... 
he assumed then that they would have the hon. 
Member's support in the lobby against the Second Reading of the 
Bill. He had ventured to intervene in the debate because the 
education question had played a very prominent part in the recent 
election in North-West Manchester. He little thought that in his 
first speech in the House of Commons he would find himself in 
accord with the hon, Member for Waterford [Parnell]"58 
Already Joynson-Hicks had forgotten that he was not speaking for the entire 
Unionist party (referring to "they[we]" instead of "he[I]"). But things got worse. 
His speech became one long, sustained harangue against the Liberal minister, 
who had virtually all his past inconsistencies on the subject flung back at him 
(given how thorny a question this was, there were a number) and finally was 
accused of something far worse - trying to enforce secularism on the country; 
"It might be possible for the other side to force a short bill 
through the House, or through the country, largely owing to the 
votes of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who were elected by a 
proportion of Great Britain which was not affected by the bill S9 
At all events they [the Opposition] refused it on that side of the 
House. Whatever might be their position in the House, outside 
they were supported by an increasing body of opinion. While they 
were willing, absolutely willing, to consider a scheme of 
conciliation or compromise which would preserve the rights of 
churchmen, as were preserved the rights of Roman Catholics, they 
would not compromise in any shape or form as to any proposal 
which gave one iota less to the Church of England than was given 
to Roman Catholics, or Jews, or Nonconformists. The 
58 ibid. column 1714. 
59 The bill applied to England and Wales - the Irish Nationalists seem to have 
opposed it on behalf of Catholics in England, who were not numerous at this 
time. It seems therefore logical to assume that Joynson-Hicks was referring to 
Scottish MPs - such as Asquith himself, and his late rival Churchill. 
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Government might force the Bill through the House if they liked, 
but he would tell them that if the Opposition had not a majority 
today they very nearly had it, and it was not for them to suggest 
terms of compromise. They would wait until the time came when 
they could dictate terms to the other side, and they would not 
accept any compromise which did not meet all forms of rights, or, 
as it had been shortly put, which did not provide that every man 
should have his child educated in his own religion out of the rates 
he himself paid. "60 
It seems to say the least doubtful whether Balfour was entirely happy at having 
his room to manoeuvre stripped away by one backbencher claiming to speak for 
the entirety of a party to which he had only newly come. Such behaviour was 
pure arrogance on the part of Joynson-Hicks. The Evening Standard laconically 
noted, "It was good of Mr. Joynson-Hicks to come and speak to the House this 
week. "61 
Quite clearly Joynson-Hicks had become puffed up with his own 
importance. But it is important to emphasise that he always spoke with a wild 
exaggeration of language - both before and after 1908. His earlier comments 
telling opponents to "look out for squalls" and later on, an intemperate stance on 
Ulster, both revealed the same total inability to moderate his language in the 
interests of prudence, tact, politics or indeed stability. While in 1906 one 
backbencher made a truly magnificent maiden speech and spent most of the rest 
of his political career struggling to live up to the promise that most of his 
contemporaries saw, before dying young in 1930 from persistent alcohol abuse, 
Joynson-Hicks was not F. E. Smith and he failed to set the same standard of 
brilliant invective and masterful attack that saw Smith rise so fast to the top of 
the Unionist hierarchy. 62 
60 ibid. columns 1721-22 
61 Taylor pp. 100-101. These mistakes took place in the reverse order (i. e. his 
Parliamentary mistakes came first) but it seemed more logical to deal with them 
in this fashion. 
62 For a brief biography of F. E. Smith, see John Campbell, `Smith, Frederick 
Edwin, first earl of Birkenhead (1872-1930)', Oxford Dictionary of National 
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Years later, after Joynson-Hicks had died, Stanley Baldwin was quoted 
as saying that "he may have said many foolish things but he rarely did one. i63 It 
is true that Joynson-Hicks was usually sounder on the practical side of politics 
and administration than he was in his rhetoric. Yet rhetoric is a large part of 
what politicians do. If Joynson-Hicks said foolish things then in effect he was 
doing something foolish. At the very least, this calls his judgement into 
question. Moreover, some of the remarks he made later actually called his 
mental balance into question as well. 
At the very least, his unfortunate first foray into Parliamentary oratory 
confirmed his status as a "natural" backbencher, of a certain level of ability but 
intemperate and lacking in judgement. His rhetoric over the next few years did 
nothing to dispel the earlier doubts that had been raised - rather it confirmed 
them. During the Ulster crisis prior to the First World War, he emerged as a 
savage critic of the blundering attempts of Asquith and Churchill to control the 
increasingly tense situation by military means, urging them to "Fire if you dare! 
Fire and be damned! "M In between, however, he had modest success. In 1910 
he lost Manchester North-West, but immediately returned as the member for 
Brentford, which was much more convenient for his London home. During the 
Parliament Act crisis he declared that he had no objection to an all-elected 
second chamber, on the grounds that a chamber elected on a hereditary principle 
was an anachronism, at odds both with his perceived status as a Diehard and 
Unionist policy of salvaging what they could of the House of Lords with its 
huge inbuilt Unionist majority. 65 He also severely embarrassed Colonel Seely, 
the Secretary of State for War, when he revealed that there were only 43 aircraft 
in a fit state to take to the air in the British armed forces, not the 120 Seely had 
claimed on the floor of the House. The government's majority fell to 33 on the 
question (notionally with the Irish and Labour members it should have been 
over 100) and Joynson-Hicks had established himself as a leading authority on 
Biography, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 
iýý: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/36137, accessed 14 Jan 2008] 
Leo Amery, diary entry for 8th June 1932, in John Barnes and David 
Nicholson (eds. ) The Leo Amery Diaries Volume II: The Empire at Bay 1929- 
1945 (London 1988), p. 240 
64 Taylor p. 127 
65 ibid. p. 120 
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aircraft in the House of Commons - fortuitously, although his previous 
experience in motor transport made him perhaps a natural candidate for such a 
role, given that aircraft were to become increasingly important in World War 
One. 66 
During the war itself Joynson-Hicks remained in Parliament, but raised a 
regiment known as the "Middlesex Footballers" for the fighting in France. He 
refused an honorary Colonelcy on the grounds that he was only doing his duty 
for his country, and deserved no recognition for it. 7 He also maintained the 
pressure on the question of air defence, but was not considered for any vacancy 
in a ministerial post, not even at the new Air Board he had helped create. Taylor 
attributed this to some "malignant influence which seems to be at work . 9-)68 In 
actual fact it seems much more likely that he was generally distrusted by those 
in authority for his previous intemperance. Throughout the war, Britain had a 
Liberal Prime Minister, first Asquith and then Lloyd George, neither of whom 
had had any reason to be well-disposed to Joynson-Hicks before the war, and 
who would have seen no particular reason to press his claims to office over, say, 
Birkenhead, Austen Chamberlain, Balfour, Bonar Law, Sir Robert Home or 
Lord Robert Cecil. It is worth noting that Joynson-Hicks was not the only one 
so frozen out: Neville Chamberlain, for all his vast ability and high-level 
connections, was only briefly utilised as Minister for National Service and then 
dismissed partly because Lloyd George took a very intense dislike to him on 
wholly irrational grounds. 
69 
In 1919 Joynson-Hicks' war work was recognised by the awarding of a 
baronetcy. Even Taylor admits that he was extremely depressed by this. At the 
66 ibid. pp. 125-127 
67 Taylor pp. 134-135: Blythe p. 28. 
68 Taylor p. 142 
69 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Major (London 1997) pp. 
227-8 comments that Lloyd George took a dislike to the shape of Chamberlain's 
head, and treated him in such a way as to force his resignation a few months 
later. It is only fair to say that Robert Self blamed Chamberlain's unhappy 
tenure more largely on the newly-formed department and Neville Chamberlain's 
own blunders, including his habit of refusing to change his mind once it was 
made up, although he does not deny the role that physiognomy played in Lloyd 
George's attitude towards him. See Robert Self, Neville Chamberlain: A 
Biography (Aldershot 2006) pp. 50-63 for a detailed account of Neville 
Chamberlain's tenure of this office and the difficulties he encountered. 
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age of fifty-three, with a sterling record of war service behind him, a specialism 
in transport that had been disregarded by those in authority (he was also 
overlooked for any sort of post at the newly-formed Department of Transport in 
1919) and no post in government in all that time while his contemporaries 
Churchill and Birkenhead soared aloft, he thought his political career was at an 
end 70 
In actual fact his political career was about to unexpectedly blossom. 
This was largely due to fortuitous factors wholly outside his control, but saw 
him catapulted in a mere five years from obscure backbencher to Home 
Secretary. 
The first upturn in Joynson-Hicks' fortunes came as a result of his 
decision the following year to pay a trip to India. His views on India were 
unquestionably and solidly Diehard. He had once publicly commented that India 
was not being run for the benefit of the Indians, but solely for the benefit of the 
British: "I know it is frequently said at missionary meetings that we conquered 
[India] to raise the level of the Indians. That is cant... We hold it as the finest 
outlet for British goods in general, and for Lancashire cotton goods in 
particular. "71 While he was undoubtedly quite correct in this analysis, the idea 
of say, Birkenhead or Montagu, both of who served as Secretary of State for 
India, saying such things (despite the fact that Birkenhead was also a Diehard) 
is ridiculous. 
By a coincidence, his visit took place in the shadow of the Amritsar 
Massacre. This event - known as the Jallianwalla Bagh Massacre to Indians, 
after the walled garden in which it happened - was highly controversial, and has 
remained so. To reduce to its lowest common denominator, after a series of riots 
and strikes General Reginald Dyer, the military chief of the city of Amritsar in 
the Punjab (very close to what is now the India-Pakistan border) imposed de 
facto martial law, including a curfew and a banning of assemblies. When a 
crowd gathered at the walled Jallianwalla Bagh garden in the city in defiance of 
this order, Dyer ordered 90 troops to fire on the crowd without warning. They 
expended 1,650 rounds of ammunition and killed a minimum of 379 people 
(Indian estimates are a good deal higher). The troops also withdrew 
70 Taylor pp. 144-5 
71 Blythe, pp. 27-28 
60 
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immediately without allowing any time for treatment of the many wounded 
(officially estimated at 1,200, although again Indian estimates are nearer two 
thousand). Subsequently, to further stamp his authority on the already cowed 
city, Dyer ordered that all native Indians must go down a street where a white 
female missionary had been assaulted on their hands and knees during the hours 
of daylight, and had six men, who had been convicted of a felony unrelated to 
that crime, flogged there. As the houses on that street had no back entrances, 
and a curfew was still in force, the residents were forced to crawl to their houses 
in a repellent mix of mud and effluent. 
The questions posed by the Amritsar massacre are not especially 
germane to this thesis. On a purely human question, the estimates of the dead 
and injured vary widely, yet seem likely to have been higher than the "official" 
figure. Yet Dyer was also, curiously, made an honorary member of a Sikh 
temple in the city for his actions, despite the fact that many of the dead were 
Sikhs from the surrounding villages come in for an important religious 
festival. 73 What also cannot be denied, unless he genuinely did fire on a riot, 
which seems unlikely given that nobody now claims that the members of the 
meeting were armed, was that he applied far more than the minimum force 
required. A volley over the heads of the crowd would probably have dispersed 
them. The edict ordering all Indians to go down a street on their hands and 
7' See Nigel Collett, The Butcher ofAmritsar: General Reginald Dyer (London 
2005: 2007) p. 263 for some of the estimate, which range from 200 dead to 
1,500 (nobody has even attempted a reliable figure of wounded). A recent 
investigation concluded that the British figure of 379 dead and 1,200 wounded 
was possible but definitely on the low side: estimates of over 850 dead and 
2,000 wounded were suggested to be out of the question given the ammunition 
expended and the type of gun used, and this was the upper limit offered. H. F. 
Clayton and S. R. Dunbar (joint presentation) "The Massacre at Jallianwala 
Bagh, Amritsar: Some Thoughts on the Casualty Figures. " Paper presented at 
Peterhouse College, Cambridge, as part of the Warfare and Organised Violence 
Workshop, 10th March 2009. 
73 See T. R. Moreman, `Dyer, Reginald Edward Harry (1864-1927)', Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004, for an 
excellent brief discussion [httpJ/www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/32947, 
accessed 14 Jan 2008]. This subsequently proved highly controversial: it seems 
that one elder who was particularly sympathetic to the British was involved, and 
he was subsequently disowned by the Sikh League. See Derek Sayer, "British 
Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920" Past and Present 131(1991) pp. 
130-164 p. 144 
62 
knees was quite simply indefensible, and of a piece with his disproportionate 
action at Jallianwalla Bagh. He himself later admitted that he had been aiming 
not to disperse the crowd (which was all he was entitled to do by law) but to 
produce a "moral effect" that would terrify the entire Punjab and stop the unrest, 
which was also the reason for his "crawling order. "74 Despite a wave of outrage 
and horror from many in India and in Britain, he maintained until the day of his 
death in 1927 that he had done the right thing. 
In this attitude he had powerful supporters, and Joynson-Hicks, never 
one to dodge controversy, was right in the thick of them. He made a point of 
visiting Amritsar and endorsing Dyer's actions (all of them, including the 
"crawling order") before speaking powerfully against Edwin Montagu, the 
Secretary of State for India and one of Dyer's chief critics, in a motion of 
censure on Dyer in the House of Commons, which the government very nearly 
lost because of a major backbench rebellion. Montagu was not compelled to 
resign as Secretary of State for India as a result, but his position, in the words of 
one biographer, was "severely shaken. "75 
Joynson-Hicks had now proven, crucially, that he was "sound" on the 
issue of India. This was of particular importance as in 1920 the Unionists were 
fracturing while the party was under the official leadership of Bonar Law and 
the effective leadership of Lloyd George. 
6 The Diehards, who were fighting 
against the continuation of the coalition led by Lloyd George had nobody of the 
power of Austen Chamberlain, Law, Home, Balfour, Birkenhead, Curzon or 
74 "It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd; but one of 
producing a sufficient moral effect, from a military point of view, not only on 
those who were present but more specially throughout the Punjab. There could 
be no question of undue severity. " Written statement of Brigadier-General R E. 
H. Dyer, commanding 45 brigade at Amritsar; dated Dalhousie, 25th August 
1919, in evidence to Lord Hunter's enquiry on the massacre, in NA CAB 27/92, 
beginning at p. 200. All the evidence for what happened at Amritsar is derived 
from this file, which consisted of the enquiry's reports and the evidence 
presented to it, unless otherwise stated. See above for a discussion of 
Lawrence's work on the fear of violence in interwar Britain, pp. 26-27 
75 Chandrika Kaul, `Montagu, Edwin Samuel (1879-1924)', Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, Jan 
2008 [http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/35074, accessed 14 Jan 2008]. 
Montagu was Jewish: this episode was one of the incidents marshalled by David 
Cesarani in his bid to prove that Joynson-Hicks was an anti-Semite: see 
Cesarani, "Joynson-Hicks and the Radical Right", p. 123 
76 Blythe p. 30 
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Long on their side - their only effective leader was Lord Salisbury, with Sir 
Samuel Hoare, a moderate figure, providing some leadership from the back 
benches in the House of Commons. But Joynson-Hicks now offered his 
boundless energy and talent for savagery to the destruction of Lloyd George, 
emerging not as a leader, but as an important figure in the right-wing opposition 
to him. However, his personal stature remained low, and he was still regarded to 
some extent as a crank by the leadershipn 
This may be one reason why they wildly under-estimated the threat this 
group posed. It became especially acute after Bonar Law's first retirement in 
1921. In the ensuing jockeying for the leadership of the party in the House of 
Commons, Austen Chamberlain emerged victorious. However, Joynson-Hicks 
tried to thwart Chamberlain by supporting the claims of Birkenhead. Quite what 
he hoped to achieve by this, given that Birkenhead was in the Lords and 
therefore ineligible for the only post officially under discussion, is not clear. 
Most likely he was simply trying to force Chamberlain out of the overall 
leadership of the party (which was a matter of prestige and custom between the 
leaders of the Commons and the Lords, and not as now an official title) by 
appointing a heavyweight, one with known Diehard tendencies, into the position 
of Leader of the Lords over the head of Lord Curzon. It was, however, always 
an attempt doomed to failure, for as Frederick Guest (the Liberal Coalition 
Chief Whip) commented, Joynson-Hicks' assistants were only "a handful. " 
Guest was in no doubt as to the motive either: "Hicks is the chief mover; but his 
motives have an ulterior object, namely the splitting of the coalition. You will 
recall he has been on this line for some months. %M 
Yet within twelve months, the Diehards had achieved this very goal. In 
actual fact, they were not of themselves very important in the Carlton Club 
meeting that saw Chamberlain's fall, bigger roles being played by Baldwin, 
Curzon, Derby and above all Bonar Law. Following Law's rise to the 
77 See Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George 
Coalition Government 1918-1922 (Oxford 1986) chapter 10 and Maurice 
Cowling, The Impact of Labour 1920-1924: The Beginnings of Modern British 
politics (Cambridge 1971) pp. 184-185 
78 Frederick E. Guest to David Lloyd George, 19th March 1921, quoted in Max 
Aitken (Lord Beaverbrook) Decline and Fall of Lloyd George: and great was 
the fall thereof (London 1963) p. 21 
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premiership they reaped their reward, as they entered government in place of the 
dispossessed Coalition ministers, who chose to remain on the back benches out 
of anger at being dismissed. 
79 But Joynson-Hicks remained outside the Cabinet. 
He was given the position of Parliamentary Secretary to the Department of 
Overseas Trade, working under Sir Phillip Lloyd Graeme. 80 This was a 
disappointment again to Joynson-Hicks, who was not only older and more 
experienced but also much more energetic and arguably abler than his superior. 
However, his family persuaded him to accept the post (refusal would have 
marked effective retirement from politics) and it subsequently became the basis 
of his success. In the following general election, as he held a safe seat (and was 
returned unopposed) he could fight a national campaign - something that was 
needed given the absence (or even outright hostility) of the ex-Coalition 
ministers. 81 
Following the defeat of Arthur Griffith Boscawen, the Minister of 
Health, in the election, Bonar Law was obliged to reshuffle, and Joynson-Hicks 
found himself appointed Postmaster and Paymaster General - still outside the 
cabinet, but now his own master. He had very little time in which to make his 
mark, however, as Bonar Law retired after another eleven weeks, and a man 
who had known Joynson-Hicks ever since 1908, and who had sat on the 
backbenches with him for eight years before attaining Cabinet rank in 1917, 
came to power, very unexpectedly, instead. 
The manoeuvres that saw Stanley Baldwin preferred to Curzon for the 
premiership have been thoroughly analysed elsewhere. 82 But from Joynson- 
Hicks' point of view, it was the best possible result. He had already become a 
reliable junior minister - now, as Baldwin tried to entice the prestigious former 
Liberal Chancellor Reginald McKenna into the government, he was paid 
perhaps the ultimate tribute. While McKenna looked for a seat that would elect 
him to Parliament, Baldwin continued as nominal Chancellor of the Exchequer 
79 The most notable exceptions were Lord Curzon, who remained Foreign 
Secretary and continued to lead the Unionists in the House of Lords, and 
Stanley Baldwin, the former President of the Board of Trade, who had rebelled 
against Lloyd George and became Bonar Law's Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
8 Later changed his name to Phillip Cunliffe Lister. 
81 Taylor pp. 163-165 
92 Probably the best account, despite its age, is in Robert Blake, The Unknown 
Prime Minister: the life ofAndrew Bonar Law (London 1955) pp. 518-27 
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- but he appointed Joynson-Hicks Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury, with a 
seat in the Cabinet, to oversee the day-to-day running of the Treasury. 83 
As it happened, McKenna, who had immense financial experience, great 
prestige in the City and, as an Asquithian Liberal, impeccable anti-Lloyd 
George credentials, was unable to find a seat that would take him. Accordingly 
he declined the offer Baldwin had made him. It seems Joynson-Hicks genuinely 
hoped to be appointed Chancellor instead. 84 However, that would have been not 
so much a remarkable rise as a ridiculous over-reach. Experience matters in 
politics, and while Joynson-Hicks had made enormous strides in a few months, 
his ministerial experience remained thin. Instead, Neville Chamberlain was 
made Chancellor, and so marked out as the coming man in the Government. 
Joynson-Hicks was made Minister of Health in his place. 85 
However, he was not permitted long in which to enjoy this post - which 
was a much larger and more prestigious department than it is now, also dealing 
with local government, housing and various minor matters now brought under 
the Department of the Environment. Late in 1923, Baldwin announced that he 
felt Britain should once more consider the question of Free Trade and 
Protection, which had so bedevilled Balfour's government. Feeling himself 
bound by a promise Bonar Law had given during the 1922 general election that 
there would be no revisiting of the "fiscal question" in that Parliament, he 
dissolved the Parliament and had an election. 
The best that can be said for this is that his decision was not 
catastrophic, but it was certainly a serious blunder. The Conservatives were 
reduced from 345 to 258 seats, short of the combined total of 191 Labour and 
156 Liberal votes, both of whom campaigned against Protection. When 
parliament met again, in 1924, these last two lost no time in turning out the 
government and installing a minority Labour administration. Asquith, in what 
was to prove his last session in the House of Commons, refused to allow an 
"anti-Socialist" allowance, on the grounds that the election had been fought on 
83 ibid. pp. 167-169 
84 Blythe p. 30 
85 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London 1969) p. 
176 
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Free Trade and it made sense to allow the larger of the two Free Trade parties to 
form the government. 
Baldwin now came under severe pressure. Having abandoned a position 
of strength, and allowed in a Labour government - the very thing that most 
members of his party had been jockeying desperately to avoid for the previous 
six years, since Labour became a serious contender for power - his judgement 
was questioned, and his position extremely shaky. Taylor was, however, quite 
wrong in claiming that Joynson-Hicks made no active move against Baldwin at 
this time. While Joynson-Hicks may indeed have publicly expressed his support 
for Baldwin in the Sunday Chronicle, his record was not clean. 86 He discussed 
the possibility of becoming party leader himself with Lord Derby, a senior Tory 
peer (although surely did not have his name "freely expressed" in the party as a 
possible candidate). 
87 Middlemas and Barnes put him in the thick of a plot to 
persuade Balfour (an ex-Prime Minister on whose judgement it was thought the 
King relied) to advise the King to send for the Earl of Derby or Austen 
Chamberlain rather than MacDonald, the Labour leader, should Baldwin resign 
as prime Minister without meeting Parliament. As these writers correctly noted, 
these plotters represented "the hard core of the right wing. "88 Precisely which 
candidate Joynson-Hicks favoured is unclear. He undoubtedly consented to try 
and persuade Baldwin to step down in favour of another Unionist as Prime 
Minister: one of Birkenhead, Austen Chamberlain or Balfour. 89 It seems 
reasonable to assume that, given the choice, he would have preferred either to 
lead the party himself or the Diehard peer Derby to the leadership of any of 
those three given his record of anti-Coalition activity in 1921 and 1922. 
However, it should not be forgotten that he would have undoubtedly preferred 
one of them (Austen Chamberlain being the frontrunner) to MacDonald should 
that be the only choice. As an aside, that was the only choice on offer (and was, 
in any case, later proven to be an illusory choice anyway). There was no 
prospect of Joynson-Hicks becoming leader himself - he was still too junior - 
86 Taylor p. 172 
87 Cowling p. 384 
88 Middleman and Barnes p. 251 
89 Cowling pp. 332-333 
67 
and Derby had long made it clear that he did not wish to become Prime 
Minister. 
The plotters had no chance of succeeding. Balfour, whose backing 
would be crucial and whom Birkenhead had taken for granted in assuring 
Joynson-Hicks of his support, refused to go along with this plot and thereby 
made carrying it out impossible, leaving Joynson-Hicks in "great indignation" 
against Birkenhead. 
90 Baldwin's back was stiffened by the Home Secretary, 
Willy Bridgeman, 91 and he decided to meet Parliament. By the time he met it, it 
was clear that the Liberals (whose votes held the balance) would not back any 
Tory as Prime Minister, so it was MacDonald or nobody, and Balfour's advice 
was neither asked nor needed. In the event, the Labour government that took 
office was a poor, weak thing, offering far less talent or experience even than 
Bonar Law's divided government. After a miserable ten months the Liberals 
withdrew their support, and in the subsequent election the Unionists92 swept 
home to a conclusive victory, taking three-quarters of the Liberals' seats and a 
quarter of Labour's. It gave them a huge majority and guaranteed them a further 
five years in power. 
On the excellent testimony of Tom Jones, we know that Baldwin 
intended to do comparatively little reshuffling of posts, even to accommodate 
the newly-returned Coalitionists. Bridgeman and Neville Chamberlain were 
slated to keep their places, with Curzon the main casualty as he made way for 
Austen Chamberlain. Joynson-Hicks cannot have been a bad Health minister, as 
Baldwin also intended to leave him where he was 93 Such an appointment might 
have made sense. Joynson-Hicks had immense administrative and legal 
experience, no fear of hard work, and an interest in Poor Law reform that can be 
easily traced to 1906. 
90 ibid. pp. 333-334 
91 William Bridgeman (1864-1935) 1st Viscount Bridgeman (1929): Home 
Secretary 1922-24, First Lord of the Admiralty 1924-29, Chairman of the BBC 
Board of Governors 1935: also played a decisive part in salvaging Baldwin's 
leadership in 1930 by injecting some new confidence into him during his battle 
with the press lords. 
92 In 1925 they readopted the name "Conservative, " although right down to the 
present day they are officially "The Conservative and Unionist Party" and are 
known by this full title in Scotland. 
93 Edited by Keith Middlemas, Tom Jones, Whitehall Diary Volume 11916- 
1925 (Oxford 1969) pp. 301-303 
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But it did not quite work out that way. While Austen Chamberlain was 
safely anchored at the Foreign Office, Neville Chamberlain refused the Treasury 
and said, to Baldwin's astonishment, that he would rather go to Health. 94 With 
hindsight, this was a good decision, as Neville Chamberlain pushed through 
massive reforms of the Poor Law that Joynson-Hicks would not have had 
sufficient prestige for, but it left several awkward questions to be answered - 
such as, who was to be given the Treasury, and where was Joynson-Hicks to 
go? Leaving aside some speculation that he might be made Chancellor after all, 
it could be seen as a serious problem. 95 
In the event, this triangle was solved rather simply. Winston Churchill, 
to whom Baldwin had intended to offer the Admiralty, to his delight and 
astonishment was made Chancellor instead, with Willy Bridgeman taking over 
the Navy. 96 That left a vacancy at the Home Office, which was offered to 
Joynson-Hicks, who immediately accepted, delighted at gaining a position 
which he regarded as eminently suitable for him. 
97 
The Cabinet thus formed has come in for a great deal of criticism. 
Curzon (one of the great losers of the reshuffle, who was demoted from Foreign 
Secretary to Lord President of the Council to make room for the returning 
Austen Chamberlain) commented that it was "impossible to imagine a stranger 
collection of round pegs in square holes. " His biographer added that "the 
Cabinet did indeed contain some bizarre appointments-the placing of Austen 
Chamberlain at the Foreign Office was in fact one of the more sensible 
decisions. " The appointments of Birkenhead and Churchill were singled out for 
particular criticism: the Diehard in control of India and a man who has come to 
be regarded as an economic illiterate in the Treasury. " But Joynson-Hicks 
would certainly come into the category of a much-criticised appointment. Even 
at the time, Austen Chamberlain commented that while "Hicks probably equal 
94 ibid. p. 303 
95 Taylor p. 174 
96 Whitehall Diary op. cit. p. 303 
97 ibid. pp. 174-5 
98 David Gilmour, Curzon, (London 1994) p. 596 
69 
to the Home office ... Hogg99 would 
be a much stronger appointment. " However, 
in defiance of later wisdom, he thought that "all the ministries adequately and 
some of them exceptionally well filled. " He singled out Churchill and 
Birkenhead's appointments - two of the most criticised - as two of the best. 
1°° 
So it is easy to get carried away on the flood of negativity. Middlemas and 
Barnes also dismissed the notion of Joynson-Hicks' appointment as 
"obscurantist, " commenting that he was "much more moderate than his rhetoric 
suggested, " although they added that Baldwin also knew "his appointment 
would go a long way to conciliate the Diehards. "101 
Joynson-Hicks, when asked what he did as Home Secretary, light- 
heartedly replied, "It is I who am the ruler of England! "102 And in many ways 
he was. The Home Secretary at the time had immense, sweeping powers. Not 
only did the department handle internal security and the justice system, but it 
was the department where anything that did not quite fit anywhere else ended up 
by default. 103 These powers had been strengthened and deepened in the First 
World War by means of the Defence of the Realm Acts, which were enshrined 
in law afterwards as the Emergency Powers Act, and gave the Home Secretary 
major powers to use at his discretion in the interests of national security. 
Joynson-Hicks became a staunch champion of DORA, as it was still known, 
causing hilarity in the popular press and Punch and leading one foreign visitor 
to ask Sir Samuel Hoare if DORA was Joynson-Hicks' mistress. 
104 
Joynson-Hicks actually had a difficult time at the Home Office, but it is 
in five major areas, leaving aside the one covered in this thesis, that he made an 
impact. They were, to take them in turn, the General Strike, which marked not 
only the failure of the radical left in Britain to overthrow the government, but 
the high-water mark of his tenure as Home Secretary; the ARCOS raid, which 
ruptured relations with Russia and forfeited him much of the goodwill he had 
99 Douglas McGarrel Hogg, 1872-1950 1st Viscount Hailsham (1928); 
Attorney-General 1922-24 and 1924-28, Lord Chancellor 1928-29 and 1935-38, 
Secretary of State for War 1931-35, Lord Privy Seal 1938. 
100 Sir Charles Petrie, The Life and Letters of the Rt. Hon. Sir Austen 
Chamberlain KG PC MP Volume 11 (London 1940) p. 243 
lot Middleman and Barnes, p. 283 
102 Blythe p. 31 
103 See below p. 159 
104 Tom Jones, Whitehall Diary p. 173 
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built up; the granting of votes to women on an equal basis with men, which 
became his responsibility by default as nobody else was willing to touch it; 
reform of Britain's antiquated penal system, substantially the same in 1924 as 
the one laid down by Robert Peel in the 1820s but radically different a mere five 
years later; and the Prayer Book debate of 1928, which marked the high point of 
his Parliamentary career. 
The General Strike of 1926 marked probably the pinnacle of Joynson- 
Hicks' administrative, rather than political career. Although there can be little 
doubt that one of the aims of the strike was, at the very least, to humiliate the 
government and force it to capitulate on terms that were disadvantageous to it, 
and possibly even aimed at the overthrow of Parliamentary rule, it was a failure 
that lasted just nine days and reduced the TUC to a national laughing-stock. 
This was due in no small part to Joynson-Hicks. His record was not 
unblemished, but it was certainly impressive. Following an abortive general 
strike in 1925, when the government, hopelessly unprepared for a confrontation, 
bought off the miners with a subsidy, Joynson-Hicks was put in effective charge 
of planning for a general strike when it came. The important word in that 
sentence is "when. " In the culture of the 1920s, none of the Cabinet doubted 
that there would be a general strike, or that it would be a concerted attempt to 
overthrow the government and establish a Soviet system. The Organisation for 
the Maintenance of Supplies (OMS) was formed to keep the country's vital food 
and fuel arteries running in the event of a strike, under Sir John Anderson, 
joynson-Hicks' Permanent Under-secretary, widely regarded as the ablest 
administrator of his time and one of the few Civil Servants to subsequently have 
a successful political career. 
105 Other departments were to have specialised 
roles: for instance, the Ministry of Labour would work on conciliation, and the 
Ministry of Transport would organise long-distance distribution of supplies and 
also look after the maintenance of the electricity network Joynson-Hicks 
105 Sir John Anderson 1882-1958,1st Viscount Waverley (1952) 2nd Secretary 
to the Ministry of Health 1919, Permanent Under-Secretary to the Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland 1920-22, PUS to the Home Department 1922-32, 
Governor of Bengal 1932-37, Elected to Parliament as an MP for the Scottish 
Universities in 1938, Lord Privy Seal 1938-39, Home Secretary 1939-1940, 
Lord President of the Council 1940-43, Chancellor of the Exchequer 1943-45 
and 1945. 
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himself remained in overall charge of the plans, chairing the Cabinet Committee 
charged with co-ordinating the individual departments in their own specialities 
and putting in place Civil Commissioners for the provinces. 
106 He was also busy 
in other spheres, intriguing against the Communists to such good effect that 
twelve leading Communists were imprisoned under the Incitement to Mutiny 
act, their headquarters searched, and the organisation generally harassed in a bid 
to keep them off-balance. 107 
When the strike itself actually began, Joynson-Hicks was definitely on 
the side of the hawks. Unlike Winston Churchill, the bellicose Chancellor, 
whom Baldwin packed off to the British Gazette to keep out of the way and stop 
him doing any damage, he was kept on in the fight against the strikers. 108 
However, Baldwin kept him on a tight rein, which curbed some of his wilder 
excesses. For instance, he was overruled when he tried to issue an order forcing 
the closure of the British Gazette's rival and although his appeals for more 
volunteer police were generally successful, whether they were actually needed 
or were part of a wider propaganda war is debatable. 
Much has been written about the General Strike, and it does not need 
substantial reinvestigation here. 
109 However, it was a great success from the 
point of view of the government, and for that the efficient organisations put 
together by Joynson-Hicks deserve much of the credit. It cannot be denied that 
he would probably, given a free hand, have introduced draconian measures in a 
bid to crush the strike, which would certainly have been counter-productive, 
rather than allowing it to fizzle out naturally when it was obviously failing,. But 
Cabinet government, especially in a crisis of this nature, is a collective 
endeavour. If Joynson-Hicks' bellicosity was a drawback, his organising ability, 
properly tempered and harnessed, was a plus. 
This bellicosity was to have unfortunate consequences a year later, when 
he was the chief mover in the raid on the Soviet Trade Delegation, colloquially 
known as ARCOS. Baldwin had for some time been uneasy about Russian 
106 John W. Wheeler-Bennet, John Anderson, Viscount Waverley (London 1962) 
102-103 FS-Middlemas 
and Barnes, pp. 390-3 
108 ibid. pp. 411 
109 The most recent, and possibly the best, account is by Anne Perkins, A Very 
British Strike: The General Strike of 1926 (London 2006) 
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activities in Britain and abroad, and like all men of his class and time, was 
nervous about the threat of a Russian-backed attempted coup. However, while 
he was willing to protest in the strongest terms about Soviet propaganda, their 
support for the Chinese nationalist movement, and their efforts to provoke 
unrest in his own country (there was a conscious linking of the General Strike 
with the Soviet government) he was unwilling to break off diplomatic relations. 
Joynson-Hicks, however, forced him to do precisely that by sealing off ARCOS 
in May 1927 and searching it for a document that was believed by the 
intelligence services to have been stolen by Russian spies. The document was 
never found, leading to claims that this was a deliberate "frame-up" by the 
Home Office. Joynson-Hicks had certainly forced Baldwin's hand, whether 
deliberately or not (although it is very hard to believe it was an accident). "° 
Joynson-Hicks was unquestionably, in the words of Middlemas and 
Barnes, a rabid anti-Bolshevik. 
"' He was not quite as paranoid as A. J. P. 
Taylor would make out - in what was, even by his standards, a remarkably 
purple piece of prose, Taylor claimed that Joynson-Hicks "saw a Communist 
under every bed, " a grotesque and ridiculous claim but which nevertheless has 
sunk into popular consciousness to a degree that considerably obscures the 
nth 112 But he genuinely did see Communism as a serious threat to the world. 
In this he was probably wrong, at least in the short term. The overwhelming 
evidence is that Russia was far too weakened by her internal troubles and a 
succession of disastrous famines to expand outwards. After World War II and 
the blatant annexation of Eastern Europe by Russia that triggered the Cold War, 
it was rather a different matter, which is why it is perhaps surprising that C. H. 
Roiph commented in the 1960s that "many more people were afraid of 
Communism then than would admit to it now. "' 13 Equally, it is surprising that 
so many people have sought to exculpate Soviet Russia in this matter. There can 
be no doubt whatsoever that the Russians were spying on Britain by means of 
ARCOS. This is largely for the very good and obvious reason that it was the 
I10 Middlemas and Barnes pp. 457-8 
111 ibid. p. 283 
112 A. J. P. Taylor The Oxford History of England Vol. XT! - English History 
1914-1945 (Oxford 1965) p. 242 
113 In his Introduction to Vera Brittain, Radclyffe Hall: a case of obscenity? 
(London 1968) p. 24 
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only way in which they could spy on Britain, as it was so extremely difficult for 
them to get any Soviet citizens into the country any other way - whether to act 
as agents themselves, or to work as contacts for British "red" sympathizers. And 
however paranoid Joynson-Hicks may have been about the Bolsheviks, that was 
nothing compared to how paranoid the Bolsheviks were about the outside world 
which they believed, with some justice, was constantly working for their 
overthrow by any means possible. Yet some people seem incapable of believing 
these simple truths, referring to "doubtful" evidence and misgivings about the 
existence of a "system of espionage. "114 It is true that it seems unlikely anything 
more than normal spying and propaganda was being operated from ARCOS, if 
only due to the financial and logistical constraints they worked under - although 
propaganda, used wisely, could have been a serious enough matter. The 
ARCOS raid, however, by missing the key document that the police had gone in 
to find -a manual on signals training - made the government look rather 
foolish. In fact, its most severe effect was felt in Russia, where a panic that the 
ARCOS raid meant a new war with Britain was imminent formed a large part of 
Stalin's decisive move against Trotsky in the name of "healing divisions in the 
party" to prepare for it, forcing the latter's expulsion from the Communist Party 
and paving the way for Stalin's assumption of total power two years later. "5 
Joynson-Hicks also became, according to his detractors, the somewhat 
unlikely figure of a champion of female suffrage. In 1928, he introduced the bill 
that finally gave women the vote at the age of 21 on equal terms with men. This 
development sits so uneasily with the image of him as an unregenerate Diehard 
that an extremely improbable explanation proffered by Churchill has been 
gleefully accepted instead: 
"Here was a private Member's Bill, debated in a Friday. No one 
took it very seriously. Interrupted by Lady Astor, he [Joynson- 
114 See Christopher Andrew, "British Intelligence and the Breach with Russia in 
1927" Historical Journal 25 (1982) pp. 957-964, and for a rather better analysis 
see Harriette Flory, "The Arcos Raid and the Rupture of Anglo-Soviet 
Relations, 1927" 
Journal of Contemporary History 12 (1977) pp. 707-723 
115 See Martin McCauley, The Soviet Union 1917-1991 (second edition Harlow 
1991) pp. 67-69 
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Hicks] quite unexpectedly, and without the slightest consultation 
with his colleagues, said that the Conservative Party would 
enfranchise men and women on the same terms "at the next 
election. " Two years later this formidable gesture had to be 
redeemed. Never was so great a change in our electorate 
achieved so incontinently. "' 16 
Leaving aside the question of whether such a course would have been achieved 
more "incontinently" than the 1867 Reform Act, which seems to have evolved 
more or less by guess and by blunder on the part of Derby and Disraeli, 
' 17 this 
legend can be safely dismissed as wrong. The reality is that the bill was 
introduced to redeem a manifesto pledge -a controversial one in certain quarters 
of the Conservative party, who came up with their own explanation (this one) to 
explain the anomaly. Jonathon Hopkins, who studied this subject in considerable 
depth and with consummate skill, dismissed it as "plainly not the case, " and 
added that the Franchise Bill was probably "Joynson-Hicks's biggest influence 
on society and politics. "' 
18 
It is correct to say that Joynson-Hicks gave a pledge to deal with the 
matter during a debate on a Private Member's bill. He in fact promised an inter- 
party conference on the subject, as directed to by Baldwin, adding an assurance 
that the matter would be dealt with in the lifetime of the 1924 parliament. "" 
Baldwin favoured equalising the franchise with votes for all at 25 -a reasonable 
compromise given the comparatively recent advent of universal manhood 
suffrage and the strong opposition within the cabinet to "flapper" votes. 
120 
However, Willy Bridgeman advised Baldwin, with some reason, that it would be 
extremely unpopular to take away votes from those men who had already had 
116 Winston Churchill writing in 1931, quoted in Blythe p. 42 
117 K. Theodore Hoppen, The Mid-Victorian Generation 1846-1886 (Oxford 
1998) pp. 249-253 
118 Hopkins wrote an MA dissertation on the passing of the Equal Franchise 
Act, which is how he came across Joynson-Hicks in the first place. See Hopkins 
54-6,102 pp 
Middlemas and Barnes, pp. 291-2 
120 A slang word for young women, who were generically regarded by some, 
particularly Churchill and Birkenhead, as essentially silly and irresponsible. 
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it. 121 So the equalisation at 21 was the only real option on the table. Bitterly 
opposed by Churchill, it nevertheless passed into law in 1928, Baldwin having 
given the bill priority to ensure it would be passed. 
122 
In this, so far as can be judged, he had Joynson-Hicks' support. Joynson- 
Hicks certainly turned all of his rhetorical fire upon his opponents in this debate, 
some of whom had mocked him for attempting to introduce a bill that they were 
sure would injure his own party: 
"Is any member going to get up in 1928... and say that we dare not 
give votes to women because we are not sure that they will not vote 
for our opponents? Mr. Speaker, what has that to do with it? I am 
not going to be deterred from what I believe to be an act of justice, 
by any idea of how they will vote... We are doing what we believe 
to be right, and I ask the House to pass the Bill by an overwhelming 
majority. "123 
Backed by a large chunk of the Labour party and an equally large chunk of the 
Tory back benches, he got his way. But it is important to point out that he had 
long been either neutral or sympathetic on the question of female suffrage, 
unlike Churchill. Indeed, that can be seen from 1908, when Joynson-Hicks was 
ignored by the suffragettes and Churchill struggled against them, to the extent 
that they turned him implacably against female suffrage and indirectly spawned 
this legend. 124 The "image" created for Joynson-Hicks was not generally one that 
121 Middlemas and Barnes, pp. 453-4 
122 ibid. p. 468 
123 Quoted in H. A. Taylor p. 284. The irony inherent in these remarks is that 
women generally have been more conservative (small c) in their outlook than 
men, and have tended to vote accordingly. There is an oft-repeated story that 
Labour would have won every election since 1945 had the franchise only been 
awarded to men -a dominance only broken by Tony Blair in 1997. Although it 
is impossible to know how an all-male electorate would have voted in practice, 
there can be little doubt that the female vote contributed significantly to 
Conservative political dominance in the latter half of the twentieth century. See 
Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, "Explaining the Gender Gap: The Conservative 
party and the Women's Vote 1945-1964" in Martin Francis and Ina Zweiniger- 
Bargielowska (eds. ) The Conservatives and British society, 1880-1990 (Cardiff 
1996) pp. 194-223, p. 194 
124 H. A. Taylor pp. 62-3: see above p. 48 
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fitted such a liberal view, and so alternative explanations were sought for this 
presumed eccentricity. 
It is, however, when the implications of his penal reforms are studied that 
his image as a Diehard suffers most. He was one of the comparatively few 
Cabinet ministers to boast of having spent "a lot of time in gaol: " in this case 
because he wished to keep up to date with the conditions and the inmates. 
Joynson-Hicks made a point of visiting every prison under his jurisdiction, and 
was often depressed by what he found there. He expressed a particular horror of 
Dartmoor, and considered that such a terrible prison should not be used for those 
prisoners who were ultimately intended to be released back into society because 
it would merely breed depression and further engrain any criminal tendencies the 
prisoners had rather than weaning them off them. 
125 
His belief that prison should play a role primarily rehabilitative in 
character was most marked in his reform of the Borstal system. He particularly 
emphasised the role of probation in trying to make sure offenders did not offend 
again - and strange though it may seem, it was not until his time that every 
Court in the country was legally required to have a probation officer. He also 
emphasised the need for a prison sentence to be of a good length - complaining 
that a prisoner should be given a sentence that would "make him remember and 
give him time to think... he can't do that in a fortnight. "126 
Joynson-Hicks also changed the prisons themselves, improving the 
internal conditions in the hope that they could play a part in the rehabilitation of 
prisoners. Oddly, this fact was acknowledged by Kate Meyrick, no friend of 
Joynson-Hicks in the ordinary way, when she commented that prisons had 
"improved considerably" during his tenure thanks to his efforts. "' His 
commitment to rehabilitation can be overstressed - while he believed in the 
corrective rather than penal nature of the prison system, he also believed that 
there existed a hard core of repeat offenders who would eventually, after 
125 H. A. Taylor pp. 186-88 
126 ibid. p. 189 
127 For Kate Meyrick's career, see below chapter 6: given that she was a 
persistent and repeat offender prison obviously did not have the effect Joynson- 
Hicks had hoped for on her! For her comment on prison conditions, see Kate 
Meyrick, Secrets of the 43 (Dublin 1994) p. 80 
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multiple convictions, need locking up for good to protect society from them. 
128 
However, even this is better than the notion of many of his peers that they should 
all be automatically hanged for multiple offences. 
But by far the most famous of all Joynson-Hicks' actions as Home 
Secretary came against the Anglican Bishops. In 1928 they attempted to 
introduce substantial revisions to the Book of Common Prayer (unchanged since 
1662) the general effect of which would be to make the church services "higher" 
(i. e. more akin to Catholic than to Protestant doctrine). As the Church of 
England was (and remains) Established, bound to the state by numerous legal 
and ceremonial ties, the prayer book had to be put to Parliament. The Bishops 
thought this was just a formality. However, they reckoned without the fervent 
"low church" beliefs of Joynson-Hicks, who scaled unsuspected heights of 
oratory and persuaded the House, on a free vote, to throw out the prayer book. 
For this, he depended upon the votes of Scottish and Welsh MPs (who had no 
established Anglican church) 
129 and a large number of Nonconformists. 130 
One possible reason why Joynson-Hicks, aided by Sir Thomas Inskip 
(another Evangelical lawyer) fought so hard and so bitterly against the revised 
Prayer Book is that they were also members of the Church Assembly, where it 
had been passed by a majority of more than two-to-one (230-92). Adrian 
Hastings also thought that the sponsoring bishops made a tactical error in not 
allowing the new liturgy as an alternative, rather than a replacement, to the 1662 
version - which would have drawn the teeth of opponents (like Joynson-Hicks) 
who claimed that this was an effort to force Catholicism on a reluctant laity. 13' 
Certainly the increasing vigour of the Anglo-Catholic clergy of the church 
coupled with the decline of the quality and numbers of Evangelical counterparts 
had, more or less accidentally, put the former in charge of a church that 
remained Evangelical in much of 
its lay character. 132 
128 H. A. Taylor pp. 187-8 
129 The Church in Wales was disestablished in 1921: the Church of Scotland is 
Presbyterian in character and the Church of England is in communion with 
another Scottish church, the Episcopalian Church of Scotland. 
130 Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 1918-1951 (Oxford 2000) 
277-8 
Adrian Hastings, A History of English Christianity 1920-1990 (third edition 
London 1991) p. 205 
132 ibid. pp. 195-201 
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Joynson-Hicks scaled new heights in oratory in his attack upon the new 
prayer book, but again showed his tendency towards wild exaggeration. 
Although his drawing in of the non-Anglicans (who may have voted simply to 
embarrass the church rather than to check its Catholic tendencies) by reminding 
them that they had Anglican constituents who were relying on them to stop this 
Bill was a masterstroke, his description of the prayer book as legitimizing a 
series of crimes committed by the Bishops themselves over twenty-four years 
was probably an overstatement. 
133 It has been suggested by Matthew Grimley 
that the real reason why Parliament rejected the new prayer book, for all the 
blandishments of Joynson-Hicks, was that there existed a deep rooted and long- 
standing affection for the Book of Common Prayer as a work of literature and an 
important cultural reference point for Anglicans, Nonconformists and even 
atheists. 134 While this is an attractive argument and it is to be hoped it will be 
further explored at some point, it also seems very likely that the charge of 
"Popery" levelled against the Anglican bishops found resonance among 
Nonconformists and atheists alike as well - the more so perhaps as in England 
the re-established Catholic church was growing rapidly in this period, 
challenging the old pre-eminence of Nonconformists among non-Anglicans. 
' 35 
The real substance of the revised prayer book differed little from the old 
one: it was merely in the optional extras that the "Catholic" practices were 
contained. Remarkably, there were even Anglo-Catholic clergy virulently 
opposed to the new liturgical forms on the grounds that they did not go nearly 
far enough. 136 In any case, although Joynson-Hicks won in the House of 
Commons, he lost overall as the Bishops simply went ahead and allowed the 
133 H. A. Taylor pp. 254,257,264. 
134 Matthew Grimley, "The Religion of Englishness: Puritanism, 
Providentialism and "National Character, " 1918-1945" Journal of British 
Studies 46 (2007) pp. 884-906, pp. 886-887: cf. the agnostic Horatio 
Hornblower's response to reading the prayer book as he takes a Sunday service 
in the 1938 novel A Ship of the Line (set in 1811): "as ever, while he read he 
was struck once more by the beauty of Cranmer's prose and the deftness of his 
adaptation. " C. S. Forester, A Ship of the Line (1938) in Captain Hornblower 
R. N. (London 1987) p. 446 
135 It is noticeable that Grimley specifically refers to "Protestant" churches 
(among which he listed the Church of England) declining in the period 1918- 
1945, while adding that the 1920s were a period of growth for all: Grimley 2007 
886-887 lý 
Hastings p. 204 
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Prayer Book to be used anyway, in defiance of Parliament. The situation left 
behind was chaotic and incoherent. It showed a lack of strength and vigour at the 
heart of Anglicanism, which refused to either accept legal reality by scrapping 
the prayer book, or by forcing Parliament to decide on the Church's own 
position by demanding Disestablishment (with rare exceptions) - this despite a 
statement from the Archbishop of Canterbury insisting on the right of the Church 
to determine its own destiny. 137 For all that, it was probably as near as the 
Church of England came to outright disestablishment in the twentieth century. 138 
In 1929 the electoral pendulum swung back against the Tories and they were 
swept from power by a second minority Labour government. Joynson-Hicks was 
one of the few Tories to recognise the threat posed by Lloyd George's 
rejuvenated Liberal party in the guise of their Yellow Book on public works to 
cure unemployment. He even tried to persuade Churchill, his old rival, to create 
a similar programme of public works to steal Lloyd George's thunder, but to no 
avail. "' In this he showed more wisdom than most of his cabinet colleagues, 
who failed to see that a well-organised Liberal party could split the anti-Labour 
vote that had won them power in 1924. Ironically, Joynson-Hicks, through his 
bill that had given votes to women and his copious use of DORA to force the 
closure of London's nightclubs, was blamed for the defeat. 
140 However, the real 
reason why Baldwin's government fell was that it had failed to deal conclusively 
with unemployment. Macdonald and Lloyd George offered new thinking (they 
also fought a much better campaign) and their enemies were bundled out. 
Joynson-Hicks resigned with the rest of the Cabinet. Despite rumours of a 
comeback when the National Government was formed, it seems likely that the 
ailing and unpopular former Home Secretary knew his meteoric political career 
was over. 
'4' 
It seems very likely that Joynson-Hicks, now old, infirm and increasingly 
eccentric, would have been dismissed even had the Tories won, because Baldwin 
had become very tired of the bad publicity over the banning of The Well of 
137 ibid. pp. 207-208 
138 McKibbin p. 278 
139 Toye p. 262 
'40 Middlemas and Barnes p. 515: Taylor p. 285 
141 Hopkins pp. 52-53 
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Loneliness and then D. H. Lawrence's poems. 142 He retired to the Lords, taking 
the title of Viscount Brentford of Newick, and it was as a member of this House 
that he died of heart failure three years later. 
Joynson-Hicks was a strange mass of contradictions. A Die-hard, who 
was pro-women; an alleged anti-Semite, who allowed more Jews to take out 
British citizenship than any other Home Secretary before or since; a natural 
backbencher with a certain specialisation in transport law, who became first 
Health Secretary and then Home Secretary; the supporter of General Dyer, who 
did not use force in the General Strike. It is not surprising that so few historians 
have ever managed to understand him. There is much that is impossible to 
fathom. 
If there was incontrovertible evidence that he was autistic, that might 
explain some of these perceived contradictions. In default of such evidence, we 
are rather left with the idea that he was simply a man who had a penchant for 
getting carried away with his own rather wild rhetoric and then became the 
prisoner of his own excesses. 
There can be no doubt of his ability. His reputation as a formidable 
London solicitor was coupled with his being one of the comparatively few men 
ever to defeat Winston Churchill on the stump -- a list which includes Clement 
Attlee, generally regarded as one of Britain's greatest post-war Prime Ministers. 
He had run a nuisance campaign against Lloyd George, and then made himself 
indispensable to the cabinets of his successors. As Home Secretary, he had 
survived nearly five years of the one of the most turbulent periods of British 
history. These are no mean achievements. 
"He had too little humility and too much to say, " was Ronald Blythe's 
verdict. Leaving aside an old saying about pots and kettles, Joynson-Hicks was a 
politician, and they are not noted for being either self-effacing or taciturn. The 
real point was that his tendency to wild ramblings obscured his genuine abilities 
and blighted his career. On the other hand, the later accident of Austen 
Chamberlain's disgrace opened up a higher office than he should reasonably 
have expected - that of Home Secretary. It was perhaps his misfortune that he 
was not given Health as Baldwin originally intended, and where he would 
142 Jones pp. 174-5: Middlemas and Barnes, p. 516: see below chapter 4. 
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probably have been a moderate, uncontroversial success. But had he been wiser, 
and shown more restraint, he might have been more successful in any case. 
Overriding every other consideration is the fact that Joynson-Hicks was a 
very devout Christian, an Evangelical Protestant. This explains some of the 
confusions felt by historians, who are mostly not themselves devout Christians. 
The Bible, looked at in a literal way, is in some places extremely right wing: 
"Eye for eye, tooth for tooth: " and in some places extremely liberal: "love your 
neighbour as yourself. " Generally speaking, politicians of both left and right 
have to pick and choose their biblical leanings in order to fit in with political 
prejudices. Joynson-Hicks would not do so. He was a Borstal reformer, and a 
believer in the inferiority of non-Christians, especially non-Protestants, and to 
him that was not a contradiction as both were drawn from his Biblical teachings. 
How important religion was to him may be fairly judged from the fight he put up 
against the new prayer book. 
Callum Brown referred to the period between 1800 and 1963 as 
"Britain's last Puritan age... this puritanism was imposed not by the state but by 
the people themselves. "143 In the succeeding pages of this thesis, we see a policy 
that might be described as Puritanical enforced and even expanded, something 
that has been directly blamed on Joynson-Hicks personal "Puritanism. "144 It is 
repeatedly noted that it is impossible to judge how far Joynson-Hicks and the 
Home office spoke for the "silent majority. " However, if Brown is to be 
believed, then it is possible that many people did support actions against those 
people who offended against a Christian moral code. It is also worth noting, 
however, that there is some difficulty in defining exactly what most people 
meant by "Puritanism. " Grimley noted that in the interwar years, it tended to 
mean rather a series of virtues; hard work, independence, seriousness and an 
adherence to conscience being among the ones he lists. Only since the 1960s, he 
suggested, had it become "primarily associated with the infringement of personal 
liberty in sexual relations"145 However, there can be no doubt from much of the 
later evidence that this latter aspect of Purtianism did motivate Joynson-Hicks, 
143 Callum G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Christianity and Society 
in the Modern World (London 2000) p. 9 
144 Middleman and Barnes, p. 283 
145 Grimley 2007 pp. 896,906 
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as did a strong adherence to the Temperance movement. Grimley may indeed be 
correct in his description of Puritanism as representing virtues, but no definition 
would be complete without these latter things as well. The point here is that 
Joynson-Hicks would have regarded them as further virtues - only aller the 
1960s did such actions come to have negative connotations. 
This perhaps goes some way towards describing the contradictions he 
showed and the policies he espoused that are exposed in this thesis. He really did 
believe in crushing out homosexuality and in keeping people from drinking 
themselves to death, as well as stopping immorality poisoning the minds of 
theatre and cinema goers. On the whole, however, he was no stricter than any 
other Home Secretary. The big difference was that he believed, totally and 
absolutely, that he was doing the right thing. That might be perhaps, an epitaph 
for his entire approach to life (one common among politicians: both Peter Hain 
and Norman Lamont have shown similar patterns of behaviour in recent times). 
But it was in the field of public morality that he showed it most clearly, and it is 
to this that we now turn. 
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3) The Lord Chamberlain's Position. 
"0, there be players that I have seen play, and heard others praise, 
and that highly, not to speak it profanely, that neither having the 
accent of Christians nor the gait of Christian, pagan, nor no man, 
have so strutted and bellowed that I have thought some of nature's 
journeymen had made men, and not made them well, that they 
imitated humanity so abominably. " 
William Shakespeare. 
Many would consider this sentiment of the melancholy Dane to be truly 
timeless - and it certainly portrays perfectly the attitude of that most widespread 
of critics, the complacent amateur (especially the wealthy complacent amateur 
who is paying the bills). But in the interwar period controversies over what 
constituted a "good" play, and what was permissible on the stage, reached near 
fever-pitch. The fact that all stage plays to be performed before a paying 
audience required a licence up until 1968 only added to the fury that was 
whipped up. Therefore, the position of the Lord Chamberlain is of absolutely 
crucial importance to any discussion of moral censorship in this period. While it 
may sound odd that a junior member of the Royal Household should feature so 
prominently in such a role, a very British administrative compromise in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had given the Lord Chamberlain the 
daunting task of acting as the official licensing authority of stage plays - as H. 
A. Taylor correctly noted, the only formal system of censorship in place under 
the British law. 2 In 1922 King George V gained the agreement of all main 
parties that the Lord Chamberlain should be considered a non-political 
appointment, where previously the office had changed hands on a change of 
government. This was due to the attachment of the Lord Chamberlain to the 
Royal Household as a sort of general factotum and organiser (which accounted 
for the majority of the duties of the post). As a result Joynson-Hicks was 
obliged to deal with a figure who was theoretically non-partisan in stage 
I The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince ofDenmarlc Act 3 scene 2. 
2 H. A. Taylor, Jiz: Viscount Brentford (London 1933) p. 242 
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censorship. However, as the then Lord Chamberlain had in fact been appointed 
by Bonar Law in 1922, this made little practical difference. 
The Earl of Cromer, 3 who was Lord Chamberlain not only for the 
relevant period of 1924 to 1929 but indeed on until 1938, was an extremely 
influential figure in the world of stage, partly by virtue of the powers he wielded 
under his office, and partly because he was generally respected by the theatre 
profession. Such respect did not, however, permit him to be generally exempted 
from adverse publicity for unpopular decisions. This despite the fact that most 
of the actual work of censorship was done by an official under the Lord 
Chamberlain, the "Examiner of Plays, " although the Lord Chamberlain always 
had the final say on any difficult case. There was criticism both for plays that 
were refused a licence to and, even more so, plays that were allowed to be 
performed. Lord Cromer's was, as a result, rather a thankless task. 
In the interwar period, this issue was complicated by a severe and 
chronic shortage of money paid for the examination of play scripts, which was 
paid to the Lord Chamberlain's office by the theatre wishing to produce the 
play. The rate of pay for reviewing a play script had been set at a guinea each by 
the Theatres Act 1843, the root of all inter-war theatre censorship systems, and 
had been badly affected by inflation. The system had to be self-financing - there 
was no question of government support. As a result, this highly important 
cultural and moral role of Examiner of Plays was fulfilled by men (the first 
woman was appointed in this period) who had to work on a very tight budget. 
Steve Nicholson's rather wry comment, "Those who complained that the Lord 
Chamberlain's office failed to inspect enough performances or read every play 
carefully enough did not realise the extent to which stage censorship was being 
done on the cheap, " says it all .4 But overall the difficulties of the system were 
subordinated to keeping it functioning, largely because everybody who had the 
power to actually do anything was very unwilling to stir up the question of 
censorship in case public debate 
forced its total abolition. 
3 Rt. Hon. Rowland Thomas Baring, 2nd Earl of Cromer (1877-1953) Lord 
Chamberlain 1922-1936. 
4 Steve Nicholson, The Censorship of British Drama 1900-1968 Volume One: 
1900-1932 (Exeter 2003) p. 9 
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Unusually for the main body of this thesis, this chapter draws 
extensively on secondary sources, for two very good reasons. First of all, this 
discipline has attracted much more attention from historians and journalists than 
the others that are to be examined, perhaps partly because of the overt and 
formal nature of the censorship to be investigated, and the huge source base - in 
the form of a mass of manuscripts, reports and correspondence - that is 
available to use in researching it. While "much more attention" means in 
practice three authors, those three authors offer a massive and well-documented 
secondary literature. Particular mention must be made of Steve Nicholson, 
author of several outstanding and crucial works in this field, whose diligence in 
uncovering new material from the archives of the Lord Chamberlain is 
unparalleled among other works on the subject. His three volume epic The 
Censorship of British Drama 1900-1968 is deserving of special praise, 5 but that 
is not to disparage his other works on British Theatre and the Red Peril, on the 
attitude of the stage and the censor towards plays about Communism (both pro- 
Communist and anti-Communist, performing a very useful service in debunking 
the unhelpful myth that all playwrights of this period were left-wing) and a 
shorter article in The Cambridge History of British Theatre, about the role of the 
British stage in the year of the General Strike. Steve Nicholson is certainly no 
admirer of Joynson-Hicks, or a particular admirer of the system of censorship 
imposed by the Lord Chamberlain (although he reluctantly admitted that it did 
have its uses)6 but his outstanding use of original sources render very much 
more effort in this direction rather redundant. 
Further excellent work in this direction is offered in an older account by 
Sir John Johnston, Comptroller of the Lord Chamberlain's office in the last 
period of theatre censorship up until 1968. Johnston was unquestionably an 
admirer of the system of censorship that he had presided over, and therefore his 
book gives very much the other side of the argument - the argument for not 
giving ammunition to the enemies of theatre by putting on plays unacceptable to 
a large proportion of the public, of protecting living people from satire or 
slander, and of keeping threats to public order down to minimum by spotting 
likely flashpoints in advance. While Johnston often falls into the opposite trap 
5 The first two volumes have been published - the third is forthcoming. 6 Nicholson 2003 p. 300 
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from Nicholson of being fulsome about the work of the Lord Chamberlain 
(Nicholson accused him of at times offering "an apologia for the censors")7 as 
the first work in this field and the only one to bring proper insider knowledge of 
the mechanics of censorship to his contribution he offers an indispensable guide 
to the system. 
A third author worthy of mention, who falls between these two in the 
timeline, is a book by Nicholas de Jongh. De Jongh is a theatre critic who also 
burrowed extensively among the Lord Chamberlain's papers in the 1990s, but 
not perhaps to such good effect as the other two. Lacking Johnston's insider 
view, or Nicholson's mastery of the detail or - crucially - any meaningful 
knowledge of the context while possessing a complete contempt for any view 
other than his own, his book Politics, Prudery and Perversion is the least useful. 
Nevertheless, it contains some indications of the way in which the censorship 
debate has matured and developed over the 1990s, and while Nicholson's work 
effectively supersedes it - Nicholson himself mentioning that the limited range 
of de Jongh's work meant that at times, in his greater research, he was 
sometimes able to "support and amplify what he says, but at other times to 
challenge or contradict its8 - it remains an important item for that reason if no 
other. Certain things have to be set against that statement as a qualification. 
Most notably, as it is written by a journalist rather than an academic, it is less 
reliable than Nicholson's own work, for which it was the forerunner. For 
instance, he claimed that the Lord Chamberlain's files are at the Public Record 
Office .9 In fact, as 
de Jongh surely must have known, they are deposited at the 
British Library. His claim that the censorship operated in secret must be 
considered doubtful as well, despite his claim that "I do not employ the 
dramatic adjectives `secret' and `concealed' loosely. "10 What he meant was that 
the records of the actual examiners were hidden from view, and they did not 
generally advertise the procedures they used in the way the British Board of 
Film Censors did in their annual reports (which is perfectly correct). ' But it 
7 ibid. p. 16 
8 ibid. p. 11 
9 Nicholas de Jongh, Politics, Prudery and Perversions: the censoring of the 
English stage 1901-1968 (London 2000) p. XIV 
10 ibid. p. IX 
11 Aldgate and Robertson, pp. 2-3 
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was surely a simple matter to deduce the workings of the Lord Chamberlain's 
office from requests for cuts or a series of plays on one theme disallowed, 
rendering the process hardly very secret. 
A further very important recent work is Anthony Aldgate and James C. 
Robertson, Censorship in Theatre and Cinema (Edinburgh 2005). This is a 
work that compares the operations of the Lord Chamberlain's office with the 
British Board of Film Censors (BBFC). The main focus is on the procedures 
followed when broadly similar (or indeed the same) scripts were submitted to 
the Lord Chamberlain and the BBFC, and offers a valuable discussion of the 
workings of both. While the concentration is on the 1950s and 1960s, there are 
also elements of the 1920s as well (e. g. the production of plays and films based 
on the life of Edith Cavell in the decade after the First World War). '2 This thesis 
adopts a very similar methodology to Aldgate and Robertson. However, the 
comparisons are also drawn with other areas, including literature, drugs and 
nightclubs, aiming to investigate the broad culture of censorship in a 
comparatively tightly-defined period, of which theatre and cinema censorship 
formed two very important strands. 
The other reason why this thesis is obliged to rely heavily on secondary 
sources in this area is due to difficulties in obtaining the relevant primary 
sources from the British Library. Although they have now had the records of the 
Lord Chamberlain for nearly 20 years, ever since 1991, they are still 
uncatalogued and it has been extremely difficult to read them. Despite much 
effort and correspondence over the last two and a half years, and several trips 
there, it has not proven possible to get hold of the office files of the Lord 
Chamberlain's correspondence with the Home Office, including with Joynson- 
Hicks personally, to which Nicholson makes tantalizing references. As it was, it 
took nearly a week of negotiating in person to see correspondence in relation to 
a handful of named plays that I decided were absolutely indispensable to this 
study - again, largely on the evidence provided by Nicholson. Even 
correspondence with the curators has failed to remedy this situation. 
'2 Edith Cavell was a British nurse working in Belgium during the First World 
War. She was shot by the Germans for helping Allied prisoners of war to 
escape, and turned into a martyr by the press. Aldgate and Robertson pp. 42-48 
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As a result, this chapter has to use something of an edited highlights 
approach, heavily reliant upon the secondary literature and such crumbs as I 
have been able to glean from the table of the British Library. However, that is 
not to say that all is lost. First, the approach offered is, if not new, at least an 
extension and development of earlier work. This is a multidisciplinary, 
comparative thesis that aims to provide theatre censorship and its like with its 
wider context in the late 1920s, which has not been fully explored, although 
Aldgate and Robertson, as noted above, go some way towards it. Second, some 
material on this subject is available in the National Archives, where the vast 
majority of documents for this thesis have been located, and these are of some 
use in detailing the issue of censorship from the point of view of the Home 
Office - particularly in relation to the police. These files seem to have been 
largely overlooked by other historians, and yet are of great interest in a 
comparative topic where the relations between the executive and the 
enforcement agencies is a recurrent theme. 
The rights and wrongs of theatre censorship was a difficult one to judge, 
even in the 1920s. In the context of an era where the Internet has rendered the 
mechanics of censorship almost completely redundant, it becomes all the 
harder. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that censorship was 
controversial less because everybody who mattered wanted it abolished, than 
because a large number of people who mattered very much wanted it to be 
retained. 
Although the principle of licensing plays on a case-by-case basis at the 
discretion of the Lord Chamberlain was a comparatively new one, since Tudor 
times there had been a Crown Office (Master of the Revels) responsible for 
regulating the theatres and averting political attacks. The most important 
function of this role was to keep the theatres from providing a public health 
hazard, especially in times of plague, when all theatres would be shut to prevent 
the spread of the disease. Following very strict censorship under the 
Commonwealth, where all theatre was officially frowned upon, the office of 
censor effectively lapsed in the Restoration period, allowing a great deal of 
latitude to the Carolingian stage - more perhaps, than at any other time, and one 
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that coincided with the important development of the first actresses to replace 
the previous tradition of boys with treble voices playing female roles. 
Such freedom did not last, and eventually fresh regulation was 
introduced in the form of the Theatres Act of 1737. It was essentially devised to 
protect Walpole's ailing government from political attacks by his enemies 
through the medium of the stage. It restricted unlicensed plays performed in 
London to two theatres - Drury Lane and Covent Garden - and gave the Lord 
Chamberlain responsibility for licensing the rest. In 1843 this was broadened 
and deepened by a new Theatres Act, which extended the censorship to all 
theatres and gave the Lord Chamberlain sweeping powers to prohibit the 
performance of an individual play "whenever he shall be of opinion that it is 
fitting for the preservation of good Manners, Decorum or the Public Peace. " 
The decision of the Lord Chamberlain was final and he did not have to explain 
his reasoning for any ban. 13 It is extremely important to note that these 
restrictions only applied to performances that were to be open to the paying 
public. Private clubs for members not charged for the specific performance 
could put on plays that were not approved by the Lord Chamberlain -a 
loophole that lasted nearly until the end of censorship, and one that often caused 
acute embarrassment to successive Lords Chamberlain by putting on 
productions of plays that had been refused a licence, sometimes to good 
reviews. 14 However, crucially, once the Lord Chamberlain had passed a script 
as fit for public performance, there was no further recourse in law to a 
complainant and theatre managers could stage such scripts with a light heart as 
long as they kept to the agreed script and any notes on costume and make-up 
specified in the licence. Sometimes alterations would be demanded before a 
script could be licensed, but usually a play would not be submitted if it had no 
chance of getting a licence (it cost a guinea a time merely to apply) so the 
number of outright rejections was comparatively few. '5 
This awkward paradox about freedom of expression against freedom 
from prosecution formed the fundamental conflict at the heart of the 1909 Select 
Committee on theatre censorship. Among the people who gave evidence was 
13 Johnston chapter 1 (pp. 23-31): De Jongh, pp. 19-25 
14 Johnston chapter 16, pp. 210-218, discusses the position of clubs fairly fully. 15 Nicholson 2003 p. 2 
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arguably the greatest of the nineteenth century playwrights and a Nobel-prize 
winning writer, George Bernard Shaw, whose own opinion of censorship was 
hardly a closely-guarded secret: 
"Abolish it, root and branch, throwing the whole legal 
responsibility for plays on the author and manager, precisely as 
the legal responsibility for a book is thrown on the author, the 
printer and publisher. "16 
Shaw himself had suffered particularly in regard to one play of his, Mrs 
Warren's Profession. It described an unashamed prostitute and pimp who runs a 
large international chain of brothels for "gentlemen, " who tries to persuade her 
daughter of the virtues of her "profession. " " The daughter, not convinced, runs 
away to study mathematics. It was very unusual for the time in that it depicted 
prostitutes in a sympathetic light, but perhaps equally seriously for the time, for 
its acclamation of the emancipation of women. '? It took twenty-eight years for 
this play to be granted a licence, by which time Shaw had become somewhat 
disillusioned by the whole process: in 1916 he wrote that he would feel acute 
embarrassment at being associated with it, because it was "so old-fashioned, " 
and continued, perhaps with some exaggeration, "as the older I grow, the more 
inclined I am to believe that all plays whatsoever should be prohibited, I have 
nothing more to say. "18 
But his point of view, one shared by an impressive list of talent including 
J. M. Barrie, William Archer, Arnold Bennett and John Galsworthy, only 
represented one side. The managers of the theatres represented another. They 
were anxious to avoid prosecution by putting on taboo subjects in a way that 
would offend the susceptibilities of powerful figures in the audience - the 
Council for Public Morals19 being one obvious example - and lead to a potential 
prosecution, which would prove far more costly than the guinea to the Lord 
Chamberlain. It was suggested that the system of licensing therefore be retained 
16 Quoted in Johnston, p. 255, written in 1899. 
17 de Jongh pp. 49-51 
18 Johnston p. 77 
19 Forerunner of the London Public Morality Council. 
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as an option in a new, non-compulsory system. This was rightly dismissed out of 
hand by the Lord Chamberlain, who commented that it would completely 
undermine his authority and leave him a target for ridicule and abuse. 
° 
It is something of a puzzle as to why this system was canvassed at all. 
Surely a theatre manager would be more likely to know than the Reader of Plays 
- at this time a retired 
bank manager - what was and was not likely to be 
pursued in a court of law. Counsel's opinion could always be sought, or anything 
doubtful simply rejected. This might, indeed, have led to a stricter form of 
censorship than that imposed by the Lord Chamberlain, due to the fears of the 
theatre managers and the repeated pressure on the Lord Chamberlain to tighten 
his rules. However, it does suggest that the idea of censorship as an 
indispensable tool had not yet been outworn by either the state or the industry. 
The only meaningful change to come out of the 1909 Select Committee 
was the establishment of an Advisory Board to assist the Lord Chamberlain in 
cases where the decision to grant a licence was marginal. It is important to note 
that, at least partly in thanks to royal opposition to the idea of anybody 
overruling the Lord Chamberlain, the Advisory Board was only able to advise - 
it could not actually enforce a decision on the Lord Chamberlain. The Select 
Committee evidence also led to the sacking of George Redford (a retired bank 
manager before his appointment) as examiner of plays, who had not 
distinguished himself under questioning and had proven unpopular in his role . 
21 
This was, ironically, to have a major impact on the history of film censorship 
that we discuss in chapter 5, as Redford was recruited by the British Board of 
Film Censorship to be their first examiner of films. 
This was more or less the situation as it existed in 1924. The personnel 
had all changed, but the basic structure of Examiner, Advisory Board, and Lord 
Chamberlain remained in place. And it was from here that Joynson-Hicks was 
obliged to start in 1924 when he took office. The only significant difference was 
that the office was now non-political, but as noted above, that was rather an 
irrelevant distinction in this case. On the 16th December 1924, he was asked to 
decide whether the whole question of theatre censorship should be reopened, by 
the Lord Chamberlain himself. Joynson-Hicks replied that it would "require 
20 Nicholson 2003 pp. 61-2 
21 ibid. pp. 62-67 
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legislation... it would be most inconvenient at the present time .,, 
22 This is 
interesting, given that in chapter 6 we will see that he was not always so wary 
about new legislation on the issue of morality and the suppression of vice. The 
most likely explanation for such wariness is the one that Lord Cromer offered to 
the King: 
"The truth is that the Censorship of Plays is so thorny a question 
that no-one is particularly anxious to take it out of the hands of 
the LC, and to tackle it themselves. This responsibility I am 
quite prepared to shoulder. "23 
In fact Joynson-Hicks seems to have feared that to reopen the question would 
have led to an uproar in which any chance of keeping a system of censorship 
intact would be lost. Two other complications ought to be noted. The Lord 
Chamberlain was in theory accountable to nobody, which may be regarded as a 
flaw in the system, but did at least mean he had no angry backbenchers or 
angrier voters to appease if he let through a play they wanted banned - and the 
overwhelming evidence is that, while most playwrights felt that the Lord 
Chamberlain was too strict, there were a great many powerful vested interests, 
including the Church and the moralistic political right, who felt he was too 
lenient - and so could be fairer than a partisan Home Secretary. The second is 
that there was no precedent for the Home Office to act as a formal censor - as 
we shall see in Chapter 4, all such decisions on literature were rather ad-hoc and 
often casual - so all that would have happened is that those staff of the Lord 
Chamberlain's who dealt with censorship would have been transferred to the 
Home Office, making it overwhelmingly likely that there would have been no 
change in practice anyway. As a result, everybody in power seems to have felt 
that while there was clearly much to be said for transferring the responsibility of 
a licensing system to the Home Office, there was more to be said for letting 
sleeping dogs lie, which is presumably why Joynson-Hicks did nothing about 
theatre censorship during his time at the Home Office. 
22 Johnston pp. 80-81. It is this correspondence that I particularly wished to see 
at the British Library, as I suspect there is much of interest in it. 
23 ibid. 
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Such contentment at the thought of slumbering canines was not, 
however, universal. In 1929, when J. R. Clynes had newly succeeded Joynson- 
Hicks and might have been open to pressure, the Under-Secretary of State at the 
Home office received the following letter from James Wilson, the Chief 
Constable of Cardiff and honorary secretary of the Chief Constables' 
Association: 
"Sir, 
The Executive Committee of the Chief Constables' Association 
(Cities and Boroughs of England and Wales) have recently had 
under review the question of censorship, more particularly in 
relation to Stage Plays, as a Police duty. 
They feel this task is not one rightly coming within the 
scope of Police duty and suggest the establishment of one 
Central Authority for the censorship of Stage Plays. Further that 
it should be the duty of the travelling manager of the performing 
company to have in his possession a copy of the script of the 
Play signed by some responsible person on behalf of that 
authority, with any alteration therein, duly initialled by such 
person, for production to the police at any time when called 
upon to do so; and that it shall be the duty of the Police to see 
that the script is strictly adhered to. 
My Committee are also of the opinion that, so far as 
gesture or suggestion is concerned, the public themselves are 
their own censors. 
The Executive Committee, therefore, respectfully 
suggest that the Secretary of State for the Home Department will 
consider the advisability of introducing legislation of the lines 
they have indicated "24 
24 James Wilson, Chief Constable of Cardiff and Honorary Secretary of the 
Chief Constables' Association, to the Under-Secretary of State, Home Office 
(A. Crapper) 7th May 1929, in NA HO 45/24879/502742/21 
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This is a very curious letter indeed, and perhaps only important in what it 
implies, rather than what it demands. First of, as a civil servant named Crapper 
noted in a rather puzzled memo on the subject, such an authority as the one 
requested already existed, in the shape of the Lord Chamberlain's office. Such a 
principle as the one requested, of an approved script with initials in place, was 
already there, and should in theory be fully enforced. 
But what is actually implied needs to be learned from the context. First, 
the mere fact that there was still an agitation for reform of the laws on 
censorship shows that Joynson-Hicks did almost nothing about it during his 
tenure as Home Secretary - almost certainly for the reason that Cromer gave to 
the King, that he feared it would be impossible to keep censorship alive in the 
context of a new parliamentary battle over it. Second, the context of the letter is 
interesting. Crapper himself wrote: 
"The Chief Constables appear to be following the advice given 
at the Chief Constables' Conference by Mr. Bernard 
Shaw... One would think to read their letter that they had never 
heard of the Lord Chamberlain as a censor of Stage Plays. s25 
If George Bernard Shaw was genuinely trying to persuade them of the 
inadequacy of the existing law, it seems on the face of it rather unlikely that he 
would be willing to support an alteration made along the lines suggested by 
Wilson - which essentially amount to the full function of the Lord 
Chamberlain's office being retained, but put under the control of the Home 
Office instead of under a royal official. Although the file in which his 
appearance at the meeting of Chief Constables was referred to does not appear to 
have survived, and so guesswork is the best that can be accomplished, it seems 
likely that he was simply trying to cause mischief with the police - perhaps in 
the hope that a very new Home Secretary would fall into the obvious trap and 
present just such a bill, stirring up the very furor that Joynson-Hicks had so 
carefully sought to avoid. S. W. Harris noted that "we [the Home office] 
certainly cannot afford to relieve the Police of all duties in respect of the 
25 Memo by A. Crapper, 18th May 1929, ibid. 
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character of public performances as we rely on them for the enforcement of the 
Lord chamberlain's decisions. "26 
Certainly it cannot be assumed that Wilson enjoyed widespread support 
in his aims, even among the police. The Chief Constable of Birmingham was 
more than startled to see the letter, and as he pointed out, it was contradictory: 
"Whilst objecting to the police censoring Stage Plays as not 
being a Police duty, it is suggested that legislation should be put 
in force to make it a duty of the police to see that the script is 
strictly adhered to. That is a very formidable task as compared 
with mere censorship on view or hearing. "27 
The implication was that he was far from eager to see such a system introduced. 
This does lead on to the more general point of enforcement of the Lord 
Chamberlain's decisions. The Lord Chamberlain could, of course, send some of 
his staff to inspect a play and decide whether or not it conformed to the 
standards laid down in the licence (which would include not only the script but 
also dress, make-up and dramatic gesture)28 But that was a rule that obviously 
only held good in London. Members of the Lord Chamberlain's small and 
overworked staff could not for logistical reasons be dispatched to theatres in 
Glasgow, Sheffield or even Cardiff or Oxford to ensure that the rules were being 
followed. In such cases, the burden fell on the police. On the whole the rules 
were enforced, but patchily. Nicholson, again, provides a long list of how the 
Lord Chamberlain's decisions were enforced in different cities across England - 
from the plain-clothes, specialist branch of the police at Manchester, to the 
superintendent with three women "inspectors" (it is unclear whether this was a 
rank or a job description) who made frequent visits to theatres to inspect not 
only plays but also safety precautions, to Halifax where the inspections were left 
to magistrates and Leicester where it was left to the local "Watch Committee. "29 
26 Memo by S. W. Harris, 21st May 1929, ibid. 
27 Chief Constable of Birmingham to A. Crapper, 9th October 1929, in ibid. 
28 Nicholson 2003 p. 8 
29 ibid. p. 302 
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Such a variety of systems was perhaps unhelpful insofar as it meant there 
was no uniformity of approach. However, the mere fact of the Lord 
Chamberlain's existence meant that there was at least an element of order among 
the chaos, one far more slackly imposed in the case of film censorship, where 
the local authorities did have the power to overrule the censor. Some 
qualification must be inserted in that happy phrase however. It is, for one thing, 
by no stretch of the imagination impossible that in performances outside 
London, especially in those townships where the police were not particularly 
active, that the cuts demanded by the Lord Chamberlain mysteriously made their 
way back into the performance. While there were prosecutions, successful ones, 
at frequent intervals, it is very doubtful that they caught all offenders. As 
Nicholson wrote, "While we will never know exactly what happened on the 
ground, any analysis of censorship must at least avoid assuming that the Lord 
Chamberlain's control was always maintained in practice"30 The Lord 
Chamberlain's office was obviously acutely aware of this. One of his staff, 
Crichton, resignedly wrote to a clergyman who had complained about one 
particular play, 
"It is almost impossible, once a play has left London, to check 
how it is played in the provinces, and we know only too well 
that full advantage is taken of this fact by Managers and Touring 
Companies. It is, therefore, quite possible that the play may not 
now be given in the same form as it was when licensed. s31 
This particular play, by Miles Malleson, was called Fanatics. Malleson is 
probably best known today for his performances as a film actor in many classic 
black and white British comedies playing bumbling, unworldly characters (in, 
for instance, Brothers in Law as Mr. Grimes, The Man in the White Suit as a 
tailor and Kind Hearts and Coronets as the hangman). But he held extremely 
left-wing social and political views, and made his name as a radical playwright 
who gave full expression to them. Such a play was Fanatics. The advertisement 
30 Nicholson 2003 p. 163 
31 Crichton to Revd. C. H. Hamilton, 5th Match 1928, BL LCP Corr. 1926/6917 
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offered for it in the local paper for Southport, Lancashire, for a performance at 
the opera House, is indeed somewhat racy in its description: 
"Next week - October 24th, we are to have a visit of that 
startling and remarkable play - The Fanatics. It is described as 
one of the most outspoken plays that ever got past the censor. To 
mention only a few of the tense scenes with which this play 
abounds would perhaps show why it has been banned in some 
towns. 
1) It indites [sic] the Churches (2) It talks frankly about 
birth control. (3) It has the audacity to stage a young woman 
who suggests a trial marriage to her fiance. (4) It contains a 
disrobing scene (5) It describes the intimacies of three love 
affairs of an unmarried woman. (6) It is pacifist, anti-Capital and 
anti-Church. (7) It contains a servant girl who is going to have a 
baby by a married man. She confesses it while moving away the 
tea things! 
This is surely a play for the broad minded. "32 
This play obviously ran very close to being banned outright. However, even 
after it was eventually passed "with reservations, " the Lord Chamberlain's staff 
knew that they could not be certain of retaining control of the subject matter 
once it had left London. The danger of being held up to ridicule by being simply 
ignored seems to have been one they were constantly alert to. 
Fanatics is in any case an interesting example of censorship in the 1920s 
in action, by the very nature of its marginality. Had it been a straightforward 
decision to allow it or refuse it then the reader would simply have recommended 
a or advised against a licence and that would have been that. However, because 
32 Cutting enclosed in letter from (illegible) occupant of Colonial house, Water 
Street, Liverpool to G. S. Street of the Lord Chamberlain's office, 22nd October 
1927, in BL LCP Corr. 1926/6917 
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it was considered doubtful, Lord Cromer decided to consult the Advisory Board 
that had been set up in 1910. At this time, it contained the former Liberal Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Buckmaster. It is interesting to note Lord Buckmaster's 
opinion of Fanatics: 
"I should licence this play: - its subject has been discussed in 
many books, notably Grant Allen's "The Woman who Did" and 
though the stage is not an appropriate machine for producing a 
symposium on ethics that is no reason for refusing a licence. 
The risk is the author's and the producer's and not the public's. 
The dialogue on p70 might have come straight from Mrs 
Stopes and I think its modification is desirable. -)933 
It is curious that while the topic of Fanatics passed the muster of Lord 
Guckmaster, despite the somewhat graphic description of it given above, 
something which presumably referred to contraception did not 
34 This, of course, 
was one of the chief dangers of censorship - it is largely a subjective exercise. 
This may be partly why Lord Cromer wrote, for his own account: 
"The ideas expressed in this play will undoubtedly appear too 
"advanced" for many people. Still, as the public likes to judge 
for itself, here is an opportunity. "35 
Cromer here showed an attitude that is not so much enlightened - he did insist 
on modifications to the script - as curious. He seems to have decided to pitch for 
not what was absolutely safe to be passed, but to see how much he could get 
away with. This may be why he commented bitterly that "the criticism is not 
account of those plays that are stopped but on account of those that are 
33 Buckmaster's opinion on Fanatics, in ibid. 
34 Marie Stopes, author of Married Love, was an early pioneer of birth control 
and contraception in the interwar years, Her work was controversial at the time, 
as was her book on the subject, Married Love, published in 1918. See Ross 
McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 1918-1951 (Oxford 2000) pp. 319- 
320 
3s Earl of Cromer, opinion on Fanatics, 11th May 1924, in BL LCP 1926/6917 
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passed. -)36 It is worth noting the date of this letter - sent on the 24th November 
1924, it was a mere month later that Joynson-Hicks felt obliged to back off from 
investigating censorship of the stage too thoroughly in case he stirred up a storm 
(an image Cromer also used) that he could not control. 
One very good reason why there were comparatively few complaints 
about those plays which were suppressed is that there were comparatively few 
plays suppressed in the first place. As Nicholson noted: 
"Banning a play was a last resort, avoided by the Lord 
Chamberlain wherever possible. Before that came the process of 
removing certain elements and of persuading the manager.. . to 
alter the script. Next time around, perhaps the manager would 
anticipate the difficulties and either refuse to touch the script or 
save time by insisting it must be altered before submitting it for 
a licence; the time after that, perhaps, the playwright would 
censor the play before sending it to the manager, or censor his or 
her own thoughts while writing. Preventing the unacceptable 
from being written or even imagined is probably the ultimate 
°'37 goal of censorship. 
One of the complaints made by the Lord Chamberlain's office against the film 
censorship system lying outside their control was that plays not submitted to the 
Lord Chamberlain for this reason, might be submitted as film scripts instead. 
Major Gordon, the Assistant Comptroller, spelled his fears out in forthright 
terms: 
"I am directed by the Lord Chamberlain to ask that he may be 
advised whether a "talking" film, such as is now being produced 
at the Piccadilly Theatre, can be construed as being a Stage Play 
within the definition of Section 23 of the Theatres Act. 
36 Cromer to Higgins, 30th November 1924, in BL LCP 1926/6767 (on The 
Passion Flower). 
37 Nicholson 2003 p. 2 
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While the film referred to above is probably harmless 
and differing little from an ordinary film, the Lord Chamberlain 
understands that there is a proposal to present other plays by 
means of "talking" films, and a difficult situation would arise 
should a play which has been refused a licence by his Lordship, 
or which has not been submitted for Licence for the reason that 
it was unlikely to be granted, be presented by means of "talking 
films" or "synchronised sound films. "38 
Such a fierce letter suggests that the privilege Nicholson outlines is one that the 
Lord Chamberlain felt under pressure of losing in the 1920s, due to the demands 
of new technology and the dangers of an elderly system. It also suggests that the 
Lord Chamberlain's office knew full well that there were plays that never got 
submitted to them in the first place because they were quite unpassable in the 
form they were due to be submitted in. This, perhaps not unexpectedly, is 
something that Sir John Johnston deliberately skates over. His remarks on the 
subject begin with, "The scripts which presented no problems - and they were 
the majority... " concluding with, 
"the Lord Chamberlain... regarded himself as the licensor of 
plays rather than as a censor, and he considered it his duty to 
allow all plays submitted to him unless there seemed to be clear 
and unmistakeable reasons to disallow them. °'39 
It is remarks like this that led Nicholson to refer to Johnston's "apologia" for the 
censorship system - of this particular remark, indeed, he commented that such 
an attitude was "no more than the usual conceit, conscious or unconscious, of all 
who impose rules that others must obey. "40 It is certainly true to say that at best 
this view is ingenuous. The Theatres Act gave the Lord Chamberlain absolute 
power to refuse anything without giving a reason, however he may have 
38 Major C. L Gordon (Assistant Comptroller) to the Under-Secretary of State, 
Home office, 12th October 1928 in NA HO 45/1380859412[/l] 
39 Johnston pp. 20-21 
a° Steve Nicholson, British Theatre and the Red Peril: The Portrayal of 
Communism 1917-1945 (Exeter 1999) p. 4 
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"regarded" his duties. And, even where on moral grounds a play might be 
irreproachable, the catch-all of a threat to public order was always available to 
the Lord Chamberlain to suppress a play - one that Lord Chamberlains were 
prepared to use. 
This can be particularly seen in their attitude towards a play about the 
Black and Tans, 41 the notoriously brutal British police force used against the 
IRA in the Irish rebellion after the First World War. Called The Whirlwind 
Passeth, it was submitted for licence in order to be performed in Liverpool in 
1929. It had, in slightly different form, been refused a licence five years earlier 
when the events of Ireland were still fresh in collective memory. While the Lord 
Chamberlain and his reader both felt that, with the passage of time, and given 
that nobody denied the atrocities committed by the Black and Tans, such a play 
might now be permissible, Cromer first decided to consult the Chief Constable 
of Liverpool to see if he had any concerns about potential public order issues. 
The Chief Constable had very grave concerns about public order, and the whole 
thing eventually ended up in the lap of the Home Office. 
42 They were somewhat 
less sanguine about the public order issue than the Lord Chamberlain. S. W. 
Harris wrote to Gordon: 
"[I am] inclined to think that if there were clear evidence of the 
danger of public disturbance the Chief Constable would be able 
to take action in the special circumstances, notwithstanding that 
the play had been licensed, but this is a matter which would 
need further enquiry. As you want an answer at once I think we 
41 There is some confusion as to exactly what constituted the "Black and Tans" 
- not least, 
in the recent film The Wind that Shakes the Barley. Strictly 
speaking, they were those officers of the RIC recruited on the British mainland 
to meet a manpower crisis caused by resignations and a lack of recruits from 
Ireland in the Troubles of 1919-1922, getting their name from the mixed green 
and khaki uniforms they were 
issued with (instead of standard green) due to 
shortages of suitable RIC uniforms. However, the term was also used to refer to 
the RIC officers and the Auxiliary Police Force, a distinct and much more 
military organisation, as well, who were otherwise called simply "the Tans" 
after their all-khaki military uniforms - see Robert Kee, Ireland, A History 
(third edition London 2003) pp. 182-5 for a cogent brief discussion of the 
difficulties of labelling them correctly. In the case of this play, it seems to refer 
to both or either, using artistic licence to blur the difference. 
42 Nicholson 2003 pp. 257-8 
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ought to regard the legal position for the moment as it would 
obviously be desirable on all grounds to prevent any conflict 
between the Lord Chamberlain's office and the action of the 
local authority. 
Liverpool with its large and vocal Irish population is of 
course the worst possible atmosphere for a play of this character 
and the Chief Constable appears to have good grounds for his 
apprehensions. 
In these circumstances would it not be well for the Lord 
Chamberlain to discuss the matter with the Chief 
Constable ... 
beford [sic] deciding to proceed any further? Sir 
John Anderson agrees that this would probably be the best thing 
to do in the circumstances. "43 
This is a very remarkable letter for a number of reasons. First of all, it suggests 
that the Lord Chamberlain could still be subordinated to the Home Office if the 
latter really decided to flex its muscles, despite the theoretical independence of 
the post. In practice, in this case, it was due to the strong links the Home Office 
had to the police. How powerful that hold was may be judged from the fact that 
Cromer backed down; although he gave no explicit reason for refusing a licence, 
he mentioned writing to the Chief Constable of Liverpool, which leads to an 
automatic presumption that without his objections and those of the Home Office, 
the play would have passed. 
44 Second, it suggests that the Lord Chamberlain's 
decision was not always final, and that it could be overruled by the local police 
and possibly the local authority if they were so inclined -- especially if there was 
a threat to "public order. " As Nicholson implicitly noted, this put huge power 
into the hands of the London Public Morality Council and its sister 
organisations, who could always threaten massive demonstrations against plays 
they took exception to and therefore allow a magistrate or officer sympathetic to 
them to close the play down. This of course also extended to those plays that 
were written before 1737 and therefore technically did not require a licence from 
43 Harris to Gordon, 28th November 1929, in NA 110 45/24789/502742/25 
44 Gordon to Harris, 30th November 1929, in ibid. 
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the Lord Chamberlain. 45 Third, and above all, it showed that the Lord 
Chamberlain was not necessarily as strict in the interpretation of his role as 
censor as some of his ostensible supporters - in the police and in the 
administration. 
It is worth noting that the question of public order could be interpreted 
very broadly indeed, to suppress plays that did not threaten a riot but had 
incurred the displeasure of those in authority - usually with the assistance or at 
the suggestion of the Home Office. One play which provoked a major 
correspondence in this area was a play called Surmise. According to the 
playwright it was "suggested" by the murder of Percy Thompson in 1922, for 
which his wife, Edith Thompson, and her lover, Frederick Bywater, were both 
hanged. The Lord Chamberlain was happy that it could be passed with 
modifications, but sought advice from the Home Office on whether it was 
advisable to allow it to be licensed in light of its link with notorious recent 
events 46 Ernley Blackwell's own opinion could hardly have been clearer, and is 
worth quoting at some length: 
"1) This play is not merely suggested by the case of Mrs. 
Thompson and Bywaters. The frame of it, with slight alterations 
necessary for dramatic purposes.. . 
is the frame of that case. The 
characters, that is the individuals, are quite clearly identifiable, 
though the characters given to the individuals in the play, their 
motives and inter-relations, are a travesty upon what is known of 
the principal persons involved in the actual case. 
The case occurred less than five years ago and it seems to me 
that all the reasons set out by Mr. Street in his last paragraph 
apply here and should have led him to recommend refusal of 
licence. The character given to Harold Carter (Percy Thompson, 
the husband), namely that of a cynical and sensual monster who 
derives some sort of satisfaction by watching the intrigue 
between his wife and her lover and prides himself apparently 
upon his sexual attraction and her appetite to hold her to him, 
45 Nicholson 2003 pp. 6-7 
46 Lord Cromer to H. R. Boyd, 27th July 1927, in NA HO 45/18008/549494/2 
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must of necessity be offensive and give pain to his surviving 
relatives... 
(2) To my mind a much graver objection is one that is only 
hinted at by the Reader, and he thinks that in this case it does not 
apply, namely "in the case of criminal matters if they would 
prejudice a court not finally determined. " This case was finally 
determined in a sense some years ago. The two prisoners were 
convicted on the verdict of a jury of men and women of 
participating in a foul and sordid murder. No doubt some of the 
members of the jury have already had to bear a certain amount 
of obloquy from persons who have derived a totally false view 
of the case from the writings of such men as Filson Young. It is 
now proposed to present in this play, to thousands of people and 
to millions if it is filmed - and there would be no reason for 
barring a film if the play were licensed -a view of the case 
according to which Mrs. Thompson was a completely innocent 
if pathetically foolish and romantic woman who was not to 
blame in any way for the murder of her husband by Bywaters, 
and who was the victim of the worst miscarriage of justice that 
has occurred certainly within living memory. '47 
The full gamut of reasons is interesting, but the hint in the last paragraph that 
Blackwell considered there would be difficulties created for the jurors who had 
sat in the case if they were held to have committed an unpardonable miscarriage 
of justice is an interesting one. He seems to have foreseen angry mobs around 
their houses, complete with the requisite pitchforks and torches. Whether it was 
an accurate reflection of his real views is a different matter. It is perhaps nearer 
to the mark when he wrote, in his actual letter to Cromer, 
"It is, I think you will agree, important that confidence in the 
administration of criminal justice in this country should be 
preserved. Criticism there must be and it can be met, but it 
47 Minute by Ernley Blackwell, 10th August 1927, in ibid. 
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would be wrong to encourage attacks based upon a gross 
misrepresentation of a particular case. "4g 
In fact, he was less concerned about the unfortunate jurors being attacked than 
the thought of the criminal justice system being questioned. Public order, 
however, made a very convenient excuse to hold on to his dignity and cover his 
real interest. His fire paid off when Cromer promptly backed down and refused a 
licence. 49 
It is perhaps surprising that this particular play was recommended for a 
licence in the first place, as it surely came into conflict with the recommendation 
of the 1909 Select Committee that the portrayal of living persons or those who 
had only recently died (especially unsympathetic portrayals) should be 
considered grounds for refusing a licence - something that, according to 
Johnston, they more or less observed 5.0 Yet in this play the (living) younger 
sister of Mrs. Thompson "is described as "the incarnation of giggling, sex- 
conscious suburbia", whatever that means. "5' Blackwell himself thought that she 
(Mrs. Thompson's sister) would certainly have grounds to sue for libel 52 
At any rate, it was by no means the only play based upon a genuine 
murder case to be recommended for suppression by the Home Office. In 1912 
similar short shrift was given to a script on the case of Dr. Crippen, whose case 
in 1910 had sparked such a sensation. S3 In October 1929 Cromer again sought 
clarification on a play about George Joseph Smith called, rather 
unimaginatively, The Brides in the Bath. J. R Clynes, who had replaced 
Joynson-Hicks as Home Secretary, took a simple and forthright view which he 
had no hesitation in expressing: 
"I have seen your minute on the play "The Brides in the Bath" 
which has been submitted to you for licence and I entirely agree 
with your view that this play should not be licensed. In my view 
48 Blackwell to Cromer, 12th August 1927, in ibid. 
49 Cromer to Blackwell, reply, 17th August 1927, in ibid. 
50 Johnston pp. 110-111 
si Blackwell minute of 10th August, op. cit. 
52 Handwritten addition to minute, ibid. 
53 See files relating to this in NA HO 45/18008/549494/1 
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no play should be allowed which is based on a capital case if 
anyone who was concerned with the original incidents is likely 
to be still alive"sa 
Cromer himself "welcomed" this view. 55 Although not an issue strictly of 
morality, there was no doubt about the consensus evolved on the subject of libels 
and attacks on the justice system through the theatre in this period. 
It is perhaps rather suggestive that in those cases the Lord Chamberlain was 
obliged to seek clarification from the Home Office, it was what the Home Office 
said that generally went - this despite Joynson-Hicks having refused the chance 
to take formal responsibility for the system in 1924. This may have been largely 
out of practical necessity. Nicholson identified in the actions of Lord Cromer a 
man anxious to hang on to power, by seeking to avoid controversy and blunt the 
attacks of his enemies on all sides -- the Home Office, the London Public 
Morality Council, and the writers. This led to the curious paradox of the Lord 
Chamberlain, the official censor, resisting demands for stricter censorship from 
"the efficiently organised and well connected [London] Public Morality 
Council. "56 It is true that in 1924, nobody could have guessed that theatre 
censorship would still be a thorny topic in Britain as late as 1968. But equally, 
nobody could have foreseen in 1909 that a system devised in 1843 and dating 
back to Tudor times would still be functioning after an exhaustive parliamentary 
inquiry inspired by a government at that time boasting a majority of several 
hundred. 
The Lord Chamberlain survived largely because it was impossible to 
think, less of a better system, than a better system that would be as widely 
accepted. Obviously there were strong arguments for handing over control of the 
censorship systems to a Government department accountable to Parliament, or 
for abolishing them outright, or for a system of self-censorship based on 
managers. But the first would have been unacceptable to the writers, the second 
to the London Public Morality Council and its Parliamentary supporters (almost 
54 Clynes to Cromer, 25th October 1929, in NA HO 45/18008/549494/5 
ss Cromer to Clynes, 30th October 1929, ibid. 
56 Nicholson 2003 p. 14 
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certainly also to Joynson-Hicks himself) and the third to the managers, who had 
proven timorous about accepting responsibility for mistakes that might lead to 
expensive and embarrassing lawsuits. 
Joynson-Hicks himself, for all his scepticism in 1924, said of the Lord 
Chamberlain in 1929 that his role as stage censor was "one of those curious 
factors in the English constitution, which are not founded on any logical position 
but which work, as many of our laws do, quite satisfactorily. "57 He was quite 
unabashed about the need to check "every form of filth" that crashed out of the 
literary mind, and considered himself to have substantial public backing in 
saying so. It is obvious, however, from the way he drew back from reforming the 
Lord Chamberlain's office in 1924 when he was offered the chance, that either 
he was worried about the potential for trouble with the anti-censorship forces if 
he tried changing the existing system, or that he was genuinely satisfied that the 
Lord Chamberlain did the job as well as he could - or possibly both. After that 
his role in theatre censorship was peripheral at best. While he could offer 
advice, it does not seem that he did so - which was not always the case with the 
topics examined by this thesis 
58 That would suggest that he was at least content 
with the stance of the Lord Chamberlain on most issues, although if the idea of 
tightening censorship and bringing it under Home Office control in 1924 had not 
been likely to cause problems for him politically, it is hard to believe that he 
would not have taken the option of doing it. 
It is, in fact, quite difficult to believe that a system in which censorship 
had no place at all would have been accepted in the 1920s. It is easy to visualise 
an endless stream of lawsuits inspired by the wealthy and powerful London 
Public Morality Council forcing managers, in the end, to be far more cautious 
about what they allowed on stage than they had ever been under the Lord 
Chamberlain. Even in 1968, there were complaints in the press that "the Lord 
Chamberlain's role in the world of theatre was abolished at precisely the wrong 
moment "59 Or, to put 
it another way, the main agitations of those who had the 
most power to do anything was for a tightening, rather than relaxing of the law. 
This is certainly the case when examining film censorship, which was a 
57 Lord Brentford, Do we need a Censor? (London 1929) p. 18 
58 See below chapters 4,5 and 6. 
59 The Daily Telegraph, quoted in Johnston p. 254 
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comparatively new concept in the 1920s and which became sterner as the decade 
progressed. 
Perhaps the most important thing about the Lord Chamberlain's off ice is 
not why it existed, but that it did exist. It alone set a formal benchmark for any 
sort of official censorship in the 1920s, and it therefore must serve as a 
benchmark for this study. It also shows that the Home Office, despite its 
assertions to the contrary, did run a government system of censorship, even at 
arms-length, and this perhaps made it more willing to interfere in other fields. 
The two most nearly analogous are literary censorship and film censorship. It is 
to the former of these fields that we now turn. 
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4) Literature, Pornography and Obscenity. 
""French, eh? " he said. "I guessed as much, and pretty dirty, too, I 
shouldn't wonder. Now just you wait here while I look up these here 
books" - how he said it! - "in my list. Particularly against books the 
Home Secretary is. If we can't stamp out literature in this country, we can 
at least stop it being brought in from outside. That's what he said the other 
day in Parliament, and I says, "Hear, Hear... "" 
Evelyn Waugh, Vile Bodies. ' 
Evelyn Waugh's satirical pen merely gave voice to what many people in his 
walk of life thought in the late 1920s, for Joynson-Hicks' purity campaigns 
perhaps reached their apogee in the field of literature. During the 1920s many 
authors were experimenting with new styles or pushing the boundaries of 
acceptability, or both: names such as James Joyce, Aldous Huxley, D. H. 
Lawrence, T. S. Eliot, T. E. Lawrence and, to a rather lesser extent, Radclyffe 
Hall, have been famous down the years. All of them boldly refuted the societal 
norms, challenged the Obscene Publications Act and generally fought what 
might be termed the "establishment. " 
This chapter seeks to focus on four things. First, it briefly decribes the 
legal framework of the times under which the Home Office and Customs 
operated with regard to obscene literature. Second, it discusses the literary scene 
of the 1920s, in the social context of the times. Third, it discusses the Home 
Office response to what it regarded as obscene literature - an important caveat, 
as this was an inherently subjective subject. What I or D. H. Lawrence might 
consider obscene would be very different from the view of Joynson-Hicks or Sir 
John Anderson. Finally, it will attempt to draw some conclusions about what 
was done, whether it was right or wrong, and what could have been done better 
or differently. 
The Obscene Publications Act of 1857 (hereafter OPA) was a quite 
remarkable mechanism for suppressing obscene publications. Named "Lord 
Campbell's Act" after the man who introduced it, it gave the magistrates power 
1 Published in 1930: this from the "Penguin Classics Edition" (London 2000) p. 
20.1 am grateful to Mr. Owen Collins for drawing my attention to this passage. 
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to destroy books and prints found inside the country, if they were deemed to be 
either written for or in danger of "corrupting the morals of youth. " Ten years 
later, in what became known as the Hicklin case, it was interpreted to mean that 
published works should be prevented from harming anyone's morals. The test 
was therefore not whether the publication had literary or artistic merit, or 
whether it was intended to be pornographic, only that it could be pornographic. 
The words "a tendency to deprave and corrupt" were brought into the language. 
Imported books were dealt with slightly differently. They could be held 
by Customs, under the Customs Consolidation Act of 1853, revised into the Act 
of 1876. Under this act, any material a Customs inspector deemed obscene 
could be seized and notice given to the bearer or consignee, either in writing or 
orally, that this had been done (as above). The consignee or bearer then had one 
month to contest the seizure in writing. If that was done, Customs had to go to 
court to prove their case - and they did have to prove it. However, seizure was 
not normally contested, so this seldom happened. ' 
Joynson-Hicks's response to the new style of literature was not 
necessarily hard and fast. As he himself pointed out, the OPA made no 
allowance for a pattern of censorship. If a book was sent to the Home Office 
with a complaint, the Home Office could either uphold the complaint and order 
the book to be prosecuted and presumably banned, or reject the complaint and 
decline to hear further argument on the matter. Joynson-Hicks wrote, after 
leaving the Home Office, that to fail to do either of these, especially if a 
potential publisher had asked for an opinion on whether or not the book was 
permissible under the law, would be "not a very helpful attitude. "4 Otherwise, 
the Home Secretary had comparatively little power to act. 
Far too little has been written from a historical perspective on this 
subject. Much of the work that does exist consists of critical studies of the 
works themselves. The most important which may be mentioned here include 
David Ayers, English Literature of the 1920s, which, in its own words, sought 
2 C. H. Rolph, Books in the Dock; (London 1969) pp. 52-4 gives an accessible 
brief survey of this law. 
3 ibid. pp. 51-2 
4 Lord Brentford (i. e. William Joynson-Hicks) Do we need a censor? (London 
1929) especially pp. 13-15. 
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to "[situate] the fiction of the 1920s in its social and political context "5 In this 
he is somewhat less than successful. Ayers' knowledge of the strictly political 
context often seems scanty, and his efforts to put the writers in context never 
quite comes off, partly because inadequate space is devoted to it. An excellent 
critical study of various inter-related books of the 1920s emerges: but it is of 
limited value as a source for the historian. Of similar size and performance is 
Hena Maes-Jelinek, Criticism of Society in the English Novel Between the Wars, 
which begins with the impact of war on England and then goes on to study how 
various writers, specifically listed by name on a chapter-by-chapter basis, wrote 
about the changes in society in their novels, and how they often ended up with 
widely differing perspectives even when they had had similar experiences. 
Again, while an interesting literary study with merit in its own field, this is of 
limited use in a historical thesis. John Lucas, in The Radical Twenties: Aspects 
of Writing, Politics and Culture, comes perhaps nearest to providing a marriage 
of the two competing disciplines. In it, Lucas tried to analyse not how but why 
writers wrote as they did, finishing up with a chapter on the General Strike of 
1926 and the way it divided the literary world. 7 
Slightly more of value has been written on the specific cases as they 
arose. On the dominant case in this chapter, the 1928 trial of The Well of 
Loneliness, the author's position was set out in a bitter, biting study by Vera 
Brittain, an original reviewer of the book and a disallowed witness at the 1928 
trial. Even the title of her book, Radclyffe Hall: A Case of Obscenity? underlines 
the author's position. How much use the conclusions of this study are is open to 
doubt. The introduction, written by C. H. Rolph, was also rather one-sided, and 
sometimes lost sight of his argument. For instance, he spent three whole pages 
condemning Cape's decision to send The Well of Loneliness to the Home Office 
for a legal opinion, before finally winding up with the sneer that "to send a 
`dubious' book to the Home Office for approval... was like submitting the plans 
3 David Ayers, English Literature of the 1920s (Edinburgh 1999) p. 1 
6 Hena Maes-Jelinek, Criticism of Society in the English Novel Between the 
Wars (Paris 1970) p. ii. The study refers throughout to "England, " although 
Maes-Jelinek may mean "Britain. " 
7 John Lucas, The Radical Twenties: Aspects of Writing, Politics and Culture 
(Nottingham 1997) see especially Chapter 7. 
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for a train robbery. "8 However, Brittain's great energy and mastery of detail 
mean that much of value can be obtained on specific points from the book as a 
whole, and an invaluable timetable of the case is also provided. A more recent 
biography of Radclyffe Hall herself by Diana Souhami came to the conclusion 
that the case demonstrated institutionalised homophobia in the Baldwin 
government and the Home Office .9 This book is the only recent effort to deal 
with Radclyffe Hall. That is unfortunate, given the serious technical 
shortcomings in its referencing system and its almost impenetrable prose style. 
It also makes, in practice, the very moral judgements it criticizes Joynson-Hicks 
and the Home Office for making. For instance, "homophobia" is a modem term 
and a modem concept, evolved during Tatchell's campaigns of the 1970s and 
1980s. 1° While moral judgements relative to the time of writing are probably 
unavoidable in practice, a certain restraint might have been desirable, and to 
produce a meaningful account a more balanced attitude would have been 
essential. 
" Nevertheless, some of its passages are useful, given the vast quantity 
of data that Souhami collected, and it will be used where it is relevant. 
There have also been some gender based studies of The Well of 
Loneliness, in particular works about lesbianism and lesbians in the early 
twentieth century. Laura Doan's Fashioning Sapphism is among the most 
notable, a study of how The Well of Loneliness helped create a "new lesbian 
culture. " It did this by, in the author's words: 
8 C. H. Rolph, introduction to Vera Brittain, Radclyffe Hall: A Case of 
Obscenity? (London 1968) pp. 22-5 (direct quote from p. 25) 
9 Diana Souhami, The Trials of Radclyffe Hall (Virago edition London 1999) 
PP. xi-xii 
16 Matt Houlbrook, Queer London: Perils and Pleasures in the Sexual 
Metropolis 1918-1957 (Chicago 2005) discusses the emergence of homophobia 
as part of homosexual identity p. 7. He also refers to talk of "homophobia" for 
this period as "socially and culturally blind" (p. 180) and "ahistorical" (p. 222). 
11 For an excellent discussion of the problems that moral judgements in 
historical accounts can throw up, see Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History 
(second edition London 2000) pp. 49-53 
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"[an] insistence on a particularized national context and 
temporality in interrogating a range of myths long accepted 
without question. "12 
In practice, it amounts to a thorough dissection of lesbian movements and 
cultural developments in Britain in the 1920s, using the trial as a starting point 
but paying comparatively little attention to it - or to Joynson-Hicks, whom Doan 
dismissed as a "marginal" figure, although adding in a scathing denunciation of 
him at the same time. Some of its attempts to consider the wider lesbian scene 
and the cultural attitude of society as a whole towards them are however useful 
to this thesis. Other works on lesbianism include Emily Hamer's Brittania's 
Glory: A History of Twentieth-Century Lesbians (London 1996) which offers a 
series of short biographical essays on a variety of famous women who were 
either thought to be or avowedly lesbian, including Radclyffe Hall. However, the 
relevant parts of Hamer have largely been superseded by Souhami's work, 
which I have generally preferred as a source in consequence. 
D. H. Lawrence, the other figure covered in some depth, was not only a 
far more famous (and, incidentally, far better) writer than Hall, but also a much 
more energetic one. His oeuvre, despite his comparatively short life, is much 
larger than that of Hall's, and includes not only novels but poetry, short stories, 
critical essays and essays on literary theory. As a result he has attracted much 
more attention that Radclyffe Hall. There are several biographies of him 
available that can be drawn on, companions to his work, and published 
collections of his private papers including his letters. 
This chapter will concentrate heavily on The Well of Loneliness case - 
indeed will make something of a case study of it - because it is an excellent 
example of the confusion at the heart of this particular aspect of obscenity and 
morality. It is a book without a single indecent or rude word. The most daring 
sentence is, "... and that night they were not divided. " 13 But this was a reference 
to two women that were not divided. The Well of Loneliness was an early book 
12 Laura Doan, Fashioning Sapphism: The Origins of a Modern English Lesbian 
Culture (New York 2001) p. auciii 
13 Radclyffe Hall, The Well of Loneliness (London 1928,1949, this edition 
London 1973) p. 316 
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on lesbianism, written by an avowed lesbian writer. In the words of Joynson- 
Hicks to the publisher, The Well of Loneliness was "inherently obscene in that it 
deals with and supports a depraved practice and that its tendency is to 
corrupt "14 The net result was that the book was withdrawn on the most tenuous 
grounds imaginable, something for which Joynson-Hicks has been blamed in 
every single study of the subject. While it would have been interesting to 
compare it with the only other book banned outright in the 1920s - Sleeveless 
Errand by Norah C. James - that is sadly not possible due to an absence of 
government papers on the subject. The only account of this affair is in the book 
written by its publisher, Eric Partridge, in 1930 - hardly a new account, and not 
one of great interest therefore in a study seeking to throw fresh light on the 
affair. The only really interesting thing that can be said about it from that point 
of view is that it was banned after a private citizen drew the attention of the 
police to it, causing them to act swiftly to seize it -a way very unlike the path 
taken by The Well of Loneliness. is 
The limitations, and indeed absence, of previous studies may be due to 
this inaccessibility of government papers on the subject. Vera Brittain had no 
access to the government records chronicling the case, because they did not 
come under the Thirty Year Rule. The documents I have consulted on The Well 
of Loneliness were closed for 100 years, and have only been opened in the last 
ten years after a review prompted by the efforts of Diana Souhami for her own 
book. Even with this assistance, the evidence is patchy. The Home Office 
initially retained several files as too sensitive for publication, claiming that to 
release them would "impede national security. -)"16 As far as I can judge from the 
numbers of the retained files, that has now been put right, but that does not 
complete the evidence. Large numbers of the relevant files have been destroyed, 
and to judge from such hints as can be gleaned from the remainder, the missing 
files are much the most important and controversial. They included, apparently, 
documents concerning the interception (albeit accidentally) of letters from 
14 Joynson-Hicks to Messrs. Jonathan Cape, 22nd August 1928, NA MS. 110 
144/22547 527705/3 
15 Christopher Hilliard, "The literary underground of 1920s underground, " 
Social History 33: 2 (2008) pp. 164-182, p. 175 quotes Partridge's account and 
offers a brief analysis of it. 
16S0uhami p. XI. 
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Jonathan Cape's solicitors to the Pegasus press in Paris concerning the court 
case. " The accelerated openings may also account for the erratic foliation and 
rather inadequate cataloguing of these documents, along with the endless 
repetitions of flimsy copies. 
The 1920s have been seen as the stamping ground of a "new literature" 
inspired by the war. In this analysis, the war, by loosening the constraints of 
Victorian literature, by the severe psychological impact of loss of life and the 
horrors of the trenches, would permit an atmosphere in which a newer, less 
stringent morality could thrive. 
However, this explanation is doubtful, because it takes too little account 
of longer-term developments in literature that pre-dated the war. It is certainly 
true that the ties of morality on literature slackened. Perhaps the best literary 
representation of this is in Aldous Huxley's Point Counter Point (1928). As 
Nicholas Mosley was to write nearly eighty years later 
"It [Point Counter Point] told of people who were clever and witty 
but above all free - free from convention and much social 
obligation, free to experiment with their own ideas and lives. They 
were not particularly happy: but they confronted life with energy; 
, 08 they did not seem to be at its mercy. 
But this might more fairly be seen as the culmination of a long process dating 
back to before the war. Although A. N. Wilson attributed modernism in English 
literature solely to imitators of T. S. Eliot, it was in fact a style of writing that 
had been a long time gestating. 19 E. M. Forster, in many ways the finest example 
of early modernism, wrote only one book after the war, A Passage to India 
(1924) and that was possibly less significant in terms of new literary 
developments than either A Room with a View (1906) or Howard's End (1910). It 
17 Memo of Home Office, 16th December 1928, NA 110 144/22547 527705/64, 
contains a hint to that effect. 
18 Nicholas Mosley, introduction to Dalkey Archive Press edition of Point 
Counter Point (Normal, Illinois 1996) p. v 
19 See A. N. Wilson, After the Victorians (London 2005) p. 300: see pp. 202-4 
for his view of Eliot's importance. 
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should also be pointed out that Robert Graves and Alan Hodge - who as 
professional writers actually knew what they were talking about - considered 
James Joyce, Aldous Huxley and D. H. Lawrence as the most significant new 
writers of what they termed they avant-gardists, and none of those three actually 
fought in the war. 20 
The 1920s might perhaps be more correctly termed a time when people 
were readier to listen to these new writers and artists. Nevil Shute, who was 
himself to become a popular writer, spoke of the need to adjust at the end of the 
war to the fact that "there was a strange stuff called fun to be got out of life. "21 
The extraordinary scenes described by Graves and Hodge on the signing of the 
Armistice suggest anything but a Victorian propriety . 
22 Whatever their merits as 
writers, Huxley, Lawrence and Joyce were definitely not the sort of writers 
ordinary people would read for fun. Ulysses, in fact, is the sort of book 
practically nobody would ever want to read at all. They regarded themselves as 
artists, and were treated as such. 
However, it would be true to say that there was a certain amount of 
movement towards a new style in the popular market as well. E. M. Hull was a 
writer aiming at a mass audience and in The Sheik (1919) she created a romance 
of a very modem kind. 
23 Rather than the main female character, Diana Mayo, 
being overwhelmed by the good looks and charm of a boring English gentleman, 
she is kidnapped by an Arab tribal chief, repeatedly raped, falls for him 
completely and nearly shoots herself when he decides that they must part. Rather 
spoiling the overall notion of a new morality and racial awareness, it all ends 
semi-conventionally. Ahmed Ben Hassan is not a "barbarian sheik, " but the son 
of the Earl of Glencaryll. He is not a brutal rapist (at least not all the time) but a 
passionate and sensitive man, able, highly educated and fluent in several 
languages. 24 He falls in love with Diana, having seized her to gratify a whim, and 
they go on - presumably - to live happily ever after. Indeed, in today's terms The 
20 Robert Graves and Alan Hodge, The Long week-end: a social history of Great 
Britain 1918-1939 (London 1940) pp. 196-7 
21 Nevil Shute Norway, Slide Rule (paperback London 1968) p. 34 
22 Graves and Hodge pp. 17-18 
23 Note: the book's title is spelt that way, not in the more usual modem form of 
"Sheikh" 
24 Most of the sexual action is implicit: it starts with a semi-suggestive phrase 
and suddenly cuts to several hours later. 
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Sheik is not daring so much as slushy. But it is hard to imagine Jane Austen, 
perhaps the yardstick of romantic novelists throughout the nineteenth century, 
writing something like it. 
The Sheik can be; and indeed has been; seen as a veiled attack on the 
sexual repression of the English (British) middle and upper classes. Diana Mayo 
is cold, calculating, tomboyish, essentially sexless, until Ahmed Ben Hassan 
rouses her to womanhood with repeated sexual assaults, inverting all her 
previous thoughts on sex and sexual relationships 25 Of more significance was 
The Sheik's immense popularity. How far its fame fed off the film version 
starring the handsome, if foppish, Rudolph Valentino is uncertain, but both were 
tremendous successes. 26 The implication was clear. The writers had moved on 
from Victorianism. At least some of the reading public had moved on with them. 
They both wanted something racier than they had been granted before. Perhaps a 
clash with the unchanged law was inevitable. 
What, then, of the most public and certainly the most legally significant 
of those clashes, the banning of The Well of Loneliness, which was to serve as a 
standard in obscenity cases until 1960? The facts of The Well of Loneliness 
(universally referred to at the time as just "The Well ") case as they appeared in 
public at the time are comparatively simple. 
It is essentially a plea for toleration of lesbianism, or as it was 
euphemistically called at the time, "female inversion. "27 In actual fact, it is 
almost as conventional a novel, albeit in a still more obscure way, as The Sheik 
is. It shows how the "invert" will live as an outcast, a pariah, and be incredibly 
miserable. Stephen, the chief character, is strong enough to survive and even to 
thrive, but has to let her weaker lover, Mary, less mentally well-equipped than 
Stephen is to cope with a life beyond the Pale, go into an ordinary marriage, at 
25 Ayers p. 197 
26 See Karen Chow, "Popular Sexual Knowledges and Women's Agency in 
1920s England: Marie Stopes's Married Love and E. M. Hull's The Sheikh" 
Feminist Review no. 63 (autumn 1999) pp. 64-87, pp. 71-78 for a fuller 
discussion of the sexual undercurrents of both the book and the film. 
27 This is actually the way Radclyffe Hall herself described it. The Home Office 
tended to refer to her as a "homo-sexualist " 
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terrible emotional cost to Stephen herself. 28 It was published in Britain by 
Jonathan Cape, in a dull black binding and at a high price in an attempt to limit 
its circulation and keep discussion within an "appropriate" circle. In this it was 
manifestly unsuccessful. It somehow came to the attention of James Douglas, 
journalist, moralist and editor of the hugely influential Sunday Express. 
In one of his more scathing editorials, Douglas ranted about The Well of 
Loneliness, climaxing with his famous declaration that "I would rather give a 
healthy boy or a healthy girl a dose of prussic acid than this novel. "29 Laura 
Doan was sceptical about how far he represented public opinion in this piece. 
She underlined that the overwhelming majority of reviews were sympathetic 
towards The Well of Loneliness, and goes so far as to label the Douglas attack 
"aberrant. "3° However, there is a very simple reason why there had been no 
similarly aggressive reviews before, one that Doan did not spot. Cape, upon 
publication, had limited his reviewers to, in the words of Michael Howard, 
"only to the serious newspapers and weekly journals; the Sunday Express was 
not on the list "31 In other words, he had made sure that only reviewers that were 
either liberally-minded on the subject of homosexuality or not liable to resort to 
hysteria in order to rouse their audience received copies. As a result, the sample 
cannot be taken as representative or indicative of opinion on the question of 
broader sympathy towards homosexuality or lesbianism. In any case, after 
Douglas's article, there was always bound to be a major controversy on the 
subject, which may have been what Douglas intended all along. 
Douglas's attack provoked a fierce response from Jonathan Cape himself. 
In a published letter to the Daily Express he wrote: 
"In the Daily Express you quote from the Sunday Express article, "I 
would rather give a healthy boy or healthy girl a phial of prussic 
acid than this novel. " But why should anyone give this book to any 
boy or girl? It is not intended for boys and girls. 
28 Ayers pp. 143-44 
29 James Douglas, Daily Express, 19th August 1928, quoted in Brittain p. 57 
30 Doan p. 5 
31 Michael S. Howard, Jonathan Cape, Publisher (London 1971) p. 103 
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"The result... [of this] article can only be to nullify our 
most careful attempts to see that this book reaches the right class of 
reader. A wide and unnecessary advertisement has been given to 
the book, and all the curious will now want to read it... The smut 
hounds will be anxious to read it so that they may lift up their 
hands in indignation that such things can be allowed. "32 
But Jonathan Cape made a serious tactical error in this letter. In the last 
paragraph, as a crowning riposte, he declared that he would send the book, the 
favourable reviews (most of which had applauded the book's bravery while 
quietly ignoring the glutinous sentimentality and the intellectual laziness of the 
literary style) and Douglas's article to the Home Secretary. He would then abide 
by the Home Secretary's adjudication on whether or not the book was obscene, 
33 
and if the Home Secretary so wished it, to withdraw the book. 
Seldom can a more unwise decision have been made in the annals of 
publishing. As a C. H. Rolph later lamented, ""The Preposterous Joynson- 
Hicks" was a man of his time as well Home Secretary; and he was a lawyer as 
well as being a leading Evangelical. "34 And indeed, he acted precisely as should 
have been expected. He informed Cape that "I am satisfied that it [The Well of 
Loneliness] is inherently obscene in that it deals with and supports a depraved 
practice and that its tendency is to corrupt. " He therefore invited Cape to 
withdraw the book, as Cape had volunteered to do 
?5 Cape bowed to Joynson- 
Hicks' wishes, albeit with little grace, and withdrew the book. 
It is here that even the public story starts to get complicated. Having 
withdrawn the book Cape, in what was either "a courageous, positive and 
liberal-minded" move (to Hall's defenders) or an outrageous breach of a 
gentlemen's agreement (to the Home Office) sent the printing moulds to the 
Pegasus Press in Paris. 
6 These were used to form a new type: with the net result 
32 Jonathan Cape, letter in Daily Express, 20th August 1928 
33 ibid. 
34 Rolph in Brittain p. 25 
35 joynson-Hicks to Messrs. Jonathan Cape Ltd., 22nd August 1928, NA 110 
144/22547/527705/3 
36 The first was Vera Brittain's view of Jonathan Cape's character, rather than 
his actions: see Brittain p. 85: for the second, cf. "Cape has not acted 
122 
that within two months of the withdrawal of The Well of Loneliness in Britain, it 
was being sent to customers in that country by mail order from France. 
It was this that decided the Home Office to prosecute Cape under the 
Obscene Publications Act of 1857. This was a highly unusual move in the 
circumstances, because the importation of obscene material was usually dealt 
with under a quite different law, the Customs Consolidation Act of 1876, but this 
was impracticable for reasons that were kept quiet at the time but will again be 
discussed later. The case was brought before Sir Chartres Biron, the Chief 
Magistrate at Bow Street, under the OPA. Several senior figures in the 
Bloomsbury set; of these witnesses Virginia and Leonard Woolf, E. M. Forster 
and V. Sackville-West are probably the best-known today; were called to give 
evidence that the book had literary merit and therefore did not deserve to be 
classed as "obscene. " All this was to no avail. Biron, of similar age and political 
persuasions to Joynson-Hicks, rejected the literary evidence because whether the 
book was artistic or not was irrelevant. The only important question was whether 
or not it was obscene. Biron ruled that it was and ordered it destroyed. Hall 
protested, shouting angrily at Biron, leading to the further humiliation for her 
when she was told off for contempt of court. An appeal failed. The seized copies 
of The Well of Loneliness were all destroyed. It was not republished in Britain 
until six years after Radclyffe Hall's death. 
Those are the public facts. In the circumstances it is not, perhaps, 
altogether surprising that most published work of the last eighty years has been 
on the side of Radclyffe Hall. Prima facie, this is a clear case of a Puritanical 
zealot (or to be exact, two Puritanical zealots in Joynson-Hicks and Biron) 
ranging themselves against a gallant band of knights in literature, and against 
justice, truth, common sense and free speech. To some extent, this criticism is 
justified. But equally, there is a good deal on the other side. Joynson-Hicks was 
not quite as active in pursuing The Well of Loneliness as is popularly been 
supposed. Like a good minister, he accepted complete responsibility for the 
actions of his officials and evidently heartily approved of them, but did not 
necessarily do everything himself. Cape certainly acted with disingenuousness 
straightforwardly, " the somewhat dry comment of the Civil Service record on 
the subject: see minute of a meeting between Mr. Harris and Sir John Anderson, 
11th October 1928, NA HO 144/22547/1169/29. 
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and in at least one place with palpable dishonesty. And against those witnesses 
who were willing to declare that The Well of Loneliness had literary merit was 
ranged a figure from the literary world of far greater status and popularity than 
anyone the defence produced. 
37 
A very important point to bear in mind over The Well of Loneliness is 
that initially Joynson-Hicks was not proactive in seeking it out and destroying it. 
In this Roy Jenkins, among many other faults as a biographer, was simply wrong 
when he declared that Joynson-Hicks "was very keen on motoring and on police 
raids to seize the works of such notorious pornographic authors as Radcliffe [sic] 
Hall and D. H. Lawrence. "38 He had the book sent to him, provided an opinion 
and advised a course of action, or at least, so he claimed. In actual fact he had 
also backed this opinion by informing his officials that if the opinion was 
declined they were to prosecute, but in the first instance it was a fair comment. 9 
Joynson-Hicks in his later writings consistently denied that he had ever 
discriminated against The Well of Loneliness because of its political undertones. 
M. A. Whittle, for one, was not convinced. As he correctly pointed out, there 
was never any restriction on the sale of a satirical book on lesbianism by 
Compton Mackenzie, Extraordinary Women. 4° It may be this that had prompted 
Whittle, earlier in his dissertation, to brand Joynson-Hicks's intervention in the 
case "illegal. "" But the fact of the matter was that Joynson-Hicks was unable to 
move against Extraordinary Women whether he had wanted to or not. Nobody 
had submitted that to him for opinion. No organisation had launched a private 
prosecution. This may not have been for the reason that one of the 
37 C. H. Rolph admitted The Well of Loneliness's flaws as a work of literature 
by asking, rhetorically, if it had any readers at the time he was writing in 1968, a 
bare forty years after the trial: see Rolph in Brittain p. 20 
38 Roy Jenkins, Baldwin (London 1987) p. 179 (biographical note on Joynson- 
Hicks) 
39 Brentford p. 14; see also note on DPP's office to Home Secretary, 21st 
August 29, NA HO 144/22547/527705/3 
40 Whittle p24: cf. Adam Parkes, "Lesbianism, History and Censorship: The 
Well of Loneliness and the suppressed randiness of Virginia Woolf s Orlando, " 
Twentieth Century Literature 40: 4 (winter 1994) pp. 434-460, p. 434 
41 In the abstract. See Martin Whittle, "The Banning of The Well of Loneliness: 
a study of censorship in action and contemporary attitudes to the case, " MLib 
thesis UCW Aberystwyth (1990) page iv: "The case progressed from an 
outrageous denunciation by a journalist through illegal political interference by 
the Home Secretary ... " 
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correspondents to the Home Office on the subject gave ("fortunately that is so 
dull that I don't think many people will read it") 42 But certainly Joynson-Hicks 
had far less room to manoeuvre in practically any case than in this one, where 
the publishers had gifted him the chance to act. The Home Secretary could not 
act routinely: only in very specific cases where he had been given the tools to do 
so. As Joynson-Hicks bluntly reminded his critics, "I did not go out into the 
highways and byways looking for books which I could destroy. "43 In 1946 the 
law was changed, to ensure that all new books were routinely sent to the Home 
Office for clearance under the OPA 44 However, in the 1920s the entire system 
was still left as it had been in the 1860s: creaky and inconsistent, and therefore 
flawed and unfair. 
This ambiguity was at the core of the decision by Customs not to 
prosecute Cape under the Customs Consolidation Act. Sir Charles Floud, the 
Head of Customs, was sufficiently alarmed by the issues raised to write to his 
political overseer, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Floud lamented: 
"It is our duty under Section 42 of the Customs Consolidation Act 
1876 to prevent the importation of indecent or obscene books under 
the Obscene Publications Act or otherwise... [but I am] in 
considerable doubt whether the book can be regarded as indecent or 
obscene. The subject is treated seriously and sincerely, with restraint 
in expression and great literary skill and delicacy.. . if the subject can 
permissibly be treated at all in a novel, it is difficult to see how it 
could be treated with more restraint. If on the other hand the subject 
is to be regarded as inadmissible, it will be difficult to know where to 
stop, and questions will at once arise whether similar action must not 
be taken against other books, particularly Mr. Compton Mackenzie's 
"Extraordinary Women. "4S 
42 Letter from Amy? Strachey to Dr. Norris, 3rd October 1928 ("personal") NA 
HO 144/22547/527705/11. 
43 Viscount Brentford, p. 15 
44 Rolph in Brittain, p. 24 
as Typewritten flimsy copy of a letter from Sir Charles Floud to Winston 
Churchill 9th October 1928, NA CUST 49/1057 
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Floud's dilemma was indeed an unenviable one. He did not wish himself to 
prosecute the book under a law where, let it not be forgotten, the burden of proof 
would be upon him, but at the same time he had the full weight of the Home 
Office, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Lord Chancellor ranged 
against him. His situation was further complicated by the fact that he was 
unhappy with Cape's actions in sending the printing moulds to Paris, which was 
plainly a breach of Cape's promise to withdraw the book if asked to do so. 
46 
Winston Churchill was equally doubtful, asking "Who put them [the orders 
banning the book] into operation? On what grounds have they decided that this 
book is an obscene and indecent publication? "47 Clearly Churchill was no more 
convinced than Floud of the case for suppression - which was a potential 
headache for the Home Office, as it virtually ruled out a prosecution under the 
Customs Consolidation Act. 
In the circumstances, Cape's actions worked against him. In withdrawing 
the book, he had accepted the Home Secretary's judgement. By endeavouring to 
republish it in another country, he had stirred up a hornet's nest. Floud was 
offered a lifeline by the Home Office. Enraged at Cape's duplicity, Sir John 
Anderson decided to prosecute him directly, absolving both Floud and Churchill 
of any responsibility and relieving them of a burden that they most certainly did 
not want. 
One can only speculate on what might have happened had Cape not 
behaved in so reckless a fashion by agreeing to abide by Joynson-Hicks' verdict. 
The Well of Loneliness might never even have been brought to court. Two days 
after Floud's letter the Chancellor of the Exchequer's own views were set out in 
the minutes of a meeting on the subject: 
"The Chancellor of the Exchequer had considered the matter and is 
strongly of [the] opinion the Customs should not be put into the 
position of having to defend their action in court: and therefore 
procedure under the Customs Consolidation Act is ruled out s48 
46 ibid. 
47 Minute by Churchill to Floud, 8th October 1928, in ibid. 
48 Minutes of a meeting on 11th October 1928, NA 110 144/22547/527705/20 
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In the ordinary case, the Home Office would have given up at this point. The 
whole purpose of the 1876 Act was to provide a simple mechanism for applying 
the OPA to imported material. Otherwise enforcement was a difficult process, 
involving entrapment, always a controversial move at the best of times. But 
Anderson and the Director of Public Prosecutions (Archibald Bodkin) appear to 
have been so furious at the way Cape had behaved that they felt it was a course 
worth taking. 
The lengths to which the Home Office now went in order to enforce their 
earlier decision are quite astonishing. The first decision made by Anderson and 
Bodkin was that they would need to have grounds for a prosecution under the 
OPA. The memorandum detailing how they intended to get this is worth quoting 
at some length. 
"This [gathering evidence] will necessitate arranging with the GPO 
that the parcels should be delivered to Cape at his premises at a 
time when a Search Warrant under the Act of 1857 has been issued 
by the Magistrate for execution... 
"A number of letters... have been intercepted ordering 
copies of the book and in some instances enclosing cheques, These 
should go back at once to the Post Office to be sealed up and 
posted, first taking from a selection of the letters the names and 
addresses of the persons in England who have ordered the book - 
say five or six or more cases ... 
49 
"Hill [the consignee] when the parcel from Dover has 
reached him should be informed... that if he publishes [sic: sells] 
any copies of it, proceedings will be taken against him. He will not 
unlikely adopt the attitude that the book is not indecent, whereupon 
he can be asked to sell a copy to the officer. 
[Added in ink] "The Attorney General to be consulted. No 
proceedings at present in respect of "Extraordinary Women. "so 
49 These were to be watched for the arrival of the books, but this is dealt with at 
such unnecessary length I have omitted the remainder of the paragraph, which 
contains little of direct interest. 
50 Minutes of a meeting on 11th October 1928, NA HO 144/22547/527705/20 
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The interception of private mail, the sending of incriminating material at pre- 
arranged moments, the trapping of witnesses into either accepting a legal ruling 
or being forced to break it: these are all classic techniques in successful counter- 
terrorist or counter-espionage operations. Yet in this case the material in 
question was a romantic novel of "restraint... literary skill and delicacy, " which 
was such a marginal case under the law that the man who would ordinarily have 
enforced the regulations which it was considered to run foul of refused to do so. 
When The Well of Loneliness was put on trial for obscenity an especial 
criticism (apart from the bias of the magistrate, which fed a far more legitimate 
sense of grievance) was the way in which all expert witnesses on the literary 
merits of the book were barred from giving evidence. Whittle, in his dissertation 
on the subject, was particularly stem, saying that this was one of the most 
obvious aspects of bias in the trial: 
"Biron permitted the personal opinion of a police officer as valid 
testimony for the prosecution, but disallowed the personal opinions 
of about 40 witnesses for the defence. The latter included a number 
of prominent medical, religious and legal authorities, but was made 
up mostly of literary figures. "S1 
These figures had been approached by the defence and asked to give evidence 
for The Well of Loneliness, rather than coming forward independently. An 
exception was George Bernard Shaw, who was openly sympathetic to The Well 
of Loneliness but declined to give evidence "on the grounds that he was immoral 
himself. "52 
The criticism that the personal opinion of a police officer was allowed in 
evidence while the personal evidence of these influential and important 
intellectuals; and the list of scientists included Julian Huxley, who was not only 
a scientist but from a family of writers that included Aldous Huxley and 
51 Whittle p. 16 
52 Brittain p. 90 
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Matthew Arnold; " is one so widely repeated that it is often tacitly assumed that 
had their evidence been allowed, as the evidence of similar witnesses was to be 
at the trial of Lady Chatterley's Lover in 1960, the trial would have ended very 
differently. No matter how bigoted and incompetent the magistrate, no matter 
how furious and determined the Government, the implication is that had the 
Woolfs, Forster, Huxley, Sackville-West and others taken the stand, popular 
opinion would have openly revolted (which with minor exceptions it had not 
done up to this point) the government would have been forced to back down, and 
The Well of Loneliness would have been vindicated. 
There are, however, two problems with this argument. First, although 
forty witnesses offered to appear if called, it is not clear how willing they were. 
Virginia Woolf in particular disliked Radclyffe Hall and the concept of the 
"mannish" lesbian that Stephen represents in The Well of Loneliness, and 
although she offered to appear, she was relieved at being spared giving evidence. 
Forster seems to have viewed the case less as one about a book of literary merit 
than about free speech more generally 54 It has to be asked how well they would 
have fared on the witness stand under the remorseless pressure that would 
doubtless have been brought to bear on them; not forgetting that the Counsel for 
the defence, Norman Birkett, himself cracked under the strain and tried to find a 
more defensible argument than one of literary merit, a clumsy reversal that did 
not help his case 
35 Many more potential witnesses simply refused to give 
evidence, either out of personal antipathy to Hall, or out of fear for their 
reputations, or because they thought little of The Well of Loneliness as a book. 
Years later, H. F. Rubinstein, the solicitor for Cape, wrote to Vera Brittain 
saying that "the number of prospective witnesses we approached who declined 
to give evidence was greatly in excess of those who consented... they were not 
going to risk their reputations by showing sympathy with an unpopular cause. " 
53 For this biographical information, see both Aldous Huxley, Brave New World 
(Flamingo Modem Classic Edition London 1994) page xi and Brenda Maddox, 
The Married Man: A Life of D. H. Lawrence (London 1994) e. g. p. 453 
54 See Parkes, "Lesbianism, History and Censorship, " pp. 435-436. 
ss Under pressure from the publishers, who were getting desperate, Birkett 
eventually tried to argue that the relationship described in The Well of 
Loneliness was purely platonic, which infuriated Hall and was not believed by 
anyone, least of all Biron. See Brittain p. 92-3, Parkes p. 440. 
56 Quoted in Brittain p. 91. 
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Anthony Hope was one of them. John Galsworthy, the chairman of P. E. N. 
(Poets, Playwrights, Essayists, Editors and Novelists) winner of a Nobel prize, 
and one of the great literary giants of the early twentieth century, rejected the 
request to give evidence both forcefully and rudely, if Rubinstein and Brittain 
are to be believed; and given Galsworthy's iconic status among writers, and the 
his fame and prestige among the public at large, his refusal must have been a 
bitter blow to the defence. 7 
However, the second reason is more intriguing. The expert witnesses 
were not, in fact, confined to one side. One major literary figure had been so 
incensed by The Well of Loneliness that he was willing to break the personal rule 
of a lifetime not to comment on contemporary literature publicly in order to give 
evidence against it. He was also, although this was not realised until letters 
between the two of them came to light comparatively recently, one of the 
primary forces stirring Joynson-Hicks into action over imported obscene 
literature. And he was so famous, so popular, and so skilled a journalist and 
publicist (albeit one rather out of practice) that it is possible The Well of 
Loneliness would have been fatally damaged by his evidence. That man was 
Rudyard Kipling. 
Kipling has been described in many ways. One of the most apt is a 
throwaway reference to him by Robert Blake, who called him "the strange 
uneasy genius who acted as both herald and Cassandra to the age of Britain's 
imperial grandeur .,, 
58 He was considered by many to be the unofficial Poet 
Laureate -a post that he would have refused - he had been the first British 
writer to be awarded a Nobel Prize (by 1928, Nobel prizes had also been 
awarded to Galsworthy and Shaw) he was hugely popular with the public, and, 
despite increasing ill-health that had diminished his output, there was still no 
doubting his talent and position. It was largely kept secret that he was willing to 
be called as a witness. According to a letter in the National Archives, it came as 
a surprise to his biographers 
S9 It evidently was unknown to the writer of his 
57 Ibid. p. 90 
58 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Major (London 1997) p. 
217 
59 See C. Carrington to Burnley, 4th May 1955: "Many thanks for your letter 
about Rudyard Kipling and The Well of Loneliness. I knew he disliked the book 
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entry in the modern Dictionary of National Biography, who writes of Kipling's 
reclusive nature: 
"A more agreeable side of this stand-offishness was Kipling's 
resolve never to criticize or to comment in print on the work of his 
fellow authors, a resolve strictly maintained throughout his life, 
despite the fact that his private comments and indirect published 
remarks show him to have been an extremely shrewd judge. "60 
Diana Souhami was equally fooled. Although she knew that Kipling was willing 
to testify against The Well of Loneliness at the appeal, she obviously had no idea 
where the initiative came from: she speaks of Kipling being "solicited by the 
Home Secretary, " and although she did dig down deep enough to find out that 
Kipling was (in her view) homophobic, she obviously never knew why he had 
such a particularly violent dislike for imported books on lesbianism 61 
The reason was, in fact, that he had received an imported book on the 
subject of lesbianism, addressed to his daughter. Kipling wrote to Joynson-Hicks 
immediately, bitterly complaining, describing the trade from the continent as 
"pretty damnable: " 
"What I object to, and what you ought to get evidence about, is its 
being sent to unmarried women. That gives the whole game 
away. )762 
Public opinion and much more importantly, any magistrate, was far more likely 
to have been swayed by Kipling than it was by the Woolfs, Forster, or Huxley, 
but I'm surprised that he was even willing to give evidence if called. " NA 110 
144/22547/527705/64 
60 Thomas Pinney, `Kipling, (Joseph) Rudyard (1865-1936)', Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
(http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/34334, accessed 19 April 2006] 
1 Souhami pp. 215-6 
62 Letter to Joynson-Hicks in Brentford papers, quoted in Jonathon Hopkins, 
"Paradoxes personified: Sir William Joynson-Hicks, Viscount Brentford and the 
conflict between change and stability in Britain in the 1920s, " University of 
Westminster MPhil thesis (1996) p. 100 (the underline is original) 
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whatever later writers may have thought, especially as some of the defence 
witnesses were reluctant, and some of them were clearly confused and ill-briefed 
(apparently the Woolfs, not realising that Hall herself was not on trial, offered to 
put up bail). 3 The book's only realistic defence might have failed on this basis 
even if it had been allowed in the first place. 
Asking, say, Biron, Joynson-Hicks or even Kipling to understand a book 
asking for sympathy for lesbians was asking rather a lot. But it should not be 
forgotten that they were far from alone in their attitudes. Kipling was not the 
only one who felt that lesbianism was a suggestive disease that could be 
"implanted" in young woman. Amy Strachey of Guildford felt the same way. In 
a letter to one Dr. Norris, preserved in the Home Office files on the case, she 
wrote: 
"I must say I came to the conclusion that these abnormal sex 
relations are so much a matter of "suggestion" that books of this 
kind do infinite harm, and I think it is an enormous pity that Cape 
should have, as he obviously has, sent the pages to France for 
circulation in a way which our Medical Authorities cannot touch ... I 
do think it was an enormous pity that the book should have been 
suppressed in consequence of the Sunday Express' hysterical 
article. The case for its non-circulation is much stronger than it 
would appear from this circumstance. 
M 
A possible fit with the profile of this correspondent is that of Henrietta Mary 
Amy Strachey, the widow of John St. Loe Strachey, for many years before and 
during the First World War editor of The Spectator, and mother of Evelyn John 
St. Loe Strachey, a socialist Labour politician and Cabinet minister in the Attlee 
government. However, there is no direct proof of this 
65 Whoever she was, she 
63 Brittain p. 90. This was a confusion shared by Diana Souhami, who referred 
to "The Trial of Radclyffe Hall" (title of part 6) 
64 Amy Strachey to Dr. Norris, 3rd October 1928 (marked "personal") NA 110 
144/22547/527705/11 
65 See the twin entries of these J. St. L. Strachey's in the DNB: A. J. A. Morris, 
`Strachey, John St Loe (1860-1927)', Oxford Dictionary ofNational 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
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was, despite the nature of her ideas on sexuality, clearly no knee jerk puritan or 
driven by horror at the desire of The Well of Loneliness to gain understanding 
and toleration for lesbians. She was involved, according to her letter, in 
"preventive health measures, " had read the book before forming her opinion, and 
objected to Extraordinary Women on the same grounds, although she doubted if 
it would be as widely read 
66 Moreover, her comments about "hysterical 
articles, " (a scathing but fully justified swipe at Douglas) suggests that her 
sympathies did not lie altogether with the forces of reaction. 
The widespread nature of the opposition to The Well of Loneliness can be 
seen from these examples. In fact, there was much less sympathy for Hall her 
defenders at the time and since have liked to claim. Even the New Statesman, 
generally a diehard anti-establishment paper, waded into the fray against Hall, 
declaring that, 
"if blame there be... [it rests] rather with the authoress and the 
present state of the law than upon the magistrate, who only decided 
as any other magistrate or judge in the kingdom must have decided 
in the circumstances. Sir Chartres Biron was certainly right to 
exclude evidence as to the literary merit of the book, since that had 
nothing whatever to do with the question... The question is whether 
the law can be usefully and effectively amended. It might be 
abolished altogether, and everyone allowed to publish what they 
please; but short of that, we fancy it will be found very difficult to 
frame a legal definition of obscenity which will give the public 
what it wants and exclude what it does not want. For our part, we 
should favour the tolerance of almost anything and everything short 
of the purely and obviously `dirty', but if there is to be a censorship 
at all that goes further than this, then we do not see how The Well of 
Loneliness could reasonably hope to escape it.. . people who 
desire 
[http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/36340, accessed 19 April 2006] and 
Michael Newman, `Strachey, (Evelyn) John St Loe (1901-1963)', Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
ý7: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/36337, fhttp: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/36337, accessed 19 April 2006] 
to Norris, op. cit. (quoted above) 
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tolerance for pathological abnormalities certainly should not write 
about them. -"67 
Although this may be sound advice, it must have been rather depressing to those 
who assumed that public opinion would be against Joynson-Hicks and the Home 
Office. The Labour party, indeed, mounted a fearsome campaign against 
Joynson-Hicks at all levels, something that led Radclyffe Hall (herself a lifelong 
Conservative who later flirted with Fascism) into a brief enthusiasm for 
Socialism, that came to an end with the abject collapse of MacDonald's 
government in 193168 But even so partisan an observer as M. A. Whittle admits 
that this probably had more to do with political opportunism than any point of 
principle-69 
The unusual thing about this case is not necessarily what Joynson-Hicks 
did, but the way in which it was done. He did warn Cape that "the book can be 
suppressed by legal proceedings, "70 which was undoubtedly a threat. And 
certainly legal procedure was bypassed and twisted in this case. 
Many people (not least Radclyffe Hall herself) expressed astonishment at 
the speed with which the book was read, discussed and foreclosed on by the 
Home Office. Michael Howard referred to the two days taken from the sending 
in of a copy of the book to Joynson-Hicks's reply coming back as being much 
faster than expected. " Diana Souhami quotes Radclyffe Hall as saying "One's 
mind reels.. . in a 
few hours my book had been read and carefully considered! 
Over 500 pages - large format - over 180,000 words. "n In actual fact it seems 
unlikely that to a set of trained lawyers a book as trite as The Well of Loneliness 
presented any difficulties in terms of speed reading, no matter how long it might 
seem to Radclyffe Hall. After all, Joynson-Hicks was used to writing about that 
amount in short order when working as solicitor for London's transport system. 
More to the point, perhaps, this was not a marginal case, dependent upon a 
thorough and total analysis of every word. Either the toleration of lesbianism 
67 New Statesman, 24th November 1928, quoted in Brittain p. 115 
68 Souhami p. 242: cf. A. N. Wilson, After the Victorians (London 2005) p. 271 
69 Whittle p. 34 
70 Joynson-Hicks to Messrs. Jonathan Cape Ltd. op. cit. 
71 Howard p. 105 
72 Souhami p. 180 
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was an acceptable subject, or it was not. If it was, there was no problem. If it was 
not, the merest skim-reading would suffice to show the book's topic and have it 
classified as obscene. 
According to the opinion provided by Sir George Stephenson, he had 
read at least some of the book. He had grasped that it was "a plea not only for 
the toleration but for the recognition of sexual perversion amongst women. "73 
Although the briefest reading of the last lines would give that one away, there is 
no reason to think that he had not read more of it. Much more important and 
certainly much more controversial is the next paragraph of his letter: 
"I may state that I have informally consulted the Chief 
Magistrate upon this matter; he has read the book and tells me 
that he would have no hesitation in granting process. v)74 
No more did he, in the event. The chief magistrate in question was Sir Chartres 
Biron. 
To Diana Souhami and Martin Whittle this fatally prejudiced the chance 
of The Well of Loneliness for a fair hearing 
75 In this they were certainly correct. 
Biron, after his previous knowledge of the case, had clearly judged the book 
before the clerk of his court opened proceedings. They do not make the next 
logical step of asking whether it was likely to get a fair hearing anyway. It was a 
book on lesbianism, in a climate where homosexuality was either not talked 
about or openly reviled. Perhaps it should be remembered that a ban on 
representations of homosexuality on the stage was not lifted until 1958.6 
Nobody sufficiently part of the Establishment to become a judge or a magistrate 
was likely to either be sympathetic or to risk their reputations on this subject. 
They would do a Galsworthy - put clear water between themselves and the case. 
73 George Stephenson to Joynson-Hicks, 21st August 1928, in NA 110 
144/22547/527705/3. 
74 ibid. 
75 Souhami pp. 183-4: Whittle p. 16. Quite where Whittle got his information 
from is a mystery: he cited the wrong date for the letter, the wrong file for the 
case (the file was in any case still closed when he was writing) and a book 
(Howard) that makes no reference whatsoever to Biron's early involvement. 
However, he was somehow correct. 
76 John Johnston, The Lord Chamberlain's Blue Pencil (London 1990) p. 171 
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Joynson-Hicks was therefore able to write in his own hand, at the foot of 
Stephenson's letter, his conclusion, nailing his colours to the anti-Well mast: 
"After long private conferences at the H. Of. we came to the 
conclusion that the book is both obscene and indecent and I 
wrote letter to publishers [sic] asking for its withdrawal. 
If they decline proceed at once. WJH 22/8/28"ýý 
Joynson-Hicks was, like Stephenson, clearly nervous that if the book came to 
trial there would be more publicity for it, the very thing they wanted to avoid. 
How long the "conferences" can have been must be regarded as questionable. 
After all, there was very little time for anything in the short space between 
Stephenson's report coming through and the letter to Cape going out. Yet there 
was little reason for Joynson-Hicks to lie - this was not a document ever 
intended for publication or even circulation among the Cabinet. Most likely he 
meant long discussions "relative to the importance of the case" which he would 
doubtless have felt to be comparatively small except maybe insofar as the 
precedent it set. Most of the evidence seems to point to his wanting it out of the 
way as fast as possible at this stage so he could get on with other things and 
minimize the embarrassment to the Home Office. 
The Well of Loneliness never had a fair crack of the whip as far as legal 
process was concerned. It was damned by the press, dismissed by the politicians, 
disembowelled by its publisher's antics and destroyed by the order of a 
magistrate who was judging on preconceived facts. But it always laboured 
against one insuperable obstacle. The climate was wrong. It was a book that 
would have been accepted, even applauded, by the Establishment of the 1960s. 
But it was trying to gain acceptance in a world where the whip was still held by 
men who looked back to the 1860s. Its only real hope of escaping suppression 
was to escape notice. When James Douglas first came across it at a time when 
other news topics were scarce, that hope was gone. 
For anyone who doubts that the climate of the 1920s was inimical to The 
Well of Loneliness's survival, it should be borne in mind that in 1946 the Home 
77 On George Stephenson to Joynson-Hicks, op. cit. 
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Office, under the first Labour government with a large majority, was still 
passively trying to suppress it. Radclyffe Hall died in 1943, and Una Troubridge, 
her long-time lover and executor, attempted to publish a complete set of her 
works, including The Well of Loneliness. She offered this to Peter Davies, a 
publisher of high repute. Her reasoning was that by 1946 The Well of Loneliness 
had been published with no serious problems for eighteen years in most other 
countries, and that now Labour (who had vigorously opposed the original 
suppression) were in power, the ban might be lifted. It was not. The Home 
Office continued to veto publication of this book, something Souhami found 
herself almost unable to believe of "a supposedly reforming, egalitarian 
government. " In actual fact, on Souhami's own admission this decision was 
made at least partly in order to maintain the precedent set in 1928 rather than out 
of specific malice towards The Well of Loneliness. 78 However, Troubridge's 
choice of publisher seems to have been unfortunate as well. In a letter accepting 
the Home office verdict, Davies wrote by hand (presumably so that there would 
be no copy in his own office) a postscript: "I am not really anxious to do the W. 
of L. and am rather relieved than otherwise by any lack of enthusiasm in official 
circles. "79 Three years later, what has become Radclyffe Hall's unwelcome 
claim to fame was finally republished. There was no opposition. Perhaps Britain 
had bigger things to worry about. 
Radclyffe Hall was primarily, however you regard her politics, a rich 
dilettante who turned a modest talent for writing to account in the firm belief 
that she was doing something worthwhile. Whether she achieved that in writing 
The Well of Loneliness and the subsequent roar of notoriety is at best 
questionable. But for the other author that had a brush with Joynson-Hicks in 
1928, and indeed up until he died in 1930, there had been no easy pot of money, 
no soft and pampered existence (although perhaps the perpetual restiveness that 
they both indulged in may point to some kind of link) no fundamental religious 
belief, and certainly no mere modest talent. In fact, David Herbert Lawrence 
was about as unlike Radclyffe Hall as it possible to conceive - yet his books 
ended up being impounded and destroyed as obscene as well in 1928 and 1929. 
78 Souhami pp. 367-9 
79 Davies to Oscar Dowson, 29th March 1946, NA HO 144/22547/527705/102 
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Lawrence was, if perhaps not exactly an atheist, certainly opposed to all 
organised religion. He was not promiscuous, certainly not by the standards of 
today - in fact, he claimed he had something of a horror of promiscuity and was 
always enraged when he was accused of promoting it, declaring that "nothing 
nauseates me more than perpetual sex in and out of season. s80 Ile was from a 
working-class background - one of the first major writers in Britain to rise from 
the masses - and always struggled with a shortage of funds. 
The root of the reason why D. H. Lawrence got into continual trouble 
with the Home Office was his persistent belief that the law was wrong, that 
conventional standards of morality were wrong, and that sex needed to be 
brought onto a different plane. Lawrence always seemed to be somewhat 
confused by what he actually wanted - at times he seems to be rejecting the 
notion of sex as dirt, part of the excretory functions, and at other times 
upholding it - but he was clearly not a conformist when it came to sexual 
mores. 81 His liberal use of the word "fuck" in Lady Chatterley's Lover was, 
according to Helen Gardner at the legendary obscenity trial in 1959, an attempt 
to redeem it from its everyday use as a swearword and turn it into a phrase for 
the sexual act. As Walter Allen noted, "this is a word on which there has always 
been a most powerful tabu.. . but it is a word all men know and most have 
used"82 But there is a snag in this analysis of Lawrence's work, as Allen 
himself pointed out: 
"Whether the word can be redeemed, in its public use, I would 
think doubtful. Its real value and importance lies in the fact that it 
is the only word we have for the performing of the act itself; 
everything else is periphrasis. And this suggests to me that in the 
interests of the language writers should be sparing of the use of 
the word in its secondary, swear-word sense. " 
80 quoted in ibid. p. 361 
81 Brenda Maddox, The Married Man: A Life of D. H. Lawrence (London 1994) 
484. 
2 Walter Allen, "The Writer and the Frontiers of Tolerance" in John Chandos 
(ed) To Deprave and Corrupt... Original Studies in the nature and definition of 
obscenity" (London 1962) pp. 139-152, pp. 149-150 
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In other words, it could be taken that Lawrence was merely trivialising 
something by endless use of it. The arrogance, indeed, of assuming that he alone 
could change the use of such a common word is something that might be worth 
considering. Lawrence was perhaps being somewhat over-optimistic about the 
extent of his possible influence. 3 
Lawrence himself had always run his head against the authorities. The 
Rainbow, a book widely regarded as his masterpiece and certainly produced 
when he was at the height of his physical and mental powers, was banned very 
shortly after publication on the grounds of obscenity. It is hardly graphic, or 
pornographic, yet it contains descriptions of sex, post coital moments and 
foreplay that must certainly have seemed shocking to the Liberal Home 
Secretary of the time. 84 
During the 1920s Lawrence, who suffered from tuberculosis and died in 
1930 at the age of forty-four, was no longer the force he had been. A critical 
reflection on much of his oeuvre in this period shows a confusion over what he 
was trying to achieve. To Jeffrey Meyers, this paradox was rooted in his desire 
for a resurrection in society based on personal relationships of men and women 
while society seemed to be crumbling around him, and his identification of 
himself as a Christ-like figure, the martyred, ignored, mistreated prophet trying 
to lead his people out of the wilderness, coupled with his rejection of 
Christianity. 85 Certainly all of this stampeding around inside his brain would be 
enough to confuse anyone, never mind someone continually distracted by his 
failing physical health. Lady Chatterley's Lover shows elements of all these 
difficulties. It is meant to be a serious novel, yet, as Brenda Maddox pointed out, 
it could hardly be funnier in its ludicrous depiction of (inter alia) a young 
woman running naked through a wood in the pouring rain to have sex with a 
man in the open air. 86 
83 Maddox pp. 446-7 
84 See Marianna Torgovnick, "Narrating Sexuality: The Rainbow, " in Anne 
Fernihough (ed) The Cambridge Companion to D. H. Lawrence (Cambridge 
2001) pp. 33-49 
85 Meyers pp. 352-3 
86 Maddox p. 447. Although theoretically this might be deliberate, Lawrence's 
pamphlet Pornography and Obscenity suffers from much the same unintentional ludicrousness. 
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existed in the first place (although the last seems very unlikely, for reasons 
outlined below). The likeliest scenarios are 1) that the Home Of ice did not want 
anyone to read what it contained or 2) they did not think it was sufficiently 
important to preserve. 
There was no major criminal trial over Lady Chatterley in 1928, as there 
was to be in 1960, and it may have seemed a minor affair of small importance 
compared to The Well of Loneliness. But the surviving evidence, while 
circumstantial, suggests that there was a certain amount of skulduggery going 
on. To take this circumstantial evidence, let us look at Pansies, the case 
discussed in more depth below. In September of 1929 the Director of Public 
Prosecutions wrote to the Home Office, thus: 
"Messrs. Spottiswoode refer to, and take great credit for, their 
clients' action in regard to Lady Chatterley's Lover in August of 
last year. 1 have suitably acknowledged their action in that 
case"87 
This is a most interesting statement. Spottiswoode were the solicitors acting for 
Lawrence's distributors in England, and were therefore very much involved in 
the distribution of all his books. The idea that the Home Office would have a 
correspondence with them on the subject of an obscene book and not have a file 
on the subject is a ridiculous one. Which begs the question - what, apart from 
evidence about the pressure exerted on the distributors, might this file have 
contained? But perhaps it is an academic question. C. H. Rolph, in his work 
Books in the Dock, was totally uninterested in the implications of the failure of 
Lady Chatterley's Lover to make it past the censor, instead focusing on The Well 
of Loneliness and Sleeveless Errand. 
88 The most recent writer on the subject, 
Christopher Hilliard, could manage only a throwaway reference that "Lady 
Chatterley's Lover had been banned in Britain for a year [in 1929]" confirming 
87 DPP to Home Office, 6th September 1929, in NA 110 144/20642/543382/6 
88 C. H. Rolph, Books in the Dock (London 1969) pp. 76-83 covers all four 
cases of The Well of Loneliness, Sleeveless Errand, Pansies and Lawrence's 
paintings. 
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and underlining the ongoing confusion as to what exactly happened to it. 
89 The 
real importance of Lady Chatterley's Lover lies thirty years after the scope of 
this study, in the momentous 1960 verdict that effectively abolished literary 
censorship in Britain. 
The most that therefore needs to be said about Lady Chatterley's Lover is 
that it was, like The Well of Loneliness, in no sense a marginal case. By the 
standards of the 1920s it was definitely "inherently obscene" in that it contains 
swearing, depictions of sex, and an adulterous extra-marital affair between a 
gamekeeper and an aristocrat as a plot device. Lawrence knew perfectly well 
that Lady Chatterley was unpublishable in both Britain and the United States, as 
did his extremely perturbed publishers, Secker and Knopf, who showed a certain 
reluctance to touch it in consequence. Finally, Lawrence, disgusted with them, 
published the book privately in Florence 
90 It sold reasonably well through 
private subscription, but it was seized wherever it was found by customs 
authorities in Britain and the United States. Attempts to sanitize it were less than 
successful, and it was not until 1959 that it was finally published in Lawrence's 
own country. 
Lady Chatterley is therefore at best a peripheral book to this study. So let 
us move on to perhaps the strangest brush over obscene publications that 
Lawrence had with the Home Office, which was in 1929, very late in Joynson- 
Hicks' tenure of the Home Office and the start of a ding-dong battle that was to 
dog both men for what short periods were left of their lives. It arose, not over 
any of Lawrence's novels, or their controversial sexual themes, but over a book 
of poems. Pansies, which Lawrence said was not a reference to flowers or 
homosexuals but a reference to the fact that the book consisted of "sort of poems 
- real pensees. s91 
And it arose, officially at least, quite by accident. 
Quite what happened to bring the book before the Home Office may 
never be wholly resolved, due to the convenient destruction of a large swathe of 
the file. Brenda Maddox accepted (or at least reported) the explanation given to 
89 Hilliard p. 178 
90 ibid. p. 441: cf. p. 453, which says that Secker and Knopf were "unhappy at 
one [book] that sounded unpublishable. " 
91 D. H. Lawrence to Harry Crosby, 2nd January 1929, in James T. Boulton et. 
al. (eds) The Letters of D. H. Lawrence Volume 7.1928-1930 (Cambridge 1993) 
p. 115 
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the House of Commons; that a random check of post from the Continent to see if 
there was any indecent or contraband matter in it had turned up three copies of 
Pansies, which had then been impounded. 92 However, a contemporary magazine 
report suggests that in fact the letters had been opened to check that they were 
paying the correct rate of postage and duty for the items they contained. It went 
on to suggest, mischievously, that next time the envelopes should be sealed to 
stop this happening. 
3 This seems to have been a source of considerable 
confusion all round. The solicitors of the sending agent (who was not Lawrence) 
protested to this magazine that as the manuscripts were in a sealed and registered 
envelope, this seizure could not have been an accident. They came to the 
conclusion that "Mr. Lawrence's correspondence was on this, as on other, 
occasion [sic] deliberately opened and searched. "94 
Certainly this would be plausible. Lawrence was a known offender 
against the Obscene Publications Act, and The Well's treatment demonstrated 
just what lengths the Home Office and (to a lesser extent) Customs were willing 
to go in order to maintain their blockade of anything that might transgress it. 
However, according to the best evidence still available in the Home Office files, 
this allegation was inaccurate. There are two handwritten notes on the backing 
page to these cuttings. One is by S. W. H. (presumably S. W. Harris) who 
commented, laconically, "This is unfortunate if true" (his underlining). The fact 
that he considered it "unfortunate" (by implication, embarrassing) rather than 
"catastrophic" (as in, would torpedo a prosecution should one be instituted) is 
perhaps revealing. He obviously did not think it likely that anyone would try to 
seriously challenge the censoring of the books. But another note put these fears 
to rest: "Newsam has already spoken to the GPO. It was an open registered 
packet, and GPO action was proper and normal. "95 Given that this would largely 
explain the situation, and the fact that this was purely an internal scrawl on a 
minor bit of paper and not an official minute or court document, it is not likely 
to be a lie to cover the tracks of officials. And it would explain the confusion 
92 ibid. p. 476 
93 Cutting from Truth, 6th March 1929, in NA HO 144/20642/543382/5 (it 
actually suggested that Lawrence should refrain from using the "open book 
Fost"). 
4 Letter to Truth in ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
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over whether the packet was registered and sealed or not - in that it was 
registered, but that is not the same as sealed. 
Pansies was a very different case from The Well. The Well was a long 
book on a subject deemed to be banned. Pansies was a book of short poems, 
that could in fact be very easily edited in order to have no trouble at all with the 
law. It was obscene, not in the sexual sense (Ronald Blythe once again 
demonstrated a lack of knowledge of his subject when he referred to them "a 
packet of erotic poems D. H. Lawrence had rashly put in the post unsealed")96 
but because of its crudity of language and description of the "excretory 
function" (as Lawrence called it) 97 In his legal opinion of the unexpurgated 
book, Sir Archibald Bodkin wrote: 
`"`Pansies" is a very mixed production, and so far as I have read it 
there are eleven so-called poems only, to which exception could 
be taken, and they are of the nauseous and disgusting kind rather 
than of the corrupting and immoral kind. This book has recently 
been extolled in a review, and if it be correct that the present 
edition was for private circulation to subscribers then the case 
stands differently from a book which is in on every 
bookstall... Probably by this time a good many subscribers have 
had their copies, and much good may they do them! "98 
Bodkin had clearly learned from the Well of Loneliness fiasco. He warned that 
he doubted whether a magistrate would be willing to prosecute Pansies even in 
unexpurgated form while it was being sent only to private subscribers, and there 
was certainly no doubt that applying for a warrant with all the due processes of 
law would lead simply to more publicity for it. He concluded that it would 
simply be better to keep a careful lookout for any books going through the post 
and confiscate them as they arose 
99 This must have come as a relief to Customs, 
96 Blythe p. 34. This might equally be a mere lazy assumption that Lawrence 
wrote only "erotic" literature, an assumption that would have annoyed 
Lawrence greatly. 
97 Lawrence, Pornography and Obscenity, p. 11 
98 DPP to Home Office, 6th September 1929 op. cit. 
99 ibid. 
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who as before displayed a more relaxed approach than the Home Office. One of 
them wrote to Bicknell to say "I have seen the Martin Secker book from which 
these eleven pieces have been ommitted [sic] and the book appears to be 
unobjectionable. "'()o 
According to Brenda Maddox "Lawrence was furious and frightened; he 
realised that he might risk arrest if he ever returned to England... Persecution 
bred paranoia. "'o' Although the last three words were in the context of 
Lawrence's growing distrust in everyone around him, they might more logically 
have been applied to his belief that he "risked arrest " The fact that books that he 
had written had been seized did not automatically make him a felon on the run. 
Neither Cape nor Hall was arrested, over the far more controversial Well of 
Loneliness. Lawrence had not been arrested over The Rainbow. It is perhaps 
symptomatic of how out of touch with reality he was becoming. 
This was symbolised by two things. In 1929, after the Conservatives had 
been swept from office and Joynson-Hicks had retired from politics, both he and 
Lawrence were commissioned to write pamphlets on the subject of censorship in 
the United Kingdom. Brentford (as he had become) called his Do we need a 
Censor? It was a document typical of the man - lucid, cogent and cold. It is a 
lawyer's tract, presented before the court of public opinion (although it 
inevitably contained an element of self-justification) demanding a verdict in its 
favour without fear of defeat. It claimed (naturally) that public opinion was not 
in favour of the great mass of writers and performers being allowed to do what 
they want, as otherwise they would do intensely silly things. Indeed, it dismissed 
the notion of a literary censor in Britain and actually called for tighter 
restrictions on the distribution of films. 
Brentford did, at least in part, discuss his actions over The Well of 
Loneliness, which he justified on the grounds that it had been sent to him by the 
publisher for an opinion. He posited the hypothetical case (the popular resort of 
a lawyer) of a publisher who likes a book but has misgivings about its content in 
light of the OPA, so sends it in to the Home Office for an opinion. Brentford 
declared that the Home Secretary could then do three things. He could refuse to 
touch the matter at all, which Brentford described as "not a very helpful attitude, 
100 w. C. Colyer to Bicknell, 8th October 1929, in ibid. 
101 Maddox p. 476(-77) 
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and one which it would be improper for him to adopt. " He could read the book 
and still refuse advice, which Brentford thought would be not merely unhelpful 
but "positively unfair to the publisher, who would have a real and, in my view, 
legitimate grievance if proceedings were subsequently instituted: " or he could 
read it and provide a legal opinion. 102 There was a certain logic behind his 
thinking. He had been asked for his opinion and had given it. The fact that there 
was a major legal action behind it, ready to be launched if Cape showed signs of 
dissenting in any way from the given opinion was not mentioned. 
Lawrence's was utterly different. Beautifully and engagingly written, 
completed in ten days from start to finish, and without the least regard for logic 
or even for common sense, Lawrence took the fight to Brentford in fantastically 
boisterous fashion. His pamphlet is written more like a great oration from 
Tacitus than the sober, authoritative and pompous prose that Brentford favoured. 
From the immortal line in the second paragraph that "if a woman hasn't got a 
tiny streak of the harlot in her, she's a dry stick as a rule, "103 through his 
recurring use of the phrase "Vox populi, vox Del, *, 
104 right up until his repeated 
denunciation of pornography, something he specifically defined as "that which is 
calculated to arouse sexual desire, or sexual excitement, " (page 6) by which he 
meant masturbation, as a "dirty little secret, " it reads not only like a comedy 
script, but as though it was written by a man who was slightly drunk at the time. 
This was probably a function of Lawrence's disgust, as well as his illness. His 
total contempt for his enemies shines out of every page, and his determination to 
treat them as amusing was almost certainly merely a device for belittling them. 
Lawrence, beneath the veneer of hilarity, had a serious point to make. It 
was that art, intended to inform and provoke thought, can be thought of 
differently and therefore treated differently from pornography (intended to 
provoke masturbation) even when it may appear that they are nearly identical in 
their depictions of (for example) the sexual act or (in the case of visual art) 
female nudes. It is a tenable point and one that is applied, with varying degrees 
of consistency, today. But Brenda Maddox, author of a major biography of D. H. 
102 Do we need a censor? pp. 13-14 
103 D. H. Lawrence, Pornography and Obscenity (London 1930, Michigan City 
Indiana 1958) p. 1 
104 -The voice of the people is the voice of God. " See e. g. ibid. p. 2 for repeated 
use of it. 
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Lawrence, took a somewhat sceptical view of this essay. Her reason for this was 
its propensity to be "wildly illogical. los Lawrence may have put his case for 
liberating the artist from the burden of the censor, but he got very confused later 
on about why they were doing it. On page eleven he asserted that the Puritans 
(by which, he strongly suggested on page eight, he meant Brentford) had 
become confused between the "sex functions" and the "excrementory functions" 
and were trying to suppress both at the same time because they thought that one 
must be, to some extent, the other. Lawrence dismissed this. He described the 
sex impulse as "creative" and excretion as a "flow towards dissolution. " But 
given that Lady Chatterley's Lover contains an anal sex scene (albeit one 
disguised and muted) one wonders whether he might not have got carried away 
here and tied himself up in a knot through not considering the implications of 
what he was saying. Anal sex is in no way creative. And what could be more 
likely than that a reference to it, even an obscure one, could lead Brentford to 
say that he was right all along and that sex was pure dirt? 
James Douglas, in another of his editorials in the Daily Express, took on 
Lawrence's pamphlet in his usual forthright terms: 
"Mr. D. H. Lawrence in a mad pamphlet... provides a clue to the 
disordered state of his mind. This takes the form of a belief that 
we are all mad, and that he alone is sane... Society has put Mr. 
Lawrence in a padded cell, and his struggles are a matter for 
compassion rather than derision. 
This [Pornography and Obscenity] is not a parody. It is 
an extract from the hallucinations of the blue one who imagines 
that we are the grey ones. When I read Lord Brentford's grave 
defence against the blue ones, I see the fun and the folly of taking 
to heavy dialectic in the realm of pathology. Let us laugh at the 
blue ones and pity them too. "106 
105 Maddox p. 484 
106 Douglas, "Disinfecting a Pamphlet, " Daily Express 14th November 1929, 
cutting in NA HO 144114042/544688/2 
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Douglas displayed as before the talent for saying that something should not be 
done and then going on to do it anyway. But he had a point. It is quite difficult to 
take Pornography and Obscenity altogether seriously. Its confusion, its 
presumptuousness, its repetition and above all its lightness of tone suggest that 
the author never meant it to be a work for serious study. S. W. Harris' light- 
hearted comment "It is interesting to note that D. H. Lawrence "detests 
indecency and desires to suppress it. " We have done something to satisfy his 
desire, "107 somehow summed up his problem. Lawrence lacked gravitas, 
therefore he could be ignored. John Anderson was harsher, saying bluntly of the 
essay, "It is good of D. H. Lawrence to show what a poisonous character he is. 
We need not deprecate his self revelation. "' 08 Lawrence was, as ever, popular 
with the public - his pamphlet sold at the rate of 1200 copies a week - but this 
kind of performance meant that he was ignored by the only people ever likely to 
do something about his demands. 109 A talented writer, even in decline, Lawrence 
certainly was; but a diplomat and politician he most certainly was not. 
It is clear that Brentford and Lawrence were natural rivals. But Lawrence 
could not keep his head out of trouble even after Brentford had been replaced by 
MacDonald's own deputy leader, J. R. Clynes. This was absolutely nothing to do 
with his writings. In fact, it arose out of a series of paintings that Lawrence had 
done. 
Lawrence was not one of nature's great painters, painting solely for the 
enjoyment he derived from it. He took up painting as an escape from writing, as 
Lady Chatterley's Lover stagnated and his health deteriorated. However, despite 
the badness of his paintings (and he himself had no very high opinion of their 
own worth as artistic endeavours) his wife and many of his ardent admirers took 
to them. Finally, in 1929, he was persuaded to exhibit them in London 
(previously, he had hung them on the walls of his home). Out of a choice of four 
venues, he chose Dorothy Warren's gallery. 11° 
The problem lay in the subject of the paintings. There were twenty-five 
sent to Warren for exhibiting, as well as a book of reproductions that was 
107 Note on an article by E. M. F(orster? ) dated 14th January 1930 in NA HO 
144/14042/544688/10 
108 Note dated 20th November 1929, in NA HO 144/14042/544688/5 
109 Figure from Maddox pp. 484-5 
110 Maddox pp. 421-425,455 
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available for sale at the gallery. Thirteen of them portrayed nudes. It was 
absolutely inevitable that they would come to the attention of the local 
authorities, in this case the local (Labour) MP, H. B. Morgan, who wrote 
furiously to the Home Secretary: 
"I am not a prude at all... [but] in my opinion the paintings have no 
redeeming feature. They are just sheer pornography. No artistic 
touch, no softening refinement, no true portrayal - but just natural 
untempered vulgarity. " 111 
As a result of this and other complaints, the Warren gallery was raided and the 
thirteen offending paintings seized, along with the book of reproductions (seized 
under the 1857 OPA). They found a symbolic value, despite their shortcomings 
as art. A furious correspondent to Clynes begged him to intercede, on the 
grounds that, 
"the Labour government... represents as well as the mass, the 
intelligentsia of the nation, will not allow such a state of affairs to 
continue, and will finally dispell [sic] the final vestiges of Victorian 
prudery and opression [sic] from England. Your intercession is 
awaited by artists and writers all over the world. "' 12 
Alas for this correspondent, the Home Secretary, who was being prodded with 
equal vigour by the other side (including Dr. Morgan, who seemed to hold no 
particular brief for the intelligentsia) did nothing. 113 
Lawrence was understandably beside himself with anxiety. His letters 
reflect a deep paranoia at the way he had been treated, and a deep fear that his 
beloved paintings might be burned. But he was fortunate. After a court case, 
they were found to be obscene, but were returned to Lawrence on condition that 
I11 Dr. H. B. Morgan M. P. to J. R Clynes, 27th June 1929, in NA HO 
45/24788/442565/45 
112 Theodor Goodman to Clynes, 6th July 1929, NA HO 45/24788/442565/46 
113 See both the letter from Morgan and a further letter, from Mr. H. Bone to the 
Home Secretary, 4th August 1929, denouncing the paintings as obscene, NA 
HO 45/24788/442565/48 
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they were never again displayed in Britain. "4 Lawrence immediately told 
Dorothy Warren, who wanted to fight on and prove that the paintings were not 
obscene, that she should accept this: 
"I think it's a mistake to want to go to the High Court - what to do? 
prove that the pictures are not obscene? but they are not, so how 
prove it? And if they go against you there - then more is lost than 
will be got back in years. No, no, I want you to accept the 
compromise. I do not want my pictures to be burned, under any 
circumstances or for any cause. The law, of course, must be altered - 
it is blatantly obvious. Why burn my pictures to prove it? There is 
something sacred to me about my pictures, and I will not have them 
burnt, for all the liberty of England.. . No more crucifixions, no more 
martyrdoms... as long as my time lasts, if I can prevent it... I want 
you to get my pictures back. If you have to promise never to show 
them again in England, I do not care. 5 
There is an element of exhaustion and defeat in the tone of this letter. Although 
Lawrence still felt the law to be iniquitous, he no longer wished to fight it. 
Admittedly, burning copies of a book would not deprive him of it altogether, 
while burning the canvases would have left him with nothing, but it might 
equally be a sign of decline, and unwillingness to fight on. Six months later, 
Lawrence was dead. His paintings, having no real merit other than their creator, 
were never displayed in Britain again. 
It is easy to overplay the changes that the 1920s wrought in the literary 
landscape. It was the era of Marie Stopes' Married Love, James Joyce's Ulysses, 
Radclyffe Hall's The Well of Loneliness, Aldous Huxley's Point Counter Point, 
E. M. Forster's A Passage to India, and D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's 
Lover, to name a handful of the major works trying to push back new 
boundaries, aesthetically, stylistically and morally. Yet they were all 
comfortably outsold, even when added together, by Agatha Christie. Christie's 
114 The Letters of D. H. Lawrence op. cit. pp. 7-8 
115 Lawrence to Dorothy Warren, 14th July 1929, in ibid. no. 5200 pp. 369-70 
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most famous, popular and enduring character, the shrewd old lady Miss (Jane) 
Marple, first appeared in 1927, just before The Well of Loneliness. 116 And while 
Miss Marple's nephew Raymond might write very "modern" books, Miss 
Marple herself is almost a caricature of an Establishment figure - the fussy, 
gossipy, elderly spinster interested only in the village church and other peoples' 
lapses. To the success of this titan of popular fiction must be added that of 
Buchan, Kipling, Sayers (for all her complicated private life, she was hardly a 
groundbreaking author in terms of taste or style) and the young W. E. Johns. The 
changes in literature were real - but they were not universal or even especially 
widespread. 
The peculiarity of the Home Office's dealings with literature in the 
period between 1924 and 1929 is clear. Joynson-Hicks, aided and abetted by the 
DPP and Sir John Anderson, perhaps did not exactly crusade against what he 
thought of as immoral books, but he certainly attacked them with every weapon 
he was endowed with or handed. However, although both Whittle and Souhami 
talk of "illegal" behaviour, this is unjustified. What the Home Office did was 
always just about legal, even when, with a complete disregard for the ethics of 
the situation, they showed a book that might be at the centre of a trial to the 
magistrate who would have to conduct it. The law was twisted, pushed, strained 
and stretched, but never quite broken. Moreover, as Hilliard noted in a more 
recent work, such cases as did occur did not depend on Cabinet action (although 
he qualified it by saying "entirely depend"). Sleeveless Errand and Lawrence's 
paintings both fell foul of complaints from members of the public - but they 
were supported by a system which Joynson-Hicks nurtured and encouraged. 
117 
Myth has come to obscure reality. The blaze of publicity in which The 
Well of Loneliness was censored obscured the fact that it was one of only two 
books actively suppressed by the Home Office on the watch of Joynson-Hicks 
(the other being Sleeveless Errand). That is not such a bad record, especially 
given his length of tenure. Lady Chatterley's Lover and Pansies, it is true, were 
not allowed to be published or distributed. But that held good until 1959, many 
116 Miss Marple first appeared in the short story "The Tuesday Night Club" in 
The Royal Magazine no. 350 (December 1927) although the series of novels 
which turned her into an icon began with The Murder at the Vicarage, 
published in 1930. 117 Hilliard p. 175 
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Home Secretaries later. Similarly Ulysses and The Rainbow were both kept out 
of circulation for a long time, on the strength of decisions taken by previous 
Home Secretaries (Bridgeman and Samuel, respectively). 
The real problem lay in the 1857 Act. Flawed even at its inception, it was 
woefully inadequate by 1924 for the needs of a new generation and culture. And 
it is here that Joynson-Hicks' defence comes apart. There is no doubt that a new 
act could have been carried. As R. A. Butler found out the hard way in 1959, the 
effect might have been to effectively destroy the censorship mechanism. It 
would certainly have had a low priority in the Parliamentary timetable. But it is 
hard to escape the conclusion that the real reason why fresh legislation was 
never proposed was so the shortcomings of the Act could be exploited whenever 
necessary in order to produce the "right" verdict. A tighter law, with a defence of 
literary or artistic merit founded upon the evidence of critics and scholars, would 
probably have seen the case against The Well of Loneliness thrown out of court 
no matter how unsympathetic the magistrate. But in 1929 no such defence 
existed. The only defence was that it would not "deprave and corrupt. " 
What then of public opinion, the ultimate benchmark of what law is and 
how law is enforced? It was claimed by both sides. Both were almost certainly 
wrong. Public appetite for the "new" literature was probably almost certainly 
lower than its defenders claimed, given the raw numbers sold. But equally, sales 
of The Well of Loneliness or viewings of Lawrence's paintings increased 
dramatically at the suggestion they were "obscene. " As Martin Whittle pointed 
out, it is impossible to be sure what the silent majority actually thinks. 118 The 
likeliest answer is that the silent majority were not very exercised one way or 
another, whatever both sides might claim. They might wish that the Home Office 
were not so censorious, or that the editor of their newspaper was not so self- 
righteous, but equally, they were not too worried about writers who were self- 
important enough to be convinced they spoke for everybody in their works. 
I II Whittle pp. 2-3. 
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5) A New Problem of Censorship: The film industry and the 
British Board of Film Censorship. 
"I feel quite hopeless about this "Film Question. " 
William Joynson-Hicks. 1 
Both theatre and literature posed a series of problems to the censorship system, 
and the very concept of censorship itself, in the 1920s, controlled as they were 
under ancient legislation that struggled in a changing climate. Yet the newest 
form of mass entertainment, and by far the most popular, was not immune from 
control. And, ironically, at a time when it was by no means certain that the Lord 
Chamberlain's office would retain its powers as censor, that new medium chose 
to quite deliberately ape the structure used in it for its own, literally self- 
imposed, system of censorship. 
The medium was film. At the time Joynson-Hicks was Home Secretary 
it was an industry that had been established for thirty years and had made 
considerable artistic and technical progress from its early days. However, it was 
also during his tenure at the Home Office that "talkies" first appeared by means 
of "synchronised sound" (sound recorded separately and played in time with the 
film) provoking a storm of controversy and throwing both the industry and its 
censorship system into a state of flux - not least, because it took some time to 
overturn the long-held notion of the industry that nobody would be interested in 
a film where the actors talked. But it had already displaced theatre as the most 
popular form of mass entertainment, possibly because it was cheaper and 
possibly also because of the novelty factor. As with all popular mediums of 
communication, it was brought under control. 
The first public cinematographic film exhibition in the United Kingdom 
was held in London in 1896. Within thirteen years, it had become sufficiently 
popular for some form of control to be introduced. In 1909, the then Home 
Secretary introduced a licensing system under the control of local authorities - 
1 Ina minute of 15th June 1927, NA HO 45/24084/450065/66 
2 See Alexander Walker, The Shattered Silents: How the Talkies Came to Stay 
(London 1978) chapter 1, especially pp. 1-6. 
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ostensibly in the interests of public safety, as the legislation was drafted in such 
a way as to emphasise fire precautions. There are varying interpretations of the 
underlying motives for this legislation. Both James Robertson and Annette 
Kuhn saw the legislation as a deliberate attempt to regulate the content of films, 
using fire precautions as an excuse - Kuhn in particular cast doubt upon the 
motives of Herbert Gladstone, pointing out that there had in fact been no serious 
cinema fires in Britain, contrary to the repeated claims of his junior minister, 
Herbert Samuel. While Robertson acknowledged that Samuel may have been 
referring to France, where there had been a serious fire in 1897 that had cost 
140 lives, and that there had indeed been cinema fires in Britain, he also clearly 
believed that this was introduced as an instrument of censorship and not of 
safety. 4 However, it should be noted that Neville March Hunnings, a legal 
historian, suggested that while the danger was exaggerated and by 1909 had 
been virtually eliminated by better precautions, the fear remained, and was a 
genuine factor in the new bills In fact, if the 1909 bill was genuinely intended 
to bring in a system of censorship, it did it in the most peculiar and incompetent 
way imaginable. The implementation of the precautions, which took the form of 
a granting of a license to those cinemas which met the local authority's 
standards (which were not strictly limited to safety) were left to local authorities 
and magistrates - the police had no power to enforce it, and there was no 
national system of reference or any sort of guidance provided. It is hard to 
believe that if a genuine desire for censorship had been at the heart of the bill, it 
would not have been better done. The result, inevitably, was confusion and 
inconsistency between the local authorities, which was deeply unpopular within 
and indeed deeply damaging to the film industry. 
In any case, it was obviously not successful if censorship of content was 
its aim, for seven years later Samuel, by now Home Secretary himself, 
attempted to formalise censorship of films produced in Britain and regularise 
the position. However, as this was at the height of the First World War and 
Parliament had pressing matters on its agenda, his aim was to introduce the 
3 Annette Kuhn Cinema, Censorship and Sexuality 1909-1925 (London 1988) p. 
16 
4 James C. Robertson, The British Board of Film Censors: Film Censorship in 
Britain 1896-1950 (Beckenham 1985) pp. 2-3. 
5 Neville March Hunnings, Film Censors and the Law (London 1967) pp. 44-45 
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system "by administrative action" - by the voluntary relinquishing of the 
powers of the 1909 Act by local authorities, in other words. Unsurprisingly, this 
proved rather difficult. Nervous that the local authorities would refuse to give 
up their powers and that they would therefore be faced with dual censorship, the 
film producers resisted Samuel's plans, and managed to delay them long enough 
for the new Home Secretary after Asquith's fall at the end of the year to 
abandon the idea. 
6 
As a result, and given the rather more pressing problems that occupied 
the Home Office in the period 1916-1924, Joynson-Hicks inherited a situation 
given shape by the act of 1909. However, this had been subtly changed by the 
film industry itself, who had decided to pre-empt the local authorities' demands 
by setting up their own system of self-censorship. This may have been borne of 
a desire to try and avoid an official censorship (such as the one later proposed 
by Samuel). However, it also seems likely that motives of sheer self- 
preservation came into play - if local authorities interpreted their powers 
sufficiently broadly to refuse a cinematic license on grounds of content, then if 
the producers were not careful they might end up with no cinemas willing to 
show their films. In November 1912, the British Board of Film Censors was 
established by the film trade to answer these concerns. As President (in effect, 
chief censor) the trade appointed G. A. Redford, a retired bank manager and 
former Examiner of Plays for the Lord Chamberlain, who, as we have seen, had 
been made the scapegoat for that office after the difficulties they had 
experienced with the 1909 Select Committee on theatre censorship 
7 His 
appointment was an obvious attempt to borrow from the practices and principles 
established for theatre censorship to the new medium. It is ironic, however, to 
reflect that Redford would not have been available had the Lord Chamberlain 
not been living in fear of losing his powers. 
One serious drawback with the BBFC, as it was usually referred to, was 
that it was not a body whose decisions were legally binding. In fact, the initial 
idea was that it was only to provide guidance to the local authorities who would 
make the final decision. With that in mind, the BBFC certified a film as "U" 
(suitable for universal viewing) "A" (suitable for adults, only children 
6 Kuhn pp. 23-4 
7 ibid. pp. 21-2: see below p. 79 
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accompanied by adults should be admitted) or simply refused a certificate. 
There was, however, no compulsion on producers to submit their films to the 
BBFC or for the local authorities to pay any attention to it. 8 However, it did 
have the support of the Home Secretary, Reginald McKenna. McKenna's 
support was not explained publicly at the time, but later he made it clear that he 
had been unwilling to put any more official system in place because he feared 
that it might cause him "embarrassment in Parliament: " in other words, he 
would have to explain himself to disgruntled MPs after any controversial 
decision, which could prove problematic .9 
However, the BBFC remained 
anxious to keep in good odour with the government, because it was only with 
government support that they could convince the doubtful local authorities of 
their worth. This may explain why the second President, after Redford's death, 
was an MP - T. P. O'Connor, the veteran Irish Nationalist member for a seat in 
Liverpool, although he was also a former journalist of long experience in public 
relations, something very necessary to the BBFC's survival. 10 
Under O'Connor's leadership the BBFC achieved something akin to 
respectability - finally gaining the endorsement of Middlesex County Council, 
in 1920, as an important first step in nationwide acceptance. Middlesex, as one 
of the largest local authorities in Britain and one which included parts of 
London in its remit, had considerable influence if only as a trend-setter, and it 
agreed to abide by the decision of the BBFC as to the classification of films for 
exhibition, and more importantly, which ones were not suitable. " As a result of 
this decision, and a similar one taken the following year by the even more 
influential London County Council, the BBFC might have been said to have 
arrived as the chief instrument of film censorship in the United Kingdom. 
There is a very considerable literature on the subject of film censorship. 
Unsurprisingly, much of it was generated by the widespread debates over 
censorship in the 1960s, although it is worth noting that most of the major 
8 Robertson pp. 5-6 
9 Quoted in Tom Dewe Matthews, Censored (London 1994) p. 22 
10 Hunnings p. 67 
11 It is noteworthy that this was declared ultra vires by the High Court, because 
it effectively ceded statutory power to a body not qualified to hold it, but the 
judge qualified this by adding that it would have been acceptable had Middlesex 
retained the ultimate right of approval while agreeing to abide by the BBFC's 
verdicts in general: see Hunnings pp. 71-2 
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debates in the film industry took place in the 1970s rather than the 1960s. Into 
this category would come the work of John Trevelyan, whose book What the 
Censor Saw offers an interesting parallel to Sir John Johnston's work on the 
Lord Chamberlain's office, written as the personal memoir of a censor himself: 
Alexander Walker, who wrote several important and influential studies on the 
subject of film censorship in the 1960s and 1970s, and in 1975 was due to be 
employed as an expert witness for the defence should a prosecution against Last 
Tango in Paris under the Obscene Publications Act come to court. '2 Mention 
might also be made of Guy Phelps, whose book Film Censorship was written in 
the context of the abortive Last Tango in Paris prosecution and is thus mainly 
concerned with the censorship practices of the 1970s, but adds important 
contextual details that elevate it to the status of a history book. However, pride 
of place for this era must go to a vast comparative study by Neville March 
Runnings, now more than forty years old but still impressive in its scope and 
perhaps still more so in its concept of a detailed comparison of eight countries 
(albeit with most focus on Britain) and a substantial and interesting conclusion. 
James C. Robertson's book The British Board of Film Censors and 
Annette Kuhn's doctoral thesis Cinema, Censorship and Sexuality - the former 
concentrating to a great degree on the mechanics of the BBFC, the latter 
emphasizing the context in which they operate - are both extremely worthy 
works that carried the debate into the 1980s. However, both were written just 
the wrong side of the VHS revolution, which redefined cinema censorship in 
this country, as was another admirable work by Jeffrey Richards, The Age of the 
Dream Palace, which, while it concentrates heavily on cinema in the years of 
the Depression, contains, like Phelps, many details important in the 
contextualisation of the subject. Richards offered a class-based analysis of 
censorship - it was, he asserted, designed by the middle and upper classes to 
control the lower classes. 
12 Alexander Walker, "Introduction" to Guy Phelps, Film Censorship (London 
1975) pp. 7-13, p. 7. In the event, a judge ruled that according to the definition 
of publication in the Act, the film was "published" to the cinema licensee, not 
the audience, and commented further that there seemed little chance of the 
licensee in this case admitting that he had been "depraved and corrupted, " 
leaving no case to answer. 
157 
After being given responsibility for classifying videos according to 
content by an Act of Parliament (the Video Recordings Act 1984) the BBFC 
was effectively given the final stamp of Parliamentary approval, and all real 
questions about its survival, so pertinent in the 1970s and so central to most of 
this work, were answered past doubt. 13 However, this did not stop a nostalgic 
longing for it to be entirely removed, as can be seen from the later book of Tom 
Dewe Matthews who in 1994 continued to call for its abolition. 14 More recently 
there has been a definite movement away from this attitude. Aldgate and 
Robertson commented that, given most of the BBFC's work now consists of 
video classification and almost no film is now banned outright by them, instead 
being given one of a complex series of certificates to indicate what age it is 
suitable for, questions about the necessity or desirability of the system have all 
but vanished. '5 
However, it is difficult to disentangle from any of these works a 
thorough discussion of the role of the Home Office in film censorship in the 
1920s. Robertson does the best job, but his view on the matter inevitably is 
refracted through the prism of the BBFC. Kuhn, meanwhile, who otherwise has 
one of the best of the more recent works on the subject, barely mentions the 
Home Office at all. Neville March Hunnings has a similarly unimpressive 
record, with only a handful of references to the Home Office and only one of 
Joynson-Hicks himself. This is all the more surprising given that there is general 
agreement that the Establishment wished to control the content of films because 
of the audience they were aimed at - the working classes. Jeffrey Richards may 
speak for all: 
"The full realization by the Establishment of the importance 
of films in maintaining hegemony was translated into action 
through the system of censorship. More than the dictates of 
13 From the BBFC's website, "About us", 
http: //www. bbfc. co. uk/about/index. php, retrieved 19th May 2008. It should be 
noted that although the Act was passed in 1984, for various reasons the BBFC's 
powers under it date from 1985. 
4 Matthews op. cit. pp. 288-9 
15 Anthony Aldgate and James C. Robertson, Censorship in Theatre and 
Cinema (Edinburgh 2005) p. 184 
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commercial necessity or the artistic vision of production 
chiefs, the censorship system provided the framework within 
which the cinema operated as a cultural and social force. It is 
impossible to understand the development and nature of the 
British cinema without a full appreciation of the work and 
influence of the censors. "16 
Yet having appreciated this, and discussed with great cogency the attitude of 
Parliament to the BBFC in the 1930s, Richards gives no very clear description of 
the precise relationship between the BBFC and the main government department 
they were answerable to in default of a specialist Ministry of Film. '7 Such a gap 
may perhaps be an indication of the success of the BBFC in divorcing 
themselves from government control - or it may be a cultural blindness, brought 
about by confusion over the subtlety of the Home Office's operations in this 
field. However, his class-based analysis of censorship is a useful and plausible 
one, given the dominance of class structures in Britain in this period. 
Sarah Smith, in her recent work on the subject, suggested that the 
censorship system in fact operated as a means of social control over children -- 
or at least, over what was considered suitable for children. '8 She dismissed the 
notion that there was a "moral panic" about children's cinema going habits and 
the potential effect upon them, but asserted that there was widespread interest 
and concern about the influences children were exposed to - concerns that she 
did not consider to be wholly groundless. 19 However, she is less robust in 
defining the cultural attitudes that led to the concerns raised about this subject. 
'6 Jeffrey Richards, The Age of the Dream Palace: Cinema and Society in 
Britain 1930-1939 (London 1984) p. 89. 
17 At the time of writing, there is still no Ministry of Film in the United 
Kingdom. During World War Two the Films Division of the Ministry of 
Information discharged many functions relating to the industry. Since 1964 
responsibility for the film industry has been part of the portfolio of the Minister 
for the Arts, a non-Cabinet post, now itself part of the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport. 
18 Sarah J. Smith, Children, Cinema and Censorship: From Dracula to the Dead 
End Kids (London 2005) p. 26: "[the censorship system] was a system directly 
motivated by concerns over children and cinema. " 
19 Ibid. p. 176 
159 
There is much that needs to be said on this subject from the perspective of the 
1920s, and this chapter aims to do it. 
This chapter depends very heavily on the National Archives' records, 
rather than those of the BBFC for two very good reasons. First of all, it aims 
principally to discuss the practices of the Home Office, less those of the BBFC 
itself, so the Home Office's own records are more important. The second and 
overriding reason is, however, that the BBFC's records from this period, like 
those of the Lord Chamberlain's office, cannot be utilised. However, unlike the 
correspondence of the Lord Chamberlain which, it is to be hoped, has been only 
temporarily mislaid, most of the BBFC's archive was destroyed by the 
Luftwaffe in May 1941 when their headquarters at Carlisle House was 
bombed. 20 This makes the collections at the National Archives even more 
important. 
Working from this material, I aim to examine film censorship in the 
1920s, to see what form it took in practice, and what the precise mechanics of 
the relationship between the Home Office and the BBFC were. I hope also to 
discuss the Home Office's attitude towards film censorship, especially that of 
Joynson-Hicks himself, and where and to what effect he exerted his influence. 
So far as can be judged, this latter happened fairly often, but not in the field of 
moral rectitude. Uniquely among the chapters in this thesis, this one touches on 
the subject of Bolshevik propaganda, and government control of it, which sheds 
interesting sidelights on the relationship between the Home Office and the 
BBFC. 
Joynson-Hicks' opinions on the subject of film censorship are reasonably 
clear, but they did not stand still over time. In 1927 he said quite simply that he 
had an "open mind" on the subject of film censorship (or more likely, from the 
context, on how suitable the BBFC was as a vehicle of censorship and whether it 
should be replaced by an official system such as the one proposed by Samuel)21 
Later, however, in 1929, he said publicly that he thought public opinion was in 
favour of a stricter system of censorship - which was almost certainly a coded 
20 Robertson p. 143 
21 Note by Joynson-Hicks, 2nd May 1927, NA HO 45/240841450065/62 
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way of giving voice to his belief that there should be one . 
22 Perhaps the dates are 
significant. In 1927 sound was yet to come - but by 1929 it had become firmly 
established, and may well have caused him to modify his views, as there were 
far greater difficulties involved in censoring sound films than silent ones. 
Because of the "synchronised sound system, " which saw a voice recording and a 
film played simultaneously in order to create the illusion that the actors were 
talking, it was necessary to keep both the film and the voice track at the same 
length - which meant that if there was problem, it was not simply a question of 
cutting the offending frames, but of refusing the entire film. Perversely this 
actually considerably simplified matters in the long run, as it gave the BBFC a 
reasonable excuse to demand a script before a film entered production and to 
advise on matters of doubt, but in the short term there were some awkward 
decisions to be made about films that were perfectly satisfactory apart from brief 
moments 23 Perhaps Joynson-Hicks' hardened attitude reflected some films that 
had gone through with doubtful passages under this new system. 
Joynson-Hicks' earlier attitude of benevolence or at least neutrality 
towards the BBFC is however unsurprising given that there had been 
embarrassing moments for his recent predecessors on this subject. In 1922, while 
the Lloyd George coalition had been in power, a film called Cocaine, showing 
the effects of drug taking on a young girl in the nightclubs of London, under the 
control of a syndicate led by her own father. Strong elements of racialism were 
introduced with the appearance of a Chinese dope peddler, a common link with 
the drug trade in popular imagination at the time 24 Unsurprisingly the BBFC, 
emboldened by the recent endorsement of London County Council but at the 
same time still anxious to gain further advancements in its reputation, refused a 
certificate with the full backing of the Home Office's resident expert on 
narcotics, Sir Malcolm Delevingne 
25 The problem was that Cardiff and 
22 Viscount Brentford, Do We Need a Censor? (London 1929) p. 9: "I believe 
the trend of public opinion is towards a more stem enforcement of the law in 
regard to cinemas. " 
23 Mathews pp. 49-50 
24 See below chapter 7. 
25 An excellent account of this episode is given in Marek Kohn's Dope Girls: 
The Birth of the British Drug Underground (London 1992: 200 1) pp. 134-139. 
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Manchester paid no attention to this recommendation and gave permission for 
the film to be shown anyway. 
When challenged by the Home Secretary on this point, the Lord Mayor 
of Cardiff replied: 
"I have not actually witnessed the film myself, but it seems 
that a marked difference of opinion exists as to whether its 
influence on an audience acts as a detterent [sic] or an 
inducement to the use of drugs. The Chief Constable, whilst 
not unmindful of the views expressed by the Board of 
Censorship, unhesitatingly came to the conclusion that, 
having regard to the conditions existing here, no apparent 
harm would result from the exhibition of the film. It is 
submitted that as there are no Night Clubs of the type to be 
found in London, the facilities for the "drug-traffic" in this 
city are so limited as to be practically non-existent, and as a 
whole Cinema audiences are immune from the temptation 
hinted at in the decision of the Film Censors. s26 
Such localism was perhaps a natural result of the devolvement of power to local 
authorities, but it caused consternation at the BBFC. While the mayor was 
probably correct in saying that the likelihood of a girl in Cardiff being able to 
become subject to the same distractions and temptations as a girl in London 
which had a much more deep-rooted nightclub and drug culture was very small, 
his decision not to follow the BBFC's lead was certainly an unpopular one. The 
Home Office's response was perhaps predictable. However, there were also 
protests from another source. Cardiff, as a major port, had a substantial Chinese 
community, and they were deeply unhappy both at the way the film had been 
advertised and how they were portrayed in it: 
"The advertisements of the film are not in any way offensive 
to any person but apparently the Manager of the "Capitol" 
26 Letter from the Lord Mayor of Cardiff to Edward Shortt (Home Secretary 
1919-22) 26th May 1922, in NA HO 45/11599/433067/3 
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cinema appears to have affixed to one of the advertisements 
outside the cinema a newspaper cutting of an inquest upon a 
young girl who recently died at London through taking an 
overdose of Cocaine. This cutting contained a photograph of 
a Chinaman named "Chang" who was a witness at the 
inquest, 27 and over the cutting was written, "Read this first, 
then come and see the film. " The newspaper cutting has 
apparently caused considerable annoyance to the local 
Chinese residents. The advertisements of the film are not 
offensive to public feeling and neither do they contain any 
offensive representations. 
I have seen Low Hing, of Cardiff. His chief complaint 
is against the newspaper cutting mentioned, but in addition he 
also complains that the Chinaman depicted in the film selling 
cocaine is an ugly cripple. The newspaper cutting was affixed 
to the poster after it had been passed by the police, and 
without their authority. "28 
This confirms two things. First, support for censorship (or at any rate, 
complaints about the content of uncensored works) came from places other than 
the far-right constituency of Joynson-Hicks that it is generally blamed upon - 
although again, it must be considered doubtful whether the BBFC would have 
paid any attention to the sensibilities of the Chinese in coming to its decision on 
Cocaine, just as there was little enough attention paid to them by the Lord 
Chamberlain in the theatre 29 Second, that Cardiff City Council had no intention 
of getting rid of censorship per se - its stance being that it was still fully entitled 
to censor the content, and even the advertisements for it; the implication of the 
27 See below pp. 231-5 
28 Report by Albert E. Davies, Inspector, Cardiff City Police, 6th June 1922, in 
NA HO 45/11599/433067/1 
29 Steve Nicholson: "I am painfully aware that at times ... I found myself being 
drawn close not only to accepting that there may have been a need to control 
what was allowed on stage, but even that in areas such as racial stereotyping the 
Lord Chamberlain should have listened more to those who complained. " The 
Censorship of British Drama 1900-1968 Volume One: 1900-1932 (Exeter 2003) 
p. 300 
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last sentence being that approval from the police would not have been 
forthcoming for this particular advertisement had they known about it. This in 
turn suggests that while they had not accepted the judgements of the BBFC, this 
was because they reserved their powers jealously to themselves, not because 
they did not intend to use them. Manchester took a similar line, the report of the 
police officer who went to inspect the film reading: 
"I beg to report, for the information of the Chief Constable, 
that on the 5th instant I viewed the above film when being 
shown to the trade, and, with the exception of a small 
portion.. .1 
formed the opinion that it was quite innocuous, 
and that there were no grounds for objecting to its public 
exhibition. 
The portion to which I took exception was cut out, 
and the film was shown at the Gaiety Cinema, in this City, 
during the week commencing the 15th May, 1922, and was 
also shown at the Winter Gardens cinema from the 22nd to 
the 24th of May 1922. "30 
While the officer found the film innocuous and fit for public viewing, the crucial 
phrase is "the portion to which I took exception was cut out.,, This underlines the 
fact that Manchester was also willing to act the censor and regulate the content 
of the films that were shown in the city, but that they were unwilling to hand 
over that power to a third party in any way. Their recalcitrance caused disquiet at 
the Home office, with S. W. Harris commenting: 
"It is very unfortunate that Manchester and Cardiff have 
decided to allow this film to be exhibited. If many cases of this 
kind occur the present system of censorship will become 
unworkable and as there is a considerable body of opinion 
30 Report of A. Fisher, Inspector, Manchester City Police, 25th May 1922 in NA 
HO 45/11599/433067/5 
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against all forms of censorship it would not be an easy matter 
to substitute a better form of censorship. "31 
This provides strong support to the idea that the Home Office would have liked 
to impose a more formal system but worried about the possible consequences - 
precisely as they did with the Lord Chamberlain's office a couple of years later. 
The then Home Secretary, Edward Shortt, was unhappy at the situation 
that had developed, and sent a firm reply to both mayors, carefully disguised as a 
private letter so that it would not escape into the hands of the press. However, 
the fact that the wording of the letters is identical underlines the fact that this 
was to all intents and purposes an official letter: 
"From the information supplied to me I came to the conclusion 
that the film was calculated to create a morbid interest in the use 
of cocaine, and would be more likely to suggest or encourage 
experiments in cocaine taking than to have a deterrent influence. 
As you will agree, it is very important to do everything possible 
to combat the cocaine evil and this film in my opinion is more 
likely to hinder than to help reform. 
There is a further consideration, that an awkward and 
anomalous situation is created when a film is prohibited in one 
area and permitted in another. Under the existing law, the final 
decision as to whether a film should be allowed or rejected in a 
particular area rests with the licensing authority for that area, 
and I have no wish to impair the responsibility and discretion of 
the local authorities; but you will no doubt agree that uniformity 
of practice in the censoring of cinematograph films has many 
advantages, and it seems to me that in existing conditions the 
best practicable policy is for each licensing authority to make it 
their general rule to accept the decisions of the Board of Film 
Censors, reserving to themselves, of course, the right in any 
particular case to take their own line if in the opinion of the 
31 Memo by S. W. Harris, 18th May 1923 in NA HO 45/11599/433067/2 
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licensing authority there is some good reason for differing from 
the Board. 
If it is not too late I should be glad if the licensing 
authority in Manchester [/Cardiff] would consider whether 
having regard to the above considerations they think it is 
desirable to let this film be shown in your city; and, in any case, 
I would ask you to communicate these considerations to the 
licensing authority so that they may have them in mind if, and 
when, any similar cases arise in the future. 2 "3 
In stating that it would be better for the cities to go with a uniform censorship 
system - particularly given that Shortt comments elsewhere in the letter that he 
was satisfied with the decision of the LCC to accept the BBFC's verdict on 
films, and the rest of the letter may be read as a very unsubtle hint that their lead 
should be followed. 
Manchester's mayor sent back a very humble and apologetic letter saying 
that the matter would be referred to the city's Watch committee for further 
consideration in light of the further information given by the Home Secretary - 
which was obviously not the case, as he had volunteered very little fresh 
information, merely advised them as to his opinion. 33 The Mayor seems to have 
sensed which way the wind was blowing, and was happy to turn his back to it. 
The decision to bully the dissenting councils over Cocaine set the tone for the 
remainder of the 1920s - whether official or not, the BBFC was sanctioned. This 
was the situation that greeted Joynson-Hicks in November 1924. 
There can be no doubt that for most of his time in the Home Office at 
least, Joynson-Hicks was satisfied with the BBFC and reluctant to tamper with 
it, perhaps for broadly the same reason as his inaction on the Lord 
Chamberlain's office - the fear of lifting a lid off a can of worms. There is one 
very interesting document worth quoting at length on this point. When he 
responded formally to a question on the subject in the House of Lords by Lord 
Danesfort, a revised brief to reflect his "open mind" read as follows: 
32 Edward Shorn to the Mayor of Manchester (almost identical letter sent to the 
Mayor of Cardiff) 23rd May 1922, in NA HO 45/11599/433067/2 
33 Mayor of Manchester to Edward Shortt 24th May 1922 in ibid. 
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"It is obvious that a system under which the appointment and 
payment of censors rests with the trade organisation is open 
to considerable criticism. It is natural to think that under such 
a system the censors must be liable to be unduly influenced 
by trade and business considerations. It is, however, only fair 
to say that those who have promoted the present Board of 
Film Censors and those who have been entrusted with its 
management have done their best to avoid this danger. It 
must be remembered that the first movement in favour of an 
organised system of censorship came from the trade itself... 
The Board, of course, has no official authority and in 
any criticism of the system it must be borne in mind that the 
Board can only function with any effect so long as it gives 
satisfaction to the licensing authorities who are the bodies 
possessing the legal power of whether particular films shall 
or shall not be shown. If the British Board of Film Censors 
were to appoint unsatisfactory persons as censors or if the 
decisions of these censors were unduly influenced by trade 
considerations, the effect would be that the certificate of the 
Board would soon lose its value because local authorities 
would not regard it as even prima facie evidence that a film 
was fit for presentation... 
There is ready cooperation between the local 
authorities and the Board-the certificate of the Board, 
however, in no way supersedes the discretion of the licensing 
authorities. Indeed some licensing authorities still act as their 
own censors - for instance the Justices of one large borough 
[tentatively given as Birkenhead] insert in their licences a 
provision that a film shall not be shown unless three clear 
days notice with a copy and description has been given to the 
Clerk to the Justices... 
If films are being exhibited which fall below such a 
standard as a censor can reasonably maintain, it is very 
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desirable that full information should be given to the 
government, and the Home Office will always be ready to 
receive and consider complaints. Some years ago a number of 
complaints were received as to the undesirable character of 
the films exhibited, but of late years these complaints have 
almost entirely ceased or when complaints have been made 
they have been found on investigation to be not well founded. 
It must be remembered that the work of censoring films is 
difficult and that the results which can be achieved by such 
censorship are limited. It is no doubt true that a considerable 
proportion of the films prepared for exhibition in this country 
do not reach a high standard from an educational, artistic or 
moral point of view. But the same can be said of many of the 
magazines, papers and novels which have wide circulations. 
Censorship can do little to encourage the production of films 
of a high standard. All it can do is to prevent the exhibition of 
films which fall below a certain level. %04 
This is a curious statement, for a number of reasons. First of all, it emphasises 
current satisfaction with the BBFC, noting that complaints have decreased, and 
that the system is currently working comparatively smoothly. While, later on, it 
adds that Joynson-Hicks had "an open mind" on the subject of "an official form 
of censorship, and is prepared to give sympathetic attention to an information 
and any considerations which may be put before him [in favour of a State 
censor] 9935 it unquestionably gives the impression that the Home Secretary is in 
no way anxious to address this question unless he had to. The claim that 
complaints had decreased is also interesting. If true, it suggests that the main aim 
of censorship, to prevent topics and films that stood no chance of passing the 
censor from being even considered for production, had been achieved - no mean 
feat given that the censor was formally subject to the whims of the manifold 
34 "Brief as amended in accordance with S. of S. 's wishes and sent to Lord 
Desborough: Lord Danesfort's motion on the censorship of films, " (undated) 
NA HO 45/24084/450065/62 
35 ibid. (see above) 
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local authorities and their differing standards. At the same time, it points up the 
limitations and pitfalls of the system as it stands, and then moves on to the 
question of the difficulty of censorship as a whole, which rather suggests a non- 
committal attitude on the part of the Home Office than an open-minded one. 
Merely because Joynson-Hicks was not anxious to interfere with the film 
censorship system as it stood did not mean that he was immune from moments 
of depression when complaints about the films allowed by the censors came into 
the Home Office. This particular motion by Lord Danesfort would appear to 
have been sparked by a letter from the London Public Morality Council, 
channelled through the Bishop of Southwark, complaining about twelve films 
that the censor should not have permitted. The secretary of the Board, Howard 
Tyrer, complained that these films were "not by any means an exhaustive list, 
but just a few selections from many we have seen, which are typical of what we 
complain. " It is however worth noting that he added almost in the same breath: 
"At the same time, we are bound to admit, that as compared 
with 1916, the Film Censor has secured many striking 
improvements, and we do feel that any change should be on 
the lines of an evolution of the present system, and Always 
[his capital] retaining the Annual Licensing Session in the 
background as the real deterrent of abuse. "36 
It is perhaps suggestive that even those who criticised the system as it stood on 
the grounds that it was too lax were willing to admit a degree of success to it. It 
is also worth noting that the films complained of were easily refuted in this case. 
The LPMC had simply not understood the system put in place by the BBFC. 
Brooke Wilkinson, the secretary of the BBFC, was anxious to underline this 
point to the Home Office whenever it was raised, as it was by S. W. Harris in 
March 1927 (before the letter from Tyrer): 
36 Howard Tyrer, Secretary of the LPMC, to the Lord Bishop of Southwark, 
forwarded to first Lord Desborough and then via him to the Home Office and 
the BBFC (undated, presumably sometime in May 1927) NA HO 
45/24084/450065/66 
169 
"I had a long conversation today with Mr. Wilkinson about 
the film trade and we discussed the censorship among other 
matters. He said that the division of films into A and U films 
is a principle to which they attach the greatest importance and 
constitutes, as he expressed it, "their salvation. " He explained 
that practically all the complaints they get come from people 
who protest against certain films being shewn to children, 
and in every case on investigation it has been found that the 
film complained of was classified "A" - that is to say the 
censors did not consider it fit for children. Mr. Wilkinson 
pointed out that the weakness of the present position is that 
while nearly all licensing authorities have accepted the model 
condition as to the Board's censorship, a considerable 
number of them have not adopted the condition about "A" 
films. He knew as a matter of fact that considerable pressure 
(some of a questionable kind) had been brought to bear on 
licensing authorities by members of the Trade so as to induce 
them not to impose this condition. Mr Wilkinson's position 
therefore is a little awkward because he knows the condition 
is not supported by a section of the Trade, and it is difficult 
for the Board of Film Censors to make a recommendation to 
"3 the Home Oflice. 7 
It is very obvious that this had happened in the case of the films complained of 
in Tyrer's letter. Of the ten films the BBFC could identify (they could not trace 
any record of having been sent two of them) nine were found to have been 
passed with an "A" certificate, so were considered suitable only for exhibition to 
adults. They had all required cuts or other alteration before being passed even 
with this certificate. It was noted as an aside that the worst offenders were all 
37 Report on an interview of Wilkinson by S. W. Harris, 11th March 1927, in 
NA HO 45/24084/450065/60. 
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British, which the Home Office official in question pointed out was rather 
unfortunate. 8 
As a result of this confusion over the ratings system, the matter was 
quietly allowed to drop. But it highlighted an important weakness of the extant 
system. Many in the film trade were complaining bitterly about the strictness of 
the censorship, pointing out that having to work within the auspices of the 
BBFC stifled their creativity at the expense of their rivals on the continent and 
especially in the United States, who laboured under no such handicap at this 
time. Frequently the BBFC elected to pass something in a foreign film that they 
would not have allowed in a British one rather than reject a film outright, which 
was demonstrably unfair. This was particularly true of American films, whose 
financial support was necessary for the continuation of both the cinema network 
and indeed the film industry itself. 
39 But equally, if the film rating system was 
not strictly adhered to by local authorities - and it was only advisory - then it 
might give the impression to its opponents that the BBFC allowed practically 
anything to be shown to any audience. This seems to have happened here (aside 
from the curious note that the films most strongly objected to were all British, 
which seems counter to the normal pattern). If the system as it stood could not 
be clearly understood, or indeed was possibly wilfully misunderstood in a bid to 
force a change, the Home Office would find itself with the unenviable job of 
sorting the entire mess out. No wonder the normally ebullient Joynson-Hicks 
wrote on this letter, "I feel quite hopeless about this "Film Question. "ao 
This may be why he was personally so reluctant to tamper with it - but 
the most important man in the Home Office went much further. In light of all 
this fuss, Joynson-Hicks invited Sir John Anderson to prepare him a brief to put 
before the Cabinet on the subject of film censorship. Anderson's own position 
was bluntly stated in a cover note to his political superior: "My personal view is 
that the existing censorship works exceedingly well and I would strongly 
38 O'Connor to Bicknell, 9th June 1927, and minute by Bicknell, 10th June 
1927, NA HO 45/24084/450065/66. 
39 Mathews pp. 53-4 
4 Minute by Joynson-Hicks, 15th June 1927, NA HO 45/24084/450065/66 (see 
above p. 153). 
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deprecate any change in the direction of an official censorship: '41 The briefing 
note to the cabinet, prepared by S. W. Harris under Anderson's guidance, was 
almost equally forthright: 
"In the opinion of my [Joynson-Hicks'] advisers the present 
censorship, with which they have kept a close touch, has in 
practice worked very well and it is probably true to say that a 
higher standard is maintained than in any other country... the 
Secretary of the Board has a wide knowledge of the industry 
and considerable influence with its members. The trade does 
not attempt to interfere in any way with the actual work of 
censorship, and the present personnel would certainly decline 
to be influenced by trade considerations.. . It relieves the 
government of a difficult responsibility. Some Minister - 
presumably the Home Secretary - would have to answer to 
the House of Commons for the decisions of the official body 
of censors, and he would be liable to meet constant criticism 
either as to undue leniency or as to excessive interference 
with freedom of expression. In matters of taste and morality 
the experience of the Lord Chamberlain in connection with 
stage plays shews how thankless such a duty would be. In the 
political sphere the duty might easily be more difficult... there 
are bound to be cases on the border line in which the film 
would have to be submitted to censorship and the position of 
the Government of the day might be embarrassing. "42 
Clearly the difficulties Joynson-Hicks had experienced when he considered 
reform of the Lord Chamberlain's role as a theatre censor had not been lost on 
his department. There seems to have been no appetite for any sort of reform of 
the system within the Home Office, even though Joynson-Hicks may have 
41 Sir John Anderson to Joynson-Hicks, 14th April 1927 NA HO 
45/24084/450065/68 
42 Memo by S. W. Harris, undated, NA HO 45/24084/450065/66 
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wished at times that he was not on the receiving end of trouble for something he 
could not directly control. 
However, even as things stood in the film industry, the Home Office 
exerted much influence over the BBFC when it cared to, much as it did over the 
Lord Chamberlain, which may partly explain why there was no desperate urge 
to bring it under formal Home Office control. It is also worth emphasising that 
the BBFC were extremely strict in their enforcement of morality on the screen - 
which may be another reason why Joynson-Hicks was never especially worried 
about lax standards of morals in films until he wrote Do We Need a Censor? For 
instance, in 1925 the BBFC had said sternly that they would check "the growing 
habit with actors of both sexes to divest themselves of their clothing on slight or 
no provocation. " Although in practice male actors were allowed to reveal their 
torsos throughout the 1920s, female nudity (which had occurred increasingly 
frequently prior to this remark and reached an apogee with the original Ben 
Hur) stopped more or less abruptly 43 Such a remark would have chimed well 
with Joynson-Hicks' own views, and may have encouraged him to view the 
censorship system as satisfyingly orthodox. However, that did not stop him 
exerting his influence in another field of film censorship; for here we finally 
touch upon one of the features that defined Joynson-Hicks' tenure of the Home 
Office - his anti-Bolshevism. 
There can be no doubt of Joynson-Hicks' firm belief that Bolshevism 
was a dangerous evil that must be fought. One of the weapons of this particular 
war was propaganda, and especially film propaganda. This was a weapon made 
the more formidable by the fact that the Russians had one of the world's finest 
film directors working for them - Sergei Eisenstein, a man who could not only 
make very effective propaganda films, but was in his own right a superb and 
accomplished film-maker. As such, his films posed something of a problem for 
the BBFC, and the Home Office's influence was decisive in ensuring they were 
refused a certificate. 
Probably the most serious and difficult of these cases was represented by 
Eisenstein's masterwork, Bponeuocey 47omenaxuu0, in English usually 
43 Matthews pp. 70-71 (quoting the BBFC's Annual Report for 1925). 
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rendered roughly as The Battleship Potemkin. 
44 The reason for this was that not 
only the Home Office expressed concern over the content. The Permanent 
Secretary of the Admiralty wrote to Anderson as follows: 
"General Page Croft has drawn the First Lord's attention to a 
Bolshevist film called the "Panzer-Kreuzer Potemkin" which 
has recently been shown in Berlin, and which appears to be a 
fantastic representation of a mutiny on board a Russian 
Battleship, worked up so as to constitute very objectionable 
propaganda against the discipline of the Fighting Forces. We 
presume that there would be no likelihood of such a film 
being allowed to be exhibited here, but should there be any 
question of it, the First Lord hopes that the Secretary of State 
will do everything possible to prevent it. "4S 
Such an attitude was perhaps understandable, given that the General Strike had 
happened only two months previously and the Russian Revolution was still a 
very recent memory. The plot of Battleship Potemkin is based around a famous 
mutiny in 1905, when the crew of a Russian warship (the Potemkin) rose against 
their harsh conditions and poor food and succeeded in overpowering and killing 
most of their officers. After sailing into Odessa and causing rioting there as well, 
they fled the port before additional Tsarist troops could arrive to restore order 
and, evading the Black Sea fleet, sailed successfully to Romania. 
The film follows the course of events fairly closely, although dramatic 
licence is taking for propaganda and narrative reasons - for instance, the 
legendary climax of the film where Tsarist troops fire on a crowd on the Odessa 
Steps did not happen (or to be more exact, did not happen there - Tsarist troops 
almost certainly did fire on demonstrators in the main streets). But the potential 
propaganda value, whether of true events or invented ones, was immense, and it 
is not surprising the Admiralty was nervous (although it seems unlikely that the 
as Technically the title translates more nearly to "The Armoured Warship 
Potemkin. " 
45 0. A. R. Murray to Sir John Anderson, 21st June 1926, NA 110 
45/24871/495038[/1] 
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particular cocktail that mixed on the Potemkin of harsh and stupid captains, 
inadequate and rotten food and a major military defeat would have been present 
in the British peacetime navy). Despite this, Anderson was very quick to 
reassure his counterpart: 
"The Home Office has no direct authority to prevent the 
exhibition of a film but I don't think you need feel any 
anxiety about the particular film which you refer to in your 
letter of the 21st instant. The Board of Film Censors to whom 
all films are submitted would, I feel sure, never pass a film of 
that character - certainly not without reference to us. They 
usually consult us if they are in doubt. To make surer [sic] I 
have had their special attention called to the "Panzer-kreuzer 
Potemkin. "46 
The easy confidence of the Home Office was not replicated at the Admiralty. 
The First Lord William Bridgeman, himself a former Home Secretary, who 
wrote personally to Joynson-Hicks to underline his concerns, pointing out that 
this comforting analysis of the BBFC's likely reluctance to pass the film was 
wrong in one vital particular: 
"The question, however, that disturbs the Admiralty is what 
will happen if cinemas showed the film in spite of the refusal 
of the Board to pass it. I understand that the worst thing that 
can happen is that the local authorities may refuse to renew 
their licences; but some local authorities, far from taking such 
action, might encourage the exhibition of this particular film, 
and it is conceivable that they might even refuse to renew a 
licence of a house that did not show it. Also it is possible that 
smaller and less reputable houses in the naval ports might be 
bribed to run the risk of their licences not being renewed. As 
the situation now stands, the probability is that this film will 
46 Copy of a letter from Anderson[? ] to Murray, 23rd June 1926, NA HO 
45/24871/495038[/1] 
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have a wide circulation in the poorer districts, whether it is 
licenced [sic] or not... I should be glad to know whether you 
have any legal powers under the Mutiny or other Acts to 
prohibit the exhibition of this film. "47 
The wording of this letter is somewhat curious, given that Bridgeman himself 
had been a Home Secretary and therefore must surely have had some idea of 
what the Home Secretary's powers were in this regard. It is possible, however, 
that Joynson-Hicks had acquired a reputation among his colleagues, as he had 
among the general public, for bending and twisting various statutes to their 
limits to suit his purposes when necessary, and Bridgeman may have been 
obliquely hinting that he wanted something along those lines done here. 8 While 
his fear seems disproportionate with hindsight, it is again necessary to remember 
the context in which he wrote and the nervousness he may have felt about the 
possibility of mutiny in the Royal Navy. It is also fair to point out that he was 
quite correct in saying that the BBFC's likely refusal to grant Battleship 
Potemkin a licence did not necessarily mean that all local authorities would be 
willing to follow its lead. 
Indeed, the suggestion that the BBFC would not pass this particular film 
and therefore there was no risk that it would be shown indicates a certain hubris 
on the part of the Home Office. The statutory powers were reserved to the local 
authorities which were run by a wide variety of local politicians, including in 
many areas very left-wing factions of the Labour party that were bound to be 
sympathetic to a film, particularly a good film, that depicted the class struggle in 
a light favourable to their own political interests. Furthermore, given that the 
BBFC was in any case theoretically fully independent of the Home Office and 
not legally obliged to follow its requests if it chose not to, the idea that "the 
BBFC will not pass it without consulting us and therefore you are making a fuss 
about nothing, " which seems to have been Anderson's attitude to Murray, is 
47 Bridgeman to Joynson-Hicks, 1st July 1926, NA HO 45/24871/495038/3 
48 "The Home Office encouraged a police crusade against vice and immorality, 
through a series of raids and prosecutions that drew a great deal of publicity and 
took DORA right to her limits: " John Ramsden, The Longman History of the 
Conservative Party Volume 3: The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902-1940 
(London 1978) p. 286 
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perhaps rather a naive one. In fairness, of course, the idea of the BBFC setting 
aside the views of the Home Office on a matter like this, at a time when it was 
still uncertain of its future, is a ludicrous one in its own right, but Anderson 
seems to have overlooked the autonomy of the local authorities, who certainly 
could ignore the Home Office on this subject if they wished to. However, further 
pressure exerted perhaps under the Incitement to Mutiny Act, already used by 
Joynson-Hicks to devastating effect in the "Campbell case, " would be enough to 
bring all but the most recalcitrant in line, so Bridgeman's letter is not perhaps as 
remarkable as it seems at first sight 49 
Joynson-Hicks certainly did not wait long before taking steps to ensure 
that Bridgeman's fears were groundless. One of Bridgeman's specific charges 
was that a print of the film was in Britain, held by a licensed film agent, F. A. 
Enders, and that it was one of "twenty or thirty such films" that had been 
imported by the Russian Trade Delegation (ARCOS) S0 Careful enquiries by the 
Home Office, partly conducted via Scotland Yard, revealed that Enders did 
indeed have Battleship Potemkin in his possession, and was perfectly open and 
frank about it when he was approached by Brooke Wilkinson. Enders simply 
said that he had it, but only for private viewings of directors to show them an 
outstanding example of Eisenstein's work rather than "commercial exploitation, " 
and that in his opinion it would be impossible to modify it enough to get it past 
the BBFC's censors. His idea had been to try and get Western filmmakers to 
commission work from Eisenstein that followed a non-propaganda line. He 
added that it was a pity that Battleship Potemkin could not be modified enough 
to be generally shown, because of its outstanding technical and artistic merit. 51 
While Enders may have been himself a little naive in thinking that the Soviet 
Union would allow their greatest director to become side-tracked into 
commercial film making, his explanation is a plausible one - and given just how 
good a director Eisenstein was, even a laudable one. 
49 A. J. P. Taylor, The Oxford History of England XV. - England 1914-1945 
(Oxford 1965) p. 242. The Mutiny Act had been passed in the eighteenth 
century (1797) to deal with trouble in the navy, but it could be readily adapted 
to other uses. 
so Bridgeman to Joynson-Hicks, op. cit. sl Wilkinson to Harris, 30th June 1926, NA HO 45/24871/495038/3 
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In light of this enquiry, Joynson-Hicks wrote back to Bridgeman in 
soothing terms, reassuring him of how limited the danger was: 
"The Customs have at our request undertaken to look out for 
any further copies and hand them over to the Police. 
I think, therefore, that as matters stand there is no 
cause for anxiety that the film will be shown here, but I will 
let you know immediately if I hear that any attempt is to be 
made to produce the film in public. s52 
Joynson-Hicks was in private somewhat less sanguine, minuting firmly to his 
officials that "people are alarmed about this film and great steps must be taken 
to stop it"53 As with The Well of Loneliness, the order for Customs to seize the 
film were it was found went out, and doubtless Joynson-Hicks felt that that 
would be sufficient to stop any more imports, leaving just the one tightly 
controlled and known copy in the country. 
However, it was his misfortune that events overtook him. After a long 
agitation, the ban on showing Battleship Potemkin was lifted in Germany, and 
this led to a surge of interest in the film in the popular press, especially the left- 
wing press 5.4 Following this notoriety, Enders had a change of heart himself and 
decided to try and get the film licensed by the BBFC in order to cash in on its 
notoriety. This time Joynson-Hicks and the Home Office moved decisively. 
They summoned the BBFC's senior figures to an "unofficial" conference, at 
which it would seem the Riot Act was read to them on what would happen 
should this film go through. The official record of this unofficial conference was 
as follows: 
"The conference was entirely unofficial and it was definitely 
understood by all who took part in it that the Board of 
Censors, in conveying their decision to refuse a certificate for 
52 Joynson-Hicks to Bridgeman, 5th July 1926, NA HO 45/24871/495038/3 
53 Joynson-Hicks, minute of 2nd July 1926, NA HO 45/24871/495038/3 
sa See, for instance, "Russian Film Fight: Germany lifts ban on great work, " 
Daily Herald, 3rd August 1926, in NA HO 45/24871/495038/4 
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the film, would do so on their own responsibility and would 
not, without permission, mention that they had consulted any 
government department. 
As shown in the memo, the probability is that no 
attempt will be made to show the film in this country if a 
certificate is refused by the board. If, in spite of the refusal of 
a certificate, attempts were made to exhibit the film by the 
Communist party or any other person, a situation would arise 
which would need further consideration. We can be sure that 
we shall get early information from the Board of any attempt 
to exhibit the film. "55 
It seems unlikely that the BBFC would have adopted so servile an attitude unless 
they were under extreme pressure. Given that they were employed by the film 
trade, and given that Battleship Potemkin is universally acknowledged as a 
cinematic masterpiece, this decision would almost certainly prove controversial 
for them, and therefore to take the blame for a decision that was effectively not 
theirs was either a very selfless act or a very pragmatic one - more likely the 
latter. It is not hard to think what could push them into this decision -a hint that 
if a trade censorship would not do what a government wished it to do, then the 
government would replace it with a system that would. Joynson-Hicks was 
however delighted, and showed his usual fearlessness in accepting 
responsibility: "I am much pleased with the action taken by the H. Office and 
other govt. departments and will support to the utmost both in Parliament and 
out the decision to proscribe this film"56 
That seemed to end any danger of Battleship Potemkin being shown 
commercially in Britain at that time. However, the difficulties with Russian 
propaganda films continued. While Scotland Yard could find no evidence to 
substantiate Bridgeman's claim of a large number of propaganda films held at 
ARCOS (while promising at the same time to keep a close watch in case any 
turned up later) several other Russian films caused the government acute 
55 Minute by Newsam, 9th September 1926, in NA HO 45/24871/495038/5 
56 Minute by Joynson-Hicks, 14th September 1926, in NA HO 
45/24871/495038/5 
179 
anxiety. 57 One such scare about a film was sparked by an article in the Observer 
about a film called Black Sunday. This particular film dealt with the events 
around what is more usually now called "Bloody Sunday, " when a column of 
marchers who wished to present a petition to the Tsar were fired on by Cossacks 
in front of the Winter Palace, sparking the 1905 revolution. The Observer 
described the film as "something more than mere acting. 58 Perhaps revealing a 
curiously haphazard method of policing Soviet film propaganda, Captain Miller 
of New Scotland Yard asked for a warrant to detain the film and examine it, as 
far as can be judged solely on the strength of this one review. 59 He got his 
warrant. It is interesting to note, however, that it was not signed by Joynson- 
Hicks. It was signed by a Nobel Laureate, a former Conservative Party Leader 
and a man who had been a pillar of the centrist Lloyd George coalition - in other 
words, somebody about as far removed from the Diehard Joynson-Hicks as it 
was possible to get in the Unionist party. That man was Sir Austen Chamberlain, 
the Foreign Secretary-60 While this is perhaps more of an interesting aside than a 
crucial point of argument, it does illustrate that the censorship of Art and anti- 
Bolshevism was not something confined to the Tory far right. 
Probably the best propaganda film apart from Battleship Potemkin that 
the Home Office had to deal with, at least with regard to artistic merit, was 
Pudovkin's film Mother. In the film a woman whose son organises a strike at 
work, in which his father is killed, turns over arms that he has collected to the 
Okhrana when he is arrested in the belief that they will then release him. 
However, he is sent to prison, escapes and is shot organising a revolt. Having 
lost everything, the eponymous mother holds the red flag high and advances on 
the police who ride her down. 61 Put that way, it is clearly Communist 
propaganda. One civil servant noted, after discussing how dangerous it was as 
57 New Scotland Yard to Home Office, official letter, 19th July 1926, in NA HO 
45/24871/495038/3 
58 "Black Sunday: Another Russian Film in Berlin, " The Observer, 28th 
November 1926, in NA HO 45/24871/495038/9 
s9 Captain Miller of New Scotland Yard to Scott, 30th December 1926, in NA 
HO 45/24871/495038/9 
60 Warrant for the seizure and detention of Black Sunday, 3rd January 1927, in 
NA HO 45/24871/495038/9 
61 Plot synopsis of "The Mother, " stamped "Received 15th Oct 27, " NA HO 
45/24871/495038/16 
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propaganda and how in his opinion it should be banned, "I ought to add that the 
film is technically a very great improvement on any previous Russian films we 
have seen and that the acting throughout, and particularly that of the mother, is 
of a very high order. "62 But it is worth noting that, as in literature, artistic merit 
played no part in the decision of whether or not it should be banned. Anderson, 
in conceding the suggestion that the film should be detained by the police if it 
was found, simply said, "There are serious possibilities here and all concerned 
must be on their guard.. "63 The "serious possibilities" must surely refer to the 
propaganda - there is no mention of its artistic merit or the quality of its acting. 
Joynson-Hicks was even blunter, simply saying "I agree and have signed 
warrant "64 
Most of the warrants in the case of films banned on political grounds 
were reversed by Clynes in 1930 65 The vigour with which Joynson-Hicks and 
the Home Office pursued Bolshevik propaganda can be judged by the fact that 
the file on this subject runs to at least 101 folders, many of which have been 
destroyed. It would be interesting to know exactly what was in them - for 
instance, did the hints that ARCOS was being used as a vessel for Soviet 
propaganda films contribute in any way to the raid on ARCOS the following 
year, which was strongly pressed for by Joynson-Hicks, but proved 
controversial and led to a rupture of Anglo-Russian relations, causing fears in 
Russia that there might be a war? Such questions can no longer be answered 
given the incompleteness of the evidence - while it is perfectly possible, it 
cannot be put forward as a tenable hypothesis on the available records. But it is 
clear that, while Joynson-Hicks was generally willing to leave matters of taste 
and morality to the BBFC, whatever doubts and private moments of despair he 
may have had, he was determined to take a more active role in the censoring of 
propaganda. His attitude may be summed up by his comment on another 
62 Report by Scott, 14th September 1928, in NA HO 45/24871/495038/16. It 
should be noted that this report was of a viewing held a year after the initial 
decision was taken that the film should be controlled. 63 Minute by Anderson, 17th October 1927, in NA HO 45/24871/495038/16 
64 Minute by Joynson-Hicks, 18th October 1927, in NA HO 
45/24871/495038/16 
65 For instance, the warrant for Mother was stamped "Cancelled 27/5/1930" 
(NA HO 45/24871/495038/16) as was that of Black Sunday (NA HO 
45/24871/495038/9). 
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Russian film, The End of Holy Petersburg: "Certainly keep this rubbish out "66 
Where he led, the BBFC followed, tamely and in many cases in a way that was 
prima facie counter to its own best interests. That surely says enough about who 
wielded the real power in film censorship in the 1920s - whenever he chose to 
exert it. 
It is worth remembering, having reviewed all the evidence in this chapter, one 
fact that causes film censorship to stand out from every other form of censorship 
activity surveyed in this thesis - as of 2008, the same system remains in 
operation, and has been continuously in operation since the time this thesis 
focuses on. Admittedly the initials `BBFC" now stand for "British Board of 
Film Classification, " and the certification system is now much more 
sophisticated. Hardly any films are now banned outright on the grounds of 
content, but the labels remain voluntary rather than statutory in the case of 
cinema exhibition, and have been overturned by local authorities in the recent 
past. One notable example springs to mind; the case of Spiderman, starring 
Tobey Maguire, given a 12 certificate by the BBFC and reduced to PG by a 
variety of local councils, despite the fact that the BBFC actually hesitated 
between a 12 and a 15 certificate due to its violent content 67 
Yet on the whole, down the years, the censorship system and later the 
classification system has worked with relatively few alarms and a great measure 
of success - to the extent that the BBFC were granted powers to grade videos in 
1985, and there are persistent rumours that they may be given further control 
over video games as well, which currently operates on something of a hit-and- 
miss basis 68 Perhaps the very nature of the system has made it durable - its 
66 Minute by Joynson-Hicks, 3rd April 1928, in NA HO 45/24871/495038/29 
67 "Parents warned of Spiderman violence, " BBC News website, entertainment 
section, 13th June 2002, 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/entertainment/film/2042729. stm, accessed 21st May 
2008. It would seem that because the film was based on a comic book character, 
these councils mistakenly thought it was a family film. The controversy was 
instrumental in the establishment of a new "12A" certificate to reflect the 
American "PG-13" rating, replacing the "12" certificate, the following year. 68 It is currently the responsibility of a game developer to decide whether the 
game in question would require a certificate, and the BBFC has no power to 
demand that games be submitted to them for approval, although they provide 
guidelines on what is and is not exempt from classification. As a result, not all 
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voluntary aspect meaning that if somebody transgresses against its rules and 
suffers for it, there is hardly any point in them complaining loudly in the press, 
because it can always be overturned by an appeal to the relevant local authority. 
Of course, in the case of a national release such an approach would be 
impracticable, and makes the BBFC's decision effectively final, which may be 
why it is not universally loved 69 
Such a result could hardly have been foreseen in the 1920s, at a time 
when Home Office pressure on the office was being exerted on everything from 
drugs to Bolshevism, questions about a state system were asked in Parliament, 
and the BBFC's very existence was new and precarious in the extreme. But, as 
Sir John Anderson said, on the whole the system devised in 1912 worked very 
well, and its remarkable resilience is testament to its soundness. But from 
another point of view, it is also important. It shows that in the 1920s, there may 
have been calls for censorship to be entirely abolished, but the general tenor of 
the times was not, as is sometimes claimed, for completely free expression. The 
BBFC started as a trade organisation that nobody trusted, and owed its later 
success to the fact that it was an efficient and ruthless censor of films that 
satisfied those with the power to follow it or ignore it, while often working 
counter to the ostensible interests of the industry it had been founded by. Like 
the Lord Chamberlain's system, it may have survived partly by default, but 
there can be no doubt that it did enjoy support among certain important and 
influential sectors. Joynson-Hicks, who was seldom afraid of exerting his 
influence where he felt it was needed, was on the whole happy to leave matters 
to the BBFC. He refused Parliamentary legislation to make the BBFC into an 
official body, even when he was under pressure to do so and admitted that he 
was finding it difficult to see his way clear to satisfy everybody. Perhaps this 
was because the Home Office's tune could determine how the BBFC danced 
when the former chose to make it. But it does not seems that Joynson-Hicks felt 
any great qualms about the way in which the BBFC exercised its functions, and 
was satisfied, as were his senior officials, that the system worked well enough in 
video games are examined, reminiscent of the situation under the OPA in the 
1920s. See the BBFC's website, "Submission of Video Games", 
http: //www. bbfc. co. uk/customer/cust_procDigi. php, accessed 30th March 2009. 69 Mathews pp. 286-289 
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practice. If the BBFC managed to avoid the wrath of Joynson-Hicks, that 
perhaps says at least as much about them and their work as about him. 
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PART THREE 
LOW CULTURE AND 
HIGH LIVING 
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6) "A Good Word for DORA": Night Club Culture. 
""There's lots of little things a man may do in the way of breaking the law. 
There's street-betting, and drunk and disorderly, and buying stuff after closing- 
hours and so on: little odds-and-ends that come in handy at times. " 
"My conscience! " said Wimsey. "First time I've heard a good word for Dora! " 
Dorothy L. Sayers, Have His Carcase. ' 
The London nightclubs of the 1920s have had a very mixed bag of opinions 
pronounced upon them, both at the time and since. In the 1920s and 1930s 
conservative writers would depict them as haunts of every form of depravity. 
For John Buchan, a "dance-club" in Soho was the front of the criminal 
organisation run by sinister master-villain Dominick Medina in The Three 
Hostages. For Sayers, in Murder Must Advertise, they made a conveniently 
raffish location for the display of depravity among Bright Young Things, and 
for a dope-running racket being investigated by Lord Peter Wimsey. Even 
Douglas Goldring, whom nobody in their senses would declare a "conservative" 
in any sense of the word, said some unkind things about nightclubs by implicitly 
linking them with prostitution. 2 However, Ronald Blythe, not somebody 
inclined to duck controversial statements or to bother examining nuances where 
a generalisation would do, veered to the other extreme and baldly referred to 
them as "rather shame-faced versions of ordinary cafe and revue-bar life such as 
could be found in any major Continental city. "3 
What were nightclubs, and what was the problem with them? The roots 
of this particular issue dated back to the First World War and were inspired by, 
of all things, the great shell scandal of 1915. General Haig blamed the shortage 
' London 1932: this edition paperback 1974 pp. 280-81. 2 Douglas Goldring, The Nineteen Twenties: a general survey and some 
personal memories (London 1945) defined the street in which Kate Meyrick had 
her nightclub as "one of most unprepossessing in Soho... frequented by tarts and 
souteners" (p. 145) Whether he blamed Mrs Meyrick for the prostitutes is 
another matter, but cf. p. 249 where he condemns Mrs Meyrick as "a "criminal" 
who aroused much good-natured public sympathy" (because she was interested 
in money and not civil liberties per se). 3 Ronald Blythe, The Age of Illusion: England in the Twenties and Thirties 
1919-1940 (London 1963) p. 35. 
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of shells that so badly hampered his campaigns on the laziness and drunkenness 
of the British worker, and Lloyd George uncharacteristically sided with him, 
uttering the immortal words, "We are fighting Germans, Austrians and Drink, 
and so far as I can see the greatest of these deadly foes is Drink. "4 As a result, 
one of the provisions enforced under the "Defence of the Realm Act" (hereafter 
DORA) strictly regulated opening hours of premises serving alcoholic liquor. 
The key feature of the legislation after 1915 was the setting up of a Central 
Control Board to regulate liquor sales in "areas crucial to the war effort, " by 
restricting hours and sales, areas that by 1917 covered some 93% of the 
population. This, coupled with higher taxes on alcohol (the price of beer trebled 
during the war) a ban on buying drinks for others and progressively weaker 
drinks due to dilution in order to conserve food supplies, saw a truly dramatic 
fall in alcohol consumption (and by implication, drunkenness) during the War. 5 
The effect of a reduction in drinking were by no means entirely negative. 
Gerald J. DeGroot noted that there was a surprising fall in infant mortality at the 
weekends, something he attributed to lower levels of drunkenness among 
parents. However, while most people seem to have put up with these 
restrictions during the war, however reluctantly, for fear of being seen as 
unpatriotic if they grumbled, there has been a great deal of criticism poured over 
successive governments, at the time and since, for continuing to enforce these 
provisions of DORA after the war had finished. Douglas Goldring, riding one of 
the conspiracy theories that his book on the period is chock-full of, saw in it an 
attempt by the upper classes to suppress Bolshevism by keeping the working 
classes sober, and to retain all alcohol solely for themselves 7 In actual fact, 
DORA in its pure form was not enforced after the war, and the law under which 
Joynson-Hicks pursued the nightclubs was the Licensing Act of 1921. Mrs 
Meyrick, one of the most prominent and notorious nightclub owners a 
4 Gerard J. DeGroot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War 
(London 1996) p. 75 
5 DeGroot pp. 237-8 
6 ibid. p. 219. DeGroot held that the reason was fewer drunken parents 
"overlying" i. e. rolling on top of small babies in bed with them and smothering 
them. 
7 Goldring p. 248. It is important to point out that it was not him who saw the 
correlation between Communism and intoxication, but it is the motive he 
attributes, by name, to Joynson-Hicks. 
187 
discussion of whose actions form a large slice of this chapter, listed the 
provisions of this act thus: places that served alcohol could open for a maximum 
of nine hours between 1 1am and 11pm with a break of a minimum of two hours 
after noon; any premises (or clubs) that served meals could stay open for an 
hour longer (i. e. up to midnight). $ 
The net result of all these restrictions was to reduce the number of hours 
in which alcohol was served by 1921 compared with 1914. For all his faults, 
Goldring puts it rather well: 
"The enemies of freedom, it is true, did their best to kill the public- 
house [sic]. Three years after the Armistice, pubs were only open six 
and a half hours out of the twenty-four, as opposed to nineteen and a 
half hours in 1914. The penal taxation of alcoholic liquors was, 
moreover, continued by the Conservative profiteers in pursuit of a 
deliberate policy to retain as many as possible of the pleasures of life 
for the privileged. "9 
Leaving aside Goldring's persistent paranoia, which I have already remarked 
upon, there can be no doubt that a heavy blow had been dealt against the sale of 
alcohol. But alcohol is a potent mixture, with its own ingenious ways of hitting 
back at its enemies. The nightclub was one such way. During the war it became 
fashionable to drink illegally after hours in closed (or at least theoretically 
closed) establishments. These became known as "nightclubs. " 
Defining a "nightclub" is by no means an easy task, as became all too 
painfully apparent to Joynson-Hicks when he attempted to legislate against 
them in 1925.10 Broadly speaking, a nightclub in the 1920s was regarded as a 
place that stayed open later, and served liquor later, than the hours provided by 
the Licensing Act of 1921 for premises that served alcoholic refreshment. 
Almost invariably they were also places where dancing and music was laid on. 
They were also, officially, "clubs, " that is, places owned and operated by 
members on behalf of members, which is how they dodged the licensing laws. 
8 Kate Meyrick, Secrets of the 43 Club (second edition Dublin 1994) p. 15 9 Goldring p. 77. 
11 See below pp. 192-193 
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In practice, one person or a small group in partnership, who appointed a dummy 
committee to maintain the "club" front for them, usually owned them. 
Generally, they charged exorbitant prices for drink and food, so they were 
patronised only by the wealthy and fashionable. 
However, there were innumerable tangles in this definition. For instance, 
many hotels and restaurants stayed open later than ordinary pubs, yet no 
reasonable person would describe them as nightclubs. They were also, 
incidentally, much more tightly controlled and regulated than nightclubs, 
because they operated inside the law and were therefore open to the control of 
it. There were also, in this period, some popular dance clubs that did not serve 
alcohol despite staying open very late. These were often, by no means 
erroneously, referred to as nightclubs as well, but there was no possible legal or 
moral objection to them. " These factors were a crucial part of the nightclubs' 
success in avoiding police suppression. 
What actually happened in what would be considered a nightclub? The 
two basic answers are drinking and dancing. Nightclubs existed to sell drink: 
but they would also provide a band and a dance floor (hence the confusion over 
what was a nightclub and what was a dance club; they often appeared very 
similar). However, the patrons of these nightclubs very often took drugs, either 
bought at the nightclub if the owner was even less than usually scrupulous, or 
bought elsewhere and often taken elsewhere as well. Nightclubs often served 
food too, although demand to be limited. The basic definition I adopt here is 
that a nightclub was a place where dancing occurred AND where drink was 
regularly served after the hours allowed by the 1921 Act. 
This chapter, in discussing nightclubs, does not aim to be an exhaustive 
study of the night life of the upper classes of London between 1924 and 1929 
(which is essentially what night clubs were). It aims to examine what nightclubs 
were, including what went on inside them, so far as can be ascertained. It 
examines why Joynson-Hicks pursued them with such vigour. It looks at who 
the principal supporters of Joynson-Hicks were in his campaign, as well as 
whom his opponents were. It also seeks to ascertain why Joynson-Hicks's 
pursuit of these law-breakers was by and large unsuccessful. It does not seek 
1' Hannen Swaffer, "The Night Club Panic, " The People, 8th February 1925, 
offers as good a summary as any of these difficulties and confusions. 
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neat cut-offs in 1924 and 1929, but attempts to look at the question in the round, 
especially the major police crackdown on nightclubs in 1930-31, that finally 
succeeded in closing most of them. 
It will be noticed that this chapter concentrates heavily on one particular 
woman: Kate Meyrick (usually referred to as "Ma" Meyrick by socialites of the 
time). The reasons for this are twofold. First, she was a notorious and persistent 
offender, with a bulky and informative police file that has survived, providing a 
great deal more information than on the average nightclub owner and his/her 
premises. She also, in writing her memoirs, left a most illuminating document 
that I have been able to draw on in order to give some idea of how it felt to be 
working in the nightclubs themselves. Secondly, and just as importantly, she 
was a dominant figure in the London social circle. As an Irishwoman, and 
therefore not technically an alien, 12 she escaped the worst punishment that 
DORA could inflict (deportation) which was reserved for undesirable aliens. 
This meant that she could steer a cunning course against the law, not necessarily 
with impunity but with far less risk than - for instance - her fellow nightclub 
owner Victor Perosino, owner of the "Chez Victor, " who was finally, forced to 
flee to his native Paris. 13 The "43, " as her club was usually referred to, was a 
major social centre for the fashionable: and especially, the wealthy. 
Joynson-Hicks had barely entered office when his campaign against 
nightclubs had begun. The Baldwin government swept back to power on the 4th 
November 1924. Joynson-Hicks was appointed Home Secretary on the 6th. By 
the 26th he was already pestering officials for details of a number of clubs that 
had been brought to his attention as especially difficult to police, or particularly 
frequent offenders, and discussing fresh legislation to deal with them. 14 It 
should be noted in fact that Joynson-Hicks was very sparing in his use of 
legislation, witness his extreme reluctance to tinker with the Obscene 
12 The Irish Free State achieved Dominion Status in 1922; the Republic of 
Ireland broke away from the British Empire altogether in 1949. 13 Robert Graves and Alan Hodge, The Long Week-End: A Social History of 
Great Britain 1918-1939 (London 1985) p. 120 14 Home Office Official to the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, 26th 
November 1924, NA HO 45/16205/472038 
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Publications Act or the Lord Chamberlain's powers. 15 But here he was clearly 
eager for action. 
The police were also clearly eager to help him in his search for fresh 
legislation. In reply to Joynson-Hicks' request for information, the police sent 
an extremely long letter detailing their current operations on six nightclubs. One 
of them ("Moody's Club") was "at present thought to be well-conducted, " but 
the others were subject to varying degrees of suspicion. One of the key 
difficulties for the police was outlined in the case of the "Lamb's Club, " which 
had been disqualified from being a club for 6 months in January 1924, but had 
reopened. This was a recurring problem for both Joynson-Hicks and the police 
throughout the rest of the decade. But a far more immediate problem was drawn 
much more firmly to Joynson-Hicks's attention: 
"The general difficulty the police have found in dealing with the 
above and many similar cases, is that although they have knowledge 
that the law (mostly relating to liquor) is being habitually broken, 
they cannot obtain evidence to bring it before a Court, or can only 
obtain it after prolonged and expensive enquiry, and long after the 
breaches have become notorious"16 
The most serious difficulty the police had in this regard was that they needed a 
warrant to enter a nightclub, as it was officially either a private residence or a 
private club. They did not need a warrant to enter properly licensed premises, as 
these were officially public places (hence "public house"). However, the 
conundrum of how to allow police to enter a nightclub without a warrant while 
at the same time not giving them the absolute power to enter any house they 
entertained any suspicions of any kind of at the same time was an impressively 
knotty one. Although at a slightly later stage the Evening News carried an article 
suggesting that nightclubs were somehow to be brought within the remit of the 
15 It should be noted that this may be partly because any attempt at fresh 
legislation might have led to these powers being lost altogether, as in the case of 
theatre censorship. See above pp. 93-4 
16 All the information in this paragraph, including the two direct quotes, is taken 
from the reply to Joynson-Hicks's request for information, dated "December 
1924, " Commissioner to Home Office, NA HO 45/16205/472038/2 
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Licensing Magistrates, giving the police the right to enter on suspicion without 
the need for material proof of wrongdoing that a warrant requires, nothing came 
of it (hardly surprising when one considers that a large part of the problem with 
nightclubs was that they were not licensed at all, never mind for after-hours). 
This was stumbling-block number one for Joynson-Hicks's campaign. '? 
Another problem lay in the definition of a nightclub itself. This was 
ultimately to wreck Joynson-Hicks' hopes of stronger legislation on the subject. 
In January of 1925 the Commissioner, William Horwood, wrote to Joynson- 
Hicks asking that the legislation demand precise information on the extent of a 
nightclub's premises. The fact that he underlined the word "precise" was of 
significance for another reason entirely, which we shall examine later. 18 But it 
was symptomatic of the fact that Joynson-Hicks's proposed legislation was 
already running into difficulties. On the 26th January 1925 Joynson-Hicks 
received a delegation from the London Public Morality Council on this subject, 
as recorded by The Times of the following day. He stressed that there was an 
acute difficulty finding a definition that would cover nightclubs (which the 
Bishop of London, leading the delegation, described as "haunts and hunting 
grounds of sharks and loose women, whose business consists of exploiting the 
follies and weaknesses of those who are induced to visit them")19 while 
excluding ordinary clubs. He specifically mentioned that there was no 
difference in law between the nightclubs of Central London and the Carlton or 
(apparently even more seriously) working men's clubs, which were proliferating 
rapidly. Joynson-Hicks was especially anxious not to tread on the toes of the 
latter, giving as his reason, in a typically Joynson-Hicks-ish moment of candour, 
that approximately 2.2 million voters would be affronted by legislation that 
damaged working men's clubs. He did, however, put forward a definition of 
"nightclubs" that included "any club that was not habitually open before 6 
o'clock in the evening, and any which habitually remained open after 1 o'clock 
in the morning"20 He refused point-blank to reintroduce the restrictions of 
17 "New War on Shady Night-Clubs, " Evening News, 26th October 1925. 
18 Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis (i. e. Horwood) to Home Office 
(undated but from its position in the file must be January) NA HO 
45/16205/472038/6 
19 "Night Clubs. Deputation to Home Secretary, " The Times 27th January 1925 
20 ibid. 
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DORA as they had existed before 1921, and he also announced that he wanted 
to find a way of excluding genuine dance clubs: "people were entitled to dance 
if they so desired. He was not going out on a crusade against enjoyment so long 
as it was properly conducted, and was not an offence to the conscience of the 
people of the country. 941 
However fine all this may sound in theory, there were serious problems 
in practice, something that did not escape alert members of the PMC. Archibald 
Allen, writing to offer Joynson-Hicks a slightly different definition the 
following day, added that in the definition offered to the PMC the nightclub 
owners would "promptly open at 5 and serve a few chops or cups of tea to 
members so-called . 9922 As nightclub owners had been operating through the 
loopholes of the law for years, any definition would have to be quite 
spectacularly watertight to beat them. Joynson-Hicks never did find a 
satisfactory definition of a nightclub, and had to shelve his plans for new 
legislation. Henceforth, he was forced to operate his campaign as best he could 
under the amended form of DORA. 
But, as Commissioner Horwood had pointed out, there was an extremely 
nasty shortcoming in the phrasing of this Act. Even in 1928, when the promised 
legislation had still not been forthcoming, there was trouble over a nightclub 
that had been raided and closed, with the premises disqualified. But 
unfortunately, the legislation meant that only the precise premises could be 
disqualified, that is, the actual rooms in which the nightclub had operated. In the 
same building, a new nightclub had just opened, under a different name, with 
identical rules to the banned club. It officially operated out of the billiards room, 
a room with a billiard table in it and no room for anything else. The police 
report somehow said it all: 
"It seems obvious that Mrs. Merrick, anticipating another 
disqualification of the lower part of the premises, has again caused 
another club to be registered. [Sgd. ] R Hannaford, S[oho] D[istrict] 
Inspector. 
21 ibid. 
' Archibald Allen to Joynson-Hicks, 27th January 1925, NA HO 
45/16205/472038/10 
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"Submitted. There is no doubt that the Richmond Club is the 
property of Mrs. Merrick and that the premises have been registered 
as a club in anticipation of the Cecil Club being struck off the 
register on 22nd June ... The facts of this case clearly proves [sic] that 
the law as it now stands with reference to the registration of Clubs, is 
a farce. [Sgd] MORTON. s23 
While the nightclub owners could evade the law with such contemptuous ease, 
it was hardly surprising that this particular nightclub owner came to think 
"DORA was all humbug. "24 And it is with this triumphal dismissal of the law, 
after the manner of Mr. Bumble's famous outburst in Oliver Twist, 25 that Mrs. 
Kate Meyrick (usually called "Merrick" in official documents) the uncrowned 
queen of the London nightclubs throughout the 1920s, enters the story. 
"Mrs Kate Meyrick, " wrote Blythe, "began her life as respectably as 
even Joynson-Hicks could have wished. , 26 She was in fact an Irishwoman, born 
and raised in Dublin, with a brief interlude as a small child as a vicar's step- 
daughter in Lancashire. She obviously had a very high sense of her own 
importance: in her memoirs she claims personal acquaintance with "the late 
Duke of Devonshire"27 as well as discussing how she was top of Ireland in four 
subjects in her school certificate, the first woman in Ireland to ride a bicycle and 
driving in the first motor car in Ireland, as well as being a good luck charm. 8 
Finally she married a doctor, living with him, on and off, from 1903 to 1918. 
There is no direct evidence available as to why she left him (certainly she does 
23 Report on Merrick's Club, with note by Superintendent C. Morton of C 
District, 14th June 1928, NA HO 144/17667/471675/13 
24 Meyrick p. 23 
25 Mr Bumble declared that "the law is a ass -a idiot [sic]" Peter Fairclough 
(ed. ) Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist (Penguin classics paperback edition London 
1985) p. 461 
26 Blythe p. 35 
27 Meyrick p. 3. This allusion must have been rather confusing to her readers, 
because according to her chronology (she was born in 1875 and she states that 
she was a small child when she met "the late Duke, " whom she described as an 
old man in his seventies) the Duke of Devonshire in question must have been 
the Seventh Duke (1808-1891) but in 1932 most people would surely have 
regarded "the late Duke of Devonshire" as the former Lord Hartington, the 
Eighth Duke (1833-1908) leader of the Liberal Unionist party. 28 ibid. p. 3: see also ibid. chapter 1 passim for biographical detail. 
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not say). However, in a court case in 1922 her counsel told Sir Chartres Biron 
that she had left her husband because of his cruelty 29 In contradiction of that, 
eleven years later after she had died her husband told the Daily Mail that she 
had left him because she wanted more money and to be part of the excitement of 
London's nightlife 30 
Whatever the reason for her separation, she found herself left with eight 
children to support and very little money. She elected to invest what little she 
had in the hospitality industry. By 1919 she was one of the partners in a dance 
club (not a nightclub per se) called "Dalton's. " Although the police rapidly put 
it out of business, she opened a new nightclub called "Brett's. " This she sold 
after a short while for £1,000, something she always regretted doing, and in 
1921 opened a club at 43 Gerrard Street, Soho, named the "43. " Although it 
underwent several changes of name in its life as a result of police action, being 
known as the "Cecil, " the "Bunch of Keys, " the "Richmond" and other names, 
she always referred to it as the "43" (itself a striking indication of the 
ineffectiveness of the law in shutting nightclubs) and for the sake of clarity, so 
shall I (except in direct quotes from official documents) 31 
She described her reasons for venturing money in nightclubs thus: 
"London life in 1919, with everyone still trying to forget the war, 
was rapid, not to say hectic. Everyone seemed bent on pleasure only; 
the only problem was, how best to turn this to my legitimate 
advantage. 
29 ""Forty-Three" Night Club. Woman Proprietor Fined £250, " The Times, 28th 
February 1922 
30 "Mr Merrick Speaks: Husband Breaks Silence of Thirteen Years, " Daily 
Mail, 25th January 1933. There is no way of being sure which explanation is the 
true one. Mrs Meyrick's is perhaps the more consistent with the facts publicly 
available. Certainly her husband's interview is no example of accuracy and 
truthfulness. His claim that the children did not help Mrs Meyrick run her 
nightclubs is total nonsense, and unless he was a complete fool (which, given 
that he was a highly successful doctor, seems unlikely) he must have known it. 
Equally, it was in Mrs Meyrick's interests to play up her financial needs to the 
judge in this particular case. But the one question over her version of events, 
why she did not try and get a divorce, might be explained by the fact that a court 
could have given her husband custody of the eight children on the grounds that 
their mother was a known criminal. 
31 See Meyrick, pp. 11-12 and pp. 23-26, and Blythe p. 36 
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I never was one to moralise; I cannot set up my outlook in those 
days as having been a symbol of "the liberty of the individual, " or 
anything of that lofty nature. I was a woman finding herself in the 
world with the business of bringing up a family. My mind was made 
up that somehow, no matter at what cost, I would render my eight 
children economically secure. And if it could be done by a means 
which would at the same time gratify my love for the bright side of 
life, why, so much the better. "32 
This is a most interesting statement. It certainly is curious to note that one of the 
people who suffered most under Joynson-Hicks's campaign was never very 
bothered about the principle of her actions. What mattered to her was money for 
her family, and the buzz of being at the centre of all the glamour of the 
nightclubs in the 1920s. This was something that Goldring lamented, writing of 
his disdain for the fact that she was no twentieth-century John Wilkes, 33 Who 
should have run her nightclubs with "some worthier object than that of making 
money. "34 
Goldring should not have deluded himself. All nightclubs existed to turn 
a profit, and many of them made extremely handsome profits. Meyrick gave a 
brief summary of her financial records in her memoirs: 
"From the door money alone came approximately £100,000. Then 
the profits on drink and food were, of course, substantial. 
Champagne cost me an average of 12s 6d per bottle, and I estimate 
32 Meyrick p. 13. She was specifically referring in this passage to "Dalton's. " 
33 John Wilkes, 1725-1797, famous wit, radical politician, journalist and writer, 
who acted as a continual irritant to the governments of the late eighteenth 
century, especially in his publication of the North Briton (1762-63) an anti- 
government paper, and in his continual victories in Middlesex elections despite 
being officially barred from entering the House of Commons. Over the North 
Briton he obtained an important new legal freedom in the abolition of general 
warrants: henceforth, all warrants had to name the property or the persons 
concerned. See Peter D. G. Thomas, `Wilkes, John (1725-1797)', Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online 
edn, May 2006 [http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/29410, accessed 1 Oct 
2006] 
34 Goldring p. 249. 
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that I sold £50,000 worth. During licensed hours I sold it for 22s 6d 
to 30s, and after legal hours at 30s to £2 per bottle. For beer I paid 
41/2d per bottle, and sold it for 8d during permitted hours and 
anything up to Is 6d afterwards. The liquor to provide for an average 
week at the "Silver Slipper" used to cost me about £125, and that 
quantity I generally sold for about £375 or so-Nevertheless, as I 
have already emphasised, there was nothing extortionate about our 
prices. They were simply the rates which the public was prepared to 
pay for its amusement; indeed if anything they were a little on the 
low side. ti, 35 
It is hardly surprising, with numbers like this, that Meyrick put the total 
turnover of her clubs in the period 1919-1932 at somewhere near £500,000, a 
truly enormous sum for the inter-war period. 36 It is also hardly surprising, with 
prices levied at this rate, that only the very rich could afford to visit the West 
End nightclubs of the 1920s. A list of her more illustrious clients is provided by 
Graves and Hodge, and the list includes Joseph Conrad, Jimmy White, 37 the 
Crown Prince of Sweden and Prince Nicholas of Rumania. 38 
Such names could make the raids on nightclubs a very risky business for 
the police, who would potentially irritate or even arrest extremely influential 
people, and may be one reason why in 1924 most nightclub owners thought 
their position unassailable. 39 Certainly it would have caused considerable all- 
round embarrassment if "the famous and fashionable Kit-Kat Club" had been 
raided one night earlier and the Prince of Wales (the future King Edward VIII) 
had been caught there. 0 Even without the question of a royal clientele, the lists 
of nightclub revellers arrested in raids are strongly suggestive of wealth and 
high social standing. In October 1924 a raid on Meyrick's 43 Club led to the 
arrest of thirty-three men and eight women. The roll of honour during one court 
35 Meyrick p. 104 
36 ibid. 
37 A Lancashire millionaire, not the modem snooker player. 38 Graves and Hodge p. 121 
39 Hannen Swaffer, "The Night Club Panic, " attributes the words "Oh, we're 
safe... nothing can touch us, " to "the nightclub owners. " 
40 Graves and Hodge p. 120. 
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case reported in the Daily Mail ran to two Army officers, one lawyer, and an 
Oxford undergraduate. 1 In this era followers of an Oxford or Army career 
meant almost automatic entry into the ranks of the "gentry, " even assuming that 
they were not members of that class already. It is probably no coincidence that 
two of Meyrick's daughters married into the peerage in her lifetime 42 
But the penalties for transgressing the law, when caught, were steep. 
Most clients were let off with fines. The owners, particularly if they were 
persistent offenders, got more than that. Meyrick was three times given six 
months in prison, as well as substantial fines, for selling liquor without a 
licence. 3 For the majority of nightclub owners, the penalty was a great deal 
harsher. Many nightclub owners were French or Italian, and so were eligible, as 
aliens, for deportation. Joynson-Hicks was perfectly happy to use this as a 
weapon, although he was by no means alone in this. Commissioner Horwood 
once wrote to him in a fine temper: 
"We shall... never put a stop to this sort of thing as long as the 
Magistrates and the London Sessions deal with the cases as they do 
now. 
In this respect I would like to invite your attention to the case of 
the Movie Club, run by an utter blackguard of Dutch nationality 
named Van-der-Land. In this case the fines and costs were £15 and 
£10-10-0 respectively. He was making this profit in a day. Luckily 
the magistrate recommended deportation, and against this he has 
appealed to you - H. 0. file 485881. This has been referred to me, 
and I am strongly recommending that you deport him forthwith. 
This class of blackguard only fears two things: - 
i) a whipping 
41 "43 Club Raided, " Daily Mail, 21st October 1924 
42 See Richard Davenport-Hines, `Meyrick, Kate Evelyn (1875-1933)', Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/66827, accessed 5 Oct 2006]. A third 
also married into the peerage after she died (Graves and Hodge p. 122) 43 For the briefest account see Davenport-Hines (ODNB). The three sentences 
ran from November 1924 to April 1925; May to November 1928; and May to 
October 1931. She also served fifteen months for bribing a police officer in 
1929-1930. 
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ii) deportation 
As they cannot be given the first for this class of offence, the sooner 
England can get rid of them the better. , 44 
Such a ruthless attitude coloured thinking on the issue. Even Keith Middlemas 
and John Barnes, normally highly sympathetic to Conservative policy in the 
1920s, denounced the attempt of Joynson-Hicks to defend his actions in this 
regard during the 1929 election campaign as "sheer folly, " saying that it had 
become "long a matter of distaste among his own party as well as the general 
public. 5 But in the matter of deportations, he usually had the backing of the 
police, although he was not above telling them off when he saw fit. In 1928, 
following a successful raid on the Winter Gardens Club, the Italian proprietor 
was convicted, but it seems that the police had guaranteed that he would not be 
deported. Joynson-Hicks wrote, enraged, "I really cannot allow the 
? Commissioner or his ? solicitor, to usurp my powers. Tell them in future not to 
make any ? bargain about deportation. "46 Of course, they were not his powers: 
they belonged to the magistrates, then the courts, and only then to the Home 
Secretary. More correctly, Joynson-Hicks should have informed the police that 
they should not make plea bargains or usurp the ultimate power of the office of 
the Home Secretary, which is what they had actually (and wrongly) done. 
44 Horwood to Joynson-Hicks, 18th November 1925, NA HO 
45/16205/472038/54 
as Keith Middleman and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London 1969) p. 
515 
46 HO 45/16205/472038/73. The question marks represent words where 
Joynson-Hicks's declining quality of handwriting is almost indecipherable. 
199 
PAGE/PAGES 
EXCLUDED 
UNDER 
INSTRUCTION 
FROM 
UNIVERSITY 
Perhaps the strangest feature of this particular aspect of Joynson-Hicks's 
campaigns was, notwithstanding the unease felt in some quarters about the 
ruthless methods and harsh sentences utilised, how widely supported Joynson- 
Hicks actually was in taking on the nightclubs. Although Joynson-Hicks, as a 
Diehard Conservative, was something of a Liberal and Labour bete noire, he 
actually achieved quite a considerable measure of support from the Left for his 
efforts, and most of the attacks came from the Right. This can be seen especially 
in the press. At the time of Meyrick's conviction for bribing a police officer in 
1929, the Daily Mail and the Daily Express wrote articles that played on the 
emotional content of her trial: the Express referred to her "weeping 
daughters, "47 while the Mail referred obliquely to her connections through 
marriage with the wealthy and titled. 8 But the left-wing press was absolutely 
cutting about nightclubs in general and Meyrick in particular. The Daily Herald, 
indeed, penned venomous leaders in the authentic language of class war: 
"These tedious night clubs... are neither halls of hilarious gaiety nor 
dens of glittering vice... [they are places that] fleece, on strict 
business lines those... who "have more money than sense. " 
So the fools flock to be bored, and to pay fantastic money for the 
high privilege.. . And then, because the dash of illegality must be 
provided to titillate the jaded appetite, comes all the elaborate play of 
spying and counter-spying, of bribery and counter-bribing. And so it 
"49 goes on... 
The Daily Herald, understandably, was in no hurry to show sympathy for 
wealthy hedonists. In the same article it denounced nightclubs as "symptoms of 
that same disease which is capitalism. s50 As long as it saw nightclubs in these 
terms, it would doubtless think it had far better grounds for criticising Joynson- 
Hicks (who, after all, had already said he had no intention of persecuting the 
47 Daily Express, 23rd June 1928 (This and all subsequent news stories on the 
Goddard case (i. e. 23rd June 1928 and 30th January 1929) are preserved as 
cuttings in NA HO 144/17667/471675/12) 
48 Daily Mail, 23rd June 1928 
49 "Goddard: and others, " Daily Herald, 31st January 1929 
50 ibid. 
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working men's clubs with whom the Daily Herald would have felt some 
sympathy) than his attacks on a class that they would have liked to have seen 
treated far more punitively. 
While the Daily Herald represented the London left, the grand old 
trooper of the provincial left took a slightly different line. The Manchester 
Guardian had its own strong opinions on the subject of nightclubs, by no means 
sympathetic to the owners. In a thunderous leader after Goddard's conviction, it 
denounced nightclubs in the language, not of class war, but of regional war. It is 
a remarkable article, and deserves quoting at length: 
"The Goddard case is not flattering to England - or perhaps we 
should say to London ... The case has thrown a remarkable and a 
somewhat garish light on the way in which a number of our gilded 
youth - and their gilded elders - spend, or rather waste, their time. 
Mrs. Meyrick's clubs will provide a text for the oratory of the street 
corner and a good many other places for many a long day; the "idle 
rich" were never seen to less advantage. Here are people who must 
dance and drink at all hours and at all costs - at the cost of ten 
pounds or so for a bottle of champagne, as well as the cost of 
breaking the law, a society so bored with everyday life that it must 
attempt to introduce into England a type of enjoyment which is 
supposed to be "Parisian, " but which seems to most intelligent 
persons to be merely stupid and dreary. Of course, a policy of 
suppression is of no use. History is conclusive on that point; you 
cannot stop foolish people from wasting their lives, their money and 
money which is not theirs. If you were to suppress such night clubs 
you would by that same act invent some alternative futility. But, 
though it is not the Government's business to supervise our morals, it 
is its business to see that the law is obeyed. And here Sir William 
Joynson-Hicks has done no more than his duty, but he has done it 
where others have not been so ready to do theirs, and he has taught 
London that breaches of the law are no more to be tolerated there 
than they are in Manchester or Liverpool. London, for some 
unexplained reason, already has an hour longer to drink in than other 
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places, and it needs no further latitude. The Goddard case has not 
only exposed corruption in the police force; it has exposed 
lawlessness among a considerable number of men and women who 
deserve no particular consideration from society. If a single act of 
corruption in the police force is disquieting, so is a group of people 
who have no respect for the law. And the law should be no more 
lenient to the one that to the other. "s' 
This is a most remarkable polemic. This was the newspaper that had in the past 
been so very critical of Joynson-Hicks, when he was Winston Churchill's 
flamboyant and controversial conqueror in Manchester North-West in 1908. It 
also shows remarkable tangles of logic that the writer got into over whether or 
not Joynson-Hicks was right. The proliferation of the minor errors show how far 
rumours of the iniquities and profiteering of nightclubs had spread among 
classes that clearly deeply loathed them. It is also of significance that nightclubs 
are seen as a London problem. The Manchester Guardian clearly felt that they 
were an aberration on the part of decadent southerners, and not institutions that 
it was inclined to defend in any way whatsoever. 
Of course, the Manchester Guardian, as a Liberal paper, might be 
expected to pour scorn on drinking as a social evil in a throwback to the 
Nonconformist temperance movements of the 19th century. It is also extremely 
easy to discern, in this article, the difficulties of a divided and exhausted 
political philosophy lacking clear direction. The writer considered that "it is not 
the Government's business to supervise our morals, " but in enforcing laws 
unquestionably designed to do just that, "Sir William Joynson-Hicks has done 
no more than his duty, " which must have confused any alert readers. It is also 
significant that the Daily Chronicle, in what was to prove its final year as an 
independent newspaper before merging with the Daily News to form the News 
Chronicle, was distinctly unsympathetic towards Mrs. Meyrick, referring to her 
as "a hardened offender. "52 
sl "Bribery and Corruption, " The Manchester Guardian, 30th January 1929 
(cutting in NA HO 144/17667/471675/12) 
Z "Guilty, " Daily Chronicle, 30th January 1929. 
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Joynson-Hicks was therefore not without support in those political 
classes which normally reviled him as a Diehard Conservative. But, more 
seriously for him, he was not universally supported in his natural constituency 
of the Tory right. This is perhaps less surprising than it may seem at first sight. 
If, as the evidence suggests and indeed logic dictates, nightclubs were a class 
issue, the rich would be firmly on the side of the night clubbers, who were 
almost invariably drawn from their class. One of the earliest attacks (and, the 
evidence suggests, one of the most irritating to Joynson-Hicks) came in the 
Daily Express, a paper not noted for its antipathy to the Diehard cause. In a 
great outburst on the behalf of night clubbers, Michael Walsingham declaimed 
on behalf of the voters of Epsom: 
"Their idea [Conservative voters in 1924] was that the Socialists and 
Revolutionaries were to be "outed [sic: ousted? ]; " that a man was to 
be allowed to manage his own business, and that in spite of 
restrictions some kind of life and liberty was to be allowed to the 
subjects of His Majesty the King. The idea was, in other words, that 
quiescence and "lakes of ale" were to reign once more as in the days 
of the good old Lord Salisbury. 
Sir William Joynson-Hicks, by disturbing these ideal dreams so 
rudely, has stirred to considerable resentment in the kind of 
constituency for which I speak. I do not suppose that one voter in a 
thousand has ever been into a night club or is ever likely to go to 
one. If any lamb did so stray he would probably be greatly 
embarrassed by the circumstances in which he found himself. Yet 
the undercurrent of sentiment is dead against the attack on night 
clubs. One man said to me the other day, "Well, Lloyd George took 
off half the war time restrictions - and Ramsay MacDonald never 
interfered one way or the other. It's odd to find a Conservative 
government interfering with people's amusements. 
The Home Secretary is making the government profoundly 
unpopular among its own supporters throughout the home counties, 
not because they want to go to night clubs, but because they object to 
Puritanism and police... unless the Prime Minister can check the 
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strange exuberances of his subordinates, there will be a long list of 
Conservative casualties in this neighbourhood at the next General 
"s3 Election. 
Of course, Joynson-Hicks was not going to let an article like that have the last 
word over him. In the margin of the paper backing to this press cutting, he 
added in pencil, "Keep this with night club file and ask police to find out who 
and what Mr. Michael Walsingham is. WJH 28/2/25. -)954 But it is not difficult to 
imagine that the pursuit of nightclubs would be less popular among the wealthy 
whose fellows and social equals patronised them than among those without the 
money who could look disdainfully at the waste and emptiness of the nightclub 
trade. Looked at purely as a class issue, nightclubbers had a lot more in 
common with the stockbroker belt of Surrey than the unemployed cotton 
workers of Lancashire. To take a Marxist analysis to a logical conclusion, the 
Epsom voters would show solidarity with their own class, particularly at a time 
when it seemed threatened by, inter alia, the Russian Revolution, a much more 
militant workforce (whose militancy was to culminate in the botched General 
Strike a mere sixteen months after Walsingham was writing). The Mancunians 
had no such motive to support the hedonists. 
But - and a crucial but - Walsingham and the Express did not speak for 
all the newspapers or their commentators, even before the revelations of 
Meyrick's further criminality. There were vocal critics of nightclubs in the press 
in 1925 as well, although even here a certain left-wing bias was discernible. For 
instance, Joynson-Hicks wrote nothing in the margins of an article by Hannen 
Swaffer for The People, written about two weeks before Walsingham's 
contribution to the Express. This is also worth quoting at considerable length: 
"It is just three years ago that I started to expose London's great 
night club scandal, the method in which openly and brazenly a ring 
of men, aliens, most of them, were selling drink all night in defiance 
of the law, not only in underground hovels in obscure streets, but 
53 Michael Walsingham, "Puritanism and the Police, " Daily Express, 26th 
February 1925, cutting in NA HO 45/16205/472038/15a 
54 ibid. 
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also right under the eyes of the police in some of the most prominent 
thoroughfares of the Metropolis ... A few days after my first article 
was printed, I received an intimation that I had "better be careful. " I 
repeated my denunciation, and indeed, at odd times, I have done it 
ever since. I have been threatened ever since, and so have members 
of my staff; you get used to threats in journalism... 
When I first called the attention of Mr. Arthur Henderson, the 
Socialist Home Secretary, to the case of Victor's, which had rich and 
powerful friends, no notice was taken of any kind. It was when Sir 
William Joynson-Hicks came into office that I knew the time had 
come; for everyone recognised him to be a man who would not be 
thwarted by evasion, and who would act, in spite of stupidity 
elsewhere, and who would have his own way. 
It must be realised that Sir William belongs to the great body of 
middle-class Evangelicals who, largely, are the backbone of this 
country. They have been behind most of the big moral causes which 
have swept the nation for centuries. They fought slavery and other 
horrors; and, usually, they have won. 
It may seem a small thing, but if you have, right in the centre of 
London, open breaches of the law, known to everybody, how can 
you expect anyone in the country to take the slightest notice of the 
law or to have any respect for it? 
That is the trouble with the drink iniquity, which has followed 
so-called prohibition in the States. The law has become a thing to be 
jeered at, and when you make the law ridiculous you are destroying 
one of the bulwarks of your constitution... 
If the authorities think that, when the Savoy Hotel is stopped 
from selling drink after eleven, except with meals, it is necessary that 
very thirsty people should be allowed to obtain it elsewhere, the 
proper course would be, in these days of overwhelming taxation, to 
put these bogus clubs on a proper footing and to tax them, just the 
same as all respectable licensed places are taxed. It would be a 
source of revenue that we might all appreciate. 
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But that it is possible, openly, in the centre of London, for men 
who pay nothing whatsoever in the way of taxation to ignore the 
licensing magistrates is a crying scandal to which ... I take the 
strongest possible objection... The bogus night club is a pest house 
that should be shut. It is a centre for the spreading of disease. It is a 
place where crooks mix up with the foolish. It is certainly not the 
sort of freedom for which nearly a million British soldiers died, but a 
hovel of unbridled license, a scandal that cries aloud to high Heaven 
and a perpetual shame, a mockery, a crime. 55 
Although, like the Manchester Guardian, the polemical style did rather tie the 
author up in knots in places (did he really, as he implied, think that the sole 
problem with night clubs was that they paid no tax? ) Swaffer's position on 
nightclubs is eerily similar to that of Joynson-Hicks. The ingredients were all 
there: the determination not to tar "clubs" and "night clubs" with the same 
brush; the fearsome rhetoric denouncing them as haunts of iniquity; the almost 
sadistic pleasure in the thought of night clubs being emptied by the pressure of 
the police (something that is even more apparent in the full article); and the 
assertion that he has no objection to dance clubs, restaurants or properly 
licensed premises; only nightclubs. Yet Hannen Swaffer was not really very like 
Joynson-Hicks. He was an ardent Socialist, an editor of the Daily Herald 
(another newspaper with anti-night-club leanings) from 1931 and later, a 
spiritualist 56 Clearly, this was an issue that cut across normal Diehard/Liberal 
divides. 
How typical Joynson-Hicks' own attitude was on the Right it is almost 
impossible to judge. Certainly it was not universal. Joynson-Hicks was never 
openly censured by Baldwin - himself, let it not be forgotten, a deeply religious 
man with High Church leanings - but one leading figure in the Conservative 
party, Sir Robert Home, was a legendary London socialite. A bachelor whose 
manner was free with the ladies, and a frequenter of nightclubs, Home had risen 
ss Hen Swaffer, op. cit. 
56 Linton Andrews, `Swaffer, Hannen (1879-1962)', rev., Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/36379, accessed 11 Aug 2008] 
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to be Chancellor of the Exchequer in the final months of Lloyd George's 
premiership, but resigned with Austin Chamberlain, and never held office again. 
It is widely thought that his private life led to Baldwin's offering him the junior 
post of Minister of Labour in 1924, something he was always bound to decline, 
and there has never been any secret of the fact that Baldwin described Horne as 
"that rare thing: a Scots cad. 9,57 If Home had truly lost his position of power and 
influence in the Conservative party -a party whose leadership he must have 
been a serious contender for had he remained active in politics - through his 
decision to haunt nightclubs, then that is perhaps the most illuminating aspect of 
the Right's problems on the subject, which may be summed up in one word - 
divided. 58 
Swaffer also goes some way towards raising a more general point, one 
that Ronald Blythe made great play of: 
"Like all little tyrants, Joynson-Hicks had to justify his ruthlessness 
by a colourfully exaggerated denunciation of the evil he intended to 
crush. A reasonable man would have seen that night-clubs were 
rather shame-faced versions of ordinary cafe and revue-bar life such 
as could be found in any major continental city, and in most 
instances the haunts of people who merely didn't happen to want to 
go to bed early. Joynson-Hicks's preoccupation with them gave them 
a reputation for orgiastic activities and the raids made headlines in 
the Sunday newspapers. The smuttiness of the latter at this time 
always amazed foreign visitors. Nearly all the raids concerned 
drinking out of hours, that strange sin whose enormity is only 
57 Middlemas and Barnes p. 282 
sg Philip Williamson, `Home, Robert Stevenson, Viscount Home of Slamannan 
(1871-1940)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
Press, Sept 2004; online edn, May 2006 
[http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/33991, accessed 9 Oct 2006]; cf. Blake 
p. 215 "But for Bonar Law's premature resignation he (Baldwin) would never 
have leapfrogged his way into 10 Downing Street, over such figures as Austen 
Chamberlain, Birkenhead and Sir Robert Home, " and p. 226 "The only one (of 
the coalitionists) he (Baldwin) did not want was Home, a haunter of night 
clubs" 
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exceeded by paederasty [sexual activity between a man and a boy] in 
Anglo-Saxon countries. "59 
Whether Joynson-Hicks did in fact exaggerate the seriousness of the problem 
with nightclubs is an important issue. Most useful here is a private note that he 
sent to Commissioner Horwood, after Kate Meyrick had escaped being raided 
for more than three years: 
"Last night I again saw my friend in the other House who brought 
the matter to my notice. He informed me that up-to-date it is a place 
of the most intense mischief and immorality, even go to the extent of 
doped women and drunken men. 
I want you please to put this matter in the hands of your most 
experienced men and whatever the cost will be, find out the truth 
about this club and if it is as bad as I am informed prosecute it with 
the utmost rigour of the law. s6° 
There are a number of self-evident points here. One, Joynson-Hicks was not 
claiming himself that the "43" was a den of iniquity. He was claiming that it was 
a member of "the other House, " which is suggestive of the old-boy network in 
two ways: one, the way it arrived at Joynson-Hicks and two, that it had got 
round among members of the upper classes who were the major patrons of the 
night clubs. Two, Joynson-Hicks certainly was claiming that the "43" was a 
major haven of vice and iniquity. Leaving aside the "drunken men, " which any 
reasonable person will concede is the likely outcome of mixing heavy drinkers 
with alcohol, let us concentrate on the "doped women. " 
There are three possible explanations. First, Joynson-Hicks (or his 
conveniently unidentified friend in the Lords) could have been lying. That is 
certainly not inconceivable, and certainly seems to be what Blythe believed. 
Joynson-Hicks must have been desperate for a pretext to break this club, and 
above all to wean the Commissioner away from the Soho District police who 
59 Blythe p. 35 
60 Joynson-Hicks to Commissioner, 3rd March 1928, NA HO 
144/17667/471675/9 
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had proven so mysteriously ineffective in this case. 1 However, Joynson-Hicks 
was an active Christian, and while, like all good politicians, he was willing to lie 
to the House of Commons when occasion demanded (as we shall see shortly)62 
it would be rather surprising and as far as can be judged, unusual for him to lie 
elsewhere. Throughout his life, Joynson-Hicks's problem was generally not that 
he lied, but that he spoke rather too much of the truth in far too blunt a fashion. 
Second, Joynson-Hicks may have been right, and Meyrick may have supplied 
drugs to her customers. That is also not inconceivable. However, it must be 
noted that Meyrick, herself a qualified medic, harshly criticised drug peddlers in 
her memoirs as "loathsome" (despite her friendship with the biggest of them, 
"Brilliant Chang") ejected peddlers from her premises, and strenuously denied 
ever supplying drugs herself to her customers. 3 It is also very important to 
remember that the police never charged her with sale or possession of illegal 
drugs, which they would have done like a shot if possible. On the whole I am 
inclined to reject both these explanations as improbable, although on such 
evidence as we have they are tenable. 
There are two much more likely explanations, however. The "drugged 
women" may have bought the drugs elsewhere and either taken them earlier 
(and thus been doped at the club) or taken them at the club (which would have 
had the same effect). This is a perfectly reasonable explanation. The nightclub 
users would indeed be the most likely consumers of illegal drugs in the 1920s, 
as the ravers of the 1960s and 1970s would be for that era. Such an overlap of 
pleasures would, indeed, be more likely than not on a night out. And, of course, 
it would only take one drug addict to spark rumours of "doped women" on the 
societal grapevine. This is surely more likely on the evidence than suspecting 
Joynson-Hicks or Meyrick of outright deception. 
But the explanation I am personally most inclined to is this. Meyrick did 
not dispute that in the early days of the "43" after 1921 she had difficulty with 
drugs, which she believed came from Brilliant Chang. Her story is that he would 
61 See reports of Sgt. Goddard, dismissing rumours of breaches of the law at the 
"43,27th February 1928: " see also Horwood's puzzled and suspicious 
commentary on it in a letter to Joynson-Hicks, 5th March 1928 (replying to the 
quoted note) in NA HO 144/17667/471675/9 
62 See below pp. 209-2 10 
63 Meyrick p. 41 
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invite girls from the "43" round to his own place, and when they came back 
"they showed signs of queer nervous excitement. " This problem, Meyrick 
claimed, became worse after Brilliant Chang opened a "restaurant" opposite the 
"43" in Gerrard Street 64 
Meyrick offered no date for the cessation of this problem, and it is 
possible that it continued up until 1928, which would explain Joynson-Hicks's 
note entirely. However, even assuming that it stopped in about 1925 or 1926, 
legends die hard. It would only take a slightly garbled account of its iniquities 
past and present to reach Joynson-Hicks's noble friend, and he might, in all 
innocence, repeat old news to Joynson-Hicks as the latest offerings. This is such 
a frequent and likely thing to happen in gossip that I am strongly inclined to 
pick this as the correct explanation for the allegations in the letter. So, was 
Blythe right to accuse Joynson-Hicks of exaggerating the evils of nightclubs? In 
this case, it seems not. The worst that might be said is that Joynson-Hicks was 
overly credulous. It is clear from the tone of the letter he sent to Horwood that 
Joynson-Hicks was losing patience: his nightclub crusade seemed to be fizzling 
out, and he was, in effect and with whatever qualification he chose to put on it, 
demanding action from the police. 
The reason for the fizzling out of Joynson-Hicks's crusade became all 
too horribly obvious when, after much prevarication and constant pricking by 
anonymous letter writers, the Metropolitan Police arrested Goddard, the 
sergeant who sent in such innocuous reports of Mrs Meyrick's ventures and 
who; somehow, lived very graciously on £6 per week, owning the freehold of a 
house (unusual in the interwar period when the overwhelming majority of 
people lived in rented housing)65 a private car, and safe deposits containing over 
£12,000 in cash. At his trial, Goddard claimed that he afforded all of this 
through thrift. One is inclined to wonder whether this is where Blake Edwards 
got the inspiration for Inspector Clouseau's immortal line in The Pink Panther, 
"Sir, my wife is very careful, she saves out of the 'ousekeeping. " In fact, there is 
no possible doubt that Goddard had been milking the nightclub owners of Soho 
64 ibid. p. 41 
65 John Stevenson, The Penguin Social History of Britain: British Society 1914- 
1945 (paperback London 1990) p. 228 
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for protection money 66 He and two nightclub owners, Meyrick and a foreign 
nightclub owner named Rubuffi, were given stem prison sentences. 
Catastrophic as this was for the Metropolitan police, in light of the 
ensuing scandal, it did highlight one of the worst dangers of Joynson-Hicks's 
approach, namely that he was putting the police under immense pressure. In 
launching fearsome attacks on these nightclubs he was inviting them to come to 
an "understanding" with the police. And once the police and nightclub owners 
had an "understanding, " the police were on the spot. If they reported any 
misdemeanours or breaches of the law, they were practically inviting nightclub 
owners to blow the whistle on their corruption. While Meyrick may well have 
been exaggerating for her own ends in her memoirs when she claimed that the 
police "do not really sympathise with the ridiculous restrictions they are 
supposed to enforce, "67 it is surely true that making men on very low pay 
enforce the law on wealthy and powerful people in a rigorous and professional 
way was asking a lot. As the Manchester Guardian shrewdly pointed out, a man 
who could be made rich and comfortable for life as a reward for his silence 
would need to have a high personal standard of honesty and be remarkably well 
imbued in the "tradition of the force" to avoid at least the occasional lapse. 8 
Here, such an ethos was clearly lacking. 
Horwood retired as Commissioner in 1928,69 and was replaced by Lord 
Byng of Vimy, a war hero who had been hugely popular with the corps he had 
commanded. With a reputation as a brilliant soldier and a long and successful 
public career as Governor-General of Canada already behind him, Byng had 
nothing to prove; so little that he was reluctant to take on a poisoned chalice, 
and had to be practically bullied into accepting the Commissionership. As 
Commissioner he proved a desperately needed breath of fresh air: so good that 
the Labour party, who were initially horrified at his appointment, refused to let 
him resign when they took power a year later. A list of his achievements in the 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography is impressive: 
66 For a superb brief account of this episode, see James Morton, Bent Coppers: 
A survey ofpolice corruption (London 1993) pp. 76-81 67 Meyrick p. 20 
68 "Bribery and Corruption, " Manchester Guardian op. cit. 69 Or was retired: although he retired aged 60 on grounds of age, his successor 
was older and not in good health. 
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"He retired inefficient senior officers, tightened up discipline, 
instituted a system of promotion based on merit, and reorganized the 
structure of the force to correspond with the distribution of London's 
population. He reorganized the system of patrolling, abolishing the 
regular schedules of policemen's beats to which criminals became 
accustomed. He instituted police telephone boxes, greatly extended 
the use of police cars, and established a central information room to 
control them by radio. Yet his reforms were not resented in the force, 
over which he established as strong a hold as he had done over every 
other body of men he had commanded. )970 
Perhaps the appointment of Byng was the shrewdest move Joynson-Hicks could 
have made in the fight against nightclubs, now not only a nuisance, but a 
profound embarrassment. For Byng, in his two years as Commissioner, took on 
nightclubs with a ruthlessness that made Joynson-Hicks's performance look 
mild by comparison. By 1931 he felt able to boast that London nightlife was 
dead. " Mrs. Meyrick especially felt the pinch. Bereft of Goddard's protection, 
in 1932 she was forced by repeated raids and fines to give an "honourable 
undertaking" that she would in future respect the law. By that time, however, 
she had as good as won; Byng and Horwood had both left office, and the 
following month Joynson-Hicks died. Meanwhile the "43" continued, albeit 
faded and quieted, until Meyrick died herself in 1933. Although worth 
considerably more than the £58 often erroneously cited by certain authors, 72 she 
was not rich. 
In any piece of historical writing it is necessary to make judgments. In 
our own time we have seen how thorny an issue the extension of drinking hours 
70 Cyril Falls, `Byng, Julian Hedworth George, Viscount Byng of Vimy (1862- 
1935)', rev. Jeffery Williams, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004 [http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/32227, 
accessed 10 Oct 2006] 
71 Graves and Hodge pp. 120-121 
72 Blythe p. 40, Introduction to Meyrick page xii: the actual figure was £771 8s 
6d (ODNB op. cit. accessed 10th October 2006) 
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can be. How much more thorny can restrictions themselves have been in the 
1920s when the whole concept of "opening hours" was comparatively new? 
First of all, it is worth saying that there was nothing particularly terrible 
about nightclubs from the angle at which they were attacked. Although at the 
time the Licensing Act of 1921 may have been a welcome relaxation from the 
high point of DORA, 73 it was still restrictive and it was really only to be 
expected that there would be people, especially wealthy people, who would seek 
ways around it. The worst that might be said of this (and it was said many times 
and in many ways)74 was that this was unfair to all legal clubs, pubs and 
restaurants, that it was scandalous that the nightclubs evaded tax, and that it was 
an alarming thought that they could not be inspected for fire safety precautions. 
But fairness has never really been a concept of the law, tax fiddling probably 
happened more in the interwar period, when high taxes were a new, unexpected 
and unwelcome legacy of the First World War, than at any time before or since; 
and it is hard to believe that in a club where no serious accident ever occurred, 
anyone was unduly bothered by the thought that fire regulations were being 
ignored. 
Joynson-Hicks' personal Puritanism, something Ronald Blythe made 
great play of, was therefore regarded as more important a factor than the law in 
the crackdown on nightclubs. 75 The fact that Joynson-Hicks had, by 1929, been 
a temperance activist for fifty years meant that it was indeed unlikely he would 
look kindly on excessive drinking. 76 
It is quite clear that Joynson-Hicks was, however, not merely desperate 
to actually do something about nightclubs but wanted to be seen to be doing 
something about them. So much so that he was prepared to take the risk of, if 
not exactly lying to the House of Commons, at least giving it a seriously 
misleading impression. In a debate of the 24th of November 1927 he asserted 
that while he had wanted more powers to deal with nightclubs, he and the police 
were doing perfectly well with the powers that they already had. Joynson-Hicks 
had certainly proven a serious nuisance to nightclubs. Over the twelve months 
73 Graves and Hodge p. 119 
74 Most volubly by Swaffer: see above pp. 188-190. 
75 Implied as well in Middlemas and Barnes p. 283 
76 Blythe p. 22: Joynson-Hicks signed the pledge aged 14 and kept it throughout 
his life. 
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before his remarks 35 nightclubs in London had closed, 22 as a result of police 
action. But only the day before, Horwood, in writing to give Joynson-Hicks 
these statistics that were used in this debate, had added at the bottom of his 
letter, "The police certainly do not have sufficient powers to deal satisfactorily 
with this problem . 91,77 Joynson-Hicks therefore 
knew that, even if in his opinion 
the powers of the police were adequate, it was not an opinion shared by the 
Commissioner. To that extent he seriously deceived Parliament. However, in 
fairness to Joynson-Hicks, the main reason why the police were having 
difficulty at this time was probably because of Goddard's activities, for which 
DORA can hardly be directly blamed. 
But what should not be forgotten, and what very few even of Joynson- 
Hicks's opponents did forget, is that nightclubs were a serious social problem. 
When in the early 1930s the nightclubs, desperate to escape the attentions of the 
Metropolitan police, moved out to the Home Counties, the complaints about 
noise pollution, incidences of drunken driving (and therefore road accidents) 
and petty vandalism in Maidenhead and Taplow soared. Two nasty incidents, 
both causing deaths, are on file as newspaper clippings. In neither case was 
forensic science sufficiently advanced to overturn testimony to the contrary, but 
it is suggestive that in one case a driver who had killed a cyclist had just left a 
nightclub when the accident happened. The driver's evidence was that he had 
been doing forty miles per hour and the cyclist had swerved in front of him. The 
forensic evidence suggested the cyclist had been hit directly from behind and 
dragged for 120 yards, which would require a speed of about sixty miles per 
hour. The jury acquitted the driver, but there seems to have been little sympathy 
for him, 8 
The real problem for nightclubs was that, if they were not quite as 
problematic as painted by their most virulent detractors, they were almost 
devoid of genuine supporters outside their users and owners. The Labour left 
regarded them as the haunt of "toffs" and other undesirables, an attitude so 
admirably captured by the Daily Herald. The Liberal Party had for years been 
77 Cutting of Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 24th November 1927, and letter 
from Horwood to Home Secretary, 23rd November 1927, NA MEPO 
3/2969/115/1622 
78 "A Prolonged Inquest, " The Windsor, Slough and Eton Express, 29th June 
1934, page 4 (cutting in NA HO 45/16205/472038/96) 
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the party of Nonconformity and temperance, not always in that order, and could 
not in all honesty oppose Joynson-Hicks's campaign, no matter how many 
reservations they might have about his methods. The Labour party had a deep- 
seated suspicion of alcohol, founded in no small part upon the financial power 
of the drink industry, but also, in the case of the most ardent Socialists, upon a 
belief that drinking was an "irrational" pastime that was hindering the 
development of a Socialist state - leading to a particularly militant temperance 
movement in Scotland . 
79 The Conservative party and its press supporters were 
split on the issue. Even Ronald Blythe said of Joynson-Hicks's campaign 
against nightclubs, "This, on the whole, was all right "80 While Joynson-Hicks 
may have seemed sanctimonious, hypocritical and unnecessarily harsh in his 
pursuit of the nightclub owners, few seem to have been able to really feel 
sympathy for those people who almost invariably asked for what he handed out. 
79 Stephen G. Jones, "Labour, Society and the Drink Question in Britain, 1918- 
1939" The Historical Journal 30: 1 (1987) pp. 105-122, provides a fascinating 
study of the relationship of Labour and drink. 
80 Blythe p. 35 
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7) "The Loathsome Trade: " Drugs and the Drug Trade 
in the 1920s. 
"One night I caught a dope peddler plying his loathsome trade inside 
the "43". No sooner has I realised his game than I quietly called the 
attendants and had him flung into the street. He never came again. I 
have every reason to believe that he came from Brilliant Chang. " 
Kate Evelyn Meyrick. ' 
So far all the areas that this thesis has covered are areas in which Joynson-Hicks 
showed an interest. He wrote to the Lord Chamberlain suggesting an alteration 
in the system of censorship, he wrote the fateful sentence condemning The Well 
of Loneliness to suppression, he made notes on the system of film censorship, 
and he frequently expressed very decided opinions on the subjects of nightclubs 
to his officials and to the public at large. If the evidence stopped at this, it would 
be reasonable to conclude simply that he was a highly conscientious Home 
Secretary who shifted rather more work than the average incumbent of that 
office, rather than one who took a very decided personal interest in certain areas 
as the result of his personal beliefs. 
However, we now come to a strange, twilit zone of law enforcement 
that, like film censorship and nightclub raiding, was largely new in its 
conception, and yet in which Joynson-Hicks took no discernable interest. In 
1924 the Dangerous Drugs Act, the basis of all modem law enforcement on the 
issue, was only four years old (although the framework within which it 
operated, like the laws on extended drinking hours, dated back to DORA and 
the First World War) but there is no real suggestion, not even by Ronald Blythe, 
that Joynson-Hicks had anything to do with its policing in the 1920s, despite 
several well-publicised mistakes caused by heavy-handed enforcement of the 
rules. 
This may partly be because the area is much less controversial. Many 
people would not accept that alcohol is a dangerous drug, but few would argue 
1 In Secrets of the 43 (second edition Dublin 1994) p. 41. 
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with a claim that opiates or cocaine (the main drugs covered by the Act) have 
inherent dangers. Although the legislation covering them was recent, concerns 
about the impact of their use and the risk of addiction had led to restrictions 
being imposed upon their sale and use as far back as 1868. In addition, the 
drugs trade itself had long been the source of considerable controversy as one of 
the more unpleasant aspects of the Indian Empire and the wars against China 
(referred to as the "Opium Wars"). It even had a substantial international 
dimension: the United States intervened in a bid to break the British monopoly 
over Chinese trade that opium had established and finally, prior to the First 
World War, laid down foundations upon which drugs regulations (including the 
Dangerous Drugs Act) could be built. 
The period immediately following the war was therefore important 
insofar as it established a basic policy towards drugs that it was a criminal 
matter not a medical one, which has proven extremely controversial, and is an 
issue that has bedevilled the question of drug regulation right down to the 
present day. But at no time did Joynson-Hicks, or any other Home Secretary so 
far as can be judged, take an active interest in the subject. It was comfortably 
thrashed out by fairly junior Civil Servants at the Home Office and the Ministry 
of Health, who have mostly remained anonymous. That does not, however, 
make it the less significant or needful of inclusion in this study in order to take a 
complete view of moral policy in the 1920s. 
In the 1920s the concept of "dangerous drugs" was still in its infancy. 
During the nineteenth century, indeed, it had been considered perfectly 
acceptable to take drugs, as evidenced by the fact that William Wilberforce, 
Edward Williams (Iolo Morganwg) Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and (in fiction) 
Sherlock Holmes were all known drug users, something which nobody seemed 
to find particularly shocking. 2 However, by the 1860s there was disquiet at the 
potential dangers of overuse of opium and cocaine, which led, in turn, to the 
1868 Pharmacy Act. Virginia Berridge asserts that this was partly a class action. 
2 Sherlock Holmes was lectured on his drug use by Dr. Watson in The Sign of 
Four (1889). By far the most detailed study of drug habits in the nineteenth 
century (although concentrating heavily upon opium) is Virginia Berridge's 
Opium and the People: Opiate use and drug control policy in nineteenth and 
early twentieth century England (revised (third? ) edition London 1999). 
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Her argument runs that, prior to 1868, opium use had been a middle-class 
pursuit, but that by 1868 opium abuse had spread to the lower classes, resulting 
in a loss of its attraction to the middle classes and concerns about racial decline. 
With the politically organised and economically important middle classes less 
interested in drugs, a measure of regulation could be introduced by professional 
bodies, especially the Pharmaceutical Society (founded 1841) and the medical 
profession (newly organised into the General Medical Council). 
3 However, 
regulation rather than suppression was the aim of the 1868 act, for two very 
good reasons. The first was that, whatever their inherent dangers, opium, 
cocaine and cannabis continued to have medicinal uses, especially as 
painkillers. No reasonable alternative drugs presented themselves until the 
advancement of science in the later twentieth century. This dichotomy, between 
danger and usefulness, lies at the heart of the difficulties of drug policy in the 
1920s, and led to some bizarre situations; for instance, there were active efforts 
on the part of the British government to suppress the cocaine trade while at the 
same time they were busily attempting to nurse an infant domestic cocaine 
production company to full economic competitiveness by means of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. 
The second reason was morally rather more problematic, but financially 
compelling. In the nineteenth century, there were strong economic reasons for a 
substantial drugs trade. Much of the British empire in the Far East, particularly 
its penetration into China, was linked with the opium trade. Indeed, Carl Trocki 
has gone so far as to claim that the British Empire in India at one time owed 
practically its entire existence to opium. 4 While this may be something of an 
exaggeration (and has not escaped criticism for the sources it used and the way 
in which they were used) it is certainly true that much British wealth (not least, 
the port of Hong Kong) was built at least partly upon the opium trades There is 
3 ibid. chapters 9 and 10, especially pp. 97,99-100,105,114,117. 
4 Carl A. Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A study of 
the Asian opium trade 1750-1950 (London 1999). 
5 See, for instance, Bill Sewell, "Review (of Opium, Empire and the Global 
Political Economy)" Pacific Affairs 74: 4 (Winter 2001-2002) (Vancouver 
2001) pp. 598-99, who comments that a lack of Indian or Chinese sources 
means that some arguments are insufficiently followed through: or for a more 
thorough and far more critical dissection, see Alexander Klimburg, "Some 
Research Notes on Carl A. Trocki's Publication "Opium, Empire and the Global 
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also a compelling logic to Trocki's claim that the decline of Chinese power in 
the nineteenth century may be linked to substantial opium use among its 
population, and there can be no doubt that the primary reason for the "Opium 
Wars" of the 1840s was to prevent the Chinese government from cracking down 
upon the opium trade. These wars not only established the opium trade upon a 
firm, quasi-official footing, but also opened up China to British economic and 
military incursion and effectively reduced China to a semi-independent, 
autonomous province of the British empire: a status that was granted and 
tolerated by Britain on the understanding that China would be obliged to do as it 
was told. It would obviously have been somewhat inconsistent to outlaw the 
use of opium in Britain while actively encouraging it within the Empire, so 
regulation of the drugs trade had to be carefully drafted. 
By the twentieth century, however, the pendulum had swung back and 
British power was no longer as secure in the Far East as it had been. The United 
States, which first established a presence in the Pacific with the admission of 
California to the Union in 1850, had an empire of their own in Hawaii and the 
Philippines, and a vested interest in breaking the British stranglehold upon 
Chinese trade in order to open up its markets to their own economy. The irony 
is that the very reasons that caused the British drug trade - economic, political 
and imperial - were ultimately responsible for its control and suppression. 
Coupled with increased domestic campaigning for the abolition of the opium 
trade, symbolised by the founding of the Society for the Suppression of the 
Opium Trade, an organisation increasingly active from the 1880s onwards, 
American pressure in the build-up to the First World War caused the British to 
negotiate and ultimately sign the Sino-British treaty of 1906, which agreed on 
the gradual elimination of the opium trade internationally and internally in 
China - something that, Trocki argued, the Chinese nearly accomplished prior 
to Chiang Kai-Shek's seizure of power. 7 This also led to further conferences on 
Political Economy" in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies of 
the University of London 64: 2 (2001) pp. 260-267, who argues that Trocki 
misrepresented the source base to present a tendentious argument most of which 
had little basis in fact. 
66 ibid. pp. 88-101 
7 ibid.: for the Society of the Suppression of the Opium Trade, p. 117: for the 
Sino-British treaty, pp. 128-130 
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the international aspects of drugs policy, at Shanghai in 1909 and at the Hague 
between 1910 and 1914, which ultimately led to an understanding that opiates 
and cocaine would be restricted in future to medicinal uses. This followed on, in 
Britain, from further tightening of the pharmaceutical regulations in 1908 
around the sale of dangerous drugs. 8 
During the First World War the political scene changed again for drugs 
and drug users. As alcohol was thought to sap the national will to achieve 
victory, so too drugs were seen as a potential threat to the war effort. In 
particular, there was a suggestion that soldiers on leave were indulging freely in 
cocaine abuse. The amount of criminal smuggling that the new restrictions were 
causing also proved both problematic and embarrassing to the British 
government. An under-secretary at the Home Office, named Malcolm 
Delevingne, suggested that both problems could be met by introducing 
regulations under DORA, which had the advantages of speed and efficiency 
(DORA regulations could be introduced by Orders in Council, avoiding the 
need to submit to the long, cumbersome and potentially difficult process of 
parliamentary scrutiny). Ultimately, the regulations introduced, as codified in 
the Dangerous Drugs Act after the war, severely restricted the sale of cocaine 
and morphine, and introduced new penalties for their unlicensed distribution. 
This became the responsibility of the Home Office. 
This decision taken over the administration of the Dangerous Drugs Act 
was of crucial importance to the subsequent history of drugs control. In 1921 
the vital question of who should administer the new Dangerous Drugs Act was 
discussed, as it was considered that either it should be left with the Ministry of 
Health (as it dealt with the medical and pharmaceutical professions) or it should 
be transferred to the Home Office (as it now concerned the police). This 
decision had implications for the entire future of the drug control policy as it 
was being worked out, not necessarily because of how it was administered, but 
because of how it would be perceived. Virginia Berridge rightly gives the date 
of 1921 as the time when a view was established in administrative quarters that 
drug abuse was a criminal rather than a medical matter. 9 
8 Bemdge pp. 239-241 
9 ibid. pp. 263-4 
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What she signally fails to mention, however, is that only a handful of 
people in the Home Office actually wanted the responsibility of administering it 
in the first place, instead giving the impression that the entire department was 
firmly behind a "criminal" approach. In fact, the granting of the Dangerous 
Drugs Act to the Home Office was a hair's-breadth decision -- and one that 
might very easily have gone the other way but for Sir Malcolm Delevingne, the 
Under-Secretary who had drawn up the original DORA regulations. 
In 1919 John Anderson, at that time an under-secretary at the newly 
formed Ministry of Health, 1° pressed very strongly for the immediate transfer of 
drug regulation to his ministry. He wrote on the file documenting the matter; "I 
think [there is] a conclusive case for transfer of responsibility [for regulating 
drugs] from the Home Office to the Ministry of Health. "" A colleague of his 
was in rather guarded agreement with him on this: 
"On the whole I concur - not I think so much on the grounds 
that this is only a wholly a Health matter, [sic] but I see no 
reasonable alternative; and substantial advantages lie on the 
side of transfer. Whether it is one of the Home Office 
"Health" matters which shd. be transferred more urgently 
than some others is I assume a question of expediency. X12 
John Anderson did not agree on the timescale proposed. Three days later he 
wrote again, once more firmly reiterating his belief that the Home Office should 
not take any part in the administration of narcotics policy: 
"I think the case for immediate transfer is strong in that the 
H. 0. have hitherto relied entirely on the NHIC [National 
Health Insurance Commission] for technical advice and 
developments are impending. 
'o See above p. 58 for a resume of his career. 
11 John Anderson, memo, 16th June 1919, in NA MH 58/51 
12 G. N(ewman)? memo, 18th June 1919, in ibid.: for details of his career see 
Steve Sturdy, `Newman, Sir George (1870-1948)', Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/35215, accessed 26 Sept 2007]. 
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You might write personally to Sir. M. Delevingne in 
the first instance telling him that in the view of the M of H 
these responsibilities shd. be taken over - for reasons stated 
- and that unless there are any points he would like to 
discuss we will at once take the matter up officially. "13 
This was firm stuff, and strongly suggests that Anderson (who, unusually for a 
senior Civil Servant of this time, was a scientist rather than a classicist)14 
recognised the inherent problems of a drug policy based solely upon a penal 
system and was anxious to make sure it was ruled out as fast as possible - if 
practicable, before Malcolm Delevingne got to hear about it. 
McCleary's letter to Delevingne certainly stressed the first point, 
underlining that "The chief object of the control of the use of opium, cocaine 
etc. is the protection of the national health from the injurious effects of the illicit 
drug-taking, and... it is most important that the control should be effected 
without undue interference with the legitimate use of those drugs in medical 
practice. "'s 
But this hopeful epistle met with a singularly stony response. Ten days 
later Delevingne wrote back with a very decided letter of his own: 
"We think the control of opium, cocaine and other dangerous 
drugs should remain with the Home Office, and we are 
making arrangements to deal with the new situation which 
will be created by the ratification of the Opium Convention. 
The matter is very largely a police matter; the interest of the 
Ministry of Health in the matter is not by any means the only 
one, and on the police side as you know it has its 
international as well as its national aspects, especially in 
connection with the prevention of smuggling. Being so 
largely a police matter, the enforcement of the regulations has 
13 Anderson op. cit. 21st June 1919 (his emphasis). 
14 See John W. Wheeler-Bennett, John Anderson, Viscount Waverley (London 
1962) pp. 7-9,13-15. 
15 McCleary to Delevingne, 27th June 1919 op. cit. 
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in the main to be undertaken by the police, and there would 
be considerable objections to its being transferred to another 
Department which is not in close relations with the police. 
The question stands on exactly the same footing as the 
control of poisons, with which it is closely allied, and it is 
clear that the control of poisons is a matter which should 
remain where it is, that is with the Privy Council Office and 
the Home Office"16 
This blunt statement can only be interpreted one way -- that Malcolm Delevingne 
saw cocaine and opium as poisons, not as medicines which could be used 
beneficially, or as substances that could be abused without necessarily causing 
death but leading to serious problems of addiction. 
The shock of the Ministry of Health at this missive was great, and went 
right to the top of the chain of command. Robert Morant, the new Permanent 
Secretary at the Ministry of Health, went so far as to remark to Sir George 
Newman, the Chief Medical Officer: 
"I expect you know Sir M Delevingne pretty well and can 
handle him. If Sir J. Anderson were here, he would see Sir 
Malcolm and possibly lash'7 him into a reasonable 
attitude... Would you take it up, and, with Dr. McCleary who 
has been in it throughout, see Sir Malcolm for one more 
pressure - which failing, we must get ministers to take it up. 
From Sir Malcolm's letter, it looks as if some adverse steps 
might be imminent in the Home Office, so our action must be 
speedy. " 18 
'b Delevingne to McCleary, 7th July 1919 ibid. 
Or possibly "lath, " which is what the word actually looks like but which 
makes no sense. 
18 Robert Morant, memo to Sir George Newman, 24th July 1919, ibid. In 
fairness Sir John Anderson had suggested on the 19th July in a similar minute 
that perhaps "the matter should be referred to ministers" (Sir John Anderson, 
minute, 19th July 1919, ibid. ) but that was as a last resort after further avenues 
had been explored, while Morant seemed to be urgently considering it. 
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Not only did this none-too-subtly suggest that in the opinion of the writer 
Delevingne was being unreasonable and required some stem disciplining, but 
also that his planned solution would be "adverse" (which is obviously diplomatic 
language for "disastrous") and that pressure must be put on him to avert a penal 
policy being introduced. In this, the Ministry of Health were manifestly 
unsuccessful. Delevingne was adamant that drug policy should remain with the 
Home Office, and largely because of his prestige in the area following the 
DORA regulations of 1916, he overruled the still reluctant Sir John Anderson 
and got his way. 
19 The irony of this is that subsequently Anderson became 
Permanent Secretary of the Home Office and found himself charged with 
implementing a policy he had done everything possible to avoid while at the 
Ministry of Health. 
This letter is also significant for another reason, however. It is the first 
time in the entire correspondence that anyone suggested consulting ministers on 
the subject. Prior to that, the entire thing was being comfortably thrashed out by 
a group of Civil Servants whose main concern seems to have been to find 
agreement among themselves. This may be because these new regulations were 
an afterthought of the DORA rules (which of course were mostly drafted by 
Civil Servants and signed on the nod by ministers as and when required). But it 
set the tone for drugs policy for the next decade as well. 
Throughout the 1920s, although a variety of Civil Servants frequently 
wrote letters under that began "I am directed by the Secretary of State... " the 
impression is that this is purely a polite formula, and that what they really meant 
was "I am writing to you because my attention has been drawn to... s20 Joynson- 
Hicks, despite being a very active and indeed officious Home Secretary for 
about half of the first decade of the Dangerous Drugs Act, on only two files that 
I can find expressed any opinion on the administration of the Dangerous Drugs 
19 See further minutes by Sir George Newman of the 22nd August 1919, and Sir 
John Anderson of the 19th July 1919, both ibid. 
20 See for instance, A. J. Eagleton to the Imperial Secretary for Northern Ireland 
11th July 1923, enclosing a list of supplies of morphine to a doctor in Ulster, in 
NA HO 267/328: Eagleton to Dr. Kingsbury, 27th January 1925, about the 
peculiarly large quantities of opium the doctor was buying, in NA HO 
144/11969 471707/3; or Home Office to the Ministry of Health, 9th August 
1928, about the consolidation of various regulations within the Dangerous 
Drugs Act, in NA HO 45/13351423410/5 1. 
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Act; once in November 1924 (soon after coming into office) when he noted his 
approval on a minor amendment to them, 21 and again in July 1926 when he 
wrote "I agree" next to a similarly trivial amendment of Section 7 of the 
regulations. 2 For the remainder of the time, the Civil Servants (especially 
Malcolm Delevingne) ran the regulations more or less as they saw fit, under the 
usually indulgent eye of Sir John Anderson, the most senior official to regularly 
minute on the drug files. The basic enforcement was, as a result, left solely to the 
police and not to the medical profession. This was to have unintended and 
indeed problematic consequences. 
Having established that a penal policy would now be pursued, the next 
step was to decide of what that penal policy would consist. There appear to have 
been three main groups of drug addicts in the 1920s (or at least, there are three 
types for whom records have survived): 
1) "Medical" addicts who had been prescribed opiates as painkillers and had 
become dependent upon them; 
2) "Recreational" users of cocaine in particular, concentrated among the 
hedonistic "Bright Young Things" discussed in the preceding chapter on 
nightclubs; 
3) What might be termed "cultural addicts, " specifically the Chinese immigrants 
who were regarded as "opium smokers" due to the prevalence of opium smoking 
in China. 
The enforcement of laws regarding these categories was, however, somewhat 
difficult. Category two, the recreational users, presented the most problems. As 
drugs tended to get taken most often inside nightclubs, where police found it 
extremely difficult to go, proving anything was almost impossible unless they 
happened to get lucky on the night of a raid. The Chinese community proved 
21 Minute by Joynson-Hicks, 20th November 1924, in NA HO 45/13351 
423410/29 
22 Minute by Joynson-Hicks, 31st July 1926, in NA HO 45/13351423410/41 
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almost as impenetrable, being extremely small, closely-knit and suspicious of 
incursions from outside. Paradoxically, the most harmless of the classes, the 
medical addicts, proved the easiest to police, largely because they were the ones 
least likely to have the money or the contacts in the criminal underworld that 
gave access to the black market in drugs, and had to purchase it from chemists 
by means of forged prescriptions. More seriously, these people, who often had 
had no wish to become addicted to drugs and often fervently wished to be free of 
them, were unable to seek help as after the first illegal purchase they were 
operating on the wrong side of the law. It is hard not to feel sympathy with the 
unfortunate man who was obliged to pose as a farrier in order to obtain 
morphine from a chemist. As a bookmaker's clerk from Norbury, John Jacobs 
would have had no contact (or at most, very limited) contact with any illicit 
supply of drugs that would perhaps have enabled him to escape detection. As it 
was, his prescriptions were amateurish affairs, clumsy forgeries that were swiftly 
spotted by the police, and he was given six months imprisonment in the second 
division. 23 There is an air of vindictiveness about the suggestion from the 
investigating officer, Inspector J. Jones of Thornton Heath police station, that as 
Jacobs had posed as an member of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons in 
order to obtain morphine, a copy of the report should be forwarded to the 
Secretary of the RCVS in case they wished to prosecute him on their own 
account - despite the fact that Jacobs was "in a bad health [sic] and now in a 
state of collapse. "24 
Such heavy-handedness occasionally misfired badly, perhaps most 
spectacularly so in the case of Dr. Kingsbury. Kingsbury had been a GP in 
Blackpool before moving to London to practice as a barrister, specialising in 
medical law. On the 17th November 1924, it was noticed during a routine 
inspection of the registers of supplies of morphine kept by chemists that he was 
purchasing a very substantial amount of morphine tablets from a chemist in 
Blackheath. When challenged by the chemist to explain why he needed it, he 
said he was still, despite his legal practice, prescribing for two or three 
23 Case of John Jacobs: Posession of Morphine (January 1923) NA MEPO 
3/423 (especially Police to Home Office, 22nd January 1923) 
24 For the RCVS comment, see J. Jones to superiors, 11th January 1923: for the 
health comment, see Fred R. Hodges, note on report by J. Jones, 11th January 
1923, both in ibid. 
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patients 25 This did not quite satisfy the Home Office, who asked that the 
Regional Medical Health Officer pay him a visit to ascertain what was going on, 
in an example of that co-operation that had been clearly laid out as being 
necessary when the issue of drug control had been decided 26 This was done, and 
the RMHO reported that he was "very favourably impressed" with Dr. 
Kingsbury, and satisfied with his explanation - that he had an old friend, also a 
patient, whom he was trying to wean from a morphine addiction caused by a 
botched appendicitis case, without publicity or fuss. 7 However, the Home 
Office insisted that Dr. Kingsbury, as a "dispensing doctor, " would have to keep 
a register of how much morphine he dispensed - and to whom. 28 
It was this last part that proved problematic. Despite an ever-increasing 
supply of the drug to Dr. Kingsbury, his register made no mention of the name 
of the patient. A further visit by a different Regional Medical Officer of Health 
raised this point, with which Kingsbury adamantly refused to comply. The only 
information he volunteered was that his patient was 70 years old, and in poor 
health, so weaning him off the drug was difficult 29 Kingsbury volunteered that 
this "patient" worked in a responsible position for a number of City firms, and 
feared losing his employment if it became known that he was a drug addict 30 
The Home Office did not find the thought of a drug addict aged seventy, 
in poor health, working for a large number of City firms in a responsible position 
very plausible, and instituted proceedings. Dr Kingsbury was found guilty of 
breaching the Dangerous Drugs Act, but immediately appealed against this, 
claiming that he had kept the patient under his direct personal supervision at all 
times and therefore was exempt from the provisions under which he was 
prosecuted. 31 The Home Office was somewhat complacent in its attitude towards 
23 Report by Segt. Thomas Cory, of Station "R, " 17th November 1924, in NA 
HO 144/11969 471707/1 
26 Home Office to Ministry of Health, 27th November 1924, ibid. 
27 Report by Dr. J. Dill Russell, RMO, 3rd January 1925 NA 110 144/11969 
471707/2 
28 Home office to Kingsbury (unsigned copy) 27th January 1925, ibid. 
29 Report by A. R. Roche, RMO, 31st October 1925, NA HO 144/11969 
471707/6- 
30 Kingsbury to Delevingne, 28th December 1925, NA HO 144/11969 
471707/7: also see report by Dr. Anderson on visits of 28th and 19th December 
1925 in same folder. 
31 Bodkin to Delevingne, 4th March 1926, NA HO 144/11969 471707/10 
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this decision - when Delevingne was asked if Kingsbury's licence to dispense 
drugs should be withdrawn, he commented that there were good grounds for 
doing so and that it was his preferred course of action. 32 He was dissuaded from 
doing so by Sir Archibald Bodkin, who thought it would look bad at the appeal 
court, and John Anderson, who commented complacently, "Our case is so good 
that it would be a pity to do anything that might bring him some small measure 
of professional support. '33 
Alas for such thoughts, for Kingsbury won his appeal, to the dismay of 
Delevingne and Anderson, who promptly set about drafting the law so that 
"direct personal supervision" could only mean under the doctor's own eyes, not 
in any less immediate sense. 4 It cannot have pleased either of them that the 
British Medical Journal promptly joined in the fun by hailing the decision as 
being of "immense importance, " which gave the lie to Anderson's belief that 
Kingsbury had no supporters in the medical world 35 
Such a case highlighted the worst dangers of an all-or-nothing penal 
approach. Had the matter been left to the Ministry of Health, it is much more 
likely that a system could have been put in place where a second doctor, under 
Hippocratic oath, could have examined the patient, given a second opinion on 
the need for morphine and left it there. Kingsbury's lies would never have 
needed to have been told. Quite clearly his story was nonsensical, dreamed up in 
order to fit whatever argument he was putting forward at the time; after all they 
amounted to a patient who was a man of 70, apparently in extremely poor health, 
a drug addict, on a low income, employed by several City firms in a responsible 
position, afraid of the sack. On this story the patient would have been fired long 
before simply due to breach of contract over frequent sick leave. In point of fact, 
the chemist who supplied Kingsbury with the drug gave it as his opinion that 
Kingsbury was actually buying morphine for his wife, who was suffering from 
terminal cancer at the time and may have needed substantial doses of opiates in 
order to minimise the pain; although quite why this should need to be kept so 
32 Minute by Delevingne, 5th March 1926, NA HO 144/11969 471707/11 
33 Minute by Anderson, 5th March 1926, ibid. 
34 Minutes of 24th November 1926, by Delevingne and Anderson, NA HO 
144/11969 471707/12 
35 British Medical Journal, 20th November 1926, p948, copy in NA HO 
144/11969 471707/13 
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intensely secret is unclear, unless the amount she needed had made her an 
addict. 36 But sending in the police at such an early stage seems to have stiffened 
Kingsbury's resolve to tell them precisely nothing - and as a lawyer, and a 
tough, stubborn man, he managed to hugely embarrass the Home Office. 
Routine checking of registers exposed the cases of Dr. Kingsbury and of 
Jacobs. But these represented only a part of the drug abuse culture in London in 
the 1920s. Far more serious, potentially, were the cocaine addicts of the 
nightclub scene. Certainly they were far more dangerous politically. Arguments 
about "racial decline" had sparked drugs legislation both in 1868 and 1917 - and 
as we have seen, the nightclub set were drawn from the elites of British society. 
This particular problem came dramatically to public notice with the death 
of "Billie Carleton, " a singer and actress, in 1919. Carleton (not her real name - 
she was born Florence Stewart in 1896) had become a famous and extremely 
popular star thanks in part to her commercial modelling for a clothier named 
Reginald de Veulle. However, this fame and fortune came at a price when he 
persuaded her to take cocaine, as he did, claiming that it stimulated his artistry. 
Despite the pleas of her physician, a man named Frederick Stuart, she persisted 
in taking the drug. Finally, on 27th November 1919, she died in her sleep. The 
police immediately assumed that cocaine was the cause of death, and de Veulle, 
who had supplied Carleton with the drug, was charged with manslaughter. He 
was however acquitted, being found guilty of the much less serious charge of 
conspiracy to supply cocaine, and given eight months. The newspapers 
wallowed in lurid headlines about Carleton's debauched lifestyle, raising the 
whole profile of drug abuse and the problems attendant upon it in the mind of 
the general public 37 
A recent speculative writer (from the field of literature with a 
background in biology rather than history) has cast doubt upon the idea that 
cocaine was in fact responsible for Carleton's death, pointing out that the 
symptoms were all wrong. Instead, a rather tenuous case is put forward for 
heroin as cause of death. A more plausible explanation is that death was caused 
36 Report of Sergeant Taggart, 23rd April 1930, in NA HO 144/11969 
471707/14 
37 See Marek Kohn, Dope Girls: The Birth of the British Drug Underground 
(Granta Books edition, London 2001) chapters 5 and 6 (pp. 67-104) gives an 
accessible albeit lurid account. 
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by an overdose of barbiturates, which is also explored. 38 However, for the 
purposes of this thesis the cause of death is not in fact relevant; what matters is 
that there was a death, followed by an attempt at draconian punishment, that was 
attributable to the cocaine traffic. De Veulle was white. In the climate of the 
time, that made it much less likely that he would suffer for his actions than the 
next character who emerges as a dope trafficker - and not an amateurish, for- 
personal-gratification-but-happy-to-hand-it-out-to-others style trafficker, but a 
tough, hardened and extremely formidable gangster who seems to have 
controlled a large proportion of the London drug trade in the early 1920s, despite 
being in fact a very shadowy figure whose files seem to be mysteriously absent 
from the government archives. 
As I noted in the last chapter, Joynson-Hicks, when prodding the police 
into action over Meyrick's club, complained that it contained "doped women. " I 
also put forward several explanations for this. 39 Meyrick herself did not deny 
that there had been women in her clubs who used drugs, rather the contrary - but 
she laid the blame at the door of one man. That man was a Chinese restaurateur 
with a premises opposite the "43 Club" in Soho, named Brilliant Chang 4° 
Brilliant Chang was Chinese, and a notorious operator in drugs. While 
the only surviving major record of him - Henry Robert Oswald's autobiography, 
Memoirs of a London County Coroner - is obviously heavily biased against him 
at least partly on racial grounds, Kate Meyrick also never had the slightest doubt 
that he dealt in drugs, although she also praised his coolness in thwarting an 
attempted robbery of another nightclub. Therefore it seems it must be accepted 
as a fact that he did traffic in drugs, although he himself (perhaps 
understandably) denied it in court. 41 He achieved a certain level of public 
notoriety (including a mention in The Times)42 without ever really emerging 
from the shadows into a world where everyone knew about him. 
38 ibid. pp. 96-101 
39 See above pp. 192-94 
ao Kate Meyrick, Secrets of the 43 (second edition Dublin 1994) p. 41. It is 
unclear whether `Brilliant" was a rendering of his name with English phonetics 
or a nickname, but he was invariably called by it. 
41 Henry Robert Oswald, Memoirs of a London County Coroner (London 1936) 
pp. 192-193. 
42 See, for instance, "Freda Kempton's death" The Times, 25th April 1922, page 
9 
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It seems almost certain that he mainly trafficked in cocaine (although the 
evidence is patchy, and he may also have run opiates). It was in this capacity that 
he first came to the notice of the police, following the suicide of a young dancer 
at one of Meyrick's first clubs, the Dalton Club, a girl named Freda Kempton. 43 
As Marek Kohn points out, the profession of a dancer is one that perhaps lends 
itself particularly to the using of cocaine. It is physically demanding, 
emotionally draining and calls therefore for both stamina and resilience. 
Cocaine, by increasing the blood pressure, can provide a measure of both. 44 
In the case of Freda Kempton, a number of factors seem to have 
combined to drive her to suicide. A few weeks before one of her closest friends, 
suffering from acute depression, took an overdose of cocaine. Her relationship 
with her partner came to an abrupt end after he became infatuated with another 
woman. Finally, according to the coroner, an insidious influence was exerted by 
Chang, who told her how to kill herself by taking cocaine, having provided her 
with a steady supply of it beforehand. 45 
The actual facts of Freda Kempton's death seem straightforward enough. 
A young girl, depressed by her emotional difficulties, distressed at the death of a 
friend and increasingly addicted to an unpleasant drug that was almost certainly 
causing her headaches, she took the simplest way out of life by taking an 
overdose of cocaine 46 But the appearance of Brilliant Chang in the case gave it 
an altogether more lurid hue. Chang represented the strange, the unknowable, 
even the inscrutable, by virtue of his Chinese race, his habit of dressing in 
Western clothes, and above all the fact that he was suspected of trafficking in 
drugs lent something of a spice to the affair, one that the press wallowed in. 47 
Chang himself offered nothing very much in the way of evidence. He 
conceded that he knew Freda Kempton, and had given her money, and was also 
(rather inconveniently from his point of view) the last man who had seen her 
alive. He denied having given her cocaine, or of ever having trafficked in 
43 Dalton's was closed after a fairly brief existence by a police raid: see Meyrick 
pp. 21-2 
44 Kohn p. 124 
as Oswald pp. 190-192: Kohn pp. 126-128 
46 Oswald p. 190 
47 Kohn pp. 128-134 discusses the media reaction in greater detail. 
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cocaine, or even of having owned it, a denial that did not convince either the 
coroner or Mrs. Meyrick of his innocence in dealing in drugs. 8 
Oswald's own account of the impression that Chang made upon him is 
rather interesting: 
"It was obvious to me in a moment that the yellow man was an 
individual of great wealth and remarkable personality. He came to 
my Court in an ostentatiously fine car, and wearing a magnificent fur 
coat. His eyes were sleepy, almond-shaped, and of an almost 
hypnotic black, and he wore a steady, inscrutable smile for a long 
time, although it was gone before I had finished with him. "49 
Quite how much of this is written from memory and how much with the benefit 
of hindsight it is hard to say. But certainly the general temper of commentary on 
Chang was that he was a remarkable man with a dominant personality. He also 
managed to escape from Oswald's court with nothing more than a difficult 
questioning, which given Oswald's obvious prejudice against him and 
determination to break him down, was no mean achievement. 
The police, however, now took a proactive stance against Chang, as 
Oswald rather luridly described in his memoirs. After the suicide of Freda 
Kempton Chang was closely watched. This had the unintended side effect of 
closing down his club in Regent Street as he made ever more swingeing cuts in 
membership in a bid to keep out surveillance officers. Finally, in a new club he 
had opened in London's Docklands, a police raid found a large amount of 
48 Oswald, p. 193 
49 ibid. p. 193 
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cocaine concealed on the premises. Chang was given a prison sentence and 
eventually deported. Oswald exulted that "he was warned never to return to this 
country, and if he is wise he will never do so"so 
To quite what degree Oswald was suspicious of Chang because Chang 
was Chinese and to what degree he was suspicious of him because he was an 
extremely wealthy man closely linked to a set that was using cocaine is 
impossible to determine - so far as can be judged after this lapse of time, the 
first may have just outweighed the second. Whichever reason weighed most 
heavily, the case of Chang brings us on to the third type of drug addicts - the 
Chinese opium smokers in the Limehouse district. 
It is surprising that the drug offences of this ethnic group should feature 
in police files on the subject to the extent that they do; some twenty per cent of 
surviving files on drug cases (admittedly that only equals three) concern Chinese 
opium smoking S1 After all, in an extremely thorough dissection of the 
population of the district, one author points out that the number of Chinese in 
Limehouse recorded in the census of 1921 at around 711 immigrants - which, in 
a city of six million people, including hundreds of thousands of European 
immigrants, hardly registers as more than a blip. However, the same author 
points out certain flaws in the methodology. The Census did not ask for ethnic 
origin - only identifying people according to their place of birth. Any children of 
these 711 Chinese born in Britain were classed simply as "British. " Conversely, 
the children of soldiers, merchants or missionaries born abroad as the result of 
their parents' travels, in China or India, might be classified as "Chinese" or 
"Indian" as well - despite the fact that they were obviously no such thing in 
ethnic terms. 52 However, it seems very unlikely that people such as merchants 
so See Oswald, pp. 194-196 (direct quote p196). I am indebted to Mr. Daniel 
Gray, late PhD student of Roehampton University, for pointing me in the 
direction of this source, which is the only substantial source I have been able to 
discover on Brilliant Chang. 
s' MEPO 3/432 - 3/434. The total run of files begins at 3/420, although not all 
the 15 are directly concerned with drug smugglers and addicts - they also 
contain a con-man posing as an anti-narcotics campaigner, for instance. 52 One person who would be affected by the statistical anomaly this presented, 
my grandmother Helen McGregor MacFarlane (1917-88) was born at I'Chang 
on the River Yangtze in China, but was, as the name implies, entirely Scottish 
and proud of it. She subsequently lived in Liverpool, however, where she might 
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and Army officers would be living, with their families, in a notorious slum such 
as Limehouse. The Chinese of Limehouse, which earned the soubriquet of 
"Chinatown" in the public imagination, were undoubtedly a very small 
community, but it seems probable that most of them would be ethnic Chinese 
rather than errors in a counting system. 53 Many had probably arrived as sailors 
or deck-hands, and stayed on in a bid to exploit the economic possibilities of the 
new country that they found themselves in. But that is perhaps to take too 
mathematical a view of the situation, which needs to be seen in more of a 
cultural perspective. 
Prior to the Second World War, there were relatively few non-white 
indigenous inhabitants of the United Kingdom, They became, however, a 
symbol of all that was alien and different about the East; drug-takers, cooks of 
mysterious and fantastic dishes (the Chinese restaurant is not quite such a recent 
phenomenon as most people seem to think) and above all, Oriental in 
physiology, in dress and in manner. 
Such fantasies as grew up were also fuelled by sensationalist popular 
fiction. Sax Rohmer's famous arch-villain, Fu Manchu, dates from the early 
1920s, and Sexton Blake's arch-enemy, Wu Ling, from the First World War. 
While the role of popular culture in popular perceptions of race and gender can 
probably be overstated, it cannot be simply ignored either. 54 
A third factor that comes into play, again, is the eugenicist one. These 
Chinese men (most of them were men) were usually very far from home and 
families, and very few of them brought wives with them. As a result, they tended 
to look for wives among the local (white) population, leading to claims of 
interbreeding (true) racial degeneracy (born of prejudices of the time) and white 
slavery (probably mostly hysteria). Such patterns of behaviour would be 
especially beloved of the press, looking for the sensational . 
55 
There can be no doubt that there was a substantial trade in opium among 
the Chinese, largely because of addictive habits formed before they had left 
conceivably have been counted as "Chinese" for the purpose of any census 
conducted while she was there. 
53 See John Seed, "Limehouse Blues: Looking for Chinatown in the London 
Docks 1900-40, " History Workshop Journal 62 (2006) pp. 58-85, pp. 62-64. sa See Seed, esp. p. 58, pp. 69-70,74-78 
55 ibid. pp. 70-71 
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China. As one magistrate commented when a case of Chinese smoking opium 
was brought before him, 
"In my opinion there is no difference between a chinaman [sic] 
smoking opium and us having a gold flake, this appears to be a 
family party, and there is no evidence that any of the prisoners were 
engaged in drug trafficking, I think this case will be met by binding 
all the prisoners over. 06 
He also ordered them to pay five pounds costs, but the attitude of a cultural 
phenomenon that was not of significant importance that he displayed did not 
prevail among the police. In fact, they often took quite serious personal risks in a 
bid to arrest known abusers of opium in Limehouse. In two of the three files on 
this subject that survive, reference is made to the dilapidated and unsafe nature 
of the buildings, and in one there is an account of how the police raiders had to 
break open a locked trapdoor that had been covered by a bed. 7 
In fairness to the police, there were also strong hints of opium trading 
going on in Limehouse as well, quite apart from the case of Brilliant Chang. It 
seems very probable that the readiest supply of opium for its consumers came 
through Chinese sailors coming into London on ships from Hong Kong. But at 
various times the police suspected that somebody was co-ordinating the traffic. 
On one occasion following his arrest and trial for the possession of opium, a 
precis was provided of the anonymous tip-offs concerning a man named Loo 
Sow, more commonly referred to by the Chinese as Chai Tai. In it, the reporting 
officer stated: 
"His practice [for establishing opium dens] has always been to 
secure a poverty stricken Chinaman, place him in the premises as 
the tenant, and then supply him with what quantity of opium is 
required for the frequenters. He then remains in the background as 
56 Quoted in statement of PC A. Edwards, 26th June 1929, in NA MEPO 3/342 
 See Statement by D. Denison 18th July 1929, referring to the courage of his 
officers in searching buildings in a dilapidated condition, ibid.: for the account 
of the raid including a barricaded trap door, see Statement by Arthur Lount, 
20th November 1929, ppl-2, in NA MEPO 3/434 
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the controlling hand of the establishment, and takes the large 
profits which accrue therefrom... Numerous anonymous letters 
have been received respecting [him]... All these letters complain of 
his activities in the drug traffic - some also alleging that he 
inveigled white girls to 17, Limehouse Causeway where he taught 
them "how to drug, " but of this we had no evidence when he was 
arrested"58 
Here, again, the question of eugenics raised its head. The fact that they were 
"white" girls being inveigled seems to have somehow shocked the letter writers 
more than if it had been the Chinese man's own daughters that had started on 
opium. Moreover, this particular claim, given that there was no evidence of it 
found to support these claims when Loo Sow was eventually arrested suggests 
that the anonymous letter writers had merely been reporting the more lurid 
rumours that they had heard. 
But in the face of such suggestions, the police clearly felt obliged to act, 
and Loo Sow's restaurant was raided in November 1929. In the waste pail a 
large packet of opium was found, which Loo Sow's pantryman insisted had been 
left by a party of guests. The jury did not believe this, returning a verdict of 
"guilty" on the charge of possession of opium. Although sentence was mitigated 
by the clean record of the two men, Loo Sow received six months and Dang 
Chee three months S9 At the end of his sentence Loo Sow, notwithstanding his 
English wife and ten children, was deported to Hong Kong on the Beinn 
Macdhui 60 
But this case highlighted one of the chief weaknesses of the police action 
against drugs. In the cases of nightclubs, that were almost impossible to enter 
except as a member or a customer, and in the Chinese community, which was 
more or less sealed against a police force with no Chinese officers and so could 
put no plausible spies of its own in place, it had to rely on informers. And these 
58 Quoted in report of Detective-Inspector Edwards to Superintendent, 13th 
February 1930, in NA MEPO 3/433 
59 Report on the trial by Messrs. Wontner and Sons to Assistant Commissioner, 
Wontner and Sons to Asst. Comm. 4th February 1930, in MEPO 3/433 
60 See various correspondence between the Home Office, the police and the 
Hong Kong police, 8th July-17th October 1930 in ibid. 
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informers were not always doing working for the police out of a sense of 
rightness or the goodness of their hearts. They expected to be paid. 
It was, of course, not always quite so simple as that. Oswald admitted, in 
his memoirs, that the police worked on a tip-off when they finally caught Chang. 
His exact words were not quite as blunt as that, but he was hinting at something 
he did not seem very eager to express publicly 61 However, fifty years later the 
need for reticence was rather less, and one of the English women who had lived 
with a Chinese drug dealer was willing to say what had happened: 
"In Limehouse, Brilliant Chang was hated and distrusted by the local 
Chinese community for the difficulties he had caused them.. . Annie 
told us that the local Chinese community had turned over the 
evidence to the police concerning Chang's drug activities. This was 
partly done for peace and quiet - partly because Chang was 
genuinely "feared" in Limehouse. "62 
While the exact words of Annie Lai were unfortunately not published, this does 
indeed seem plausible. The accounts of both Annie Lai herself, and Lilian 
Wyles, the inspector of police who features much more prominently in chapter 
eight, strongly suggest that the relationship between the Chinese population of 
Limehouse and the local Limehouse police was by and large good-natured. 3 
Whether that extended to the senior officers or only to the beat constables who 
might "happen" to look the other way at crucial moments is unclear. Annie 
herself largely blamed Scotland Yard for the pressure brought to bear upon the 
opium trade. 
61 "But by this time the inner workings of the place were known. A quiet 
detective unloosed some of the brickwork behind a disused stove...: " clearly, 
that would have been difficult to spot from mere observation of the premises, 
especially with Chang on the alert for police spies. Oswald p. 195 
62 Annie Lai, Bob Little and Pippa Little, "Chinatown Annie: The East End 
Opium Trade 1920-1935: The story of a woman opium dealer, " in Oral History 
Journal 14 (i) (1986) pp. 18-30, p. 23. 
63 See Lilian Wyles, A Woman at Scotland Yard (London 1951) pp. 92-4. She 
speaks highly of the Chinese community's friendship and good behaviour, and 
also expresses a regret that she had never taken up an oft-repeated invitation to 
try an opium pill. 
64 ibid. pp. 23,28 
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Scotland Yard itself had to rely substantially on informers, however. 
And, in paying them for their services, they were clearly formulating a system 
wide open to abuse. The more remarkable thing is how open the officers were in 
their own reports about what they were trying to achieve. Inspector Denison 
wrote on the file of one arrest in Chinatown: 
"Throughout our observation on these and other premises suspected 
of drug trafficking, we have been materially assisted both by 
information and observation (which at times could not have been 
performed by officers without detection) by a woman informant 
named Rose Doyle. This woman is living with a Chinaman, and 
although I and other officers have assisted her financially at times, I 
respectfully suggest that she be granted the sum of £5 from the 
Informants' Fund as an inducement to furnish me with further 
information respecting offences in "Chinatown. ,,, 65 
The very obvious danger, and one that does not seem to have occurred to this 
particular officer, is that "Rose Doyle" would simply start either bringing all 
gossip and rumour, whether or not it had any foundation, to the police in the 
hope of getting money, or far more seriously (as it could not do too much harm 
for the police to know what was being said) lead to her making things up. While 
the chances of her actually getting away with something like that in a system 
where anyone can demand a fair trial by jury were perhaps remote, it might well 
have led to the police tying up time and resources chasing phantoms of 
imagination. 
Yet the police obviously considered the informant system indispensable 
to their success. Loo Sow was also caught following a tip from an informer, who 
called himself "Harry Wills, " and who had evidently spent considerable time 
and effort penetrating the Limehouse Chinese community. It seems very unlikely 
that he did this for the financial rewards offered by the police (which amounted 
to £10 for the successful prosecution of Loo Sow). 66 Quite why he was busily 
engaged in ingratiating himself is unclear, and it is very possible that the police 
65 Statement by Inspector Denison, 18th July 1929, op. cit. 66 Report by Edwards to Chief Inspector, 4th March 1930, in NA MEPO 3/433 
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themselves had no idea. But whether he was a journalist, a writer, the member of 
a rival criminal organisation, a vigilante or even a local government inspector 
exploiting a source of income on the side is not very relevant. What matters is 
that the police were quite openly paying him in a bid to get more information out 
of him: 
""Harry Wills" the informant in this case has proved himself 
extremely useful and has given us most valuable information which 
he has obtained by associating and ingratiating himself with the 
principals engaged in opium traffic in the district of Limehouse and 
elsewhere. He has in addition to this case assisted police in bringing 
about the arrest of two other opium traffickers and it is expected that 
he will continue to give us further assistance. I therefore respectfully 
suggest that the sum of £10 be awarded him from the Informants' 
Fund. so 67 
And all this was in the year after the Goddard case, when a police sergeant in 
Soho was given a stiff prison sentence and a heavy fine for tipping off night 
clubbers in his district about impending police raids in exchange for payment 68 
In fairness, of course, Goddard was being paid to break the law; the 
informants were being paid to help uphold it. But the same fundamental 
principle applies. It was corruption - and a dangerous system open to rank 
abuse. 
The penal policy of the British government ultimately proved so 
problematic that in 1924, a mere two years after it had been begun, a committee 
was set up under the chairmanship of Rolleston to investigate the matter. 
Reporting in 1926, it recommended the establishment of a predominantly 
medical policy, that did not eliminate the Home Office but relegated it to the 
background. This system endured for nearer forty years than four, until it was 
broken by the new, more hedonistic culture of the 1960s. Partly this may be 
because at no time in the 1920s were drugs a particularly serious problem in 
67 Edwards' Chief Inspector to Superintendent ? 13th February 1930, in ibid. 
69 See below, chapter 8. 
241 
Britain - certainly not as serious as alcohol abuse. While it would be reckless to 
assume that the thirteen or fourteen files on the subject in the National Archives 
represent the whole accumulated prosecutions, as they certainly do not, they 
suggest that at worst the issue was an irritation rather than a crisis in the pattern 
of government. 69 
"It is significant that Rolleston's name is still associated with British 
drug policy - while that of Malcolm Delevingne is virtually forgotten, " 
commented Virginia Berridge of the enforcement of drug laws in the 1920s. 0 
Certainly in the 1920s a large number of false starts were made, and some 
glaring errors were committed, which complicated the picture of narcotic 
control in Britain. 
But the brutal fact is that a wholly medical drugs enforcement policy, 
with an interlude between the Second World War and the 1960s, has not been 
hugely effective at controlling the problem of dangerous drugs either. So the 
whole question really boils down to a moral one - are responsible adults 
allowed to put what they like in their bodies, even at the risk of causing them 
serious damage, or should they be forced to conform to somebody else's idea of 
what is "safe" and "reasonable" for them to do? 
In the 1920s, the climate of governmental opinion, as can be seen 
throughout all the previous chapters, was that people simply could not be trusted 
with their own lives. They would possibly be corrupted by obscene books, 
attracted by obscene plays or films, or corrupted into alcoholism by illegal 
nightclubs. 
The decision of Malcolm Delevingne to reserve drug policy to the Home 
Office as "essentially a police matter" was almost certainly an extension of that 
culture. The embarrassments it brought upon the Home Office and the police 
over, say Dr. Kingsbury, or the unfortunate arrest of an important Indian 
Maharaja's nephew following a tip-off that he was smuggling cocaine into 
Britain from France to sell to his connections on the nightclub circuit (an 
accurate one, incidentally)71 seem to have been purely incidental to this policy, 
69 See Berridge Opium and the People pp. 272-278 
70 ibid. p. 278 
71 See files relating to the prosecution of S. S. Gaikwar (March-April 1922) in 
NA MEPO 3/420 
242 
just as the equally "unfortunate" furore over The Well of Loneliness was 
incidental to a "gentleman's agreement" going wrong. 
The only official to have shown any views that differed from the 
orthodox on a penal versus medical policy at the Home Office was Sir John 
Anderson. As I have already said, this was probably due to a background in 
chemistry and science rather than in literature. But, while no evidence to 
confirm this point has survived, it seems certain that he was not willing to make 
a major issue out of it - otherwise Delevingne would almost certainly have had 
to yield. Anderson, in fact, once he was satisfied that the Ministry of Health 
would be substantially involved in any policy on drugs that the Home Office 
came up with, seems to have been content to let the matter ride - and even he 
did not demur from the fact that "surely so far as the matter is really a police 
matter they (the Home Office) will come into (the policy) automatically. s72 
The Home Office line was further confused by the fact that no option as 
simple as an outright ban on the drugs they wished to control was available to 
them, for the very good and obvious reason that cocaine and morphine were 
both still essential medical drugs in the 1920s. In 1923 a committee was in fact 
established to investigate whether there was a viable substitute for cocaine, so 
that its circulation could be curtailed. Reports in the British Medical Journal on 
scientific studies commissioned as a result of the work of this committee were 
unambiguous; the substitutes were "a) at least as dangerous b) not so 
efficient "73 This inability to rid the medical practice of the need for these drugs 
led, of course, to the problems in the case of Dr. Kingsbury. It also led to the 
bizarre and almost unbelievable situation of the Home Office on the one hand 
cracking down ruthlessly on the illegal cocaine trade, while on the other trying 
to establish a cocaine manufacturing company to meet Britain's need for the 
drug (presumably particularly in time of war) - behind high tariffs and other 
even stiffer barriers to entry (including the strict licensing of imports and the 
establishment of quotas) that must surely be one of the earliest examples of a 
full-blown protective system in Britain's post-industrial economic history, and 
72 Memo by John Anderson, 19th July 1919, op. cit. 
73 Minute on two reports in the British Medical Journal, 21st December 1923, 
NA HO 45/19427 434228/9 
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one which was certainly deeply unpopular with both the importers and with the 
medical profession, as it made cocaine scarcer and more expensive. 74 
Overall, this culture of "the forces of reaction, " as Middlemas and 
Barnes called them, was by far the most potent force in all moral policy in the 
1920s. Few Home Secretaries, if any, took an active interest in these affairs, 
except to initial minutes and blithely agree with the opinions of their Deputy 
Secretaries. When Marek Kohn talks of Joynson-Hicks' appointment to the 
Home office making the climate "much more favourable" for these forces, he is 
wildly overestimating the influence of one man. 75 
There is absolutely no reason to think that Joynson-Hicks did not 
approve of the penal policy on drugs pursued by the Home Office, and every 
reason to think that he did - after all, he would very likely have expressed fury 
on the files, with the thick red felt-tip pen that he seems to have favoured, had 
his officials gone against his personal wishes. But it is hard to think of what he 
could have actually done to change their policy had he disapproved of it. After 
all, no Home Secretary prior to Roy Jenkins in the 1968 seriously considered 
the drug laws, proving content to leave the system unchanged - and Jenkins, an 
egalitarian, enlightened, reforming Home Secretary and ardent critic of 
Joynson-Hicks, 76 tightened them, not loosened them, presaging the Thatcherite 
reforms that saw a further strengthening of the penal drugs policy 77 Joynson- 
Hicks would doubtless have approved the moves made, but it should not be 
forgotten that in this field he had, in Sir Humphrey Appleby's immortal phrase, 
"responsibility without power - the prerogative of the eunuch throughout the 
ages. "78 
74 For files relating to this venture, see NA HO 144/22550. The company (May 
and Baker) seems to have been founded post-war, but by 1929 controlled nearly 
70% of the British legitimate cocaine market, with the proactive help of 
Malcolm Delevingne in particular at the Home Office. 
75 Kohn p. 140 
76 He referred to Joynson-Hicks as "good on penal reform but illiberal on 
everything else. " Roy Jenkins, Baldwin (London 1987) p. 85. See also his 
biographical note (p 179) quoted above p. 25 
77 Berridge pp. 283-285. 
78 Anthony Jay and Jonathan Lynn, The Complete Yes Prime Minister (London 
1989)p. 466. 
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8) The Problem of the Police. 
"About Mr. Duckworthy I know what he has told me and no more. I 
daresay he will tell you, too, if you ask him nicely. But no third degree, 
you know, sergeant. No Savidgery. " 
Dorothy L. Sayers, Hangman's Holiday. ' 
One thing that becomes very clear through the evidence amassed during the 
writing of this thesis is the enormous extent to which Joynson-Hicks depended 
upon the support of the police in order to enforce Home Office policy. In a state 
where the military's role is strictly limited by statute, and the civilian police are 
numerous, well-organised and powerful, this is perhaps hardly surprising. But it 
is something far too often forgotten in histories, or even in general conversation. 
One may borrow a phrase A. J. P. Taylor used to bait critics of his book The 
Origins of the Second World War in Europe: "It seems to be believed nowadays 
that Hitler did everything himself, even driving the trains and filling the gas 
chambers unaided. "2 Similarly, there has been a considerable tendency to talk 
about Joynson-Hicks as though it was he personally who looked into every 
packet coming over from France, patrolled Hyde Park in the evenings, went to 
theatres with copies of the licensed play in his hand to scrutinise any illegal 
changes, 3 looked at films to detect smut or violence, and who raided nightclubs. 
Indeed, this is what Ronald Blythe actually wrote on the subject: 
"He [Joynson-Hicks] looked as happy as a sandboy as he 
emptied the stews, wagged his finger in Hyde Park, leafed 
through a packet of erotic poems D. H. Lawrence had rashly 
put in the post unsealed, and sent the town to bed by ten: '4 
' "The Image in the Mirror, " Hangman's Holiday (paperback London 1974) p. 
24 
2 A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (with a new 
introduction) (second edition London 1963) p. 17 
3 Strictly speaking that aspect of the morality campaigns should of course read 
"Lord Cromer" for "Joynson-Hicks. " 
4 Ronald Blythe, The Age of Illusion: England in the Twenties and Thirties 
(paperback London 2001) p. 34 
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But it was in all these ways and many more that Joynson-Hicks needed the 
support of many other groups - and above all, the police. They searched 
Jonathan Cape's office after the seizure of The Well of Loneliness, they raided 
the nightclubs, they policed Hyde Park, they investigated plays performed 
outside London, and most important of all, they kept him informed of what 
action was and was not possible in order to keep London clean of Douglas's 
"moral poison. " 
Such an immense amount of work, however, was always bound to put a 
strain on the police, particularly as this was also an era when they where meant 
to be active in the pursuit of Communists and trades unionists (not necessarily or 
even usually the same people) and maintain public order in the face of a 
recession and social dislocation caused by the war. Joynson-Hicks went to 
enormous lengths to keep the police, especially the Metropolitan Police - the 
only force over which he had direct control - on his side. Generally he 
succeeded. But throughout the 1920s the problems of the police were substantial 
and made obvious by successive minor scandals. In 1925 an inquiry was ordered 
into the case of Major R. 0. Sheppard, who had been wrongly accused of 
stealing a prostitute's purse and had been held for four and a half hours before 
being bailed. Bail procedures were tightened, on Joynson-Hicks's insistence. 
However, this was evidently less than successful, for in 1927 a similar case 
necessitated a further inquiry and a further revision of the rules. 5 To dwarf these 
fairly trivial failings, in 1928 two major scandals erupted, exposing problems in 
the Metropolitan force that ran from top to bottom, and which threatened both to 
wholly discredit the police force in the eyes of the public and even sweep from 
office the Home Secretary himself. One was the Goddard case, already 
mentioned in connection with Mrs. Meyrick. The other one, which was in fact 
considerably more serious in its implications and in the institutional failings that 
it highlighted, was the case of Irene Savidge. 
Miss Savidge was a young woman in her early twenties, of a modern 
type. She had a job in one of the new industries of London, testing wireless 
5 For a fuller account of these cases, see Jonathan Bernard Lopian, "Crime, 
Police and Punishment 1918-1929: Metropolitan experiences, perceptions and 
policies, " University of Cambridge PhD thesis (1986) pp. 45-49 
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valves, and she went about, unchaperoned, with male friends. She was engaged 
but not married. In 1928 she was arrested in Hyde Park for "behaviour likely to 
offend against public decency: ' Although acquitted and freed by a magistrate, 
she was subsequently taken to Scotland Yard and questioned for several hours 
about the circumstances of her arrest. Although Chief Inspector Alfred Collins, 
the officer in charge, was ostensibly investigating whether or not there were 
grounds for charging the constables who had arrested her with perjury, many at 
the time and since have concluded that he was merely trying to cover up their 
mistake (or, alternatively, prove the magistrate wrong: but in law that would 
amount to the same thing). 
George Goddard was a station sergeant in Soho, responsible for policing 
the nightclubs of the area. For several years there were allegations that his record 
in this was patchy at best, and that he was happy to take money to look the other 
way. In 1928 matters came to a head when a nightclub to which he had awarded 
a clean bill of health was raided by the CID and found to be in flagrant breach of 
the law. Goddard was arrested and found to have a fortune of several thousand 
pounds in cash hidden in various safe deposits, as well as the freehold of a large 
house and two cars. Goddard was imprisoned and heavily fined, but he 
eventually got a considerable sum of his money back. A mere two years after his 
fall from grace, many of the London nightclubs had been forced by increased 
police pressure upon them to close. 
These two cases arose directly out of the campaign to keep London clear 
of "vice, " which is why this chapter will focus exclusively on them. It is 
extremely difficult to find any published matter that deals with either of these 
cases in a meaningful way. Perhaps this is partly due to the paucity of material 
on the subject. The police and Home Office files are all recent openings; indeed 
the police file on Savidge's arrest has only been made available in the last two 
years. However, some useful material is available. Given the scandal at the time, 
nothing, not even the suppression of official files, could be done to expunge 
them entirely from the public record. 
Two sets of memoirs deserve mentioning: those of Kate Meyrick, whose 
book Secrets of the 43 details her involvement in the Goddard case: and those of 
Lilian Wyles, a female police officer who had a minor role in the Savidge 
interrogation and a pivotal part in the subsequent enquiry. As a milestone in the 
247 
acceptance of women as part of Scotland Yard, it also merits a mention 
in Joan 
Lock's narrative history of the early female police, entitled The British 
Policewoman: Her Story. Although the most recent "official" history of the 
Metropolitan Police makes no reference to either incident, 6 the books of John 
Fitzgerald Moylan are eloquent in their defence of the conduct of Collins, albeit 
scathing in their denunciation of Goddard and fervent in the belief that this was 
an isolated case. As Moylan was the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police 
District at the time, such an attitude is hardly surprising. The only recent book to 
really merit a mention, however, is James Morton's Bent Coppers: The Story of 
Police Corruption, who grapples with both topics as well as he could without 
being able to get at all the official files on the subject. His conclusions, which 
are tenable even in light of additional evidence, is that there was a serious 
culture of corruption in London of which Goddard was just one example, and the 
Savidge case was a classic example of a police cover up .8 However, with new 
documentation many important details become clear, so it is more than worth 
investigating this subject in greater depth than Morton did. 
Although the Goddard case has already been dealt with in an earlier 
chapter, this chapter begins with the Savidge case, simply because it is earlier in 
terms of time and had therefore a bearing on the conduct of the Goddard case, 
and especially the public reaction to it. The irony in this approach is, of course, 
that while Savidge was arrested, cleared, interrogated, brought before a tribunal 
and then faded into obscurity again in a comparatively short space of time, 
Goddard had taken bribes from nightclub owners for many years before he was 
finally caught, as was made clear by the huge amount of cash he possessed in 
6 Gary Mason, The Official History of the Metropolitan Police: 175 years of 
policing London (London 2004). This is in fact less an historical dissection of 
its past and role than an exercise in modern political science designed to 
promote the current police system. 
See especially Sir John Fitzgerald Moylan, C. B., C. B. E., Scotland Yard and 
the Metropolitan Police (second edition London 1934) pp. 212-214 and 250-2 
(for Savidge) and pp. 327-331 and 126 (for Goddard): cf. his The Police of 
Britain (London 1948) where he claimed that there was "no reason to think that 
the police were arbitrary or oppressive, or practised any form of "Third 
Degree. `999 (p. 37) 
8 James Morton, Bent Coppers: A survey ofpolice corruption (paperback 
London 1994) p. 76 (for the "cover-up" conclusion) and pp. 79-81 (for the 
systemic problems exposed by the Goddard case). 
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addition to the assets he held as well. However, where one case has to come first, 
it is logical to examine them as the public did. After all, a scandal only really 
becomes a scandal when everybody knows about it. 
This chapter, in the limited space available, cannot hope to follow every 
detail of both these cases, which were extremely complex and proved to have 
far-reaching consequences. What it will endeavour to do instead is to summarise 
the main facts of the cases, give some idea of the events as they unfolded, draw 
conclusions as to what really happened, and finally to assess whether the purity 
campaigns Joynson-Hicks unleashed were really to blame, as was clearly the 
belief of many at the time including several Labour Members of Parliament. 
In the Savidge case the facts as they appeared at the time were 
straightforward enough. Hyde Park was routinely patrolled by police officers, 
who were trying to catch prostitutes and their clients, courting couples, 
homosexuals trying to have sex away from prying eyes, and anyone else who, in 
the famous phrase, "offended against public decency. " In May 1928 Joynson- 
Hicks claimed in Parliament, in answer to a question from S. Saklatvala, the MP 
for Battersea, that there were 21 police officers engaged in these duties in Hyde 
Park. In fact there is internal evidence to suggest that there were as many as 69 
officers patrolling Hyde Park to watch for these offences at an annual cost of 
E25,000.9 As we have seen in chapter 6, Joynson-Hicks was not always 
scrupulously honest in his answers to Parliament when he felt that public opinion 
of the police might be compromised if he told the truth - and his position was 
fragile enough at the time due to the events that are about to be described. He 
himself freely admitted later what he wanted to achieve by all this police 
activity- he wanted Hyde Park to be a place where a man could "take his 
daughters for a walk. "10 It was one of the better-known aspects of his morality 
campaign, although not discussed in depth in this thesis for reasons outlined in 
the introduction. " However, in 1928 it all went rather horribly wrong. 
On the 23rd April 1928 a former MP, indeed a former government 
minister, Sir Leo Chiozza Money, and a young woman of 22, a valve inspector 
9 See NA HO 144/17752/512746/15, including a transcript of the Hansard 
entries for the 10th May 1928 (no. 7) and an undated internal memo giving the 
actual figures. 
lo Viscount Brentford, Do We Need a Censor? (London 1929) p. 7. 11 See above, pp. 6-7 
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in a wireless factory, Irene Savidge, were arrested by police in Hyde Park for 
"behaviour likely to offend against public decency. " Reports of the trial in the 
newspapers were somewhat reticent as to the precise nature of the offence. 12 
However, the transcript of the hearing could hardly be clearer. The specific 
allegation was that Money had his hand up Savidge's skirt while she 
masturbated his naked penis. The defence disputed these allegations, stating that 
not only had Savidge been medically examined and found to be a virgin, but that 
on the day in question she had been menstruating and so would not have been 
likely to be interested in sex. 
The case was brought before a stipendiary magistrate sitting alone at 
Marlborough Street Police Court, Henry Cancellor. 13 He made great play, in the 
hearing, of the fact that during the arrest a witness had overtaken the police as 
they led Money and Savidge away carrying Money's umbrella, which had been 
left on the seat. The police had not attempted to get the name of this witness, as 
at the time Money had been struggling and both constables had had to hold him. 
On going back later they had been unable to find him. Quite how important this 
witness would have been is open to doubt, given that he must have been some 
distance off. Sir Leo had himself testified that there was nobody "within a length 
and a half of this Court away, " which was a vague description, estimated to be 
between twelve and thirty yards by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
police. 14 However, the magistrate made it clear that he considered this lack of a 
statement to be a serious omission, and that he had been deprived of crucial 
evidence. The magistrate also implied that he had doubts as to whether anyone 
would be fool enough (as Money and Savidge allegedly were) to commit graphic 
sexual offences on a deckchair under a streetlight when there was a huge dark 
area of grass just behind that they could have used. After hearing the evidence of 
12 See for instance, "Sir Leo Money and a Woman, " Daily Mail 7th May 1928, 
which only says "Mr. Fulton described what the officers are alleged to have 
seen, " (cutting in NA HO 144/17752) 
13 Henry Lannoy Cancellor (1862-? ). A barrister on the Western Circuit from 
1888 to 1912, then a "revising barrister" from 1912 to 1914, he was a 
stipendiary magistrate from 1914 until 1929, sitting successively at West 
London Police Court (1914-1921) Thames Police Court (1921-1924) and finally 
at Marlborough Street (1924-1929) where he also occasionally assisted at 
Marylebone. Source: "London Magistrate's Retirement, " The Times, 30th July 
1929, p. 9. He does not appear to have been granted a Times obituary. 
14 William Horwood to Ernley Blackwell, 5th May 1928, NA MEPO 3/554 
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the two constables and Money, the magistrate dismissed the charges without 
putting Savidge into the box, thinking as he did so that he was sparing her "an 
ordeal. " 15 
He could hardly have been more wrong. The police, rather sensitive on 
the subject of perjured evidence (which is what the magistrate had implied: the 
descriptions the two police officers gave were so graphic that there could be no 
question of an honest mistake) following a case earlier in that same year when 
two other officers had been convicted of fabricating charges against a "girl who 
had "refused to be complacent with them"s16 now investigated whether they 
should bring charges of perjury against the arresting officers. This investigation 
was entrusted to a senior officer, Chief Inspector Alfred Collins. He claimed that 
he needed the evidence of Savidge in order to pursue his enquiries, and on the 
16th May sent a car with a policewoman, Inspector Wyles, to her workplace in 
order to bring her to Scotland Yard. Savidge went willingly enough, but clearly 
with no idea of what lay in front of her. She was not given a chance to speak to 
her parents, who might have been alert to what was happening. When the car 
reached Scotland Yard Wyles was dismissed and Collins, with only a male 
detective sergeant in attendance, interrogated Savidge for four hours. He 
proceeded, allegedly, to make offensive remarks to her all the time, including, 
"Now you are a good girl and have never had a man, have you? " The ordeal so 
exhausted Savidge that she fainted on arriving home. 
The following day the Labour MP for Dundee, Thomas Johnston, 17 
raised the matter in the House of Commons. In a magnificent speech he tore 
apart the methods of the officers, and received backing from indignant MPs on 
both sides of the House of Commons. When Joynson-Hicks rose to reply he was 
received in dead silence. Knowing that he was in a totally false position, he 
is All this from the transcript of the hearing: "Sir L. C. Money and Irene Savage 
(sic): Charged with behaving in a manner likely to offend against public 
decency in Hyde Park" NA MEPO 3/554 (there are no folder references for 
much of this file) 
'6 Morton p. 69 
17 Thomas Johnston (1882-1965) MP (Labour) for Stirling and Clackmannan 
West 1922-1924, for Dundee 1924-1929, and for Stirling and Clackmannan 
West 1929-1931 and 1935-1945; Lord Privy Seal 1931, Commissioner of Civil 
Defence (Scotland) 1939-1941, Secretary of State for Scotland 1941-1945, 
Chancellor of Aberdeen University 1951-1965. 
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made no attempt to exonerate the police officers concerned on the spot, and 
offered to set up an inquiry, with terms of reference formulated in association 
with Arthur Henderson and Sir John Simon. 
The tribunal, composed of a newly retired judge, a Conservative MP and 
a Labour MP, took evidence over an eight day period. At the finish it was split, 
the judge and the Conservative exonerating the police and dismissing Savidge's 
allegations. The Labour MP accepted her version of events and made 15 
practical recommendations for improvement in the treatment of witnesses. After 
yet more debate on the issues, the Government finally set up a Royal 
Commission on the subject, which introduced revised guidelines for the 
treatment of witnesses, especially female witnesses in sexual cases. 
At the time, there were reasonable grounds for assuming that the police 
were not lying over the interrogation. The evidence of Wyles was pivotal. By 
asserting that she had not been immediately dismissed by Collins, but had gone 
later with Savidge's express consent, and that she could have been readily 
contacted in case of need, she smashed the evidence of Savidge to pieces. Later, 
however, she retracted this story and eventually gave a version that tallied at 
most major points with that of Savidge. 18 She covered up for her male 
colleagues, backing them against Savidge even though she told Collins it was 
something "which you did not deserve. " The Labour MP, Lees-Smith, 19 had 
been shrewder. He noted that the police, unlike Savidge whose version of events 
never varied, "denied both the probable and the improbable with equal force. "20 
And he was quick to seize on the unlikelihood of the notion that Wyles would 
18 Joan Lock, The British Policewoman: Her Story (London 1979) pp. 161-163 
19 Hastings Bertrand Lees-Smith (1878-1941) MP (Labour) for Northampton 
1910-1918, for Keighley 1922-1923,1924-1931,1935-1941; Postmaster 
General 1929-1931, President of the Board of Education 1931. After Attlee and 
his senior colleagues entered Churchill's coalition government in 1940, Lees- 
Smith was elected chairman of the backbench Parliamentary Labour Party (in 
effect, acting leader in Attlee's place). In this role he discharged the functions of 
the Leader of the Opposition, but was never formally recognised as such and 
was not paid a salary for his work. Andrew Thorpe, `Smith, Hastings Bertrand 
Lees- (1878-1941)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, Oct 2006 
[http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/66087, accessed 25 Jan 2007] 2° Tribunal report (published by HMSO) p. 24: copy in NA HO 
144/17753a/512746/1 10 
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have volunteered to leave the interview merely to sit at the other end of a phone 
line until summoned, although he did not explicitly accuse her of lying. 1 
The case never really quite rested. Libel actions followed, with the 
original constables from Hyde Park claiming damages against those newspapers 
that had accused them of perjury, and Collins likewise pursuing those 
newspapers that had accused him of fondling Savidge (as part of a practical 
demonstration of what had happened in Hyde Park). The newspapers had little 
evidence, and either settled or were found guilty. The Metropolitan Police 
backed these officers throughout the civil cases, as can be seen from the way in 
which Commissioner Horwood kept pressing the litigants for updates. 22 
But practically none of this was straightforward. There were layers of 
confusion and deception, that make the entire case clearer in the sense of what 
happened, and yet perhaps less clear as to why it happened. With so much 
information on various aspects of this case, it is rather difficult to know where to 
begin trying to untangle the skein. However, it seems best to start at the 
beginning, with an explanation of how the case blew up into such epic 
proportions. 
Money was not a good person to arrest. He was, allegedly, a personal 
friend of Joynson-Hicks's, and it was Joynson-Hicks, rather than his lawyer, 
whom he phoned upon being charged. When he was subsequently released, there 
were questions in Parliament (as well as being a former Liberal minister, he had 
been an unsuccessful Labour candidate in 1918)23 The arresting officers, 
Consatables Badger and MacLean, claimed that he said "I am not the usual riff- 
raff. I am a man of substance. For God's sake let me go. "2¢ Although this may 
have been a subtle appeal to their pockets, it was a serious threat. Money had 
many powerful friends, and it was not wise to offend him. 
The police, as is made clear by the files, felt that the magistrate was one 
of those friends. The furious letters denouncing the magistrate as criminally 
21 ibid. p. 30 
22 "How do the actions for libel stand? W(illiam) H(orwood)10th August 
(1928? ): "Libel proceedings by PCs McLean and Badger... in respect of articles 
in the Observer, " NA MEPO 3/554 
23 Martin Daunton, `Money, Sir Leo George Chiozza (1870-1944)', Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http: //www. oxforddnb. com/view/article/55929, accessed 30 Nov 2006] 
24 Quoted in Morton p. 68 
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negligent, partisan, and defamatory are perhaps best summed up by the letter of 
Wontner and Sons, the police solicitors in this case: 
"Very early in the proceedings we felt that the learned 
magistrate was not going to be of any assistance to the 
prosecution, and as the case went on his leaning towards the 
defence became more apparent... Little of the cross- 
examination [of Badger and McLean] was to the point of the 
indecency, a great deal of it being in the form of criticism of 
the officers for not having attempted to obtain the name and 
address of a person who came up with Sir Leo's 
umbrella... We might say here that as things turned out it 
would have been wise for the Officers to have obtained this 
man's name and address, but neither the Officers nor Sir Leo 
Money ever suggested that the person who brought the 
umbrella was seen by them at the time of the arrest, and when 
Sir Leo was cross-examined by Mr Fulton he clearly said to 
Counsel that the nearest person to himself and the girl... was at 
a distance.. . we think, about 10 to 12 yards"2s 
For a formal lawyer's letter, this was strong stuff, roughly the equivalent of a 
police officer writing "the old fool must have been clean off his rocker. " But it 
was the prevailing attitude of the police. Horwood was equally outraged, writing 
to the Home Office to complain that this was not the first time Cancellor had 
gone against all the evidence to return a verdict against the police, and providing 
several examples to boot. 
26 
Faced with all this confusion, the Home Office cut straight through the 
conundrum by writing to Cancellor and asking him to explain his verdict. Why, 
in particular, had he acquitted the defendants so readily? Cancellor's reply was 
as follows: 
25 Wontner and Sons to New Scotland Yard, 3rd May 1928, "Sir L. C. Money 
and Irene Savage: Charged with behaving in a manner likely to offend against 
public decency in Hyde Park" NA MEPO 3/554 
6 Horwood to Blackwell 5th May 1928, ibid. 
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"Dear Sir John Anderson 
When in deciding the charge I said "I have come to the 
conclusion that the defendants are not guilty", I had just heard 
Sir Leo Money's evidence and believed that he had told the 
truth. 
At this moment my mind was directed towards the 
question of whether Miss Savage [sic] should be exposed to the 
ordeal of the witness box. 
In my opinion the two police officers fancied in the first 
instance that indecency was taking place, pounced quickly on 
the defendants with a hasty accusation, and then had not the 
courage or wisdom to admit making a mistake, but gave false 
evidence to escape from a difficult position, created by the 
blunder of having made an unjustifiable arrest. 
I state my opinion, in the hope that it may assist the 
Secretary of State in his determination to ascertain the truth, and 
I also hope this communication will be regarded as strictly 
confidential. 
Yours sincerely H. L. Cancellor. s27 
This obviously raised almost as many difficulties as it solved. Cancellor gave no 
explanation as to why he thought Money's evidence was more trustworthy than 
those of the two police officers. 
The trial transcript is understandably unhelpful on such points. It does 
not record facial expressions, or tone of voice, or nervous twitchings of the 
hands or eyes, that might be taken as an indication of the truthfulness or 
otherwise of a statement. 28 However, purely on the cold words of the paper, the 
magistrate made a peculiar decision. The story of the officers was consistent: 
that of Sir Leo was not. The officers did not give odd answers under cross- 
27 Cancellor to Anderson, 5th May 1928 (written on top: "Seen by S of S") NA 
HO 144/17752/512746/23 
28 As noted by Richard Rathbone, Murder and Politics in Colonial Ghana (Yale 
1993) p. 98 
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examination: but Sir Leo seemed at times to be evasive. 29 It is quite possible that 
Cancellor regarded this as a fixed case given on formulaic evidence, something 
that happened very frequently in the 1920s in cases of this type, and a common 
cause of a charge being dismissed. But Cancellor had a reputation for peculiarity 
that extended well beyond formulaic evidence. On one occasion he had even 
returned a "not guilty" verdict in a case where no defence had been offered. 
0 In 
fact, it seems most likely on the available evidence that it was Cancellor who 
was flinging about groundless accusations of perjury in order to deliver himself 
from the highly embarrassing position of being accused of bringing his office 
into disrepute. That might also explain why he insisted on anonymity, a demand 
he maintained in further correspondence with Anderson; somebody else might 
inquire as to how he reached this conclusion. Anderson, short of abusing his 
office, could not. 31 
Cancellor's conduct of the case was certainly open to criticism. He had 
persistently harped on about an eyewitness so far away that he could not have 
seen anything. He had expressed surprise that anyone would ignore a nice big 
dark patch of grass and commit acts of indecency on a chair, despite the fact that 
the night was sufficiently wet for Money to have taken an umbrella with him, 
and that Money's own evidence was that it had earlier been raining. And he had 
accepted irrelevant medical evidence that Savidge was virgo intacta, despite the 
fact that at no point had the officers alleged that they had seen sexual 
penetration. 
In desperation, Anderson referred the case to Sir Archibald Bodkin, 
commenting, that "it is perjury or nothing and therefore for the D. of P. p. s32 
This was to prove the disastrous error that led to part two of the case. For Bodkin 
had reservations about making a decision on the evidence in court, and wanted 
more information. In his reply (typically, it was sent on the following day) he 
wrote: 
29 Trial transcript ibid. 
30 Horwood to Blackwell, 5th May 1928, "Sir L. C. Money and Irene Savage: 
Charged with behaving in a manner likely to offend against public decency in 
Hyde Park, " NA MEPO 3/554 
31 See further letters 24th May 1928 -1st June 1928 in NA HO 
144/17752/512746/23 
32 John Anderson, memo of 9th May 1928, NA HO 144/17752/512746/23 
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"I have heard a story as to Sir L. M. - not to his credit, indeed of 
indecent behaviour on another occasion. This came from Sir W. 
Childs - and before charging two reputable P. C. s with perjury I 
should like of course to know the reputation of the only two 
witnesses against them. This enquiry must be done through the 
police -I can fully trust any CID chief officer to go fully into 
the case - although it is one which may be to the discredit of the 
Police Force. The enquiries would be known and the papers will 
get hold of them. But if you see no objection I would get hold of 
some Chief Inspector and set him to work. I should like to know 
the views of Sir L. Money - as to a prosecution a failure in 
which would be very prejudicial to him. If I were to lay an 
information for a magistrate to consider...! should have to see 
the full statement of Sir L. M. and the girl and go fully into this 
somewhat unusual acquaintanceship. These statements could 
take in [? be taken in] my office, but police assistance is 
necessary in addition. 33 
And that was precisely what Horwood did. Bodkin's touching faith was to have 
highly unfortunate consequences. 
James Morton's comments on the original incident were anything but 
censorious. But he had a very clear opinion of what followed. His remarks are 
worth quoting at length: 
"With hindsight, it is possible to reconstruct the Savidge affair 
in a number of ways. Given the circumstances of the arrest it is 
certainly possible that the arresting officers believed what they 
saw and that deliberate perjury can be eliminated... What is 
absolutely clear is that the behaviour of Collins when he 
investigated the arrest has all the hallmarks of a police cover-up. 
33 Bodkin to Anderson, 10th May 1928 ibid. 
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He was determined to exculpate his officers and, at some cost to 
himself, he did so. "3a 
The ruthless honesty of that last passage shows how far Bodkin's faith was 
misplaced. Collins was not very interested in the justice part of the equation. 
Lilian Wyles, writing some twenty-five years later, was also to throw up 
almost as many questions as she answered. However, her book is practically the 
only source for what happened among the police officers themselves apart from 
the formal statements that, obviously, are somewhat limited in scope as regards 
times and attitudes. Wyles asserted that she was waiting at Marylebone police 
court to support two girls giving evidence in a case of indecent exposure when 
Collins rang up and demanded that she be ready to accompany him to New 
Southgate in order to fetch Savidge to Scotland Yard. He then turned up in 
person, and when the police solicitor insisted that Wyles remain until the girls 
had given evidence he spent his time "railing against ... this ridiculous 
instruction 
that I must accompany him and Sergeant Clarke [sic] in the car to New 
Southgate. "35 
It is here that the story is complicated by the conflicting pieces of 
evidence. In her book Wyles asserted that she went to New Southgate with 
Collins and Clark. In her statement, Savidge insisted that she had been 
accompanied back by a local officer from New Southgate Police Station, Wyles 
and "an Inspector Clark. , 36 Statements that Clark, Collins and Wyles made at the 
time agreed that Clark and Wyles, supported by the local officer, had gone to 
fetch Savidge, with Collins only coming in for the actual interrogation at 
Scotland Yard itself. 37 
34 Morton p. 76 
35 Lilian Wyles, A Woman at Scotland Yard. " Reflections on the struggles and 
achievements of thirtyyears in the Metropolitan police (London 1952) p. 184 
36 Statement of Miss Irene Savidge, in "Inquiry of tribunal re Interrogation of 
Miss Savidge at C. O.: report on proceedings with newspaper extracts, " NA 
MEPO 3/554. This mistake is all the more confusing because she said that his 
"identity card" gave him as Inspector Clark. 
37 Statements by Clark, Wyles, and Collins (Clark's and Collins's dated 17th 
May 1928, Wyles's undated) NA HO 144/17752/512746/3 lb 
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This disorder highlights three things. Much the most likely reason for 
Savidge's confusion over Clark's rank is that she was still exhausted and 
muddled by her ordeal of the day before. The Personnel officer at the factory 
where she worked, Edward Saxe, got both Clark's rank and the number of 
people in the party right. 
38 In the case of Wyles, it is much harder to understand. 
It is possible that the lapse of time may have blurred her recollections of the 
event, but it is surprising that, if that is the solution, she was so definite about 
Collins turning up to collect her from the police court and throwing a tantrum 
when he could not take her off instantly. As Joan Lock, herself an ex- 
policewoman, pointed out, this was "a new element... something not even 
Savidge had claimed. "39 Another possibility, one that Lock herself seemed 
inclined to accept, is that Wyles was being deliberately controversial in order to 
sell more books. 
40 That is plausible, but it seems rather a clumsy way of doing it. 
Agreeing with the statements of a controversial witness was one thing. Doing 
what would have to be a glorified pick-and-mix of fact and fiction would be 
quite another. 
It is unclear from the official record whether or not Savidge was 
effectively forced into going. Saxe, who seems to have had no motive for lying, 
thought that she went willingly. 41 However, as is evident from the statements of 
Wyles at the time and later, Savidge was given no chance to talk to her parents 42 
Although Savidge appears to have made no specific demand to talk to her 
parents, she was obviously nervous and expressed a repeated wish to go home 
and change, or just speak to her mother. According to Wyles, it was Collins who 
refused this request 
43 According to Savidge, it was Wyles herself who did all 
the persuading: 
"Inspector Clark was accompanied by a lady a Miss Wild [sic] 
and I suggested to her that I should first go home and change 
38 Statement by Edward Saxe, 17th May 1928, ibid. 
39 Joan Lock, The British Policewoman: Her Story (London 1979) p. 163 
4° ibid.: she wrote that "Wyles decided to tell the truth (or agree with Miss 
Savidge's statements)". 
41 Statement by Saxe op. cit. 
42 Wyles p. 187 
43 ibid. 
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into another coat, but she said that this was entirely unnecessary 
and I therefore accompanied Inspector Clark with Miss Wild in 
a car which was driven by another man. "44 
At any rate, it was clear that Savidge was not to be allowed home. She was 
instead taken straight to Scotland Yard, where she claimed she met with Collins 
45 for the first time. Again, the likeliest explanation is that, despite ostensibly 
being a "modem, " independent young woman, Savidge simply had no idea of 
what might be lying in wait for her, or that she should have a legal representative 
present. Although the way in which she kept trying to persuade her escort to go 
home in order to change might be - indeed has been - viewed as a coded plea to 
speak to her mother, 
46 it seems far more likely that it Savidge wanted to go home 
to change her clothes so that she would feel more comfortable and on more level 
terms with her questioners. In the 1920s, especially for women, clothes were a 
strong indication of status; the wrong sort of clothes therefore meant a loss of 
status 47 Wyles is worth considering on this subject: 
"Irene Savage [sic] was neatly and tidily clad, but she was 
wearing her working clothes and this fact worried her. She 
very much wanted to go home and change into something 
smarter before going on to Scotland Yard... [Collins] would 
not agree and the car continued on direct to the office. I think 
his refusal of a perfectly reasonable request was a mistake 
though I understand why he refused. i48 
44 Statement by Irene Savidge, 23rd May 1928, "Inquiry of tribunal re 
Interrogation of Miss Savidge at C. O.: report on proceedings with newspaper 
extracts, " NA MEPO 3/554 
as Obviously, this again conflicted with Lilian Wyles's later account. 
46 Morton p. 71 (by implication, saying that Savidge was "refused permission" 
to go home and change): Lock p. 159 (again by implication). 
47 I am indebted to Professor Angela John for pointing out this aspect of 
Savidge's request, an explanation that would certainly never have occurred to 
me. 
48 Wyles p. 187 
261 
This was therefore directly opposed to what Savidge herself said at the time. 
Most probably, Wyles had either forgotten her role in this particular manoeuvre 
or recast it in order to show herself in a more favourable light. The reason for 
Collins's behaviour would be eminently understandable; he did not want 
Savidge's parents butting in on her interrogation and refusing to let her go to 
Scotland Yard. However, as we have established already, almost all the most 
reliable evidence points to the fact that he was not there. Wyles, it would seem, 
must take the blame for preventing Savidge from seeing her parents before her 
interrogation. 
All accounts at least agree that Wyles was dismissed upon their arrival at 
Scotland Yard, leaving Collins and Clark alone with Savidge. Savidge's own 
account of what happened next is that the officers proceeded to interrogate her 
for more than five hours without having any other witnesses present. During this 
period she became so exhausted that, rather than dispute statements that she 
subsequently described as false, she simply let the police write them down. The 
questions asked became more and more personal as time went on, including 
questions about her underwear, and whether she was wearing a short or a long 
petticoat on the night in question. Finally, she alleged that towards the end of the 
interview, Collins had proceeded to "demonstrate" what he meant by his 
insinuations and allegations. Specifically, he presaged his offensive (in more 
ways than one) with the comment, "Now you are a good girl and have never 
really had a man, have you? But there are a lot of things you can do without 
really sinning. " He then proceeded to put his hand on her knee, put his arm 
around her, and all the while make offensive remarks about her moral 
character. 49 The ordeal she endured over these five hours was so great that 
according to the man who took her case to Parliament, she fainted upon arriving 
so home 
49 ibid. 
50 , Miss Savidge's 5 Hours at Scotland Yard: M. P. discloses her amazing 
story, " Daily Mail 18th May 1928, cutting in NA HO 144/17752/512746/34. I 
have been unable to establish exactly why it was the MP for Dundee who raised 
this matter; presumably there was some kind of link with Savidge's family or 
friends, or more likely with Money (a former Labour Parliamentary candidate). 
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The case lost no time in being transferred to Parliament. The Labour MP 
for Dundee, Thomas Johnston, raised it on the 17th May. Although hardly a 
great name on the stage of history, he managed to find some true fire that night: 
"The Labour party had raised this discussion not because they 
had the slightest concern with what was known as the "Money 
case" or the "Hyde Park case. " Their concern was that they 
should take whatever steps could be taken by the House to 
preserve what civil liberties we still possessed, and it was their 
duty to offer determined and resolute opposition to anything in 
the nature of the Cheka the Russian-Soviet terrorist secret 
police], a Turkish system, Star Chamber methods, or what was 
known in the United States as the Third Degree. "s 
Unsurprisingly, he found a good deal of support on both sides of the House of 
Commons and outside. The press were ecstatic. This was a major scandal for 
them to get their teeth into, and they did not waste the opportunity. The more 
right-wing press led with praise for the House of Commons as an institution. The 
Daily Mail declared that: 
"The debate was a triumph for the House of Commons. It came 
into being in defence of the liberty of the subject. Nothing 
more sensational or passion-provoking has been witnessed in 
this Parliament. 
Members of the House of Commons may be of little 
account when the Government has decided on new legislation 
or on new taxation, but in the great and final issue of human 
freedom their voice is supreme. Members felt this tonight. It is 
probable that in history this parliament will be remembered by 
"32 this debate. 
st ibid. 
52 "Miss Savage's 5 Hours at Scotland Yard, " op. cit. 
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On the left, the Daily Herald had a good gloat that the Labour Party had finally 
achieved something, but added something more. After 1924, when the parties of 
the Left had been almost annihilated, the Conservatives had been all-powerful in 
Parliament. However, here was a Labour MP severely embarrassing the Home 
Secretary, the most senior of the right-wing Die-hards. In its lead article it went 
further than Johnston had done. It called for a scalp: 
"Sir William made one further statement of deep significance, 
in reply to Mr MacDonald. It was this: - 
If the police, even under the instructions of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions, have acted wrongly towards this lady, I 
am ultimately responsible. 
We may take it, therefore, that, when the case is sifted, 
and if it is found that the police are guilty of this amazing 
procedure, the necessary disciplinary action will be taken 
against the offending officers and the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, and that the Home Secretary will resign. 03 
This might have been written off as the words of a Socialist organ desperate to 
clutch at any straw in order to embarrass the government. However, one other 
paper, one in no sense Socialist (albeit in no sense either a friend to the Baldwin 
government) came to the same conclusion. The Daily Express thundered an 
equally fierce denunciation of Savidge's interrogation, and concluded with an 
ill-veiled threat: 
"The "voluntary statement" that is made after five hours' 
questioning by detectives has an ugly sound. It smacks far too 
much of the methods used by the New York police on the East 
Side gunmen. We write this realising that Scotland Yard has 
not been given a chance to make its explanation. But it would 
be as well for the Home Secretary and the Commissioner, Sir 
William Horwood, to realise that no one, no matter how highly 
s3 "Miss Savage" Lead article, Daily Herald, 
144/17752/512746/34 
18th May 1928, cutting in NA 110 
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placed, can be allowed to escape the most searching inquiry. 
Scotland Yard may produce complete justification for methods 
which appear inquisitorial and un-English. If Scotland Yard 
fails to do so, then judgement must fall not only on those who 
administer the system but those who inspire it"54 
Only these two papers picked up on this point. However, it is an extremely 
important point, and one that deserves underlining. Joynson-Hicks was directly 
responsible for the Metropolitan Police, and for them alone out of all the police 
forces of England, Wales and Scotland 55 All other forces were administered by 
the immediate local authorities: especially the county councils (including the 
county borough councils) and the city councils. However, the Metropolitan 
Police, as the largest and most important force, was the benchmark for all other 
constabularies to aspire to. Therefore it must be held to a high standard. In the 
event of serious constitutional errors, such as this one, they would be held 
politically accountable. In the British system, that means that the Minister 
responsible for them to Parliament would have to resign. This way Parliament 
could hold the government institutions to account, and be held accountable to the 
electorate for their own actions. It is the bedrock of representative democracy 56 
Both the Herald and the Express were quite correct to call for Joynson-Hicks's 
head in the event of the charges against Scotland Yard being proved. Given how 
badly his entire department had blundered - trying to force a magistrate to break 
confidentiality, believing charges that had been thrown out, foolishly entrusting 
an inquiry into the police to the police themselves, however good the reasons 
behind these decisions were - the demand for Joynson-Hicks's resignation was 
an eminently reasonable one, and Joynson-Hicks was very lucky to escape 
unscathed. 
Even before he had been attacked in this way, Joynson-Hicks had clearly 
become uneasy at what had happened. Prior to the debate, he had summoned 
54 «. he Scotland Yard Inquiry, " Daily Express, 18th May 1928, cutting in NA 
HO 144/17752/512746/34 
ss Northern Ireland, at that stage officially still part of the Kingdom of Ireland, 
as a self-governing province had a different system again. 
56 The most recent example of this principle in action at the time of writing was 
the dismissal of Charles Clarke over the foreign prisoners scandal, May 2006. 
265 
Collins, Clark and Wyles to his office in Parliament so that he could interrogate 
them himself. Much of the later confusion stemmed from what happened in this 
questioning. Rather than tell the truth, Wyles, on her own later admission, 
backed Collins, saying of him "nothing but good. 9957 The curious thing is that in 
her book she insisted that it was the truth. She subsequently repeated this 
statement to the tribunal, insisting that she had left to perform other duties, rather 
than being "dismissed" by Collins as reported in Savidge's statement (although 
Collins himself said that he "dismiss(ed) the lady police officer as she had other 
duties to do, but she was about if required) . 
58 The accounts of Collins and Clark 
were much more straightforward. Clark's in particular is a model of how to say 
nothing at all. It can be easily quoted in full: 
"I was introduced to the Manager by a local officer. 
The Manager sent for Miss Savage. I explained to her 
in his presence and he said to her, have you any objection to 
going down. She was quite willing to come. There was no 
question of communicating with her mother. 
At that time the manager turned to her and said - 
Nobody in the firm, Miss Savage, knows who these gentlemen 
are, so it would be just as well if you said nothing to 
anybody. 59 
She went out of the room to put on her overcoat and hat and 
was given a pass out check to leave the firm. 
She was gone about 10 minutes. 
I saw her in a room just inside the gates of the firm. 
On the way to Scotland Yard I was in front with the chauffeur 
and she sat with the lady inspector. 
S' Wyles p. 196. 
58 See Savidge's statement, op. cit.: also the statements of Woman Inspector 
Lilian Wyles (? 17th May 1928) and Detective Chief Inspector Alfred Collins, 
17th May 1928, both in NA HO 144/17752/512746/31b. The best attempt at 
cutting through the tangle of this evidence is in Lock, pp. 158.60,163, although 
it raises questions rather than answering them. 
59 Added by hand: "I myself made no such request. WIIC" (presumably W. H. 
Clark). 
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About 5 p. m. I think she said her mother was expecting her 
home about quarter to 6. 
On the way home I was sitting again in front with the chaffeur 
[sic]. "6° 
The studied deliberation and utter uselessness to the matter in question of this 
statement brings to mind a motion analogous to that of washing hands. Clearly 
Clark had seen that the entire interview had blown up in the faces of the 
Metropolitan Police, and wished to be dissociated from it. 
Collins was not afforded this luxury. He had to say what had happened: 
or alternatively, say what he wanted to be believed had happened. He in fact 
made three statements in total, in order to clarify certain points that were raised 
to cast doubt on the veracity of his story. Denied the option of silence, he elected 
to go on the attack, and adopted the simple tactic of denying everything in plain 
and forceful language: 
"I made no suggestion whatever that on the evening in 
question she had had so much to drink that she had no clear 
recollection of what was alleged to have taken place in the 
park. 
I did ask her what she was wearing on that evening, 
but I did not ask her to show me her underclothing; nor did I 
ask her to stand up [n]or did I inspect or examine her 
clothing. 
I asked her no questions as to her sexual relations 
with men. "61 
I Statement of Detective Sergeant Clark of New Scotland Yard, 17th May 
1928, in NA HO 144/17752/512746/31b. 
61 Statement by Collins on 17th May 1928 (not as above: one of three in the 
same folder on the same subject) in NA HO 144/17752/512746/3 lb. He did 
however admit that he had asked Savidge what She and Money had had to drink 
on the evening in question, but insisted that the "bottle of wine" noted in the 
answer was her own suggestion. 
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This denial was one that he was to repeat before the Court of Inquiry, and one 
that was to lead to much of the subsequent confusion in the case. 
Bolstered by this evidence Joynson-Hicks; who when he stood up to 
reply to Johnston was received in the dead silence so ominous to the 
parliamentary ear; 62 was willing to concede an inquiry. It is a fair assumption 
that had the officers not denied Savidge's story, he would not have done so. 
There is but little use holding an inquiry to establish what has already been 
agreed upon. But, as Joynson-Hicks put it, there was "a quite definite challenge 
of truth between those for whom Mr. Johnston has spoken and these two police 
officers. Clearly the matter could not be left at this impasse. But, equally, 
although the Daily Herald declared that Joynson-Hicks "was evidently greatly 
shocked at what had been alleged, "TM he was still on the side of the police, and 
expected the inquiry to clear them, saying: 
"You will remember that on the character of the police force 
depends a very great deal of the life of this great metropolis. If 
it can be established for one moment that charges of this kind 
are true it will be a very great slur upon the police force, and a 
disgrace which I don't hesitate to say they will take some time 
to live down. 
I say sincerely from the bottom of my heart I hope the 
result of the inquiry will not be to cast that slur. On the other 
hand the complainants are entitled to have that inquiry, so at 
once I accept the suggestion of Mr Johnston. "6s 
Joynson-Hicks also agreed to liaise with the principal Opposition spokesmen for 
Home Affairs, Arthur Henderson and Sir John Simon (both of whom were 
themselves former Home Secretaries) over the make-up of the tribunal, which he 
62 "Miss Savage's 5 Hours at Scotland Yard" Daily Mail op. cit. 63 ibid. 
64 "Home Secretary Agrees to Labour Demands, " Daily Herald op. cit. 65 "Miss Savage's 5 Hours at Scotland Yard" op. cit. 
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proposed should be chaired by a judge. 66 The net result was therefore an attempt 
to take the politics out of the situation. 
But the entire process was fraught with acute difficulty. The first problem 
lay in framing the terms of reference for the inquiry. Originally it was proposed: 
"That it is expedient that a Tribunal be established for inquiring 
into a definite matter of urgent public importance, that is to say, 
the conduct of the prosecution of Sir Leo Money and Miss 
Savidge and the evidence given therein, and the action of the 
police in connection with their interrogation of Miss Savidge on 
the 15th Day of May, 1928. -"67 
However, there was one highly significant drawback to this phrasing, as Sir John 
Simon pointed out: it practically retried the original offence that Money and 
Savidge had already been acquitted of, something illegal under British law at 
that time and indeed until recently. 8 The final draft removed all reference to the 
original arrest in Hyde Park, much to the dismay of the two police officers 
concerned who had hoped to be able to clear their names by giving evidence 
again 69 
It also proved to be quite difficult to find three satisfactory officials to sit 
on the tribunal. Eventually, Joynson-Hicks was able to report to the Cabinet that 
he had agreed with Henderson and Simon to appoint Sir John Eldon Bankes, a 
newly retired judge, as chairman, with J. J. Withers MP70 as the Conservative 
member and H. B. Lees-Smith MP71 representing Labour. It appears that both 
Henderson and MacDonald approved of these appointments. 
66 ibid. 
67 Draft resolution, in NA 110 144/17752/512746/56 
68 Sir John Simon to Sir William Joynson-Hicks, 21st May 1928, in NA HO 
144/17752/512746/56 
69 PCs Badger and McLean to their Divisional Chief Inspector, 24th May 1928, 
in NA HO 144/17752/512746/64 
70 Conservative MP for Cambridge University and a practising solicitor, noted 
for his fair-mindedness and his support of women's causes including the Equal 
Franchise Act: S. M. Cretney, `Withers, Sir John James (1863-1939)', Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, online edn, Oxford University Press, May 
2006 [http: /Iwww. oxforddnb. com/view/article/95283, accessed 25 Jan 2007] 
71 See above p. 252 for biography. 
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The tribunal sat for six days, and failed to reach a verdict. Two reports 
were eventually presented. Bankes and Withers exonerated the police 
(specifically Collins) of overt wrongdoing. Their verdict was that Savidge had 
probably been tired, overwrought and nervous, and that she was probably guilty 
both of confusion and exaggeration. However, both were sharply critical of the 
decision to take Savidge to Scotland Yard. Both considered that she had not been 
fully informed of what she was letting herself in for. Above all, they were 
emphatic that Wyles should not have left the room. It was recommended that in 
future a woman police officer should always be present at the taking of a 
statement from a woman on "matters intimately affecting her morals" unless the 
witness specifically asked otherwise. 
2 Lees-Smith went the other way, 
accepting Savidge's story. He described her as the more credible witness, 
dismissing the police evidence as something that "denied both the probable and 
the improbable with equal force. "73 He also expressed incredulity that Wyles 
should have been asked to leave the room when she clearly had no other duties 
to perform, and was only going to sit at the other end of the telephone line. His 
final verdict was that Savidge was asked many things that the officers had no 
right to ask her, and that her answers were twisted into misleading forms. 4 
Fifteen practical recommendations for reform were included, ranging from a 
tightening of the rules on interrogating witnesses to a recommendation that in 
future the police should not be asked to investigate their fellow officers, and that 
the Director of Public Prosecutions needed his own coterie of investigators for 
this purpose. He also agreed with the third point of the majority report 75 
Faced with all this mass of suggestions, it is perhaps not surprising 
(albeit depressing) that Joynson-Hicks elected to ignore the minority report. He 
was hardly proactive in implementing the majority report either. A new order 
was added to the book of Metropolitan Police Orders (number 72a) giving effect 
to their recommendation that in future a woman police officer should always be 
present at the taking of a statement from a woman on "matters intimately 
affecting her morals", but within two years it was found superfluous and was 
72 Majority report, published by HMSO in 1928, copy in NA 110 
144/17753a/512746/110 (p 16) 
73 ibid. p. 24 
74 ibid. p. 30 
75 ibid. pp. 30-32 
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withdrawn. 76 Therefore it may be said that the Savidge case was a tempest in a 
teacup, for all the turbulence it caused at the time. 
The question remains: what really happened? In the original incident, the 
policemen's story stands up; at least to a point. Money was a known and 
notorious womaniser even at the time, as is made clear by the remarks of Sir 
Archibald Bodkin. 77 Five years later Money's notoriety became still more 
widespread when he was arrested again for kissing a woman against her will in a 
train; this time he was convicted. 78 It is not surprising that Bodkin felt torn two 
ways between what the magistrate thought and what his own knowledge 
suggested. Although the affair is more than a touch ludicrous; the sequence of an 
elderly man seduces a young woman under a light, is seen and arrested, and has 
someone else run after him with an umbrella that he has understandably 
forgotten, sounds like something out of The Two Ronnies; it is believable. 
Morton may have considered that this was "a cheap arrest, " and that the two 
were arrested because they were an old man and a young girl in a park at night: 79 
but it seems unlikely that two people merely sitting decorously in chairs would 
be arrested. The officers would have run the risk of arresting every father and 
daughter on an evening stroll through the park. Cancellor himself, with his 
previously noted bias against the police, is an equally unreliable figure. The odds 
are that there was no perjury involved, even though it is certainly not out of the 
question that the officers exaggerated what they saw in order to make a 
conviction more likely (the masturbation element is certainly much less plausible 
than the tale of kissing with a hand up the skirt). This was implicitly recognised 
by the civil courts when a libel action against The Observer was settled in the 
constables' favour-80 
Collins is an entirely different matter. His account is certainly, as Lees- 
Smith noted, less credible than that of Savidge. Moreover, reading her 
statements it is hard to credit Savidge with the brains to think up the quite 
76 See NA HO 45/13804/52610319 for the recommendation to withdraw the 
order ("Recommendation XIV") and a copy of the order itself. 
77 See above pp. 256-257 
78 A file on this case was included in NA HO 144/17754/512746/141, 
presumably as a somewhat petty revenge on Money. 
9 Morton p. 76 
80 In MEPO 3/554 
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remarkable (and consistent) statement that she gave solely from her imagination 
(Lees-Smith thought they had an element of "child-like" simplicity and 
frankness about them). 81 To agree with Morton on this point, it was a classic 
cover-up. 82 Collins was trying to force Savidge to say things that would utterly 
discredit her, and it seems unlikely that he would have succeeded so well as he 
did without at least a measure of bullying. The tribunal was clearly stacked 
against a pro-Savidge verdict: the terms of reference meant that she would be the 
only material witness on her side against three police officers, all of whom were 
willing to be part of a cover-up. Although there is definitely a ring of 
"Establishment" against "Workers" in the way the verdict went, at bottom that 
imbalance of evidence is the probable cause of the confusion. 
There were inevitable repercussions. Sir Archibald Bodkin, whose initial 
decision to investigate further had backfired so badly, resigned very suddenly 
eighteen months later, having been under pressure to go for much of that time. It 
seems that he was badly shaken by his mistake of effectively retrying the 
original case and the disastrous fallout from it. William Horwood did not 
officially resign: but when he officially retired in 1929 on the grounds of age he 
was replaced by an older man, Lord Byng of Vimy. It is hard to believe that his 
retirement was voluntary or unconnected with the Savidge case. 
But there was a more positive side. Officers - including Collins himself - 
were a good deal more careful in future to have women officers present at the 
interrogation of female suspects and witnesses. And for Lilian Wyles, it marked 
the moment when she became accepted as a proper police officer, not some 
peculiar auxiliary of ambivalent status. Collins, indeed, became a friend that she 
valued highly. So, although the ill-treatment of one young woman was a 
shameful episode, nobody could deny that it had positive, albeit unintended, side 
effects 83 
The case of George Goddard was wholly different. It was a scandal that 
had been rumbling around for years before coming to a head. Finally, a 
combination of factors - the increasing restiveness of Joynson-Hicks at the 
81 Minority report op. cit. p. 24; also quoted in Morton p. 73 
82 Morton p. 76 
83 See Lock p. 163 and Wyles pp. 202-3 
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peculiar shortcomings of his drive against nightclubs, an anonymous letter, and 
the growing suspicion of Goddard's superiors at the top of the Metropolitan 
Police - conspired to bring the case entirely into the open. As far back as 1922 a 
young officer named Josling had reported to his superiors that Goddard had 
ordered him to leave street-betters alone. The superiors were furious, held an 
inquiry, and dismissed the officer concerned. That officer was not Goddard, but 
Josling. Charged with making false statements about a superior officer, he was 
condemned and sacked. 84 The snag was, as became painfully apparent in 1928, 
with the police still shaken after Savidge, that Josling was almost certainly 
telling the truth. 
The basic facts of the Goddard case concern less police cover-ups (like 
Savidge) and more a systemic failure of action. On the 27th February 1928, 
Goddard wrote such a glowing report on Kate Meyrick's "Forty-three Club" that 
his superiors, already becoming suspicious, seem to have taken alarm. Horwood, 
writing to Joynson-Hicks on the subject, declared that, although he was still fully 
confident in the Soho police, he was considering replacing the men policing the 
nightclubs with men from outside the Division. " Joynson-Hicks himself had 
already been desperately chivvying Horwood for some action over Meyrick, 
who in the word of Ronald Blythe, "flourished. 9986 But the final tipping-point 
seems to have come on the 23rd September 1928, when the following 
anonymous letter was received by the Commissioner: 
"Dear Sir 
I am desirous of bringing a matter of great public importance to 
your direct notice in order that you may cause immediate 
necessary action to be taken. It concerns the activities of 
Sergeant Goddard of Marylebone Station, who not only accepts 
bribes for services made and offered, but has financial interests 
in some of London's most notorious nightclubs. Goddard resides 
in his own freehold residence in Streatham, and he also owns a 
84 Morton pp. 79-80 
85 Horwood to Joynson-Hicks, 5th March 1928 NA HO 144/17667/471675/9 
86 Blythe p. 35. As usual, he exaggerated in saying that Meyrick was the only 
nightclub owner to escape the attention of the police, but she was certainly the 
most notorious. 
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beautiful Chrysler motor-car. His brother-in law is also in 
business provided by money supplied by Goddard. No notice 
was taken of my last letter to the authorities, and before 
approaching the political candidate for this constituency I am 
prompted to write this letter to you. I suggest that you call on all 
officers under your personal control to inquire into this 
communication"87 
This reference to "my last letter to the authorities" presumably implies that the 
same letter writer had earlier been in direct contact with Goddard's immediate 
superior. Goddard had obviously seen some such letter; in a report that Norwood 
forwarded to Joynson-Hicks in March, Goddard referred to anonymous letter 
writers making "insidious lying and unfounded allegations against Police who 
are powerless to defend themselves owing to the cunning of writers of 
complaints hiding under the cloak of anonymity, " (his errors of punctuation and 
grammar). 88 
However (presumably in April or May 1928) what is described in the 
files as "a non-police spy" infiltrated the Cecil Club at 43 Gerrard Street and 
subsequently successfully claimed £30 in expenses, a sign perhaps that this 
infiltration bore fruit. 89 What is certain is that in May 1928 Kate Meyrick finally 
suffered another raid by the police. Horwood was extremely pleased with the 
initial result (which was to confine Meyrick to prison for 6 months and hand her 
a stiff bill of costs) even though the club was promptly reopened in the same 
building under another name. 90 But this raised an awful lot of questions. Norman 
Birkett, hired to defend Meyrick, asserted that "the police have had nothing to 
report against Mrs. Merrick for practically three years... Surely we may be 
entitled to assume that for this period she has not been `an inveterate law- 
breaker. "'91 However, the police could not assume that. They had had a glowing 
$ý Quoted in Morton p. 77 
88 Report on 43 Gerrard Street by Sergeant Goddard, 27th February 1928, NA 
HO 144/17667/471675/9 
89 See NA HO 144/17667/471675/14 
90 Horwood to Under-Secretary of State Home Office, 4th July 1928 NA HO 
144/17667/471675/13 
91 Daily Express, 23rd June 1928, in NA HO 144/17667/471675/12 
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report of her premises less than three months before. Clearly something was very 
wrong somewhere, and the evidence suggested that that somewhere was 
Goddard. 
Goddard had previously insisted to his superiors, when they asked him 
how he funded his lavish lifestyle, that he had made his money through thrift, 
coupled with intelligent or lucky betting on the horses in the years after the war, 
using money that his wife had inherited, and had subsequently speculated on the 
foreign exchanges. However, the anonymous letter writer had an effect on this 
complacent thinking. Goddard was ordered to make a full list of all his contacts 
in this regard. Meanwhile, Chief-Inspector Cooper was ordered to investigate 
Goddard's personal finances. 
Far from confirming Goddard's unlikely stories, Cooper finally found the 
evidence to bring Goddard down. He uncovered a huge network of safe-deposits 
under a variety of names in which Goddard kept vast sums in cash 92 On October 
26th, 1928, Cooper and Chief Constable Wensley confronted Goddard, 
informing him that his safes had been discovered and that Goddard was to go 
with Cooper and bring the contents of those safes for inspection. "Upon that 
Goddard reeled as if he was about to faint. Recovering himself quickly, he said, 
"I am done for. , 93 
Done for he truly was. The notes seized by this move were traced. 
Mostly they were traced to nightclub owners, whom Goddard had plainly been 
bleeding white in an extensive protection racket stretching back years. 
Allegations that Goddard had been running a similar system for brothel keepers 
and street betters, while very probably true, were not substantiated in the same 
way. " Meyrick, ill in hospital, passed a frantic note to her daughter, "Beware of 
the notes! " Unsurprisingly, the daughter did not understand this cryptic 
communication, but Meyrick was correct; some of the notes were traced back to 
92 In fact two of them (at Selfridge's) were in Goddard's own name. However, it 
appears that he took fright upon seeing the anonymous letter and transferred 
large sums of money to another deposit rented in the name of Joseph Dankes. 
93 "Police Bribery Charges. Three Defendants At Bow-Street; Case For 
Prosecution, " The Times, Tuesday, 4th December 1928; pg. 11; Issue 45067; col 
A. This article has been the source for most of the information in the previous 
two paragraphs 
94 ibid. 
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her, and she duly stood trial with Goddard. " The two of them, along with 
another nightclub owner, were all convicted, fined, and imprisoned. 
The Goddard case has already been dealt with at some length in an 
earlier chapter, and there is no need to go over it in detail again. 6 However, 
there are several important points to bear in mind that were not relevant in 
chapter 6. Most significantly, Goddard was hardly a victim of Joynson-Hicks. 
He had almost certainly been running his protection racket for at least six years, 
probably much longer - ever since Josling's first, abortive attempt to blow the 
whistle in 1922. He had found himself a nice little earner. However, the drive 
against nightclubs must have made his services even more valuable to the 
nightclub owners. Although I have found no evidence of such a change, it seems 
logical to assume that his scale of fees rose as the demands for punitive action 
from the Home Office became louder and more insistent. Unlike Savidge, who 
was caught in forces she could not understand or control, or Collins, who was 
doing what he clearly thought was his job (exonerate his fellow officers) 
Goddard was out to feather his own nest. At that he was evidently very 
successful. 
However, there is an aspect in the Goddard case that was missing from 
the treatment of Collins, the man most at fault in the Savidge case. When Collins 
blundered so badly, the police rallied round him. Even Lilian Wyles, who of all 
people had little reason to love Collins, defended him in front of a tribunal. But 
Goddard was coldly and quite ruthlessly thrown to the wolves. Even though this 
may have been less a prejudice than a necessity, given how fragile public 
confidence in the police had become after Savidge and how serious his crimes 
were, there is still something almost shocking in the way he was attacked years 
after his case was over. 
The process of the law and the law-enforcers was vindictive right from 
the start. Part of Goddard's sentence included, understandably, a heavy fine and 
the payment of substantial costs, amounting in total to £2000 for the fine and at 
least as much again in costs 97 He would also, of course, have to forfeit the 
95 Kate Meyrick, Secrets of the 43 (second edition Dublin 1994) pp. 161-2 
96 See above, chapter 6. 
97 Costs were put at £2589/11/5 by Goddard's solicitor: see Freke Palmer 
(solicitor) to Treasury 15th May 1929, NA HO 144/12266/532055/26. For the 
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money he was convicted of receiving in bribes, which amounted to a further 
E925.98 All told this added up to about five and a half thousand pounds, very 
substantial money considering that originally the total sum in cash seized was 
£12,471/10. 
But there was a trifling problem. Upon Goddard's arrest all that money 
had been seized, and now the Home Office was trying to hang on to the full 
amount, regardless of the fact that over half of it still, in theory at least, belonged 
to Goddard. As James Morton noted, "Goddard certainly could not have come 
by this money honestly. "99 In fact, even to earn it dishonestly he must have been 
working overtime. But it had not been proven to be the proceeds of crime, 
however obvious it was that a man on a maximum of £6115 a week could not 
have saved it up himself. 100 Finally, after his release Goddard brought a lawsuit 
to recover what was left of his money. On the 11th December 1929 Mr Justice 
Rowlatt of the King's Bench division ordered that the balance of the original 
money, less outstanding fines, costs and money proved to be the proceeds of 
crime, should be paid to Goddard. But even here, the judge, officially impartial 
and giving judgement for Goddard, cut the former sergeant's solicitor dead with 
the words, "I am trying to hold the scales very evenly. I don't like your 
client. "101 Such a public expression of hatred and coldness from a bench that 
must be regarded as at least quasi-sympathetic to Goddard is nothing short of 
astonishing, and shows the very deep hatred that Goddard had inspired. 
Even before this judgement, the seizure and holding of his cash had 
caused problems for Goddard's wife. In fact, in order to pay his fine his assets, 
his house and furniture, were seized. This prompted her MP to write to Joynson- 
Hicks irritably, commenting that the action was "a little low" and warning him 
that "while there is no sympathy with Goddard there is considerable sympathy 
fine and costs part see "Goddard Case Sentences. Three Convictions., 
Imprisonment And £2,000 Fine On Goddard., Hard Labour For Mrs. 
Meyrick, " The Times Wednesday, 30th January 1929; pg. 9; Issue 45114; col A. 
Goddard was also sentenced to 18 months in prison. 
98 Tracing report on Goddard's funds, 20/2/1929, NA HO 
144/12266/532055/14. 
99 Morton p. 78 
'°° information for Court, 24th April 1929, NA HO 144/12266/532055/24 
101 "Judge and fate of money taken from Goddard, " Evening News 12th 
December 1929, in NA HO 144/12266/532055/35 
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for Mrs Goddard, and resentment at the brokers being put in. "02 Joynson-Hicks 
replied, declaring that he had no power to interfere with the courts in the levying 
of fines; the tone of his letter strongly suggests that he would have disdained to 
interfere even if he had been able to. 103 Indeed, when Rowlatt ordered the return 
of Goddard's money he included a criticism of the police for holding onto it, 
implying that they had acted rashly and laid themselves open to prosecution. 
Joynson-Hicks was delighted to claim full and sole responsibility, even declaring 
that he had ordered the seizure and retention of the money in writing. Moreover, 
this was not in a quiet statement to the House of Lords, but in a public letter to 
the Daily Mail. 104 His letter might even be read as an implied criticism of the 
judge for being so fool as to give Goddard any of his supposedly ill-gotten gains 
back at all. 
But it did not end there. Thwarted in their aim of stripping him of every 
penny that he had made, the senior police powers proceeded to rubbish him 
personally in an extended smear campaign. In 1934 Sir John Moylan, the 
"Receiver" (that is, lay controller of the Metropolitan Police's finances) 
dismissed the Savidge case as "of little public importance in itself, " to the extent 
that two of three members of the initial enquiry wholly exonerated the police of 
improper conduct. los The fact that such an enquiry had never been needed 
before, he argued, was "remarkable testimony to the absence of oppressive 
methods. "106 
Moylan devoted something in the order of seven or eight pages of his 
book to this persistent whitewash. 107 But when it came to Goddard, it was a very 
different story. Scathing is hardly the word for it: 
102 Sir W. Lane-Mitchell MP to Joynson-Ilicks, 4th March 1929, NA HO 
144/12266/532055/19 
103 Reply, 12th March 1929, ibid. 
104 Letter from Lord Brentford, Daily Mail 14th December 1929: see also 
article, "Lord Byng and Goddard" in the same newspaper, NA HO 
144/12266/532055/35 
ios Sir John Moylan, C. B., C. B. E., Scotland Yard and the Metropolitan Police" 
(second edition London 1934) p. 212. The subclause of the sentence after the 
quotation marks is a paraphrase. 
16 ibid. p. 213 (he also added that it rarely came up in court cases that testimony 
had been obtained by torture). 
107 Specifically, pages 75-76,212-214,251-252 
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"Given the temptations to which policemen are exposed and how 
little they were paid in the past [corruption is surprisingly 
little]... The facts with regard to the police and night clubs which 
were exposed in the Goddard case (1929) related to a very special 
sphere of police duty, and one of the features of this case was the 
practical monopoly, so to speak, of corruption, in a singularly 
fruitful field for it, by one sergeant who secured for himself a sum 
more than sufficient to bribe a whole Division. "108 
In that verbal blow not only did Moylan label corruption as isolated, but he also 
hinted that Goddard was a greedy, selfish and gratuitously immoral character, 
allowed to indulge his vices by the accidentally propitious nature of his duties. 
Strong stuff. In a further book of 1948 he was still industriously whitewashing 
the Savidge case (or at least, the Royal Commission that followed it) but he 
employed a still deadlier weapon towards Goddard; that of silence. 
109 Instead, he 
spent most of the book declaring how noble, self-sacrificing and upright the 
police were. Perhaps he felt that a World War might have dulled some 
memories; perhaps it had merely dulled his own. 
The alarming feature about this is that Goddard cannot have been 
working on his own. The fact that Josling had been dismissed in 1922 without 
even the most cursory of investigations into his claims about Goddard strongly 
suggests that at least one officer higher up the chain of command in Soho knew 
all about what was going on, or at least did not want to know - not necessarily 
the same thing in theory, but much the same in practice. Anthony Judge, in an 
interview with Morton, dismissed as "laughable" the notion that Goddard was 
working alone and in secret from his senior officers for at least seven years. 110 
And it is perhaps significant that it was not until the Commissioner and the 
Home Secretary became personally involved by the means partly of an 
anonymous letter-writer and partly because of their confusion over how Meyrick 
was getting away with her activities that anything happened to break Goddard's 
108 ibid. pp. 327-8 
109 See Sir John Moylan, The Police of Britain (London 1948); the Royal 
Commission is mentioned on p. 37 
110 Morton p. 80 
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power. It is perhaps also significant that the first letter (presumably sent to 
Goddard's immediate superior in Soho) was not investigated - it was just shown 
to Goddard, who baldly denied all the allegations. Yet nobody higher up the 
chain of command was ever prosecuted for (or even, according to official files, 
suspected of) taking bribes. 
There has always been something of a culture of denial in the police 
1 
about corruption, one that continues to this day, as recent reports clearly show. 
"' 
Throughout all time, as James Morton so graphically revealed, not only have 
coppers taken kickbacks, but their superiors do not want to know. 
112 But here 
this "I'm alright Jack" attitude cost them all the dearer when it came out. 
It is perhaps unfair to blame Joynson-Hicks entirely for the failings of the 
police that I have outlined here. For a start, Goddard at least had almost certainly 
been taking protection money from the criminals of Soho for years before 
Joynson-Hicks arrived on the scene. Further, the institutional framework of the 
Metropolitan police, while overseen by the Home Office, was the direct 
responsibility of the Commissioner. A far bigger share of the blame must surely 
therefore lie with William Horwood - which would fit in with other historical 
assessments of his abilities and his negative effect on the Metropolitan Police. A 
comparatively recent assessment of him by J. B. Lopian was damning in the 
extreme. He detailed how Horwood forcibly extended police duties (to cover 
such things as "nuisance crimes, " i. e. prostitution, indecency, nightclubs etc. ) 
even before 1924, at a time when numbers were falling due to government 
economies (it took three years for the Force to recover its numbers after the 
infamous "Geddes Axe"). No attempt was made to introduce new technology of 
more than a very basic kind, or to reform a Victorian command structure to cope 
with the modem city, or to provide new communication facilities. 113 
... See Ben Leapman and Tom Harper, "Corrupt officers damage Met, says 
report, " The Sunday Telegraph, 11th February 2007, accessed electronically on 
the 19th February 2007, 
http: //www. telegraph. co. uk/news/main jhtml; jsessionid=CJSUD3XTWZBNZQ 
FI QMGCFF OAV CBQUI V 0? xm1=/news/2007/02/ 11 /npol i ce l 1. xml 
112 See Morton, especially the Introduction. 
113 See Jonathan Bernard Lopian, "Crime, Police and Punishment 1918-1929: 
Metropolitan experiences, perceptions and policies, " University of Cambridge 
PhD thesis (1986) pp. 15-21 
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All the evidence, this study concluded, is that the Home Office would 
have liked these things, especially more police and above all more women 
police; but Horwood failed to give the necessary backing to their attempts to 
convince the Treasury on the first, and implacably opposed women police every 
step of the way. "4 When looked at in comparison with his successor Lord Byng, 
who despite poor health due to his age, tight budgets due to the onset of the 
Great Depression, no previous experience of policing and a mere three years of 
tenure, achieved a near-revolution in the both the performance of the police and 
their role, Horwood's performance in ten years seems still worse. "" Joynson- 
Hicks might perhaps have done better to rid himself of Horwood after the 
General Strike (which was to prove his high-water mark as Commissioner) and 
get someone with more fire in. However, sacking such a senior official would 
always be ticklish, not to say downright risky. Joynson-Hicks was no doubt 
relieved when he could plausibly "retire" Horwood, but doubtless he would have 
liked to be rid of him much earlier. 
But the policing of "nuisance crime, " especially nightclubs, was very 
much part of Joynson-Hicks' own plan for London, even if Horwood had 
worked on it before his tenure at the Home Office and Byng afterwards; it 
peaked when he was Home Secretary. And therefore, especially following the 
Home Office's unwise decision to accept Bodkin's advice on the methodology 
to pursue the Savidge case, Joynson-Hicks must be held at least partly 
responsible for what went wrong. Not only constitutionally responsible; nobody, 
least of all Joynson-Hicks himself, would question that he was definitely that. 
But in, not a small way, or a large way, but a medium-sized way he participated 
in making the police, by 1930, one of the least trusted of all government 
organisations, despite its near-universal acclaim in the aftermath of the General 
Strike a mere four years earlier. Goddard and Collins were the architects of their 
own destruction, but the institutional framework and the policy background 
provided practically begged for their crimes and errors to happen. 
tis ibid. pp. 21-5 
115 ibid. pp. 26-7 
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Conclusion. 
I 
Throughout this thesis, it is clear that the "forces of reaction, " or "forces of 
conservatism" as a more recent Prime Minister might have said, were strong, 
and effectual, and enjoyed more support than their detractors at the time and 
since are willing to acknowledge. Keeping Hyde Park free of courting couples 
may have been like taking coals to Newcastle, but the theatre censorship system 
remained largely unchallenged - thanks not to a penal system or to its being 
especially popular in Parliament, but because theatre managers knew that, when 
a play had been licensed by the Lord Chamberlain, there was no danger of an 
action brought against them for obscenity. The Obscene Publications Act 
survived not necessarily because it was any good, but because it was so seldom 
used that very few people could muster up the energy to do anything about it to 
try and improve it, at a time when so many other pressing matters were on hand. 
Equally, the nightclub law proved nearly unenforceable - but that did not make 
nightclubs popular with the public at large. Drug legislation and policy has 
swung from one extreme of opinion to the other since the 1960s. And the film 
censorship system that was brought to its full fruition in the 1920s is still in 
operation today. 
Throughout all ages, all societies have practised censorship of one form 
or another, be it political, moral or social. However, the system operated in Great 
Britain' in the 1920s has come under severe and sustained attack. While much of 
it was written at the time, rather more has been written retrospectively. It 
therefore becomes difficult to judge exactly how far popular support swung, one 
way or another. 
Although class-based analyses have become unfashionable in recent 
years, Britain in the 1920s was a nation still strongly defined by social class and 
status, and it is worth considering the problem in light of this. There is an easily 
accessible reference point. John Stuart Mill was probably the most important 
British philosopher of the Victorian era, and he had much to say on this 
particular subject in relation to his own time. In perhaps his most famous essay, 
On Liberty, he discussed the problems of a class-based system of morality, with 
1 Northern Ireland had its own rules. 
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particular attention to Alexis de Tocqueville's concerns about the "tyranny of the 
majority. " His general argument is best summarized in his own words: 
"Wherever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality 
of the country emanates from its class interests, and its feelings of 
class superiority... the sentiments thus generated, react in turn upon 
the moral feelings of the ascendant class, in their relations among 
themselves. Where, on the other hand, a class, formerly ascendant, 
has lost its ascendancy, or where its ascendancy is unpopular, the 
prevailing moral sentiments frequently bear the impress of an 
impatient dislike of superiority. "2 
This is a model that is very attractive, and more than superficially so. It seems 
particularly applicable to pre-First World War "middle class morality" so 
wonderfully lampooned by Alfred P. Doolittle in George Bernard Shaw's classic 
1914 play Pygmalion: 
"I' m one of the undeserving poor, thats what I am... [I'm] up agen 
middle class morality all the time. If theres anything going, and I put 
in for a bit of it, it's always the same story: "Youre undeserving, so 
you cant have it. But my needs is as great as the most deserving 
widow's that ever got money out of six different charities in the 
same week for the death of the same husband. I dont need less than a 
deserving man: I need more. I dont eat less hearty than him; and I 
drink a lot more. " 3 
A dominant class forcing its own ideas on a reluctant lower class was the most 
important strand of Stefan Petrow's work on how the suppression of vice and 
immorality in London had greatly extended the powers of the Metropolitan 
2 John Gray (ed. ) John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, and Other Essays (Oxford 1991) 
t, p. 10-11 
George Bernard Shaw, Pygmalion (London 1957) Act II (p. 58). N. B. Shaw's 
prejudice against English spelling, which forms a large part of the plot of 
Pygmalion, extended to apostrophes. 
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police in the late nineteenth century - one that borrows openly from Mill .4 
Petrow also emphasised that the First World War greatly extended the power of 
the state and permitted it to extend social control from "the bottom 30 per cent to 
other classes. "5 He never seems to have taken the next logical step and asked 
why that spread in power should have happened - when on his own readings of 
increasing industrial unrest signifying working class rebellion against middle 
class constraints and a decline in the power of the Nonconformist churches, the 
precise opposite effect of weakened middle class influence should have been the 
result. 
Here, again, we look at Mill. Petrow would presumably take the view, 
along with Mill, that the 1920s showed a middle class ascendancy was on the 
wane following the difficulties and economic crises attendant on the First World 
War, and that the efforts at artistic and social rebellion discussed in this thesis 
were a symptom of that rebellion. Again, there is much that is attractive in that 
view, and it would seem certainly to be received wisdom on the subject. But 
there is a problem with this argument - it simply cannot be correct. 
Ross McKibbin, sticking with great determination to an old-fashioned 
class-based analysis of British society, is the most important source here. In his 
book Classes and Cultures, he argues that between 1918 and 1923, the middle 
classes felt themselves to be under genuine pressure. Yet after 1923, the middle 
classes actually throve and prospered, benefiting from the weaknesses of their 
social superiors and their inferiors; or in McKibbin's own words, "the crisis was 
comparatively short and resolved largely in favour of the middle class"6 But 
McKibbin also underlined the fact that it did not necessarily look that way to the 
middle classes themselves. The 1920s was a time of unprecedented class conflict 
- culminating in the General Strike of 1926. It is also notable that Jeffrey 
Richards concluded that censorship in the cinema was primarily an instrument of 
social control by one class over anther.? The evidence for this thesis not only 
4 Stefan Petrow, Policing Morals: The Metropolitan Police and the Home Office 
1870-1914 (Oxford 1994) pp. 294-296 
S ibid. p. 300 
6 Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 1918-1951 (Oxford 2000) p. 
50 (pp. 50-52) 
7 Jeffrey Richards, The Age of the Dream Palace: Cinema and Society in Britain 
1930-1939 (London 1984) p. 89 
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tends to confirm his analysis, but strongly suggests that it spread into various 
other sectors as well. 
Taking this to its logical conclusion and with reference again to Mill, we 
might accept that instead of a waning middle class ascendancy, the 1920s was a 
time when middle class ascendancy was unpopular with virtually everybody else 
and that the moral warfare outlined in this thesis was a symptom of it. Yet more 
than seventy-five years earlier, Marx and Engels had been writing of the war 
between middle and lower class - making it reasonable to question whether such 
a scenario would be anything very new. 8 Once the theory of class warfare is 
allowed, it seems reasonable to assume it is a constant war that would lead to 
any dominant class being unpopular. 
A much more plausible explanation, albeit one still based on class might 
be made as follows. If in the 1920s the middle classes were unusually powerful, 
and able to impose their morality on the rest of the population, it is fair to note 
that it was unpopular among those people who made up the more cultured 
groups that it now targeted. Police may have always been unpopular with 
prostitutes, street-betters and the like, but nightclubs were the haunts of the 
wealthy and famous, and it was the wealthy and famous who were embarrassed 
by the raids on them. Radclyffe Hall was a wealthy woman. D. H. Lawrence was 
not in fact from a wealthy or privileged background, but he encapsulated a 
newly found working class ability to rise into this group and pepper it with his 
own opinions following the introduction of universal education. Moreover, this 
vocal grouping was the very one with not only the power but the skill to put its 
point of view across most effectively - something the Civil Servants of the 
Home Office seemed less capable of doing. An element of antagonism between 
a well-established and powerful elite and a vocal, well-organised grouping 
outside it would certainly be the most plausible explanation of the efforts both to 
throw off conventional morality by one group and to enforce it by another that 
has been examined in this thesis. 
8 A. J. P. Taylor (ed) Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto 
(London 1967) pp. 79-80 
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II 
Of course, leaving aside the issue of what was causing such friction, there is the 
obvious question of what censorship was really trying to achieve. This confusion 
is inherent in Donald Thomas's recent book on the subject, which never offers a 
definitive ruling on the issue - although this may simply be because he neglected 
to write a proper conclusion, preferring a narrative account instead. One 
reviewer thought that Thomas was arguing that censorship was intended simply 
to suppress what was censored - and agreeing wholeheartedly that usually such 
suppression was ineffectual, tending to draw the item in question to the attention 
of a wider public, but it has to be said it is not easy to discern such a clear-cut 
argument in Thomas's own book. 
9 In this analysis of course, the aims of 
censorship are simple - to punish those who transgressed against societal (or 
governmental) taboos and try to confine the publications or behaviour of such 
transgressors to as small an audience as possible. 
Yet this cannot be wholly accurate. While Joynson-Hicks was anxious to 
keep the suppression of The Well of Loneliness as quiet and uncontroversial as 
possible, the genie of publicity had already been well and truly released from his 
lamp in that particular case by James Douglas, who had achieved more publicity 
with one savage editorial than the most over-zealous City magistrate could have 
garnered in a prosecution - and therefore there would have been little enough to 
lose by banning it in a loud public court case (as eventually happened). 
Steve Nicholson's own explanation of censorship is much more coherent 
in light of the evidence -- that in fact, censorship existed not so much to remove 
controversial items (plays, in this case) from circulation, as to prevent them ever 
actually being allowed to get there in the first place. In that sense The Well of 
Loneliness case, to continue with the above example, becomes less an ineffectual 
aberration and more an effort along the lines of the execution of the eighteenth 
century seaman Admiral Byng - who, found guilty of "not trying his utmost in 
the presence of the enemy, " was shot on his own quarterdeck, in the words of 
one (fictional) French observer that have passed into legend, "pour encourager 
9 Alasdair Palmer, "Speak freely about censorship, " The Daily Telegraph (Arts 
and Books Section) 11th October 2007, available online at 
http: //www. telegraph. co. uk/arts/main jhtml? xml=/arts/2007/10/11/botho107. xm 
1 (retrieved 17th June 2008) 
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les autres. s10 The Well of Loneliness may not have been particularly obscene, 
but it set the standard for prosecutions under such laws for the next thirty years - 
until supplanted by a new law in 1959 and the famous trial of Penguin Books 
over Lady Chatterley's Lover in 1960. It was also, it has to be said, unlucky in 
that it was singled out - both Compton Mackenzie's Extraordinary Women and 
Virginia Woolf s Orlando, published in the same year, managed to somehow 
escape the kind of opprobrium heaped upon Radclyffe Hall's book. However, 
after 1928, it was many years before lesbian relationships were again openly 
depicted in novels. From that point of view the law achieved its purpose. 
It is a little more difficult to apply this precisely to the other three topics 
covered. For instance, the BBFC can hardly have hoped to influence Sergei 
Eisenstein to cease making Soviet propaganda films when they banned 
Battleship Potemkin, as this would have caused him considerably more difficulty 
with the Russian authorities in his own land than the BBFC could ever have 
hoped to give him abroad. But by laying down strict guidelines on what they 
would and would not pass they did exert some measure of control over what 
reached the screen. While this control was not complete, they did at least set the 
parameters of acceptability much more closely than either the film trade (whose 
interests they nominally served) or the local authorities (whom they were 
supposed to be working with). However, in this case it is reasonable to assume 
that the BBFC and the Home Office were genuinely concerned at the possibility 
that such films might provoke unrest or lead to a strengthening of Communist 
agitators among the unions. Given that this is after all one of the aims of 
propaganda, it would be an understandable fear. 
Success in discouraging or at least curtailing immoral behaviour could 
only be achieved at a price. The police force was rocked by a series of scandals 
in the Metropolitan Police caused by these campaigns - most notably the 
Savidge inquiry and the Goddard prosecution. The image of politicians, already 
somewhat tarnished by the failures of the First World War, the war in Ireland 
and the continuing chronic unemployment in Britain's antiquated heavy 
industries, took a further level of oxide. Playwrights and film makers of high 
quality found their products restricted -although whether this was a serious loss 
10 The observer being Candide, in Voltaire's novel Candide. 
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to artistry it is impossible to know, as it is not possible to prove what might have 
been written had the writers not been wary of writing unpublishable work - 
although Maurice, E. M. Forster's penultimate novel, perhaps gives some idea. 
For those who did openly transgress, the penalties were severe, but they tended 
to be writers of the second rank. Forster's Maurice was far more daring than The 
Well of Loneliness - which is presumably why it remained unpublished until 
after Forster's death. Radclyffe Hall may have been a prize-winning author, but 
the prize winning novel in question was ruthlessly satirized by Dorothy L. 
Sayers in Gaudy Night. ' The top-level authors who suffered most were D. H. 
Lawrence and James Joyce - but it has to be said that Lady Chatterley's Lover is 
not one of Lawrence's better works, and Joyce's problems began long before 
Joynson-Hicks arrived at the Home Office and continued for eight years after he 
had left. Among playwrights, the affected included George Bernard Shaw, one 
of the greatest thespian writers of the modem age. However, his most serious 
problem - the outright ban - was confined to one play, Mrs Warren's Profession 
- which is not one of his best efforts. 
How far status and general hypocrisy fed into each other on this issue it 
is impossible to judge. After all, writers of the second rank are more open to 
prosecution even under a system that permits a defence of artistic merit because 
their work is, almost by definition, not artistically significant. Certainly Bernard 
Shaw, despite his travails over Mrs Warren's Profession, was able to get away 
with many things that more junior playwrights would have been unable to - for 
instance, Eliza's famous phrase "not bloody likely" in Pygmalion - and was able 
to get servile letters from the Lord Chamberlain saying how important his 
opinion was when he actually asserted himself. In an earlier age, Thomas Hardy 
had written ever more controversial books without being censored, until the 
reaction to Jude the Obscure's position on divorce made him decide to give up 
writing novels altogether. It is interesting to speculate whether Radclyffe Hall 
'I Adam's Breed, Hall's most successful novel, is about a waiter who contracts a 
complex about eating because of the amount of food he has to work with, and 
eventually starves to death under a tree. In Gaudy Night, Harriet Vane is forced 
to listen to a diatribe about a novel called Mock Turtle, a book about a lifeguard 
at a swimming baths who is unable to bear the sight of skin through seeing so 
many scantily-clad female swimmers and eventually goes mad when his wife 
runs off with a nudist. Dorothy L. Sayers, Gaudy Night (London 1990) pp. 205- 
206 
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would have been allowed to write on lesbianism had she been as good a writer as 
Hardy. 
However, it should be noted that one of the unusual things about 
Joynson-Hicks' tenure of the Home Office was his willingness to enforce the 
law irrespective of the status of the transgressor. This is the most curious thing 
about the night clubs campaign in particular - the fact that it generally targeted 
those people (the upper classes) who had been previously immune from the 
attentions of the police. The same thing might easily be said about recreational 
drug users - although it is hard to quantify such things due to the patchy nature 
of the records. However, if the nephew of a wealthy and powerful Indian rajah 
could be prosecuted for selling drugs at a time of growing unrest in India, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the police were becoming less wary of 
offending those in high positions -a point that also holds relevance to the 
Savidge case, where former Member of Parliament Leo Money may have been 
let off by a magistrate, but was shown no previous mercy by the police 
themselves. We come back again to questions of class. The First World War 
may or may not have left the upper classes substantially weaker - there seems 
little doubt that it did affect them to some extent, at least in terms of wealth but, 
in a knock on effect, in terms of political power too12 - but it seems to have led 
to a willingness by the middle class politicians to assert themselves over both 
ends of the social spectrum. Perhaps in this measure of control, may be 
discerned the fear of losing political and social pre-eminence among the middle 
classes noted above - perhaps an unrealistic but nevertheless understandable 
fear. In asserting their morality, they did undoubtedly reassert their pre- 
eminence. Of course, it is worth noting that Middlemas and Barnes partly 
blamed Joynson-Hicks' night club campaign for Baldwin's defeat in 1929, to a 
Labour government elected to represent the workers - even though chronic 
unemployment was unquestionably a more important factor. 13 It is perhaps 
understandable that assertions of class dominance would lead to the fostering of 
further class resentment - particularly in hard times. 
12 McKibbin, pp. 42-43 
13 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London 1969) p. 
515 
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III 
It is generally assumed that Joynson-Hicks' tenure at the Home Office marked a 
particularly harsh period of suppression of immoral and obscene behaviour. 
14 
This is certainly not only confined to times that have the benefit of hindsight - if 
anything, it was more forcibly expressed at the time. Theodor Goodman referred 
to Joynson-Hicks' tenure of the Home Office in a letter to Clynes, the new 
Home Secretary, thus: 
"Under the last government England was rapidly becoming a place 
where the self-respecting artist could no longer work. Surely the 
Labour government... will finally dispell [sic] these final vestiges of 
Victorian prudery and opression [sic] from England. "5 
This attitude reached an extreme with Ronald Blythe in the 1960s, when 
freedom of expression and the "permissive society" made all forms of 
censorship seem archaic. But in reality it is difficult to see precisely how the 
conduct of the Home Office under Joynson-Hicks differed from its conduct 
under David Maxwell Fyfe in the 1950s, who was credited with a relentless 
crusade against homosexuality. Matt Houlbrook noted that "official rhetoric was 
suffused with vitriolic hostility towards the queer. "16 Yet Houlbrook himself was 
doubtful about how far Maxwell Fyfe's remarks were the cause of an anti-gay 
crusade, and how far they were simply an expression of a general resumption of 
a police campaign against behaviour that they had relaxed their vigilance on 
during the Second World War when they had rather more important matters on 
hand. 
Martin Francis drew a blunt and explicit parallel between the two 
campaigns - Joynson-Hicks and his literature and nightclubs, and David 
Maxwell Fyfe and homosexuals. He added that in his opinion both were born 
partly of a fear of Communism -a generic fear in the 1920s, and by the link 
'4 See, for instance, Marek Kohn, Dope Girls: The Birth of the British Drug 
Underground (London 1992,2001) p. 140 
15 Theodor Goodman to J. It. Clynes, 6th July 1929, in NA HO 45/24788 
16 Matt Houlbrook, Queer London: Perils and Pleasures in the Sexual 
Metropolis, 1918-1957 (Chicago 2005) p. 34 
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between homosexuality and Russian sympathies made in the public and political 
mind by the Burgess and Mclean affair. '? He also pointed out that both Maxwell 
Fyfe and Joynson-Hicks had links with Lancashire's Evangelical Toryism 
(although in Joynson-Hicks' case at least, it has to be considered very doubtful 
whether that had the slightest effect on his already well-formed opinions). Yet 
David Maxwell Fyfe went on to be a respected and long-serving Lord 
Chancellor, who played the role of "kingmaker" when Harold Macmillan 
became Prime Minister in 1957 and whose dismissal in 1962 marked a crucial 
step towards Macmillan's fall. 18 And it is hard to see quite how his successor at 
the Home Office, Rab Butler, was any more lenient on immoral behaviour. 19 
Although Butler did make modest reforms - most notably the Obscene 
Publications Act of 1959 - he refused to decriminalise sodomy, and it was on his 
watch that Lady Chatterley's Lover was eventually prosecuted. 20 But nobody 
could accuse Butler of being a Diehard reactionary - on the contrary, he was 
overlooked for the premiership in 1957 largely because he was considered by the 
Tory party to be too left-wing21 
As we have already seen, Lawrence had as much trouble with J. R. 
Clynes as he did with Joynson-Hicks. But there were other authors respected for 
their artistic value who had difficulty with authority long before either had even 
arrived on the scene. James Joyce, the Irish author of Ulysses, had to arrange for 
the publication of this, his most famous work, abroad. In 1922, the Director of 
17 Martin Francis, "Set the People Free"? Conservatives and the State, 1920- 
1960" in Martin Francis and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds. ) The 
Conservatives and British society, 1880-1990 (Cardiff 1996) pp. 5 8-77, pp. 65- 
67 and 72-73. I am indebted to Dr. Sian Nicholas for drawing my attention to 
this article. 
18 He was dismissed as one of the victims of Macmillan's "Night of the Long 
Knives", along with Selwyn Lloyd. See Robert Blake, The Conservative Party 
from Peel to Major (London 1997) pp. 278,288. 
19 Maxwell Fyfe's immediate successor was Gwilym Lloyd George (1954-1957) 
before Butler accepted the Home Office upon being overlooked for the 
premiership. 
° Francis, p. 72: a recent account of the Lady Chatterley trial, which does not 
mention Butler, can be found in Thomas, chapter 10, especially pp. 239-247 
21 Edward Heath, The Course of My Life: My Autobiography (London 1998) p. 
178: "Whereas the left and centre would reluctantly accept Macmillan's 
leadership... many on the right could never forgive Butler. " Note - this 
particular classification was due to the opinions of the two candidates on Suez, 
but there is no reason to think that it did not extend to other points of policy. 
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Public Prosecutions had attempted to read it (and on his own admission, failed to 
do so) but considered what he could read was obscene? This would have been 
while William Bridgeman was Home Secretary - one of Baldwin's oldest 
friends and political allies. It should be noted that this advice was altered by the 
Attorney-General, Donald Somervell, in 1936, who simply stated that it would 
be foolish to take action as "standards in these matters are constantly 
changing. s23 But throughout all bar a few years of the interwar period -a period 
that included two Labour governments - there was no effort to allow a book now 
recognised as a landmark in literature to be published. 
Similar problems had beset D. H. Lawrence long before either Pansies or 
Lady Chatterley's Lover. The Rainbow, his 1915 book about the sexual history 
of an extended family now considered to be one of his best works, was banned 
in much the same way as The Well of Loneliness - by a magistrate making a 
destruction order. 24 It seems at the very least unlikely that Sir John Simon, the 
then Home Secretary, had either no knowledge or no hand in the proceedings. 
Yet he was an Asquithian Liberal, in a government that still had at least a 
Liberal imprimatur. While he did later become a de facto Conservative, rising to 
be Lord Chancellor in Churchill's wartime government, he was certainly imbued 
with the ideals of Liberalism. It would seem that they did not stretch quite as far 
as free speech for books that were held to be obscene. 
On nightclub raids, the only issue apart from literary censorship where 
the Home Secretary's personal influence may be discerned, the same pattern 
applies. Nightclubs were a postwar phenomenon, so far as can be judged deeply 
unpopular with the public at large, the press, the senior ranks at least of the 
police force and politicians (apart from those politicians who, like Sir Robert 
Home, were "haunters of nightclubs") 25 While the corruption of the Soho police 
hamstrung efforts to bring them into line for several years, Goddard's arrest and 
imprisonment removed that obstacle. Lord Byng of Vimy, the new 
Commissioner, was just as vigorous in pursuit of nightclubs as Joynson-Hicks 
22 Report of the Director of Public Prosecutions on Ulysses, 22nd December 
1922, in NA HO 144/20071/186428/2 
23 Minute by the Attorney General (D. Somervell) November 1936 (precise date 
not given) in NA HO 144/20071/186428/61 
24 Thomas p. 102. 
25 Blake p. 226 
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had been - and, relieved of the protection rackets of the 1920s, rather more 
effective. The coming of the Depression in 1929 may have assisted him in his 
efforts, but it was his proud boast in 1930 that the London nightclub scene was 
dead. 
Leaving aside the question of before and after Joynson-Hicks' tenure, we 
have to consider how much he would have achieved during his time in office 
had he not been fully supported by the civil servants - many of them, like him, 
middle class. Special mention should be made of Sir John Anderson, who spent 
ten turbulent years as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office between 
1922 and 1932 before becoming Governor of Bengal, crowning his career by 
entering Parliament and serving with distinction under both Chamberlain and 
Churchill in a variety of wartime Cabinet posts - including Home Secretary 
(1939-40) and finally Chancellor of the Exchequer (1943-45) in which post he 
was the number three in the government after Churchill and Eden. 26 As a result 
he has tended to be lauded by most of his biographers and historians for his 
administrative genius and strong sense of duty. Yet if blame for the Home 
Office's policies of repression is to be apportioned anywhere, much of it must be 
laid firmly at his feet. While a fairly low percentage of documents on this topic 
did not carry the endorsement of Joynson-Hicks, it was extremely rare to find a 
document on any important point that was not signed by Sir John Anderson. 
While he was clearly not especially keen to take a hard line on drugs, his 
immortal summary of D. H. Lawrence's Pornography and Obscenity perhaps 
sums up his views on the rest of it: "It is good of D. H. Lawrence to show what a 
poisonous character he is. We need not deprecate his self revelation. "27 
Anderson's support was crucial in most of the areas covered by this 
thesis. The civil servants obviously respected, even feared, him (that remark 
about his "lashing" Malcolm Delevingne into a more reasonable frame of mind 
is perhaps the most significant) 28 Yet it should be pointed out that most of them 
- including Arthur Dixon, Malcolm Delevingne, Ernley Blackwell and George 
Newman, to name the most senior - appear either to have been very supportive 
26 That is, in the caretaker government of 1945 - Attlee was senior in the 
National wartime government. 
27 Note dated 20th November 1929, in NA HO 144/14042/544688/5 
28 See above p. 224 
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of Joynson-Hicks or to have been even more strongly in favour of a penal policy 
than he was. In this they were supported by the police (apart from those officers 
who were taking bribes). Both Horwood and later Byng were eager to push the 
clean-up of London, and did so with varying degrees of success. The magistrates 
too were essentially sympathetic to a culture of suppression - Cancellor's 
acquittal of Money proving an (in the event unfortunate) exception to a rule well 
established by, inter alia, Sir Chartres Biron. Even without Joynson-Hicks, the 
cultural bias of the Home Office and the legal institutions that supported it was 
set firmly against those forms of art and behaviour covered in this thesis being 
allowed to flourish unchecked. This certainly goes a long way towards 
explaining why it was not solely Joynson-Hicks' tenure that proved so 
problematic for art, drink and drugs - and for that matter, towards explaining 
why his tenure was problematic in any case. 
IV 
It is worth - referring again to Harold Macmillan - examining "the wider vision" 
of this era as well 
29 The states most deeply involved in the First World War 
were Italy, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Britain, France and the United 
States. This thesis has obviously concentrated on the fourth of these nations. Yet 
it is interesting to look briefly at the cultural history of some of the others as 
well. 
Italy and Russia may both be discounted. Both of them - Russia in 1917 
and Italy in 1922 - had become dictatorships, one Communist and one Fascist 
(albeit cloaked by a thin constitutional veneer in Italy's case). As a result, 
freedoms were seriously curtailed for political rather than social or religious 
reasons, making them unhelpful as points of comparison. Austria-Hungary, to all 
intents and purposes, had ceased to exist, although the name survived in the new 
states of Austria and Hungary. That leaves Germany, France and the United 
States as perhaps the most useful comparisons. All three were democracies in the 
1920s, all had suffered in the First World War (albeit in the case of the United 
29 "I thought the best thing to do was settle up these little local difficulties, and 
then turn to the wider vision of the Commonwealth; " Harold Macmillan, 7th 
January 1958, on the resignation of his entire Treasury team and their prompt 
replacement. Quoted in David Butler and Gareth Butler, Twentieth Century 
British Political Facts 1900-2000 (corrected eighth edition Basingstoke 2005) 
p. 291 
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States far less than any other major belligerent) and all of them were major 
centres of cultural change and lifestyle alterations in the period. 
The United States is perhaps the nearest parallel with Britain. It 
possessed a strong, stable democratic system with a directly elected bicameral 
Congress, albeit one based upon a strong presidential system rather than a 
system of Parliamentary dominance. In the 1920s it was dominated by the 
Republican party (although there is no straightforward transference of the party 
allegiances across the Atlantic). More importantly, it was also dominated by 
various forms of censorship -- censorship that went far beyond anything 
Joynson-Hicks ever tried to impose. 
The most obvious example of this repressive culture was the Eighteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution. The statute was generically referred to as 
"Prohibition; " to be exact, the prohibition of "the manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of intoxicating liquors... within the United States. "30 The complete 
banning of alcohol was the result of a long and often bitter campaign waged by 
various pressure groups, including the churches, that dated back to before the 
War of Independence, many of whom emanated from the Protestant areas of the 
Deep South. This largely stemmed from efforts to cure the United States of its 
"alcoholism", which has passed into part of the legend of the "Old West. " Prior 
to the First World War there had been restrictions imposed on the movement of 
alcohol by Congress, over-riding Taft's presidential veto, and under the 
Southerner Woodrow Wilson the movement gained further ground in 
Washington, resulting in the passing of the Eighteenth Amendment. Yet the new 
rules could hardly be considered a great success. Enforcement was extremely 
slack - corruption among the police forces and the Federal enforcement agency 
was a serious problem - and criminal gangs took over the organisation of the 
liquor trade, leading to chronic problems with gang warfare. Even some State 
administrations refused to enforce Prohibition, repealing all laws which had 
come about as a result of it - including New York. Smuggling, made easy by 
30 The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of 
America, 29th January 1919. 
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America's long land borders with Canada and Mexico and its three substantial 
coastlines, was a chronic problem. 31 
Parallels might certainly be drawn with the campaign against night clubs. 
After all, this had severe difficulty in enforcing the law, led to rampant 
corruption among the police, and was led by a temperance activist of some fifty 
years' standing. Yet at no point did Joynson-Hicks attempt to outlaw alcohol. 
While he did attempt to limit its use, and certainly made life very difficult for 
those who opposed him, he was anxious at all times to underline the fact that he 
was not opposed to clubs serving alcoholic liquor per se - only night clubs. In 
part, this was due to the different political dynamic. It is inconceivable that a 
General Election in the United Kingdom would have returned a two-thirds 
majority in favour of temperance, as Congressional elections must have done in 
the years leading up to 1919; 32 particularly given the dependence of the 
Conservative party on the brewing and distilling barons for financial support 
(although Ensor surely slightly exaggerated their importance when he credited 
the liquor industry alone with saving the Tories from bankruptcy in 1871 and 
sustaining them until the First World War) 33 But it also suggests a degree of 
pragmatism with which Joynson-Hicks is seldom credited. 
America also had strong policies on drugs. Carleton Simon, Special 
Deputy Commissioner for Drugs in the New York Police Department, had long 
and involved correspondence with the Metropolitan police in an ultimately futile 
attempt to persuade them to sign up to providing information for an 
"International Bureau of Drug Takers, " a register that would contain all known 
narcotics abusers and allow cross-border tracking of them. One London 
superintendent commented drily: 
"Writer wishes to commence International Bureau of drug takers. 
31 Michael Parrish, Anxious Decades: America in Prosperity and Depression, 
1920-1941 (New York 1992) pp. 94-108 
32 A two-thirds majority in Congress is required to overturn a Presidential veto, 
and for an amendment to the Constitution, which also has to be ratified by the 
legislatures of two thirds of the States (respectively Article One, section Seven, 
and Article Five of the Constitution). 
33 
, C. K. Ensor, The Oxford History of England XIV. - England 1870-1914 
(Oxford 1936) pp. 20-22 
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Medical authority has agreed that the large increase in drug 
trafficking in USA is the natural consequence of "Prohibition. " 
Apart from Chinese opium smokers there are very few 
persons convicted in this country of this offence, few of which are 
likely to interest America. Should, however, an American be 
convicted of this offence it might assist if a copy of his record were 
sent to writer. "34 
Although it is not easy, at this remove, to see how far this comment about drink 
and drug prohibition feeding off each other was correct, it would seem that there 
was far more appetite for a punitive policy in America against such 
transgressions than there was in Britain -- and although it should be noted that 
the comment antedated Joynson-Hicks, as has been outlined above, the effect he 
had upon drug enforcement policy was negligible to non-existent. 
In part this may be explained by the different context. Although London 
seemed to be at the centre of a marked slackening of social and cultural 
constraints, in America the problem was even more severe because the 
traditional institutions had suffered less and were correspondingly more 
outraged. This clash, between the morality and lifestyles of the young in what 
became known as "the Roaring Twenties" and the older, more orthodox 
generations still dominated by a church and chapel-going ethic, forms the main 
theme in F. Scott Fitzgerald's literature - especially his first novel, This Side of 
Paradise. 
Francis Lewis Allen referred to "a revolution in manners and morals. " 
He argued that the causes lay partly in the disenchantment of the younger 
generation with their elders following the First World War, partly with greater 
female emancipation, partly to changing technology (the advent of films in 
particular) but also to Prohibition - making drinking an act of legal as well as 
hormonal rebellion. 35 Yet a large part of this story was also the suppression of 
the culture thus engendered. While there is some dispute about how effective it 
34 Comment by Superintendent C. S. Williams (Supt. C-3) 2nd December 1922, 
on a letter by Carleton Simon dated 4th October 1922 in NA MEPO 31422. 
35 Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday: An informal history of the 1920's 
[sic] (New York 1931,1959,1997) chapter 5, pp. 67-91 
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was - Allen, writing more or less at the time, thought it was largely ineffectual 
and indeed ludicrous, while Parrish, writing sixty years later, pointed out how 
widespread it was - not merely being confined to a few places in the Deep 
South, but encompassing Boston as well, which banned a newspaper for printing 
an article about a prostitute who took both Catholic and Protestant clients. 
6 
What is not in dispute is that perhaps the most important case studied in 
this thesis, The Well of Loneliness, was not banned in America. However, it is 
worth noting that initially it was banned, before the verdict was overturned on 
appeal to a higher court37 It would seem from this that there was a similarly 
censorious culture well established in the United States, at least in the lower 
levels of the government and judiciary, which is backed up by further archival 
evidence. 
One of the more curious features of the lengths to which the Home 
Office went over The Well of Loneliness was in sending out letters to various 
other governments, including the Dominions and other friendly nations (if they 
sent one to Russia, there is no surviving reply) advising them that this book had 
been considered obscene and advising them to be on their guard in case Cape 
tried to smuggle it into their own jurisdiction. This was presumably a 
consequence of Cape's having sent the book to Paris. In retrospect these letters 
appear as little more than a rather spiteful aside in a bid to embarrass Cape 
internationally, but they are interesting for the light they shed on the 
international situation. New Zealand, Ceylon, India and South Africa all thanked 
the Home Office for the information and assured them that "steps will be taken 
to prevent the importation of the book into this Dominion. 08 Given that Britain 
was still at this time the de jure ruler of those four areas to varying degrees, the 
attitude expressed is unsurprising. However, the United States expressed its 
gratitude too. Horace Donelly of the American Post Office Department wrote 
thanking the Home Office for the "information, which is appreciated. "39 While 
the letter was hardly a ringing endorsement of the punitive policy that the Home 
Office had followed, it stands in stark contrast to the response of a Dutch 
36 ibid. pp. 85-6; Parrish pp. 198-9 
37 Michael S. Howard, Jonathan Cape: Publisher (London 1971) p. 111 
38 W. B. McIlveney, Commissioner of the New Zealand Police, to A. Crapper of 
the Home office, 5th February 1929, in NA HO 144/22547/527705/69 
39 Horace Donelly to A. Crapper, 3rd January 1929, in ibid. 
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official, who responded vigorously, "I am inclined to conclude ... that this book 
cannot be declared obscene according to the laws of this country and therefore 
its circulation is not punishable. "40 The implication is that the Americans were 
not unsympathetic to censorship - as indeed they proved in the initial banning of 
The Well of Loneliness. 
Such an attitude certainly extended to film censorship, which was also 
the preserve of the Postmaster General. Will Hays, for one, preferred to exercise 
it informally, but Allen was in no doubt that he did exercise it 41 Yet in America, 
as in Britain, the movie industry elected to regulate itself, fearing that otherwise 
it would be regulated at a state level; a fear far from groundless in 1922, when 
the system of self-regulation was being formed under the auspices of Hays, who 
retained much control, Virginia was passing a censorship statute. Had such a 
system been put into effect, as with the local authority regime in Britain, 
standard censorship patterns would have become impossible. Neville March 
Hunnings noted that it took a further twelve years to set up a full system 
acceptable across the whole of America - the famous "Hollywood Production 
Code" - but the principle had been established and the threat of a formal 
censorship headed off. 42 While the Motion Picture Association found censoring 
films just as difficult as the BBFC had, the majority of the criticism aimed at 
them was by organisations who wanted tighter regulation, which would 
undermine the idea that they were resented for their strictness. Truly the lot of a 
censor is not a happy one. 
France offers a marked contrast to both Britain and America. A very 
early republic, 43 and a very different culture based on Catholicism rather than 
Protestantism, and famous for its much more relaxed attitude towards free 
expression in the arts, France was a particular problem for the Home Office in 
terms of literature: it was where several banned novels, including Pansies, Lady 
40 Indecipherable Dutch official to Crapper, 24th March 1930, in ibid. 
41 Allen p77. 
42 Neville March Hunnings, Film Censors and the Law (London 1967) pp. 153- 
54 
43 France has been a republic several times, traditionally numbered to 
distinguish them. The republics encompass five constitutions: from 1793-1804 
(First Republic) 1848-1852 (Second Republic) 1871-1943 (Third Republic) 
1946-1958 (Fourth Republic - an unstable revival of the Third Republic). Since 
1958 it has operated under the constitution of the Fifth Republic. 
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Chatterley's Lover, The Well of Loneliness and Ulysses were printed before 
being smuggled back into Britain. Such a tolerant attitude was hardly surprising 
given the literary tradition in France of Victor Hugo, Alfred de Vigny, 
Alexandre Dumas and Emile Zola, all of whom wrote books that had run into 
trouble, either legal trouble upon publication or bowdlerisation in translation for 
publication in Britain. 44 France was also the home of a number of expatriate 
writers who aimed to escape the restrictions elsewhere; at one time or another 
James Joyce, D. H. Lawrence, Ernest Hemingway and Aldous Huxley all lived 
there. As for drinking after hours, it simply was not a crime, which is why a 
number of nightclub owners left London for Paris in the face of the persistent 
raids by the Metropolitan police. These included Victor Perosino, who 
subsequently invited Joynson-Hicks to dine at his new club in Paris - an 
invitation that Joynson-Hicks never took up, although allegedly with some 
regret. 45 
Yet it would be unwise to get too carried away with the idea of freedom 
of expression and action in France. For instance, it also had a very active film 
censorship system in this period. In 1917, after a great deal of confusion caused 
by a localised system of censorship closely resembling the one north of the 
Channel, a Commission was set up under the auspices of the Ministry of the 
Interior in order to scrutinize films and pass them as fit for exhibition. This was 
largely in response to the belief that there was a link between the crime films 
being shown and a rise in juvenile crime. But increasingly in the 1920s the 
Commission expanded its remit to take in sexual morality and Communist 
propaganda. Among the films thus scrutinized and banned were the films 
Mother and Battleship Potemkin. Although these developments were bitterly 
opposed by the French film industry, they were unable to get legal redress 
through the courts and were obliged to campaign for fresh legislation. This in the 
event made little practical difference to the film censorship system, but did allow 
44 See Thomas pp. 44-5 for a brief discussion of the difficulties La Terre 
(English title The Soil) encountered when published in Britain: cf. Robin Buss, 
"Introduction" to Alexandre Dumas, The Count of Monte Cristo (Penguin 
Classics Edition, London 1996) pp. xvii-xviii for a discussion of some of the 
"bowdlerisation" in the original Victorian English translation. 
as Jonathon M. Hopkins, "Paradoxes personified: Sir William Joynson-Hicks, 
Viscount Brentford and the conflict between change and stability in British 
society in the 1920s, " University of Westminster MPhil thesis (1996) p. 101 
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representatives of the film making companies to join the Commission. a6 
Regrettably, there is no strong cultural history of the French nation between the 
wars available in English. Yet in the book that comes closest to providing one, a 
curious brief paragraph states the following: 
"Unsurprisingly, the French Right was disturbed both by the 
growing assault on Western values and by the emergence of the 
Communist party... it is important to remember, however, that in 
matters cultural, as well as in matters political, the right was by no 
means in a minority. s47 
The authors did not say how this translated into support for or opposition to 
censorship, although they did add that this Right-wing intellectual movement 
underpinned French fascism in the 1930s and made life difficult for the Popular 
Front between 1936 and 1939 48 
Somewhat more is available on Germany - specifically two excellent 
books by Walter Laqueur and Eric Weitz. Laqueur, writing in the early 1970s, 
concentrated heavily on the culture of Weimar per se, less on the counter-culture 
among the elites. In doing so be to a large extent reinforced the image of 
Weimar as a centre of avant-garde culture and "one of the main cradles of 
cultural modernism" even while pleading for a more realistic appraisal of the 
cultural significance of Weimar. 49 This was something rectified by Weitz's 
recent work. Weitz, while not in any way doubting that Weimar, "for the most 
46 Hunnings chapter 10 esp. pp. 332-350 
47 Michael Scriven, Nicholas Hewitt, Michael Kelly, Margaret Atack, "Wars 
and Class Wars (1914-1944)" in Jill Forbes and Michael Kelly (eds) French 
Cultural Studies: An Introduction (Oxford 1995) pp. 54-96, p. 69 
48 ibid. pp. 70-71. 
49 Walter Laqueur, Weimar: A Cultural History 1918-1933 (London 1974) p. 
277 (pp. 276-77). The two statements are not in fact as contradictory as they 
may seem - he was deploring the selective use of Weimar culture in the 1960s 
to support particular political viewpoints, rather than looking at the totality of 
the subject. At no point did Laqueur doubt that Weimar genuinely marked a 
cultural revolution. 
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part, abolished censorship, "50 pointed out that in Weimar there were still well- 
entrenched elites who were extremely hostile to both the new cultural patterns 
and to the Republic itself. After a good deal of campaigning, in 1926 these elites 
managed to force a "Law to protect youth from trashy and filthy writings. " This 
was essentially a law to allow censorship of cheap paperback novels, some of 
them pornographic, but not by any means all, and was the culmination of a 
campaign that dated back to the Kaiserreich. While it was bitterly attacked by 
intellectuals, who particularly feared that the formally established board of 
censors would be used in order to curtail their freedoms rather than to root out 
pornography, the law stood. This was partly thanks to the strong powerbase of 
the traditional elites who supported it - who were well established in the Army, 
the civil service and the churches - but also due partly to the weak and 
ineffectual campaigns against it, which were never organised into any sort of 
mass movement for the exertion of public pressure sl It has to be said that it was 
rather slackly enforced - only allowing 143 books to be banned up until 1932 - 
but the principle had been established, and in any case, it should be noted that 
143 is a far higher number than the four at most that Joynson-Hicks either 
covertly or overtly banned in his tenure at the Home Office. 52 
Yet this campaign had a wider significance. It showed that the political 
right, who were willing to go to great lengths in order to organize support by 
means of mass meetings, petitions, and building unlikely Parliamentary 
coalitions to get this bill through, were better organized and more determined 
than their left-wing opponents - the people on whom Weimar depended for its 
survival. Weitz called it "a rather ominous sign for the republic. 9953 Even worse, 
the continuing strength of the intellectual right opposed to the freedoms of 
Weimar had far-reaching consequences when the German economy collapsed in 
the period 1929-1932. Already many right wing intellectuals had shown overt 
sympathy towards the Nazi party, although very few of them actually joined it. 
50 Eric Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy (Princeton New Jersey 
2007) p. 364. I am indebted to Dr. Peter Lambert for drawing my attention to 
this source. 
sl ibid. pp. 106-108 
52 The four being The Well of Loneliness, Sleeveless Errand, Pansies (all by 
either legal action or seizure through customs) and Lady Chatterley's Lover 
(methods obscure due to absence of the relevant documents). 
51 Weitz p. 108 
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As Laqueur commented, "much of the intellectual spadework for the "revolution 
of 1933" was done outside the Nazi movement "54 The freedoms of Weimar 
were always railed against, and they placed an immense strain on the fragile 
republican system. When this new, decadent world was, rightly or wrongly, 
linked with economic collapse and near-anarchy, the right rejected it altogether 
in favour of an anti-Semitic, anti-Bolshevik, pro-autocratic strand put to them by 
a young Austrian demagogue. ss The avant-garde in Britain railed against 
Joynson-Hicks, but the Right of the Tories that he represented stayed by and 
large within the parliamentary system and contented themselves with existing 
laws and structures. The greater freedom of Weimar Germany saw a backlash 
which formed an important strand in the crisis that propelled the most reviled 
tyrant in all human history to power. It seems reasonable to wonder whether the 
intellectuals of Weimar, if they ever looked back, felt that this was an entirely 
fair exchange. 
V 
So far, we have established that there was a campaign in Britain against various 
forms of art and behaviour considered obscene, by standards of middle class 
morality which then dominated society, despite a challenge from influential and 
vocal groups outside it. It was closely associated with Joynson-Hicks personally, 
and wrongly. It persisted under Liberal, Unionist/Conservative and Labour 
Home Secretaries and governments. It crossed national boundaries, taking firm 
root in America and even proving a major force in the Weimar Republic, 
supposedly a great crucible of new culture and lifestyles. It was widespread, 
resilient, and often popular. Why, then, has particular opprobrium been reserved 
for Joynson-Hicks? 
Part of the explanation must be in the enigma of the man himself. As 
outlined at the end of chapter two, he was a strange, uneasy mass of 
contradictions - the Diehard in favour of women's suffrage, for instance. Most 
studies of him present him as a one-dimensional, autocratic, almost Fascistic 
man (one nickname he had was indeed "Mussolini Minor")56 with a pathological 
54 Laqueur p. 97 
ss Weitz p. 364 
56 David Cesarani, "Joynson-Hicks and the Radical Right in England after the 
First World War, " in Tony Kushner and Kenneth Lunn (eds. ) Traditions of 
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lack of mental balance and promoted wildly beyond his abilities. If the picture 
were that simple, he would present much less of a problem. Having studied his 
policies on moral policing, I would at once dismiss such stereotypes and still feel 
no nearer to understanding him. My position is analogous to that of 
Guildenstern, to whom Hamlet said accusingly "you would pluck the heart out 
of my mystery; " and more especially, close to the confusion Guildentsem 
exhibits over the accusation. Much further study remains to be done on this man, 
one of the most curious characters ever to hold high cabinet office. The only 
thing that can be definitely said here is that he certainly was not one dimensional 
or stupid. Indeed, he was a clever man with a very rounded personality - 
solicitor, farmer, traveller, motoring pioneer, Christian, Freemason - these are 
not the marks of a man with no brain or soul. 
But it is not in fact too difficult to see why he has had such a poor 
posthumous reputation, although it seems to have been missed by most scholars. 
Perhaps surprisingly, it was Ronald Blythe who came closest to understanding 
the enigma of Joynson-Hicks' reputation. Although he never properly developed 
the insight, with these words he got straight to the nub of the argument: 
"All through the twenties Jix's [Joynson-Hicks'] appearance offered 
some kind of evidence that prohibition had paid off where he 
personally was concerned. He looked years younger and jollier than 
his Cabinet friends, dressed with a pre-war garden party elegance 
and faced a whole series of calamities with a dreadful cheerfulness. 
He looked as happy as a sandboy as he emptied the stews, leafed 
through a packet of erotic poems D. H. Lawrence had rashly put in 
the post unsealed, and sent the town to bed by ten. His gaiety as he 
suppressed the virtue [sic: vice? ] in others was particularly offensive 
and soon people wondered what was the worse, his policy or the 
enjoyment he got from enforcing it. There was a perverse element in 
Intolerance: Historical Perspectives on Fascism and Race Discourse in Britain 
(Manchester 1989) pp. 118-139, p. 134 
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his obsession with sexual morality and something immature in his 
neurotic ideas about drink. 57 
Those words "the enjoyment he got from enforcing it, " are the full and true 
explanation of why Joynson-Hicks has been so ill treated by historical writings 
on the subject. All Home Secretaries have acted as repressors of one sort or 
another. Michael Howard became infamous for "Prison Works. " Jacqui Smith 
looks set to join him as the originator of forty-two days detention without charge 
for political purposes. David Maxwell Fyfe was roundly attacked for the 
persecution of the homosexual community in London on his watch. J. R. Clynes 
moved against obscene paintings by D. H. Lawrence. Rab Butler permitted the 
prosecution of Lady Chatterley's Lover. Roy Jenkins reintroduced strict drug 
controls. But none of them have openly revelled in such actions (apart possibly 
from Howard). 
One of Joynson-Hicks' most formidable handicaps as a politician was a 
complete inability to dissemble - as when he remarked about India that it was 
not colonised for the benefit of the Indians, but as "the finest outlet for British 
goods, and the Lancashire cotton goods in particular; " a perfectly accurate and 
yet seldom expressed view of the situation 58 He genuinely did think the 
unthinkable - and then say it. In his actions against The Well of Loneliness, 
Russian propaganda films, nightclubs and courting couples in Hyde Park, he 
made no secret of the fact that he was trying to get rid of vice and clean up 
London for the benefit of sinners - in other words, went through the usual 
actions without the crocodile tears and instead with a positive zest for the task. 
While he was less anxious to be seen as a censor of literature, stressing that as 
The Well of Loneliness was obscene under the law he had no choice but to advise 
Jonathan Cape to withdraw it, carefully not mentioning the lengths he went to in 
order to suppress it afterwards when Cape evaded his demands, in his campaign 
against nightclubs he was, in the words of John Ramsden (another one who 
S' Ronald Blythe, The Age of Illusion: England in the Twenties and Thirties 
1919-1940 (London 2001) p. 34 58 See above p. 60 
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came close to the truth without quite realising the implications of what he was 
saying) "quite open about what he was trying to do. 59 
It is puzzling that people prefer a lot of pious platitudes and hand- 
wringing to genuine honesty in politicians. It is small wonder that Middlemas 
and Barnes wrote savagely, of Baldwin's treatment after the Second World War, 
"the English vice is sanctimonious humbug. "60 There is of course an inherent 
irony in the position that Joynson-Hicks' opponents took up - while he was 
denying completely free speech and free action to others, many of his them were 
ardent Communists or anti-clericalists who would in any case have denied even 
the most basic freedoms of expression and religion to him had the position been 
reversed - Douglas Goldring being an obvious example. Radclyffe Hall was 
herself a Fascist, an admirer of Mussolini. Freedom of speech has generally 
always meant, in practice, "freedom to say what I please but not to 
let you say 
something I disagree with; " a problem that has always bedevilled those with 
passionately held political or religious beliefs 
61 Voltaire's sentiment, "I do not 
agree with what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say 
it" stands 
as an honourable but lonely exception to this rule. 
Joynson-Hicks was an evangelical Christian. He was a Diehard. He was 
also - and this is not the prevailing view of him, but nevertheless a point 
that 
needs making - an extremely clever man, something he proved time and again 
as a highly successful lawyer and later as a long-serving and powerful 
Cabinet 
minister. With such intelligence and beliefs comes arrogance. It 
is not a case of 
"he thought he was doing the right thing. " He knew, absolutely and past any 
doubt at all, that he was doing the right thing - and therefore he did not see how 
it could matter what a variety of sinners, writers, criminals and other people 
he 
would doubtless, perhaps subconsciously but more likely avowedly, have 
59 John Ramsden, The Longman History of the Conservative Party Volume III: 
The Age of Balfour and Baldwin (London 1978) p. 286 
60 Middlemas and Barnes p. 1061 
61 For an interesting example of this, see John O'Farrell, Things can only get 
better: eighteen miserable years in the life of a Labour supporter 1979-1997 
(London 1997) p. 60, on the attitude of ultra-left wing Labour student activists 
in the early 1980s: "While we condemned anyone who did not share our view of 
the world as "fascists", we had developed a special fascism of our own, which 
excluded and condemned people because of what they believed in... We said "I 
do not agree with what you say, so you are not allowed to say it 'cos you're a 
fascist. " 
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considered to be wrong actually thought. Therefore there was little point as far 
as he was concerned in dissembling. It was a talent he did not need to acquire - 
because it would simply obscure his own absolute rightness. 
In the particular circumstances of this thesis, it is probably the 
Christianity that matters most. There can be little doubt that Joynson-Hicks 
acted, particularly over nightclubs, The Well of Loneliness and his actions 
against prostitutes in Hyde Park out of a belief that he had to do something to 
save the souls of the lost, and crucially, stop them leading anyone else astray. 
Based on the strict word of the Bible, he would have seen the need for only one 
authority on any of this - that of God Himself. From that point of view, he might 
fairly be compared to William Wilberforce, mostly now remembered as the 
tireless campaigner for the abolition of the slave trade, but who was also in his 
earlier years noted for a major campaign against vice (including drinking, 
gambling and prostitution) which he called "the reformation of manners, " and 
who wrote in 1787, "God Almighty has sent before me two great objects, the 
suppression of the slave trade and the reformation of manners. "62 Wilberforce's 
campaigns might indeed be traced as the start of a rejection of eighteenth- 
century debauchery in favour of nineteenth-century "joylessness, " although it 
seems very unlikely that they were the only cause. 
Yet that should be qualified by a very important point. William 
Wilberforce was largely a humble and gentle man. Joynson-Hicks was an 
arrogant and aggressive one. As a diehard, he helped stoke the tensions in 
Ireland, he became jingoistic in the First World War, and he supported the 
forcible holding of India and the suppression of protests there by a 
disproportionate armed force. In other words, in no sense an ideal Christian who 
forgives, who loves and who seeks to help. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus 
exhorted his followers to "first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you 
will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother's eye. "63 In that sense, 
Joynson-Hicks is perhaps more reminiscent of the fiery nineteenth century 
politician William Gladstone than William Wilberforce. 
62 Quoted in William Hague, William Wilberforce: The Life of the Great Anti- 
Slave Trade Campaigner (London 2007) p. 141 63 Matthew 7: 5 (New International Version) 
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As Joynson-Hicks had no empathy with or sympathy for those he 
pursued, he seemed to have little enough idea of how his performance would 
appear to neutral observers in his own time and in retrospect. In his pamphlet Do 
We Need a Censor? he genuinely seemed to think that he was speaking for a 
silent majority. In this he was of course not unique - so did D. H. Lawrence in 
his reply. But we always come back to a crucial difficulty -a silent majority is 
silent. In the days before sophisticated opinion polling, it is impossible to gauge 
which side of any argument the public supported. Most probably, in the case of a 
comparatively peripheral issue such as the policing of morals, the side of "not 
very interested" (which has entered modem polling as "don't know"). But there 
can be no doubt that most of the intelligentsia were ranged against Joynson- 
Hicks - the very people who had the most power to set the record. So it was the 
version of Evelyn Waugh in Vile Bodies, of Douglas Goldring and later, of 
Ronald Blythe, that has coloured in Joynson-Hicks and confused the office with 
the man, and judged accordingly. 
However that was to a large degree his own fault. While a more just 
perspective is urgently needed, Joynson-Hicks would doubtless prefer the insults 
of Waugh, Goldring, Blythe and later Roy Jenkins and Marek Kohn to their 
praise. He would consider them at best misguided and at worst dangerous. The 
problem is that, having no sense of his own shortcomings, he does not seem to 
have ever learned how to achieve more lasting change than mere suppression 
could accomplish. The Well of Loneliness, trite, ill-written book that it is, would 
never have become famous (and still be readily available) had it not been so 
clumsily suppressed. Nightclubs might have been encouraged to fizzle out with a 
more subtle approach that replaced fines with penal taxes. And it is possible that 
Russian propaganda films would not have been such an awkward problem with 
illegal exhibition and film society demonstrations had a less confrontational 
approach to class warfare been adopted in the 1920s. 
Yet, despite this, Joynson-Hicks was largely successful in his aims. The 
nightclubs he so adamantly opposed quietly withered away, partly thanks to his 
efforts. The Well of Loneliness, although it is still published, never achieved 
mass circulation. The Lord Chamberlain's office survived without challenge. 
The film censorship system was developed and, if not perfected, at least greatly 
enhanced. It should not be forgotten either, although he took no interest in it, that 
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the "Rolleston" system of narcotics control was introduced while he was Home 
Secretary - and that has often been hailed as a masterpiece of government 
policy. It was this very success that made him anathema - part of what a recent 
writer has described as a "belated victory" of the left-wing who fiercely 
contested all of these systems, yet were unable to force change even when their 
political wing was in government, in the writing of the literature so long after. 64 
What he did was controversial, and even given it was necessary, could 
have been achieved by other means. But to achieve it at all, as well as work on 
radical penal reform, regularize the female franchise, keep Communists under 
surveillance, and to survive five years of general acute turmoil and difficulty in 
this most troublesome of departments, rank as major achievements. It is a shame 
that his arrogance and insensitivity has obscured his record and have prevented 
these feats from being seen in their true context before now. 
64 Martin Pugh, We Danced All Night: A Social History of Britain between the 
wars (London 2008) page A. 
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